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Executive Summary 
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts engaged Spectrum Gaming Group, an independent 
research and professional services firm, to analyze a legislative proposal to authorize three 
commercial destination casino resorts in the state, and to project its potential impacts.1  
Four core themes resound throughout our analysis that would help ensure that gaming 
advances public policy in Massachusetts: 
1. Public policy should be designed to maximize capital investment, a critical element 
that separates successful gaming markets from less-successful ones. 
2. A robust, comprehensive bidding process should be established to attract the highest 
quality applicants and to ensure that such applicants develop policies that inure to the 
best interests of the Commonwealth. 
3. Casino licensure, as envisioned in this legislation, is tantamount to a regional 
monopoly. We suggest that it should require a concomitant responsibility on the part 
of each licensee to operate in the public interest.  
4. The interests of all stakeholders – from operators and investors, to patrons, small 
business owners and taxpayers – should be parallel. This means that policies and 
practices must be designed to ensure that all interested parties benefit, and that no 
interests are sacrificed. 
A vigorous licensing process designed to evaluate bids based on how applicants intend to 
advance the public interest on a variety of fronts is required to ensure the development of a 
gaming industry that operates in the best interests of Massachusetts.  
Many impacts can be expected that can be characterized as related to general economic 
trends, or that would occur in any industry that targets consumer spending – including the 
prospect of enhanced competition among private businesses. With that in mind, we caution that 
there can be no guarantees from the Commonwealth or from casinos that all impacts will be 
positive. The public and private sectors must maintain realistic expectations, and guide public 
policy where it can be guided. 
Based on our research, analysis and experience, Spectrum reached the following 
conclusions: 
Economic Impact 
 Three destination casinos in Massachusetts could generate between $1.23 billion and 
$1.78 billion in annual gross gaming revenue in their first year of stabilized 
operations. The likely projection is $1.5 billion in annual gaming revenue. The 
following table provides a range of revenue projections for one casino in each of the 
three regions: 
                                                 
1 Our assumptions for each potential property include the following: 160,000 square-foot casino; 3,000 slot machines; 180 live 
table games (120 traditional, 60 poker); 2,000-room hotel; 100,000 square feet of convention/meeting/event space; $1 billion in 
actual construction costs. 
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Total est. gross gaming revenue (in millions) 
 Region 1 Region 2 Region 3 Total 
Low case $452.3  $438.1  $  336.4  $  1,226.8  
Moderate case $542.1  $526.8  $  432.7 $  1,501.6  
High case $643.4  $623.4  $  509.7  $  1,776.5  
 
 The casinos would each create an average of 4,377 direct jobs. 
 Every direct job in the casino industry would yield approximately 0.5 jobs elsewhere 
in the local economy. The statewide employment impact of this industry would be a 
total of 20,000 jobs throughout Massachusetts. 
 Turnover at the Massachusetts casinos would be about 25 percent, which translates 
into approximately 1,100 job openings annually at each casino. These will be 
disproportionately greater in certain job categories, such as unskilled, entry-level 
positions, where the turnover rate could reach as high as 40 percent. 
 The Massachusetts casinos in our moderate-case, or likely, scenario would add about 
$1 billion to the gross regional product of the Boston area and $2 billion to the gross 
regional product of Massachusetts. 
 This moderate scenario shows that $596.7 million in total government revenue – 
including indirect revenue -- would be generated, including funds that would be 
available for property tax relief. This amounts to 39.7 percent of projected gaming 
revenue.  
 Each Massachusetts casino would create an estimated 3,000 direct construction jobs. 
 Total annual salaries and wages would be $121 million for a Boston casino and 
$119.6 million for each of the two casinos in the eastern and western regions of 
Massachusetts. With benefits, total compensation would be $157.3 million for Boston 
and $155.5 million for each of the other two properties. This represents more than 
$468 million in annual direct compensation in Massachusetts with three casino 
properties. With benefits, the average compensation level for casino workers in 
Massachusetts would be $35,641. Without benefits, the average is $27,417. 
 Lottery sales in counties near the three destination casinos in Massachusetts would 
decline, at least in the short term. Long-term, our view is that the Lottery will not be 
significantly affected by the introduction of casinos in Massachusetts, particularly 
with the development of cross-marketing plans and other strategies designed to 
protect the Lottery. 
 Conventions and meetings at a destination casino would generate at least $7.2 million 
in annual spending at other area businesses, and also would create annual demand for 
more than 26,000 room nights at other lodging facilities. 
 The potential for substitution away from existing entertainment, bars, restaurants, 
hotels and other businesses can be addressed through effective public policy. The 
impact of casinos on other businesses – whether a substitution or complementary 
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effect – is likely to be felt within a relatively short distance of the casinos. Without 
knowing where the three Massachusetts casinos would be located, we cannot project 
the specific local impacts on businesses. Any adverse effects casinos may have on 
other industries could be significantly mitigated if the locations for the casinos are 
chosen wisely, with an eye for strategic placement, and if applicants for licensure 
affirmatively address this issue in their competitive bids. 
 The agencies regulating Massachusetts casinos would have a projected combined 
annual budget of about $16.1 million, with most of that funding coming from the 
gaming operators. 
 Legalizing commercial casinos could open the door to Indian tribes to also offer Class 
III (Las Vegas-style) gambling. However, such casinos would require tribal-state 
compacts, over which the Commonwealth would have significant negotiation power. 
Tribes could offer Class II (bingo-based) gaming without a tribal-state compact. 
Although a Class II tribal casino would represent competition to commercial casinos 
in the state, a Class III facility would pose much more of a threat. 
 Unless and until the open question of a potential tribal casino in Massachusetts is 
resolved, that uncertainty will be perceived by capital markets and commercial 
operators as a heightened risk. Added risk would be reflected in a higher cost of 
capital – i.e., sources of capital will demand greater returns to compensate for the 
increased risk. This would result in less capital being invested, which would lead to 
fewer jobs, less gaming revenue and less overall benefit to the Commonwealth. 
 
Social Impacts 
 The social impacts of casino gambling are significantly more difficult to objectively 
analyze and estimate. We concur with the conclusion of prominent problem-gambling 
epidemiologist Dr. Rachel Volberg: ―The negative impacts of gambling [which 
chiefly concern the social impacts] typically take much longer to emerge than the 
positive impacts and they‘re also often much harder to measure in terms of 
quantitative and economic terms.‖ 
 Massachusetts likely would have the largest budget among all casino states that could 
fund problem gambling programs. Existing programs in Massachusetts presently treat 
problem gamblers who visit out-of-state casinos. These out-of-state casinos presently 
contribute no funding for such Massachusetts programs. 
 While treatment for problem gambling would be funded from state revenue, the 
casino licensees should have primary responsibility to develop comprehensive 
―responsible gaming‖ policies to address this issue. Such plans should be viewed as a 
critical element in evaluating competitive bids. 
 Destination casinos – because they will drive high levels of visitation – will have a 
significant impact on the demand for law enforcement and related services. For 
example, a significant increase in driving under the influence (DUI) arrests should be 
expected. Local law enforcement agencies – particularly in rural areas – could face 
serious demands for their services, which must be anticipated. 
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 Casinos located near high-volume highways that have adequate access can cause less 
disruption to the host and surrounding communities; casinos nestled among towns, 
farther from high-volume highways, can potentially fuel considerable disruption in 
terms of traffic, quality of life, and maintenance costs. 
 
Casino Visitation 
 Destination casinos collectively would generate an average of between 18,000 and 
27,000 visits per day.  
 Three Massachusetts destination casinos would draw between 43 percent and 65 
percent of all Massachusetts gaming trips and spending, or between $572 million and 
$864 million annually.  
 Massachusetts residents have been spending an estimated $1.1 billion annually on 
gaming alone in Connecticut and Rhode Island. Massachusetts casinos could 
recapture about $500 million to $700 million of that annual total. 
 Complementing such recaptured spending, Massachusetts would see the importation 
of new gaming revenues from neighboring states ranging from about $650 million to 
$900 million. Overall spending on casino gambling by Massachusetts residents would 
increase by $125 million to $150 million over present levels. 
 Casinos can complement existing attractions, add perceived value to tourists and 
business travelers who are considering Massachusetts as a destination, and help 
attract incremental capital investment for the tourism industry.  
 
Recommendations 
The public sector in Massachusetts has broad discretion and powerful leverage at 
the outset to ensure that the successful bidder takes whatever steps are necessary to 
advance the public interest on a wide variety of fronts. Such leverage would be at its 
zenith during the bidding phase, in which applicants would recognize that they must 
compete against each other in their zeal and in their creativity in developing strategies to 
advance the public interest. Once licenses are issued, and casinos are operational, we 
caution that such leverage would largely disappear. 
Using that leverage to require that all bidders submit comprehensive, credible 
plans that are in congruence with public policies can be justified by the proposed 
legislation, which essentially creates up to three regional monopolies. No other private 
businesses that target consumer discretionary spending, from hotels to restaurants, could 
reasonably expect that Massachusetts would protect them from potential in-state 
competition. Our core recommendation is to develop a robust bidding process designed to 
ensure that all applicants develop financial, marketing and other plans that fully operate 
in the public interest. To that end, all applicants must develop comprehensive plans that 
address a variety of concerns and policies, including: 
o Protecting the Lottery. 
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o Targeting conventions and meetings to increase overnight visitation and 
increase utilization of existing convention facilities. 
o Developing cross-marketing plans with other local businesses. 
o Training local workers. 
o Promoting tourism. 
o Addressing problem gambling. 
 The selection process must be developed and guided by appointed officials who 
possess the political ability and independence to establish rigorous standards in a 
variety of areas. Such officials must be vested with the ability – and willingness – to 
weigh applications and, if necessary, deny any and all applications, should such 
applications fall short of these standards. 
 The Commonwealth must maintain the highest possible degree of independence from 
fiscal pressure to help ensure the highest-quality facilities that operate in the public 
interest. Fiscal pressures could enhance the appeal of proposals to allow for the 
relatively quick installation of slots at racetracks or other facilities, operating under a 
higher tax rate, but such facilities would likely have different business models than 
destination casinos, and would thus be less likely to advance the same public policies. 
Visitors to well-capitalized destinations – as opposed to, say, smaller, under-
capitalized properties that target convenience-driven, local adults – will likely stay 
longer and spend more. The greater the level of capitalization, the less vulnerable a 
gaming industry would be to competition from the expansion or introduction of 
gaming in other states. 
 The Commonwealth should use a staggered bidding process, focusing on Region 1 as 
the first license to be awarded. This would allow stronger bidders that are not 
successful in one region to pursue plans in another. It would also allow the most 
efficient operators – who would be more likely to build properties that would further 
public policy – more than one opportunity to participate in Massachusetts gaming. 
The drawback of a staggered process is that it could significantly add to the length of 
time in which the Commonwealth would not be realizing anticipated revenue. This 
could be ameliorated, however, by allowing operators to build temporary facilities. 
 Regulators should be wary of any bids that attempt to win licensure by promoting 
higher rates beyond the 27 percent minimum. Higher rates – while they might be 
tempting as a means of addressing near-term budget shortfalls – would likely result in 
less investment, fewer jobs and potentially less overall gaming revenue in the long 
term. Even at a 27 percent tax rate, Massachusetts casinos would be at a material 
disadvantage against their most direct competitors in Connecticut, as well as against 
some more distant competitors in New Jersey and elsewhere. 
The Commonwealth must protect the Lottery by using multiple tools: 
o All bids for any future casino destinations in Massachusetts should include 
plans designed to minimize any negative impact on the lottery. 
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o The casinos should assume financial responsibility for protecting the lottery 
against any adverse impact from the new casino competition. 
o Require casinos to develop plans to increase ticket sales to out-of-state 
residents. 
o Require casino operators to develop and follow through on cross-marketing 
strategies with the lottery. 
o At least one of the two gubernatorial appointees to the Massachusetts State 
Lottery Commission should be a representative of the casino industry to help 
coordinate all efforts to grow lottery revenues. 
o Reconsider the proposed 3 percent guaranteed long-term growth rate, as it is 
perhaps too ambitious for a lottery that has proven to be so successful. (The 
lottery‘s success will make it increasingly difficult to achieve such growth 
over time, requiring higher per capita spending from adults who already are 
spending more on lottery tickets than their counterparts in other states.) 
Rather, we suggest that the Legislature consider a lower target growth rate, yet 
require applicants for casino licensure to develop plans designed to achieve 
that 3 percent growth rate. 
 Casino applicants should be weighed, in part, on how they intend to develop cross-
marketing arrangements with appropriate nearby businesses. Such arrangements must 
recognize, and serve the interests of both the casino and the outside business. 
 Any Indian casino should, ideally, be one of the three state-issued commercial 
licenses. An Indian casino that operates outside of the Massachusetts regulatory 
system could potentially generate no gaming-tax revenue to the Commonwealth and 
would likely cause a significant decline in the gross gaming revenues of one or more 
of the commercial casinos. Any compact negotiated by the state should seek to ensure 
a level playing field – notably with respect to the tax on gross gaming revenue – 
among all gaming operators. 
 Massachusetts should adopt an efficient but relatively strict approach to the regulation 
of its gaming industry at the start to ensure the public‘s trust. This regulatory scheme 
should: 
o Create regulations for the control of the assets that thoroughly address rules 
for table games and controls for slot machines. 
o Include a visible presence on the casino floor and be accessible to the public 
and casino employees. 
o Create a licensing structure that addresses all those that participate in the 
gaming industry, including operators, employees and vendors. 
o Create an investigative agency that is independent of the regulatory agency. 
 Destination casinos must be fully integrated into the tourism industry. Any casinos 
developed in Massachusetts must coordinate their marketing efforts closely with 
existing tourism programs, both at the local and state levels. Such programs should be 
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designed to increase the frequency and length of visitation and expand the visitor 
base.  
 The Commonwealth must be sufficiently flexible when considering mitigation 
funding for communities. The number of communities potentially impacted by 
casinos cannot be ascertained in advance of knowing the location, project scope, ease 
of access or other factors for any of the three destination resorts. Therefore, we 
suggest that the bidding process should require all applicants to take a broad view 
when defining their local community. This includes the following provisions: 
o Applicants for licensure must demonstrate they would minimize the negative 
impacts, to ensure that mitigation funding stays within the proscribed 2.5 
percent limit. Such steps would require the applicants to bear the burden of 
proof that they have selected an optimal location that offers sufficient access 
to both patrons and employees, and that the property is pursuing marketing 
and other strategies designed to minimize such impacts. 
o Law-enforcement responsibilities on the casino floor should be handled at the 
state level, with minimal demands on local law enforcement. This should 
include the cost of handling any prosecution of crimes on the casino floor, as 
is done in other states. 
o The public sector must recognize that not all types of communities will be 
impacted in the same way, so a one-size-fits-all funding formula might not 
prove effective once casinos are operational.  
o Given that resource allocation and political representation in Massachusetts 
are based on population measures, visitation must be taken into account when 
allocating resources for casino mitigation purposes, particularly when it comes 
to funding law enforcement.  
 Each casino applicant should compensate the Commonwealth or the impacted area 
for a preliminary impact study of that area. The successful applicant would then be 
required to compensate the Commonwealth or the impacted area for an updated study 
every five years, or other appropriate interval. 
 Casinos should be sited in areas that provide easy access for its workforce. Such 
access should be an important criterion in weighing any application. 
 The Commonwealth should expand its workforce development efforts to address the 
vital needs of the unemployed and underemployed as well as people on welfare. The 
public interest would be best served through private/public partnerships designed to 
provide basic skills and workplace training to those who need it the most. 
Additionally, the gaming industry‘s efforts to help lower-skilled, entry-level workers 
become part of the Massachusetts labor force will help instill public confidence in 
casino gaming. The Massachusetts Casino Workforce Development Partnership 
(CWDP) program could utilize the existing structure of the Massachusetts Workforce 
Development System. 
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About this Report 
Spectrum Gaming Group was engaged on February 19, 2008, by the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts – namely the Executive Office of Housing and Economic Development, the 
Department of Business & Technology, the Office of Business Development and the 
Massachusetts Office of Travel and Tourism – to provide ―comprehensive and comprehensible 
analysis that includes a variety of questions that interested parties may have in connection with 
the Governor‘s proposed resort casinos initiative.‖ 
 
About Spectrum 
Spectrum Gaming Group (―Spectrum‖ or ―we‖), founded in 1993, is an independent 
research and professional services firm serving public- and private-sector clients worldwide. Our 
principals have backgrounds in gaming operations, economic analysis, law enforcement, due 
diligence, gaming regulation, compliance and journalism. 
Spectrum holds no beneficial interest in any casino operating companies or gaming 
equipment manufacturers or suppliers. We employ only senior-level executives and associates 
who have earned reputations for honesty, integrity and the highest standards of professional 
conduct. Our work is never influenced by the interests of past or potentially future clients. 
Each Spectrum project is customized to our client‘s specific requirements and developed 
from the ground up. Our findings, conclusions and recommendations are based solely on our 
research, analysis and experience. Our mandate is not to tell clients what they want to hear; we 
tell them what they need to know. We will not accept, and have never accepted, engagements 
that seek a preferred result. 
Among our most recent public-sector clients are Broward County (FL), West Virginia 
Lottery Commission, the New Jersey Casino Reinvestment Development Authority, the Atlantic 
City Convention and Visitors Authority, the Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs, Rostov Oblast 
(Russia), and the Puerto Rico Tourism Company. Recent private-sector clients include Bear 
Stearns, Casino Association of New Jersey, Harrah‘s Entertainment, Morgan Stanley, Pokagon 
Band of Potawatomi Indians, and the Seneca Nation of Indians. 
We maintain a network of leading experts in all disciplines relating to the gaming 
industry, and we do this through our offices in Atlantic City, Bangkok, Guangzhou, Harrisburg, 
Hong Kong, Las Vegas, Macau, Manila and Tokyo. 
We have performed economic-impact analyses in markets ranging from Atlantic City and 
Philadelphia, to Guam, Louisiana, Connecticut and South Korea. 
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Methodology 
Certain principles guided Spectrum throughout this study: 
 We must listen to a wide variety of interests, regardless of their stated or potential 
position on the issue of legalized casino gambling. 
 Our role in all such meetings is to understand the concerns of others, and be 
respectful of their views. We did not approach any of the meetings held in 
Massachusetts with an eye toward engaging others in debate, nor did we intend to be 
persuasive. 
 We strive, wherever possible, to be aware of local sensibilities. In practice, that 
means that our analysis cannot adopt an off-the-shelf approach, in which models and 
examples from other markets are automatically inserted. At the same time, however, 
we recognize that any state seeking to legalize casinos must look to existing gaming 
states and nations for examples. Those two goals must be balanced by identifying the 
best possible examples, and endeavoring to identify where such examples might 
potentially fall short. 
Spectrum does not advance any pro- or anti-gaming viewpoint, which means that we 
cannot downplay or ignore examples, arguments or evidence that might contain either positive or 
negative implications. Indeed, we have an obligation to clearly identify such examples and 
arguments. 
We attended legislative hearings held on the subject, and gleaned important insights from 
the variety of testimony offered. We listened to the committee members and co-chairs, and the 
report aims to reflect their concerns as well. Rep. Daniel Bosley of North Adams, who co-chairs 
the Joint Economic Development Committee, raised issues and asked questions during a March 
13, 2008, hearing of that committee that we found to be insightful and helpful. For example, 
Bosley noted that many of the studies released to date cite each other, and hence support each 
other‘s conclusions in what could arguably be a circular path that fails to consider new evidence 
that could prove either supportive or contradictory. Spectrum shares that concern, and we have 
made efforts to uncover new evidence and independent, credible studies and surveys. 
Spectrum professionals and consultants have made numerous visits to Massachusetts 
during this research, and have interviewed approximately 40 individuals. Thanks to our 
subcontractor, Boston-based Beetrix Research & Consulting, we have enhanced our visits with a 
full-time presence during the course of this research. Additionally, we have interviewed public 
officials and private industry executives in other jurisdictions as well in the course of this 
analysis. The following table lists the public and private agencies, organizations and elected 
officials we have met with. We are grateful for their time and support, and we note that many of 
these organizations provided access to numerous individuals, some of whom granted us multiple 
interviews over time as new questions arose. 
 
Elected Officials, Appointed Officials, Government Agencies 
Administrator James Malloy, Sturbridge 
Boston Redevelopment Authority 
City Manager Jay Ash, Chelsea 
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Commissioner Ed Davis, Boston Police Department 
Massachusetts Lottery Commission 
Mayor Thomas Ambrosino, Revere 
Mayor Michael Bissonnette, Chicopee 
Mayor Charles Crowley, Taunton 
Mayor Joseph Curtatone, Somerville 
Mayor James Harrington, Brockton 
Mayor Clare Higgins, Northampton  
Mayor Thomas Menino, Boston 
Rep. Thomas Conroy, Lincoln, Sudbury and Wayland 
Rep. Amy Grant, Beverly 
Sen. Anthony Petruccelli, First Suffolk and Middlesex Counties 
Sen. Stanley Rosenberg, Hampshire and Franklin Counties 
Selectmen Edward Harrison and Kathleen Conley Norbut, Monson 
 
Organizations 
Environmental League of Massachusetts 
Fire Chiefs’ Association of Massachusetts 
Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce 
Greater Boston Convention and Visitors Bureau 
Major Cities Chiefs Association 
Massachusetts Council on Compulsive Gambling 
Massachusetts District Attorneys Association 
Massachusetts Lodging Association 
Massachusetts Municipal Association 
Massachusetts Public Health Association 
Massachusetts Restaurant Association 
Massachusetts Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children 
Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation 
Western Massachusetts Casino Task Force 
We note that not all the individuals and organizations that we sought out in our research 
elected to meet with us. 
In developing the various estimates and projections found in this report, Spectrum‘s 
standard approach is to be conservative, comprehensive and transparent. We recognize that in 
doing so, some of our estimates will fall short of others. However, we believe that such a 
methodology – which is explained in each appropriate section of the report – is more useful in 
helping public and private leaders develop plans and strategies. 
As noted throughout the report, we have learned over the decades that impact studies are 
not static, in that the impacts will vary in response to public policies and private investment. 
Wherever appropriate, this report identifies areas that could be impacted by such policies, and we 
make recommendations that we believe could help the Commonwealth and its leadership gain 
the maximum benefit from our experience and research. 
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Our effort throughout this report has been to put all the issues in the appropriate context. 
Readers of this analysis have a responsibility to do likewise. This is particularly critical in areas 
ranging from crime to personal bankruptcy to impacts on local businesses, along with others. 
Statistics and anecdotes that are not viewed in the proper context are at serious risk of being 
misinterpreted.  
Former New Jersey Governor Brendan Byrne – who was in office when New Jersey 
became the first state outside Nevada to offer legal casino gambling – has often been asked 
whether crime increased in Atlantic City since casino gambling began in 1978. Byrne said: ―Of 
course crime increased. Before casinos, there was nothing in Atlantic City to steal.‖2  
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion in a recent 
court decision overturning a District of Columbia ban on handguns. In that opinion, Breyer noted 
the risks in assuming causal relationships. The increase in crime in the district since the 
imposition of strict gun control laws in 1978 might lead one to conclude that the ban fueled the 
increase in crime. ―As students of elementary logic know, after it does not mean because of it.‖3 
In the context of understanding the potential impact of casinos, the wisdom of both Byrne 
and Breyer should be heeded. Complex issues often defy efforts to impose simple cause-and-
effect relationships. 
In that vein, another issue that is prone to varying interpretations is the national economic 
downturn that is taking place as this report nears completion. As noted in more detail later, the 
gaming industry is not immune to economic cycles. The current downturn – fueled by a 
combination of declining home values, rising commodity prices and an end to easy credit for 
homeowners – is proving to be particularly painful for casinos. 
The issue as it relates to Massachusetts was encapsulated well in a comprehensive article 
by Steve Decosta of the New Bedford Standard-Times, whose research included numerous 
interviews with experts on the issue. He wrote: 
―The realization — after years of steady, healthy gains — that the gaming industry isn't 
immune to the distress of a troubled economy couldn't have come at a worse time for 
Massachusetts. 
―‗It's ugly,‘ Andrew Zarnett, gambling analyst with Deutsche Bank AG of New York, 
said of the revenue losses and declining stock prices that have thrown the industry for a 
loop. ―‗There‘s an overall uncertainty in the economy and gaming is feeling the impact. 
It's really bad.‘‖4 
The current climate can lead to assumptions that would likely prove false in the long-
term, including: 
 The gaming market is already saturated.  
                                                 
2 Byrne, a popular speaker known for his wit, has used that example many times, most recently at a dinner in Atlantic City held 
on November 28, 2007.  
3 ―Gun Laws and Crime: A Complex Relationship,‖ by Adam Liptak, New York Times, June 29, 2008 
4 ―Gambling revenue declines across U.S.,‖ by Steve Decosta, Standard-Times, July 27, 2008 
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 Destination resorts, as envisioned by the proposed legislation, would not perform 
as well as high-tax, convenience-based slot parlors that are less likely to be 
whipsawed by economic cycles. 
As the report notes in detail in various sections, destination casinos draw from a broader 
geographic area and a wider demographic market than locals-oriented properties. By definition, 
the broader the market, the more likely it is to reflect the economy as a whole. In our experience, 
that does not support the argument that high-tax properties that require less capital investment 
would better serve the public interest. 
The ability of slots-only casinos in Pennsylvania and New York to weather the downturn 
must be understood in context. Destination casinos in the same locations would perform just as 
well in economic downturns – i.e., visitors would be just as inclined to visit a convenient 
destination casino as they would another property at the same location – but would clearly 
outperform over the long-term. At the same time, destination casinos would spend more on 
goods and services, employ more people and be less vulnerable to external competition. 
The critical point here is that elected officials and other policy-makers in Massachusetts 
must look beyond current economic conditions when establishing policies that will have 
economic and social ramifications that would extend for decades. 
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Introduction: Listening to Stakeholders 
 
Spectrum Gaming Group LLC (Spectrum) has analyzed and observed the evolution of the 
gaming industry around the world for three decades. Spectrum is neither an advocate nor an 
opponent of legalized gaming and has always taken an independent approach to these issues, 
recognizing the need to analyze all markets based on the individual goals, assets and policies 
within each region. This analysis is built on certain factors that must be present in order for 
gaming to be successful for its investors, for its local community, and for the entire 
Commonwealth. 
In studying the potential impact of three gaming destination resorts in the Commonwealth 
of Massachusetts, we have applied certain principles that we have developed from observing and 
analyzing the evolution of gaming as public policy. 
 Gaming must attract significant capital investment. This means that a casino property 
cannot function with a minimal level of amenities or attractions.  
 The statutory and regulatory structure must be developed so that the private sector 
would identify an opportunity to realize an attractive return on investment. 
 The casino should endeavor to attract visitors from outside the local area or region. 
These visitors should possess a combination of important attributes, chiefly affluence 
and available time. 
 The casino should only be one among many attractions. While it might be the most 
important offering on a diversified menu, it cannot function effectively if it is the only 
―cash register‖ in a property. 
 The tax rate must be reasonable and competitive with other gaming markets around 
the world. The casino industry is global, and capital markets can transfer funds 
instantly around the world. Taxes are an integral element in determining potential 
returns on investment, and thus must be set at levels that can attract investment and 
optimize the benefits to the public. 
 Regulation must be comprehensive and transparent. Effective regulation need not be 
onerous. It simply means that the rules are clear, fixed and understandable. Effective 
regulation also breeds confidence among investors and the public. 
 Casinos must be fully and uniformly integrated into the tourism and hospitality 
industries. A casino can be an engine that can encourage Massachusetts adults who 
now spend money outside the Commonwealth to redirect some of that spending at 
home. It can also help spur convention business, while assisting in efforts to attract 
visitors from other states and foreign travelers as well. 
 Gaming must be governed by rules and policies that pay strict attention to minimizing 
problems, such as pathological gambling. Indeed, gaming works best – for both the 
industry and for the public sector – when it is led by operators who adopt clear 
policies related to responsible gaming. 
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 Gaming around the world is evolving into mainstream entertainment, allowing resorts 
that feature casinos to attract a variety of affluent adults beyond those who would be 
characterized as ―gaming-centric.‖ This trend means that all destinations effectively 
compete against each other for investors and visitors. With that in mind, resorts that 
feature gaming have advantages in both a lower cost of capital, and in pricing their 
other amenities. 
Those are the ingredients for success. Clearly, they are all necessary and mutually 
supportive. When policies are established that keep these principles in mind, several potential 
goals will be advanced. These include: 
 Optimizing tax revenue. Tax revenue is not measured simply by the tax on gaming 
revenue, but must take into account all forms of spending that help generate taxes. 
 Optimizing employment. A full-service destination resort that has a wide array of 
attractions will employ more people, and attract more spending to the local area. 
 Addressing problem gambling. This is an area that requires a significant 
coordinated effort, as an increase in pathological gambling can fuel increased 
problems in other areas, from white-collar crime to bankruptcy rates. 
 Ensuring a competitive tourist industry. As we have seen around the world, no 
gaming market can claim a monopoly for long. Even though the Commonwealth 
would grant up to three regional monopolies under the proposed legislation, 
Massachusetts lawmakers and business leaders will have no control and little 
influence over what occurs in neighboring states and beyond. The expansion of states, 
nations and regions that offer gaming will continue unabated. The only way to ensure 
that a region remains competitive is to attract a sufficient level of capital investment 
that will make a destination attractive to multiple demographic and geographic 
market segments. 
A common element and theme that resounds throughout our analysis is the attraction of 
capital investment. That is the element that separates successful gaming markets from less-
successful ones, and is the element that will help advance all of the identified public policies. 
Note that the sections of this report that focus on projecting revenues and profitability show a 
clear correlation between the level of capital investment and such measures. 
This essentially gives the Commonwealth an abiding interest in maximizing capital 
investment, since better capitalized properties offer certain inherent advantages: 
 They are more likely to generate greater revenue since they would appeal to a much 
broader demographic, and would reach a greater geographic distance. 
 Visitors to well-capitalized destinations – as opposed to, say, smaller, under-
capitalized properties that target convenience-driven, local adults – will likely stay 
longer and spend more. 
 Well-capitalized destinations will be better positioned to target affluent adults, thus 
reducing or eliminating any risk that a casino would focus on lower-income adults 
who could least afford to gamble. 
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 The greater the level of capitalization, the less vulnerable a gaming industry would be 
to competition from the expansion or introduction of gaming in other states. 
A second, related theme that permeates our analysis is: The interests of all stakeholders 
should be parallel. This means that policies and practices must be designed to ensure that all 
interested parties benefit, and that no interests are sacrificed. The concept of mutual benefit is not 
only attainable, but is necessary. When the private sector, including casino operators, seeks to 
maximize profit and return on investment, it cannot be at the expense of the public, nor can such 
efforts sacrifice the local or regional interest. Conversely, public policies must be conceived with 
the goal of maximizing capital investment without creating or exacerbating social or economic 
problems. Policies that do not seek to strike a balance and do not advance all interests will 
ultimately advance none. 
Spectrum also points out some necessary caveats that must be taken into consideration by 
policymakers that we have gleaned from our experience: 
 No two gaming markets can expect the same experience, nor should they be guided 
by the same public policies. Regions vary in multiple ways, from their population 
density to their employment, to their ease of access and to the level of existing 
tourism infrastructure within a region. Consequently, results will differ and gaming 
policy should differ as well. 
 The role of the public sector – including the executive and legislative branches at all 
levels – does not end with the legalization of gaming or the creation of a regulatory 
body. Indeed, effective public policy mandates that the difficult tasks are just 
beginning at that point. 
 To help ensure that the beneficial effects are targeted to where they are needed most, 
and to help ensure that the harmful effects are minimized, the private sector – 
including, but not limited to the casino industry – cannot be fully left to its own 
devices, but must be guided by sufficient incentives and mandates as necessary.  
An example of an incentive would be legislation that allows developers tax incentives to 
build non-gaming attractions that dovetail with the needs of the tourism industry. New Jersey 
developed such an incentive in 2004 with legislation that allowed casino operators to retain a 
portion of state taxes generated on site to offset the cost of constructing approved 
retail/entertainment districts.5 We are not suggesting in this analysis that such an incentive would 
necessarily be appropriate for Massachusetts. We simply point it out for illustrative purposes. 
The public sector may be called on to invest additional resources, both financial and 
human, to best capture the beneficial effects. For instance, the siting of a casino must take into 
account a variety of factors that would advance public policy, minimize disruption and optimize 
the return on investment to the operators, including: 
 Will casino traffic disrupt local neighborhoods, or exacerbate existing blockages? 
 Will the pool of available labor have access to affordable, convenient transportation? 
                                                 
5 The legislation is known as Gormley-James, after its principal sponsors, former New Jersey state Senators William Gormley 
and Sharpe James. 
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 Will gaming complement existing businesses and attractions? 
In developing this analysis, Spectrum is focusing largely on potential impacts that are 
gaming-related in the sense that they can be attributable to some unique aspects of casinos that 
might not be attributable to other industries. We caution, however, that in the three decades in 
which we have been tracking this industry, impacts can be expected that can be characterized as 
related to general economic trends, or that would occur in any industry that targets consumer 
spending. 
For example, if a casino generates increased employment in some communities, such 
activity might result in increased investment by restaurants, pharmacies, or any of a host of 
service industries that would be attracted by the presence of increased consumer spending. In 
many cases, these new businesses would compete against a presumably smaller number of 
existing businesses that were already targeting those market niches. If the new businesses are 
better capitalized, say, or have stronger brands, better locations or any other competitive edges, 
they could take market share from existing businesses. From the standpoint of the larger 
community, the arrival of new businesses would likely be perceived as a net positive. For the 
existing businesses that now find themselves at competitive disadvantages, the perception would 
be clearly negative. 
With that in mind, we caution that there can be no guarantees from the Commonwealth or 
from casinos that all impacts will be positive. Winners and losers will be created by the 
introduction of casinos into a community. The public and private sectors must maintain realistic 
expectations, and guide public policy where it can be guided. 
Our experience over the past decades has led us to develop certain cautionary notes to 
help ensure that expectations are realistic. While no two gaming markets can be precisely alike, 
there are some commonalities, including: 
 Gaming should never be viewed as a panacea to cure social ills or solve fiscal 
problems. It is a tool that, if effectively managed, can generate capital investment, 
employment and visitation that in turn would provide resources that can help address 
a variety of other issues. 
 Casinos, by themselves, cannot turn unattractive or unappealing neighborhoods or 
communities into attractive magnets. To effect such a potential change often requires 
significant amounts of planning, financial capital and political capital. 
 Casinos, by themselves, cannot turn former industrial areas or other non-tourist sites 
into tourist attractions. That requires a concomitant investment in developing a 
necessary tourism infrastructure. 
 Neither the challenges nor the opportunities created by a casino industry stop at 
municipal or even state boundaries.  
Spectrum notes that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, in the legislation we have 
analyzed, is suggesting a competitive bidding process for the three available licenses, a practice 
that offers the opportunity to most effectively guide public policy. 
The heart of the competitive bidding process will be the establishment of guidelines that 
delineate the criteria for evaluating bids. As we will note in more detail later, we suggest that the 
Commonwealth needs to be as expansive and comprehensive as possible in its guidelines.  
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In our experience in various markets, including as participants and close observers in the 
30-year history of casino regulation in New Jersey, we note the following:  
 A regulatory system should start out strictly, and then be modified as circumstances 
change, and as the regulators become more comfortable and gain confidence that the 
process is moving in the right direction. In most cases, political and economic 
realities will be quickly established, making it difficult to move in the opposite 
direction toward a system of stricter regulation and tighter controls. This would be 
particularly true in this instance where the legislation contemplates a competitive 
bidding process. In such instances, the most important rules are the ones established 
at the outset to determine the successful bidders. Once those criteria have been 
established and a successful bidder has been named, the system would not allow 
lawmakers or regulators to go back and alter those initial criteria. 
 In effect, the Massachusetts Legislature must take into account the political reality 
that once a casino is established and is generating tax revenue, employing people and 
attracting visitors, it cannot be easily undone in any practical sense. This is true for 
the licensing of a commercial casino, but recognition of this reality should be 
particularly acute for the establishment of a tribal casino. Even though the state‘s 
leverage over licensed commercial operators would diminish once a license is 
granted, it would still be greater than the future leverage over a tribal operator. 
 The public sector in Massachusetts has broad discretion and powerful leverage at the 
outset to ensure that the successful bidder takes whatever steps are necessary to 
advance the public interest on a wide variety of fronts. Such leverage would be at its 
zenith during the pre-licensing phase, in which applicants would recognize that they 
must compete against each other in their zeal and in their creativity in developing 
strategies to advance the public interest. Once licenses are issued, and casinos are 
operational, we caution that such leverage would largely disappear. 
 Using that leverage to require that all bidders submit comprehensive, credible plans 
that are in congruence with public policies can be justified by the proposed 
legislation, which essentially creates up to three regional monopolies. No other 
private businesses that target consumer discretionary spending, from hotels to 
restaurants, could reasonably expect that Massachusetts would protect them from 
potential in-state competition. We suggest that such protection requires a 
corresponding commitment to ensure that marketing, human resources and other 
policies put forth are designed to promote the public interest. 
We are not suggesting that Massachusetts follow the policies that New Jersey had in 
place in the 1970s and 1980s, in which casino operators were forced to abide by a strict set of 
minimum standards that governed everything from the required amount of public space to 
inflexible rules, such as requiring casinos to offer nightly live entertainment. The latter example 
was one of the first mandates to be amended in New Jersey after regulators recognized that 
musicians were often playing to empty showrooms. In the early 1990s, most of those rules were 
eliminated, with the exception that licensed casinos must have at least 500 hotel rooms. Notably, 
the elimination of those requirements helped spark a renewed interest in Atlantic City. Today, 
market forces compel existing and potential operators to significantly exceed the minimums once 
required. 
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Nor are we advocating policies put forth in Louisiana in the early 1990s, when a casino 
monopoly in New Orleans was granted to Harrah‘s Entertainment under strict requirements that 
prohibited the operation of a hotel or on-site restaurants. In that instance, Harrah‘s was not able 
to develop a business model that would have allowed it to generate or sustain sufficient 
profitability. 
Rather, we believe that the interests of the Commonwealth could best be served by 
adopting criteria that require the applicants themselves to delineate their potential impacts, and 
the policies they will adopt to ensure that they will endeavor to work in the public interest. This 
will essentially create ―goal congruence,‖ in which the public and private sectors have ascribed 
to mutually beneficial policies. Such policies – many of which will be analyzed in more detail 
later in the report – could apply to various areas of potential concern, including: 
Impact on the Lottery. Applicants should develop policies designed to coordinate 
marketing efforts to enhance, rather than diminish, Lottery sales. Examples would include shared 
advertising and promotional campaigns, or efforts to market the lottery to casino visitors who 
reside outside Massachusetts. 
Pennsylvania, concerned about the impact of slot parlors on its lottery, went so far as to 
require each operator to sell lottery tickets ―at a location as near as practicable to the pay 
windows.‖6 
There are currently 11 player-activated terminals and two instant ticket vending machines 
in Pennsylvania‘s six slots gaming facilities.7 From July 1, 2007, to February 27, 2008, those 
machines generated lottery sales of more than $1.3 million. Massachusetts might want to 
consider a similar mandate in its casino legislation. 
Impact on transportation. A successful casino, by definition, means a casino that 
attracts a large number of visitors. In Atlantic City, for example, casinos annually attract about 
12 million vehicle trips per year, while nearly 6 million patrons arrive by bus. If Massachusetts 
casinos attract only one-third those totals, it would still mean 4 million vehicle trips annually, or 
more than 333,000 monthly. Those trips will not be evenly spaced throughout the year or month, 
which could mean that existing roadways that are in need of improvement will become even 
more crowded. Note, for example, that state Sen. Anthony Petruccelli commissioned a study that 
estimates the cost of improving the Route 1A corridor that connects Copeland Circle in Revere 
to the Sumner-Callahan tunnels – which already experiences regular rush-hour traffic jams – 
would cost $420 million.8 A casino in that area would make that traffic problem more acute. 
Impact on restaurants, other businesses that target discretionary income. This area 
is of particular concern to restaurant owners and other small businesses, some of whom fear that 
casinos will compete against them for customers or for a share of discretionary spending by local 
residents and visitors. This is arguably an area that might be most readily addressable through the 
adoption of policies and strategies, such as developing joint marketing efforts with area 
restaurants, targeting incremental conventions and meetings, or adding signature third-party 
restaurants on site that are owned and operated by Massachusetts restaurateurs. 
                                                 
6 Pennsylvania Race Horse Development and Gaming Act (2004-71) 
7 Pennsylvania Lottery 
8 ―State will have to hit the jackpot to pay for 1A improvements,‖ Revere Journal, March 12, 2008, p. 1 
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Impact on unemployment, existing labor force. Casinos require unimpeded access to 
significant sources of labor that cut across various fields, as well as levels of experience and 
education. Massachusetts, like most states, has significant pockets of unemployment and 
underemployment. The commonwealth would be well served by casino licensees that have 
developed programs of reaching into such communities for hiring. This would require some level 
of training, and coordination with government and non-profit organizations, including colleges, 
that assist in job training, career development and placement. We also note that one concern 
often expressed by business people in the lodging and restaurant fields is the competition for a 
limited supply of entry-level labor. A coordinated approach to this issue could increase that 
supply, minimize that competitive threat and increase the number of jobs that earn a living wage 
with benefits and the potential for career growth. 
Some of the minimum bidding requirements are spelled out in the legislation, such as a 
minimum of $1 billion in capital investment, exclusive of acquisition costs, as well as a 
minimum license fee of $200 million, and tax rate of 27 percent. While it is arguably good policy 
to give regulators sufficient authority and flexibility to develop a comprehensive list of criteria, it 
also raises an additional set of risk factors: The appointed regulators must have a sufficient base 
of knowledge, and be free of political and other pressures, to develop these criteria. 
In effect, this means that the appointment of regulators could be the single most 
important policy decision following the enactment of gaming legislation. 
Other states have learned that the enabling legislation that governs gaming is hardly the 
final step in the process, nor can even the most prescient regulators anticipate all the social, 
political, economic and technological trends that casinos and regulators must grapple with. New 
Jersey, for example, enacted the Casino Control Act in 1977, and the original statute governed 
many specific elements of gaming, including: 
 The percentage of floor space that could be devoted to slot machines. 
 The amount of public areas that a casino must include. 
 The specific table games that could be offered on the casino floor. 
 The hours of operation. 
 The number of casinos that one licensee could own. 
All these were changed in a series of regulatory reforms that took place in the early 
1990s, with responsibility shifting from the Legislature to the New Jersey Casino Control 
Commission.9 These changes, as part of a significant streamlining and downsizing of the 
regulatory agencies, helped fuel a gaming renaissance in Atlantic City. Just as important, 
however, the changes indicated recognition on the part of legislators that they could not expect to 
understand all the critical nuances and issues that accompany gaming. They had to cede that 
authority to regulators in order to make the process more effective. 
Massachusetts has the opportunity to learn this lesson from the outset. For example, our 
meetings with various public and private officials that were undertaken as part of our research 
                                                 
9 ―Years of Change: 1990-1994,‖ New Jersey Casino Control Commission 
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indicated some rather strong fears and concerns in a host of areas that cannot easily or effectively 
be addressed in legislation. These include such examples as: 
 Concerns that different regions of Massachusetts have little in common in terms of 
their economies, cultures or geography. Officials in various regions fear that a one-
size-fits-all government policy could hurt the interests of rural regions that lack the 
political clout, funds or infrastructure to meet the demands of a major gaming 
operation. 
 Concerns that gaming would be so atypical from other Massachusetts industries that it 
would detract from such industries as health care, academia, life sciences and others 
that have helped distinguish the Commonwealth, and that have served as a magnet for 
thousands of well-paying jobs. 
Regulators – not legislators – are best equipped to serve as vigilant watchdogs in 
protecting the public interest on these and other issues. They can set clear criteria to ensure that 
casinos are producing workable plans that meet the needs of, and leverage the assets of, their 
local areas. 
At the same time, regulators must have the will – and the necessary protections – to make 
difficult decisions as needed, including the freedom to determine that no application meets their 
standards. 
This illustrates and underscores a core principle that underlies and permeates this entire 
analysis: Many of the impacts of legalizing casinos in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 
should not be viewed as either static or inevitable. Indeed, with a coordinated approach to 
ensuring goal congruence between the public and private sectors on gaming policy, the benefits 
could be enhanced and the drawbacks could be minimized.  
This report, where appropriate, will endeavor to identify those areas that could benefit 
from such efforts. 
 
Understanding, hearing concerns 
Spectrum Gaming Group has endeavored to reach out to a broad array of public and 
private leaders throughout Massachusetts who have a stake in the important issue of developing 
destination casinos. Whenever possible, we have attempted to address their concerns and answer 
their questions.  
Addressing many of the concerns requires us to ensure a complete understanding of some 
tenets that are central to our analysis: 
 Destination casinos, as envisioned by the legislation that we have analyzed, are 
significantly different from convenience-driven, local-oriented casinos in terms of 
their business models, their demographic and geographic reach, and in their ability to 
advance public policy. 
 A competitive bidding process can be effective if it is accompanied by robust, 
rigorous and comprehensive licensing requirements. 
Not surprisingly, many of the most detailed and telling questions came from members of 
the Massachusetts Legislature, who must make the policy decisions that will govern the 
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Commonwealth. We are addressing some of their specific questions in this section of the report, 
as we believe that they are asking questions and targeting issues that are likely to have 
widespread interest. 
As state Sen. Stanley Rosenberg noted in interviews with us, applying what has occurred 
in other states ―only goes so far,‖ as each situation is different. And in our report, we make the 
point that Massachusetts clearly has its own unique set of circumstances that planners will need 
to address.  
Rosenberg – who clearly did a great deal of research on the casino topic – wanted the 
report to estimate how many patrons could be expected to come from the local area. Based on 
our research, as noted in detail in the report, we expect: 
 Destination casinos would collectively generate between 18,000 and 27,000 visits per 
day.  
 Three Massachusetts destination casinos would draw between 43 percent and 65 
percent of all Massachusetts gaming trips and spending, or between $572 million and 
$864 million annually.  
 Massachusetts residents have been spending an estimated $1.1 billion annually on 
gaming alone in Connecticut and Rhode Island. Massachusetts casinos could 
recapture about $600 million to $700 million of that annual total. 
Rosenberg also said it was important to estimate the number of trips per year by patrons. 
Our research shows that the number of trips per patron per year would be roughly seven. We 
estimate the loss per patron would be about $147, although that will vary slightly by region. 
Rosenberg also raised the issue of increased crime associated with casinos. As our report 
endeavors to point out in great detail, crime must be evaluated based on increased visitation, 
increased opportunity, and must be examined in terms of whether law-enforcement agencies 
have the funding to address added demands. Based on our research in other gaming jurisdictions, 
law enforcement struggles to cope with crime committed on the casino floor. Regions with 
destination resort casinos, similar to that envisioned by Massachusetts, could realistically 
anticipate as many as 300 larcenies a year occurring, along with some robberies. In addition, as 
we point out in our report, a significant increase in DUI arrests can be expected to occur. 
Neighboring and host towns might experience an increase in break-ins. Still, our analysis 
emphasizes the following points: 
Our experience has led us to determine that the following guidelines must be applied if 
this subject is to be properly analyzed: 
 Casino-related crime must not be confused with crime that might be related to 
increased economic activity. 
 Visitor population must be taken into account when analyzing data. 
 To the extent possible, external factors such as the urban or rural nature of a 
community must be factored into the analysis. 
Another issue Rosenberg raised concerned the cost of treating problem gamblers. It is 
difficult to estimate how much casino gambling will exacerbate compulsive gambling, but, as 
noted in more detail in the appropriate section of our report, the cost of out-patient treatment of a 
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problem gambler in Indiana is roughly $2,500. Indiana, recognizing that the current amount 
spent is inadequate, is about to more than double its annual budget to $5.2 million over the next 
five years.  
Rosenberg also wanted to know how certain state laws, such as mandatory health 
insurance, might be impacted in the event that Massachusetts eventually hosts a tribal casino that 
would be governed by federal laws and tribal sovereignty. While we cannot offer a legal opinion 
as to the relationship between state and tribal governments, we can address such issues from a 
practical perspective. It is highly unlikely that any casino in Massachusetts would seek an 
exemption from state rules governing health insurance, and, notably, both Connecticut Indian 
casinos use their health benefits as a key attraction for both managerial and line employees. 
(Both casinos tout their health plans as being ―unsurpassed.‖) In part, such benefits can help 
tribal casinos compete against casinos that are owned by public corporations. Tribes cannot offer 
equity stakes in their operations, thus benefits become more important in the realm of attracting 
talent. 
Traditionally, the benefits package offered by a casino – whether tribal or commercial – 
is an excellent one, with some casinos offering policies that come with no employee 
contribution. Others require only a minimal contribution. The industry uses its health benefit 
packages as a recruitment tool. In our experience, casinos often endeavor to become an 
―employer of choice‖ in their communities, both to retain quality workers and reduce turnover.  
Additionally, casinos in many areas have large sections of their workforce governed by 
collective-bargaining agreements that often place significant emphasis on health benefits. 
The Swift Commission in Massachusetts,
10
 citing a 1997 poll of casino workers, found 
that: 
 50 percent of those polled thought their benefits were better than average; and 
 48 percent stated they would be unable to pay for any medical insurance if it were not 
provided by the casino.  
The Burke report also noted: ―Workers shared the following impressions of the effect of 
gambling on their standard of living:  
 64 percent reported improvement in their wages since they began working in the 
industry; 
 61 percent reported improvement in their medical benefits; and 
 36 percent reported improvement in their job security. 
The poll found: 
                                                 
10 Expanded Legalized Gaming In Massachusetts: A Presentation of Gaming Regulation, Economic Development Impact, Fiscal 
Impact and Social and Cultural Impact, by The Commission to Study the Potential Expansion of Legalized Gaming, Essex 
County District Attorney Kevin M. Burke, Chairman. Burke now serves as Secretary of the Executive Office of Public Safety. 
The 19-member commission was established pursuant to Executive 441 under Governor Jane M. Swift. Burke has also served on 
Governor Patrick‘s internal study group on gaming, formed in 2007, that was chaired by Housing and Economic Development 
Secretary Dan O‘Connell. 
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 20 percent of the members reported their jobs helped them buy their first homes; 
 18 percent reported their jobs assisted them in moving to a better home; and 
 8 percent reported their jobs contributed to paying for their own education.‖ 
Rep. Amy Grant cited a number of questions that must be considered in any discussion as 
to whether casinos should be approved, and how public policy should govern gaming. She 
questioned, for example, whether sufficient attention is being paid to the relationship between 
transportation and tourism. Since more tourists means more traffic, can the infrastructure in areas 
targeted for potential casinos support that traffic? She also noted that Connecticut and its casinos 
will likely respond to a competitive challenge from Massachusetts. How would that challenge 
affect the future of this potential industry, and – when considering competition and other threats 
– how reliable are projected revenue streams?  
 Rep. Thomas Conroy also took great pains to raise issues that should be central to any 
debate governing casinos. He suggested that some of the debate has included numbers that could 
be misleading, such as average compensation for casino employees. We agree that any 
consideration of an average salary must put those numbers in the proper context. When you 
average the salary of a CEO, for example, and housekeeping staff, you get a number that can 
easily be misinterpreted. With that in mind, we have also calculated the median salaries, without 
benefits.  
The median compensation level, without benefits, in our model, based on the salary in the 
50
th
 percentile of job titles, is $42,390 for a casino in Boston, and $41,600 for Massachusetts 
overall. When you weight that measurement by calculating the median based on the actual 
number of employees, the median compensation for a Boston casino drops to $22,901 and 
$22,963 for Massachusetts. Those numbers, however, can also be potentially misleading. Many 
of the positions that are hired in large numbers tend to cluster at the lower end of the scale. When 
we eliminate housekeepers, valet parkers and casino dealers (whose compensation level is 
artificially low because it does not reflect tips), the median compensation is $25,459 for Boston 
and $25,168 for Massachusetts. 
Conroy, in discussions, pointed out to us the benefits of what Professor Michael E. Porter 
of Harvard University has termed ―Clusters of Innovation.‖ Porter – whose work is cited at 
various places within this report – summarized this concept as: ―In healthy regions, 
competitiveness and innovation are concentrated in clusters, or interrelated industries, in which 
the region specializes. The nation‘s ability to produce high-value products and services that 
support high-wage jobs depends on the creation and strengthening of these regional hubs of 
competitiveness and innovation.‖11 
The core question is whether casinos can assist in developing such clusters, or whether 
gaming would either work at cross-purposes or divert attention and resources from such efforts. 
The answer to that question ultimately lies with whether the enabling legislation and the 
competitive bidding process are part of what Porter deems to be a necessary public-private 
partnership. Indeed, one of our core suggestions is that all aspects of the process governing the 
awarding of licenses and the oversight of casinos must be fully aligned in that the goals of the 
                                                 
11 ―Clusters of Innovation: Regional Foundations of U.S. Competitiveness,‖ by Michael E. Porter 
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public and private sectors must be congruent in all aspects. Additionally, we suggest that gaming 
must be fully integrated into the tourism sector of the economy. 
Porter notes: ―Regional strategies should encompass a wide range of clusters, and be 
attentive to clusters that overlap. Overlapping clusters offer potential synergies in skill, 
technology, and partnership. … The majority of traded jobs in any region are in clusters that are 
not generally perceived to be ‗high-tech‘ (e.g., business services, financial services, education 
and knowledge creation, transportation and logistics, and hospitality and tourism). In order to 
meaningfully increase overall regional prosperity, innovative capacity must be built in many 
clusters.‖ 
We emphasize that hospitality and tourism can continue to be a meaningful cluster in 
Massachusetts, with gaming being used in part to bolster the conventions and meetings business. 
It has done so with great success in other markets, most notably Las Vegas, where various 
industries hold regular events. COMDEX (Computer Dealer‘s Exhibition) held its annual event 
in Las Vegas every year from 1979 to 1993. Its successor show, INTEROP, also holds its annual 
show in Las Vegas.12 
As noted in more detail in the report, gaming is an increasingly important tool in the 
arsenal of marketing professionals seeking to attract conventions and meetings. Gaming can be a 
valuable entertainment option, and can add more rooms to the regional inventory. A casino can 
also help position a market as offering more value for the convention dollar. 
Conroy asked a number of other probing questions as well, such as whether or not 
casinos would clash with the existing culture in areas such as technology and local history. 
Atlantic County, New Jersey – where casinos are the largest industry – is also home to the 
Federal Aviation Administration‘s William J. Hughes Technical Center, which employs 3,500 
people. This makes it the county‘s second largest non-casino employer.13 The Hughes Center – 
which is 10 miles from the nearest casino – continues to grow, and is adding a research park as 
well.14  
Our report addresses in detail the question of whether a casino can be fully integrated into 
a tourism base that relies heavily on historical interest. We note in that section that Philadelphia 
perhaps offers the best example of a major northeastern urban center that is combining gaming 
with a rich colonial heritage and vibrant academic and technology centers. Indeed, Philadelphia – 
which is only 60 miles from Atlantic City – is immediately bordered by two casinos, and is 
allowed two more in its downtown area. 
Major universities in the Philadelphia region – from the University of Pennsylvania to 
Drexel, Weidner and Temple – have added some form of gaming and hospitality management 
courses to their undergraduate, graduate or executive education programs. 
The larger question that Conroy asked us to address is whether casinos can serve as a net 
economic benefit to a region. Various examples abound as to how casinos can assist in economic 
growth and the related area of improving the quality of life in a region. 
                                                 
12 www.comdex.com  
13 Business Forecast, Press of Atlantic City, January 27, 2008 
14 ―Summit Reviews Economic Hopes for Atlantic City,‖ Press of Atlantic City, April 26, 2008 
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One example can be found in Lemay, Mo., near St. Louis, which was recently placed 85
th
 
on the Fortune Small Business list of ―Best Places to Live and Launch.‖ The St. Louis Business 
Journal noted that Lemay ―is waking up, thanks to Pinnacle Entertainment's $450 million River 
City casino project that is expected to create more than 1,000 new jobs and is scheduled to open 
in Lemay in the first half of 2009. Lemay already boasts a 20,000-square-foot startup incubator, 
a supportive county economic council, and a strategic location on the Mississippi River, 
according to Fortune. The local economy is currently dominated by small manufacturers, but 
Fortune said the influx of tourists should stimulate the retail and service sectors.‖15 
Such anecdotal information is of limited value, of course, and must be balanced by what 
Conroy seeks: independent quantitative analysis as to the economic impact of destination 
casinos. We endeavored to do that in our analysis by combining proven models with 
conservative assumptions. 
Our report shows, for example, that every direct job in the casino industry will likely 
yield roughly 0.5 jobs elsewhere in the local economy. This is in keeping with the experience of 
other markets – and the general predictions of widely used modeling programs. (See the details 
later in the report.) Such jobs are created in a variety of ways, from increased government 
spending and hiring, to dollars from employees rippling through the local economy. 
Other areas of concern expressed by Conroy and others require a more thoughtful, 
qualitative response that is not always clear when analyzing the numbers that have been 
developed through economic models. For example, we have spent considerable time in areas of 
Massachusetts that are prosperous, as well as a few that have significantly less hope. However, 
we expect that such areas – which would include Revere and Chelsea, both in the Boston area – 
would potentially benefit from gaming, if given the benefit of good planning. Such areas would 
have access to mass transit, an essential element in matching employment to those most in need. 
As we describe in detail in the report, a comprehensive training program that is 
developed and instituted at an early date could help ensure that the people who need those jobs 
are the ones who get them. This indeed addresses another concern expressed by many, that jobs 
go to existing Massachusetts residents rather than serve as magnets for those who presently live 
elsewhere. 
While there can be no guarantee of such a result, we recognize that policies that 
encourage such employment of local residents equate to sound public policy: Such policies 
would simultaneously generate more dollars into the local economy without a concomitant 
increase in demand for services. When such policies are successful, as shown in the report, 
demand for government services by individuals can actually decrease. 
 An important undercurrent of this debate deals with the essential, undeniable issue of 
problem gambling. Both the casino industry and the public sector in all jurisdictions that we have 
studied have clearly evolved, and it is now widely accepted that comprehensive programs must 
be instituted to minimize the impact from problem gamblers, and provide them with treatment. 
Conroy correctly notes that more casinos would exacerbate that problem, and slot 
machines might be particularly conducive to creating more problem gamblers among certain sub-
sets of the population. Still, the experts in this field whom we have been interviewing and 
                                                 
15 ―Fortune ranks Lemay high for business, lifestyle mix,‖ St. Louis Business Journal, March 26, 2008 
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working with for three decades do not advocate abolition, nor do they oppose legalization. They 
simply want the resources to address the problem, which we analyze in detail later in the report. 
The issue of problem gambling extends beyond funding, however. In our view, the 
bidding and licensing process offers the greatest opportunity to ensure that any casino licensee 
puts forth a credible, comprehensive and ambitious plan to deal with this issue. And that is a 
theme that runs through our entire report in a host of areas, from employment to mitigation 
funding: Those who vie for, and successfully earn the privilege of licensure, are granted regional 
monopolies where they will enjoy some level of protection from in-state competition. No other 
private industry could expect such protection. The Commonwealth should match that protection 
by requiring a concomitant level of responsibility from casino licensees to serve the public 
interest while realizing an acceptable return on investment. 
The remainder of this section is devoted to detailing the array of concerns expressed to 
us. We are grateful to all the people who spent time with us to improve our understanding of the 
areas of concern throughout Massachusetts.  
Most of the people we spoke with were eager to learn from the casino experiences in 
other states and were interested in seeing analyses based on realistic data. The cautions and 
questions they emphasized are as follows:  
Desire for accurate, sustainable mitigation that fits the localities 
Many of the people with whom we spoke commented approvingly on the general 
commitment to mitigation in the original legislation. Some expressed concern about the 
mechanics as to how the various revenue disbursements would be handled in practice. For all, 
major questions remain. 
Some of the questions raised included whether the significant financial obligations 
spelled out in the bill for mitigation would render casinos in Massachusetts unattractive to 
potential developers and investors, and whether this could translate into projects not being built – 
or not being able to meet the mitigation obligations. 
Most of the people with whom we spoke assumed that the casinos could be built and 
focused their concerns about mitigation on the delivery of the payments to localities – and not 
just the host community, but also the surrounding communities that would bear the brunt of 
increased traffic, emergency services and population (and its resultant impact on school funding, 
concerns strongly expressed in western Massachusetts).16 
We heard several suggestions for ways to ensure that the funds made it to the affected 
localities, including giving funds proactively to affected cities and towns rather than forcing 
them to bear the burden and seek reimbursement (a view expressed in southeastern 
Massachusetts).  
And many residents and leaders, especially in western Massachusetts and those with 
statewide responsibilities, gave strong emphasis to the argument that any casino impact has to be 
viewed by location rather than as a statewide phenomenon. The potentially unfunded mandates 
that they believe would arise are problematic for smaller cities and towns, as they do not have 
                                                 
16 Our interviews took place over several months, and straddled the legislative debate and voting. 
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scalable infrastructure to handle the changes in demand. The concern is that the localities need to 
be financially held harmless. 
Particular questions about how mitigation would work and what would be covered 
include:  
 What happens to the host communities? Does local aid just get offset against costs so 
these communities in effect, break even? 
 How are mitigation funds apportioned to the surrounding municipalities? How much 
of a say do they have in the planning process? 
 What happens when casino revenues dip and mitigation funds decrease, but demands 
on the local communities remain the same? 
 What is the burden of proof for impact? Does it involve engineers to study traffic, for 
example? And who pays for those assessments? 
 What is the likely increase in population to anticipate? Specifically, what is the likely 
proportional increase in Special Education and language needs in schools from 
children of casino workers?  
 What is the impact year by year for various public services, from law enforcement to 
the demands on water supply? Are the mitigation dollars designed to cover all such 
impacts? 
Spectrum cannot possibly analyze all community impacts because many of them are 
subjective and personal and they can neither be satisfied by mitigation dollars nor measured by 
quantitative means. These typically involve quality-of-life issues, those that make up the fabric 
of a community. In many Massachusetts communities, the presence of a casino resort could 
impact a way of life that has been enjoyed for more than two centuries. 
We found these concerns poignantly aired in a May 2008 meeting of the Western 
Massachusetts Casino Task Force,17 whose members represented such towns as Belchertown 
(pop. 12,96818), Brimfield (pop. 3,330), Holland (pop. 2,407), Monson (pop. 8,359), Palmer (pop. 
12,297) and Wilbraham (pop. 13,473). 
In particular, we note the case of Monson, which in fall 2007 established a Local Casino 
Study Committee. Among its actions, the committee in March 2008 conducted an unscientific 
survey of residents to determine their concerns about ―the potential siting of a casino in an 
abutting community upon Monson.‖ The committee received 782 responses; 122 indicated they 
had no concerns. 
Among those who answered ―yes,‖ they were asked to check whether they had concerns 
in 11 listed subject areas. Following are their responses (they could check more than one):19 
 360 – character 
                                                 
17 The Western Massachusetts Casino Task Force was created in fall 2007 in response to Governor Patrick‘s casino proposal. It is 
comprised of representatives from 11 towns and maintains a neutral stance on gaming. 
18 All population data from U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 figures 
19 Monson Local Casino Study Committee, survey results memo, May 5, 2008 
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 350 – traffic 
 271 – crime 
 257 – accidents 
 240 – taxes 
 218 – schools 
 215 – housing 
 207 – environment 
 169 – business 
 128 – pollution 
 118 - water 
In nearby Sturbridge, Town Administrator James Malloy said town officials have similar 
concerns. The town is home to Old Sturbridge Village, a living museum that attracts 250,000 
visitors per year, and is home to Sturbridge Common Historic District, which is listed on the 
National Register of Historic Places. ―The character of the community – that is our biggest 
concern. ... Having a casino, especially on the scale of Foxwoods, is totally inconsistent with the 
town‘s character,‖ Malloy said.20 
Some quality-of-life issues should be asked of any high-volume business that would be 
placed in a position to impact small towns, whether an amusement park, a casino or a Walmart: 
Will there be a significant increase in traffic through the towns? Will the size and nature of the 
town‘s population change? What are the impacts on water quality? What are the impacts on land 
usage and residential and commercial development? 
Some of these concerns are exacerbated by the inherent nature of a casino, which 
operates 24/7/365 (in Massachusetts this would subject to Gaming Control Authority approval), 
thus boosting traffic, artificial light and noise during hours and days that would otherwise be 
more serene. 
The proposed legislation requires local approval before any casino can be developed. 
Still, we emphasize that such issues cannot be confined to the casino-host town, as illustrated by 
the Foxwoods example (see our section on the Foxwoods-Mohegan Sun contrast in Connecticut). 
The towns en route to Foxwoods have been forever altered as a result of the casino‘s success. In 
this regard, we find the words of Richard Blumenthal, who has been Connecticut‘s Attorney 
General since the pre-casino year of 1991, most instructive for Massachusetts: 
―If I had one major piece of advice [for Massachusetts], it would be to be more sensitive 
to the surrounding local communities. In Connecticut, and it‘s really a criticism [of the 
state] more than the tribes, we have failed to provide for police, fire, roads, upkeep, other 
kinds of economic burdens that have hit the communities immediately surrounding the 
two reservations [of Foxwoods and Mohegan Sun]. Certainly they‘ve created traffic and 
other kinds of issues.‖21 
It is evident that any town hosting or surrounding gaming has a considerable stake in the 
development of a casino resort. Should the occasion arise where the Commonwealth‘s gaming 
                                                 
20 Interview June 12, 2008. 
21 Speaking at the ―Big Gamble‖ symposium, Quinnipiac University, March 18, 2008 
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legislation is revisited, Spectrum recommends representatives of such towns be included when 
considering the issues of siting, mitigation and selection of the casino developer. 
Further, we recommend that each applicant compensate the Commonwealth or host 
town/county/region for a preliminary social-, economic- and infrastructure-impact study of host 
town/county/region. The successful applicant would then be required to compensate the 
Commonwealth or host town/county/region for an impact study every five years, or other 
reasonable interval. 
Concern that destination casinos will be a poor fit for Massachusetts 
Many interviewees framed their concern about casinos, or their willingness to support 
casinos, in terms of the correctness of the fit for the Commonwealth. Some believe that 
Massachusetts has led the way in so many economic and cultural ways that they are concerned 
that casinos would diminish or detract or distract from those standards and accomplishments. 
Others believe that casinos would not put the exceptional gains and role of Massachusetts at risk, 
and would add to the economy and life in the Commonwealth in useful ways.  
While data and analysis will not fully address these differences, here are the main 
concerns and counter points: 
Economic: The Massachusetts economy is focused on higher education and 
healthcare/life sciences, and future activity should enhance this economic and cultural capital or 
create or contribute in meaningful new ways, e.g. green jobs. Casinos do not add to the economy 
in this way. 
The current economy does not satisfy the needs for lower skilled jobs. Casinos would 
redress the need for these kinds of jobs with solid benefits. 
Cultural: Massachusetts has a unique and vital culture, steeped in history and the arts, 
and layering casinos on top of it is a disservice. 
Casinos, especially in Boston, could provide entertainment for adults in a form that 
currently is missing and could be attractive to residents and visitors. With The Lottery, Suffolk 
Downs, and neighboring states‘ casinos, gambling already exists in Massachusetts and has not 
proven to be problematic in this context. Additionally, a resort casino would regularly attract 
headline and other entertainers, enhancing night-life attractions. 
Government involvement: Supporting casinos is not the proper role for the 
Massachusetts State government. The Commonwealth, with a history of leadership on important 
social and economic issues, should advocate activities that are in line with its long-term goals 
such as developing economic sectors that cultivate and inspire growth, supporting downtowns, 
and other initiatives. 
With neighboring states already sponsoring gaming and with the potential for an in-state 
Indian casino, the Commonwealth needs to act or it could lose revenue.  
Questions about the effects of demand and substitution  
Consistently in the course of any study of the economic impact of casinos, there are 
assumptions or an interest in understanding the potential demand for casinos and the substitution 
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effects concerning local patrons and business. In particular, some of the Massachusetts people 
interviewed cautioned about the negative impact on existing local entities. 
Noting that there has not been great data on the substitution effect, people asked: 
 Do local people continue to go to other casinos if one is built nearby? Will they want 
the convenience of a local outlet or would they prefer to get away, not gamble in front 
of their neighbors and thus still go to Connecticut? 
 If local people go to local casinos, will they still support other local entities? Are the 
people who frequent, for example, downtown Northampton, going to shift some of 
that support to a casino in western Massachusetts? 
 Do people come from elsewhere to patronize casinos? What is a credible count of 
how many from Massachusetts go to Connecticut? Would visitors to Boston add an 
extra night to their stay if there were a resort casino? 
 Do people who travel to a casino support local businesses? Do they just visit gas 
stations and convenience stores or also local restaurants and shops? Are there ways to 
mitigate the negative effects on local businesses, such as including local procurement 
requirements in legislation? Is this something the government should be doing? 
 How will all this hold up over time? 
Questions abound about a tribal casino 
Many of the people we spoke with referred to a potential tribal casino as a key factor in 
their thinking about casinos in Massachusetts. While their views about its impact and how the 
Commonwealth ought to respond differed, all were curious about the jurisdictional issues 
relating to tribal law and sovereign nation status, and how federal and state law apply to the 
entity. 
Questions regarding the Lottery 
Given the dependence of cities and towns on revenue generated by the lottery, many 
people told us of their concern that casinos in Massachusetts would substantially reduce the 
Lottery‘s – and, in turn, the municipalities‘ -- revenue. They contend that the lottery probably 
already has peaked and the addition of casinos would put revenues at greater risk. They are not 
certain that the original legislation offers a reliable response for the long term. One common 
question: in general do state lottery receipts drop off in a meaningful way when a casino 
becomes active in a state? 
Caution that proper planning is needed for casinos 
People on different sides of the issue and with different roles in their communities spoke 
of the need to plan well and early for casinos. They advocated getting interested and affected 
parties to plan for and work through issues early. Also, they believed that many of the issues will 
need to be revisited over time. 
Some particular issues of concern include: 
 Increased traffic/transportation-related problems. Some prefer that casinos only be 
built in areas where mass transit systems exist so as to minimize the environmental 
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impact. Others caution that the existing traffic problems surrounding an East Boston 
location, including routes 1 and 1A, would be exacerbated and therefore need to be 
addressed. If a casino were built in western or southeastern Massachusetts, people 
wonder how much traffic would stick to the major roads and how much would end up 
flowing through the smaller roads. Such traffic-related eventualities warrant planning 
and mitigation. 
 Increase in the need for emergency medical services. Not only may there be an 
increase in EMS – needs given the clientele of the casinos – but the first responders 
also may be overburdened. A shortage of coverage would mean a reliance on mutual 
aid, a resource that also would be strained. 
 Thoughtful planning for fire safety. Fire prevention and suppression requires early 
planning and cooperation among local and state officials regarding 1) egress; 2) 
evacuation of heavier construction; 3) smoke and air handling controls; as well as 
having well-trained staff in 1) fire exiting operations; 2) evacuation; 3) maintenance. 
 Increases in gambling with negative effects on individuals and families.  
 Increases in crime, prostitution, drinking. There was range of opinion regarding how 
much to anticipate and plan for increases in these activities. Smaller communities in 
particular expressed greater concern, as they would have to staff and fund a response 
to such issues.  
Impact of Indecision 
Several people with whom we spoke also raised concerns related to the indecision 
surrounding the casino issue. They contend that key pieces of land, in Palmer and Revere, for 
example, will not be developed until the casino issue is resolved. The uncertainty and delays 
therefore stave off local improvements. Also, many wondered how many casinos would be 
appropriate, noting that three, as proposed, might be too many.  
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Section I: Macro Gaming Trends, Issues 
 
 Hubs vs. spokes 
The U.S. gaming industry has developed over the past three decades in fits and starts, 
fueled by a variety of macro factors. For example, national recessions in the early 1990s and at 
the dawn of this decade led to the legalization of riverboat gaming in Midwest states and to the 
expansion of gaming in a variety of Eastern states, such as New York and Pennsylvania. 
The arguments that appear to gain the greatest political traction in various states can be 
summarized thusly: 
 The racing industry is in steady decline, and needs a new source of funding in order 
to ensure it will remain competitive, particularly in light of the introduction of 
―racinos‖22 in neighboring states that use slot machine and other revenue to subsidize 
purses. 
 States are in need of new sources of revenue, a need that becomes particularly acute 
during periods of recession when sales taxes and other levies are often in decline. 
 Adults often cross state lines to visit casinos in other states, thus depriving their home 
state of needed revenue while subsidizing governments in other states. 
The success of such arguments makes it increasingly clear that states respond to their 
neighbors, often creating what can be termed an upward spiral. Witness, for example, what has 
occurred in the Mid-Atlantic region over the past dozen years.  
 In 1994, West Virginia approved slots-only racinos, and soon opened four such 
properties. A year later, racinos opened in nearby Delaware, which has three. 
 A decade later, Pennsylvania lawmakers approved Act 71, which authorized seven 
racinos, five stand-alone slots-only casinos and a limited number of slots (500) at two 
additional resorts.  
 Shortly after that, West Virginia authorized live table games at its racinos. 
 Officials in both Delaware and Pennsylvania have begun discussing such counter-
moves as adding live table games and, in the case of Delaware, of taking advantage of 
a federal statute that allows Delaware the opportunity to be one of only four states 
that can legally offer sports betting.23 
 Maryland, prodded by arguments that its own racing industry needs support and that 
its adults are gambling at casinos in other states, will hold a November 2008 
referendum to legalize up to 15,000 slot machines at five locations. 
                                                 
22 ―Racino is a portmanteau that combines two words: racing and casino. It has been in general use for less than a decade. 
23 Federal law enacted in 1992 outlawed sports betting except in states that already had some level of pre-authorization: Nevada, 
Oregon, Montana and Delaware. New Jersey had a limited opportunity at the time to enact sports betting, but its Legislature 
declined to act. 
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New Jersey, meanwhile, had responded during this entire period with its own efforts to 
protect and enhance the casino industry in Atlantic City. These efforts ranged from widespread 
regulatory reform in the early 1990s to legislation a decade later that encouraged casinos to 
develop non-gaming attractions. These incentives allow developers to retain some of the tax 
revenue generated on site for a limited time to help offset the cost of construction. 
The Gormley-James legislation
24
 created up to 11 ―entertainment/retail districts‖ in 
Atlantic City. Qualifying projects: 
 Are exempt from construction sales tax 
 Receive a rebate on sales taxes, up to $2.5 million per year for 20 years 
 Receive a rebate on incremental unique local entertainment taxes generated for 20 
years 
The incentives have encouraged several major expansion projects in Atlantic City. The 
following table lists the approved projects under this program: 
 
  RETAIL HOTEL PARKING COST JOBS START END 
PROJECT (sq. ft) Rooms Spaces ($millions) (permanent) Date Date 
Tropicana 179,000 500 2,400  $230  2,000 1/02 11/04 
Caesars 415,000 0 3,000  $215  1,190 9/03 6/06 
Resorts 168,000 1,159 1,500  $108  514 3/02 n/a*  
A.C. Outlet Shops 670,000 0 1,600  $205  1,348 5/02 7/04 
Borgata 179,000 800 1,400  $563  1,725 3/05 6/08 
Harrah’s/Showboat 257,646 1,360 3,697  $688  1,088 5/02 5/08 
Trump Plaza 504,000 4,612 9,850 $1,542 2,662 n/a n/a* 
Revel 420,000 1,822 7,793 $2,300 5,457 11/07 10/10* 
TOTALS 2,792,646 10,253 31,240 $5,743 20,307     
Source: New Jersey Casino Reinvestment Development Authority / * - Project not yet completed 
Viewed collectively, these moves and counter-moves have fueled growth in annual 
casino revenues within the mid-Atlantic region from $3 billion in 1994 to more than $6.5 
billion25 at present.  
One result of gaming‘s expansion throughout the nation has been the evolution of the 
casino industry into what Spectrum has termed the ―hub-and-spoke‖ business model. We define 
the ―hub‖ markets as those with the following characteristics:  
 A relatively low tax rate. 
                                                 
24 The principal sponsors were former New Jersey state Senators Sharpe James, D-Essex, and William Gormley, R-Atlantic. 
25 For purposes of this estimate, we include racinos in lower New York in the revenue total, as they compete within the same 
general customer base. 
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 A relatively high degree of capital investment. 
 A concentration of casinos in one location. 
 A relatively broad demographic and geographic reach. 
The ―spokes,‖ by contrast, are characterized by: 
 Relatively high tax rates that discourage significant capital investment. 
 A limited number of licensees with a degree of geographic protection and separation. 
 A focus on local, convenience-driven, gaming-centric customers. 
On a national level, the most prominent hubs are Las Vegas, Atlantic City and the Gulf 
Coast of Mississippi (most prominently Biloxi). The spokes – which tend to be the fastest-
growing segment of the gaming industry – are gaming properties in states such as Delaware, 
New York, Pennsylvania and other smaller markets. 
The proposed legislation in Massachusetts would arguably be termed a ―hybrid hub.‖ 
Because the legislation suggests a base 27 percent tax rate (relatively low by the standards of 
spoke markets, which often have effective rates in excess of 50 percent), along with a minimum 
$1 billion in capital investment, the policy is clearly designed to build up to three hub properties, 
i.e., destination resorts. At the same time, however, the legislation has some characteristics of 
spoke markets: chiefly, a limited number of licenses as well as geographic protection. 
Connecticut would be an example of a hybrid hub, as it has limited the number of 
participants. The state has two tribal casinos – Mohegan Sun and Foxwoods – that have 
negotiated compacts with the state that include a provision in which the state gets 25 percent of 
slot revenue (not tables), while the tribes are assured that the state will not authorize any 
additional casinos. Should there be additional casinos, the tribes would no longer have to provide 
the 25 percent share of slot revenue.26 
In a practical sense, hybrid hubs would have to rely on a combination of local customers, 
both gaming-centric and non-gaming centric, as well as efforts to generate visits from out-of-
state tourists. Such properties would still have the ability to create some level of critical mass in 
which different attractions – with different brands at multiple price points – would be in close 
proximity to each other, albeit under one general ownership. 
The core question then is: Can hybrid hubs perform as well as larger, regional hubs in 
advancing the public interest? The answer is yes, subject to certain qualifications: Hybrid hubs, 
such as those proposed in Massachusetts, would operate under tax rates generally higher than 
those that are in place in hubs such as Nevada, New Jersey and Mississippi. This tax rate, as will 
be noted in more detail later in the report, has an important impact on returns on investment, and 
thus would not automatically generate the same level of capital investment as would, say, a 
destination property in a lower-tax market. Additionally, a hybrid might not attract the critical 
mass of capital in one location that would be a powerful magnet for a broader geographic and 
demographic range of visitors. 
                                                 
26 Tribal Gaming: Sharing Revenue with States, National Conference of State Legislatures 2004 
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These caveats can be ameliorated, however, as hybrids – like hub properties – have the 
potential to add multiple brands at multiple price points under the same general ownership, or 
license. Examples of this would be the Harrah‘s properties in the center Boardwalk of Atlantic 
City – where customers can play at Caesars, Bally‘s, Claridge or Wild Wild West, which are all 
under the same ownership – and, effectively, under one roof. Other examples would include the 
planned $4 billion Echelon project in Las Vegas, as well as properties such as Mandalay Bay, 
which house various hotel flags at different price points under one corporate umbrella. Foxwoods 
in Connecticut is another example, having opened the $700 million MGM Grand at Foxwoods to 
complement its existing properties, which are already divided into multiple casinos and hotels. 
This analysis is being performed at a time of revenue declines at many gaming markets in 
North America, notably in the Northeast: Combined year-to-date (through April) gross gaming 
revenue for Connecticut (slots only), Rhode Island and New Jersey is down 5.1 percent, or 
$116.4 million, compared to the same period last year. 
Such declines raise the question of whether gaming has reached the saturation point in the 
Northeast. Or, is this decline part of a cyclical downturn due to current economic problems, 
ranging from high gas prices to tighter lending practices from banks? 
Historically, the notion that casinos were resistant to such trends could be tied to their 
relatively small demographic base, and dependence on customers who are gaming-centric in 
their spending habits, i.e., they view gaming as a serious pastime. Such customers would be less 
willing to reduce their gaming budgets, and would, in many cases, view casino visitation as 
value-oriented: They enjoy complimentary goods, beverages and/or hotel rooms (―comps‖), and 
have a theoretical potential of leaving with more than they came with. Any movement beyond 
that base will inevitably link the industry more closely to economic trends. 
Additionally, we do not know if this particular economic downturn will be worse than 
previous recessions. Economists note, for example, that the current downturn (which, at this 
writing, cannot be referred to as a recession as it does not meet the definition of a recession, 
which is two consecutive quarters of a decline in gross domestic product) is more linked to 
declines in housing prices. It is already clear, however, that the downturn – fueled by declining 
housing prices and rising commodity prices in fuel, food and other areas – is a major factor 
behind the decline in gaming revenue in many major markets in recent months. 
 
 
Evolution, success of hub markets 
The other question, with respect to reaching a saturation point, can best be addressed by 
looking at the recent history of casinos in North America. Prior to the opening of casinos in 
Atlantic City in 1978, Nevada held a monopoly on casinos, and properties in Las Vegas and 
elsewhere in the state were able to thrive by virtue of having such a monopoly. Atlantic City then 
held a monopoly in the Mid-Atlantic market, while the two casinos in Connecticut essentially 
held a duopoly on the New England market. 
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These monopolies are eroding. At the end of 2006, there were nearly 63,000 slot 
machines and 2,000 live table games at 57 Indian casinos in California,27 the key feeder for 
Nevada casinos. In the East, racetrack and Indian casinos opened and/or expanded in New York, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Delaware, thus eating into the Atlantic City and Connecticut 
feeder markets. As these monopolies and duopolies continue to erode due to the growth of 
gaming elsewhere, it forces operators in the larger markets to adapt to different business models: 
They must go beyond the core gaming-centric customer base to reach a broader array of affluent 
adults. 
Spectrum estimates that Atlantic City generally has attracted about 34 million visitor trips 
per year,28 which we project amounts to about 6 million adults visiting about 5 to 6 times per year 
each. Within the same geographic area, there is a far greater number of adults who do not visit 
Atlantic City: 20.6 million adults reside within a 120-mile radius of Atlantic City.29 
Such estimates indicate that the number of adults who could theoretically be persuaded to 
visit Atlantic City if it offered more attractive amenities is greater than the number of adults who 
would be tempted to shift some of their gaming business to more convenient casinos in 
Pennsylvania, New York and elsewhere. 
This phenomenon has already proven to be valid in Las Vegas. Las Vegas was forced to 
reinvent itself after the expansion of gaming in other states. Starting with the opening of the 
Mirage in 1989, the transformation has been astounding – and is continuing. Several new 
projects – including the $7 billion CityCenter by MGM Mirage and the $4 billion Echelon by 
Boyd Gaming – are under construction and gambling revenue continued to increase until the 
current economic downturn. 
Few people visit Las Vegas because it is the most convenient place to gamble. While its 
unique status as a legalized gambling destination was Las Vegas‘ raison d‘être for most of its 
existence, that has not been the case for many years. In fact, visitation to Las Vegas remains 
strong even though casino gambling is now located in direct Las Vegas feeder markets. Even 
with the growth of California into a $7.7 billion gaming market,30 Las Vegas continues to expand 
its revenue and visitation. The first chart below shows four years of visitation by region of origin. 
Despite the growth in California gaming, Las Vegas continues to maintain its market share from 
the West – all while growing gross gaming revenue by 46.6 percent in the four-year period 
illustrated in the two following charts. In 2007, overall visitation to Las Vegas was 39.2 million, 
up from 38.9 million in 2006 and 38.6 million in 2005.31 
                                                 
27 ―The State of the Indian Gaming Industry,‖ Analysis Group, 2007-2008 edition 
28 Gaming Industry Observer, various issues, Spectrum Gaming Group estimates. This comports with South Jersey 
Transportation Authority estimates, as cited later in the report. 
29 U.S. Census 
30 ―The State of the Indian Gaming Industry,‖ Analysis Group, 2007-2008 edition 
31 Las Vegas Convention and Visitors Authority 
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The next chart breaks down the Western region by state, and by section of California. 
Clearly, the destination casinos in Las Vegas are maintaining their draw in the California market, 
despite the growth of gaming there. 
 
An examination of Las Vegas, however, begs the question whether the lessons are limited 
insofar as other resort destinations – whether or not they offer casinos – could seriously emulate 
its experience. To some degree, they cannot – as Las Vegas has developed a critical mass of 
luxury destinations in a low-tax gaming market that effectively makes it immune to competition. 
In another sense, however, the lessons are clear and transferable: Destinations that target leisure 
spending overall will outperform markets that simply target gaming revenue, and will be less 
vulnerable to competition. 
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Public policy implications: hubs vs. spokes 
Spectrum recognizes that the debate within Massachusetts in recent months has included 
legislative suggestions for gaming that would range from installing slot machines at racetracks to 
three casino destinations. This debate essentially translates into the question: Does Massachusetts 
seek to develop a hub or spoke gaming industry? 
Our experience over recent decades leads us to conclude that developing destination 
resorts is far more likely to advance public policy on a variety of fronts: 
 Destinations generate greater capital investment, which translates into more 
construction jobs. 
 Because they deploy a much greater level of capital, destinations are better positioned 
to attract third-party retailers, restaurateurs and other attractions that can be leveraged 
to create a more enjoyable visitor experience.  
 Destinations operate under a different business model that is designed to attract a 
wider variety of adults, reaching more affluent adults and targeting a much broader 
geographic area. 
 Destinations are more likely to withstand competition from other states. 
 Perhaps most important, destinations will employ far more individuals. 
Those differences can be graphically illustrated in the following table, which shows the 
actual employment data from six properties, both the racinos and one stand-alone slot casinos 
(Mount Airy Lodge), that were operational in Pennsylvania in the first quarter of 2008: 
 
Pennsylvania casinos Operations Jobs 
Presque Isle Downs 867 
Hollywood Casino at Penn National 983 
Harrah’s Chester 1,093 
Philadelphia Park* 560 
The Meadows* 478 
Mohegan Sun at Pocono Downs* 669 
Mount Airy Lodge 950 
Total 5,600 
* Temporary facility / Source: Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board, as of April 30, 2008 
 
Note that, even under our conservative scenario, it would take more than four average 
spoke properties, as defined by the Pennsylvania model, to employ as many individuals as one 
destination casino. 
Michael E. Porter of Harvard University, in a recent analysis of how various industries 
compete, pointed out that price competition and rivalry often intensify as industries mature – but 
there are exceptions. He writes: ―For example, there has been enormous competitive activity in 
the U.S. casino industry in recent decades, but most of it has been positive-sum competition 
directed toward new niches and geographic segments (such as riverboats, trophy properties, 
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Native American reservations, international expansion and novel customer groups like families). 
Head-to-head rivalry that lowers prices or boosts the payouts to winners has been limited32.‖ 
We respectfully add to Porter‘s observation that destination casinos are far better 
equipped to target niches, largely because lower tax rates and a more comprehensive business 
model allow them to add amenities and meet the needs of these niches. In our observation, for 
example, we note that – for the most part – the larger casino destinations on the Las Vegas Strip 
tend to compete on the quality and breadth of their amenities, rather than on such price points as 
the payout percentage of their slot machines or by offering free buffets. 
The argument that destinations would be more likely to advance public policy is 
confirmed by other surveys. Vertis Communications, a Baltimore-based organization that assists 
companies in various industries better target their direct-mail and other advertising messages, 
surveyed 2,000 consumers in 2007. Overall, about 20 percent of the adult population visited a 
destination-type property in the preceding 12 months, with the average adult visiting 4.3 times. 
The ―loyalist,‖ however, visited such hubs an average of six times. According to Scott Marden, 
director of marketing research for Vertis,33 ―loyalists‖ are characterized as the ―most traditional 
(segment).‖ They tend to be a bit older, and their numbers would include more retirees and 
empty nesters. The Vertis survey was not limited to casino customers.  
The table below shows that the upside potential of destination resorts could be 
significant, as only one in five adults have visited a destination resort: 
 
In the past 12 months, how many times have you visited a casino in a major destination such as Atlantic City 
or Las Vegas? 
 Total 
Adults 
M18-24 M25-34 M35-49 M50-64 M65+ W18-24 W25-34 W35-49 W50-64 W65+ 
0 80% 85% 80% 76% 72% 81% 78% 81% 83% 80% 86% 
1 + 20% 15% 20% 24% 28% 19% 22% 19% 17% 20% 14% 
1 10% 5% 11% 12% 16% 7% 9% 10% 9% 10% 9% 
2 3% 1% 4% 4% 5% 2% 5% 3% 4% 3% 2% 
3 + 7% 9% 5% 7% 7% 11% 8% 6% 4% 8% 4% 
3 2% 2% 1% 2% 3% 3% 2% 1% 0% 2% 2% 
4 1% 3% 0% 1% 1% 1% 2% 1% 1% 2% 1% 
5 1% 1% 0% 0% 1% 2% 1% 3% 0% 1% 1% 
6-10 1% 2% 1% 2% 0% 1% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
11-20 1% 2% 3% 1% 0% 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 
21+ 1% 0% 0% 1% 1% 3% 0% 1% 0% 1% 0% 
Source: Vertis Communications 
We then compared that table with another based on the frequency of visitation to local 
casinos. Clearly, greater accessibility generates greater visitation: 
 
                                                 
32 ―The Five Competitive Forces that Shape Strategy,‖ by Michael E. Porter, Harvard Business Review,  January 2008, p. 88 
33 Gaming Industry Observer, vol. 12, no. 16, p. 1 
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In the past 12 months, how many times have you visited a casino in your local area? 
 Total 
Adults 
M18-24 M25-34 M35-49 M50-64 M65+ W18-24 W25-34 W35-49 W50-64 W65+ 
0 73% 76% 74% 70% 70% 73% 76% 72% 77% 68% 76% 
1 + 27% 24% 26% 30% 30% 27% 24% 28% 23% 32% 24% 
1 10% 7% 8% 11% 10% 6% 7% 12% 9% 13% 9% 
2 6% 4% 6% 5% 5% 8% 5% 6% 8% 5% 4% 
3 + 12% 13% 11% 15% 15% 13% 11% 11% 6% 14% 11% 
3 3% 4% 4% 5% 4% 2% 2% 3% 2% 3% 3% 
4 1% 1% 0% 1% 3% 1% 1% 1% 0% 1% 1% 
5 2% 1% 1% 3% 1% 3% 3% 4% 0% 3% 2% 
6-10 3% 4% 5% 4% 3% 3% 2% 3% 2% 3% 3% 
11-20 1% 4% 1% 1% 1% 2% 1% 1% 0% 1% 1% 
21+ 1% 0% 0% 1% 2% 2% 1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 
Source: Vertis Communications 
Notably, the Vertis survey appears to comport closely with other surveys that attempt to 
delineate the percentage of the population that would participate in casino gambling, as noted in 
more detail in the next section. 
  
Travel and leisure trends 
This section of the analysis shines a light on various trends in travel and leisure that could 
affect the potential success of destination resorts in Massachusetts. Depending on the location 
and the seasonality, we expect that destination resorts in Massachusetts will target some 
combination of extended stay, as well as some of shorter duration. For example, off-season 
occupancy anywhere in the Commonwealth would likely be shorter stays, as would conventions 
and meetings business. Seasonal demand – such as the potential to add vacationers in the Boston 
area – would also be to take advantage of the extended stay market. 
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The above chart shows that over the past six years, the majority of leisure trips has been 
of short duration while the vacation of five-plus days has accounted for less than one-fourth of 
all leisure trips. Overall, we expect that hybrid or regional hubs would focus more on the stays of 
shorter duration, as well as mid-week. This effectively bodes well for the prospect of three 
destination casinos in Massachusetts. 
The next chart, from 2007 – which makes no distinction between business and leisure 
travel – shows an increased demand for overnight accommodations.  
 
 
While more people are venturing farther from home, the list of desired destinations runs 
the gamut from destination resorts (mostly without gaming) to urban centers, as shown in the 
following 2007 chart: 
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To better understand that trend, the following chart examines what adults are looking to 
do while vacationing, and charts those desires since the beginning of the decade.  
 
 
 
Related to that chart, the following tracks the desired experiences in a hierarchy, with 
gambling near the tail end: 
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With only one out of five adults selecting gambling as a desired vacation experience, the 
next 2007 chart confirms that gambling is the primary purpose behind very few vacations (less 
than 10 percent): 
 
 
Incidence of gambling among adults 
The next part of our analysis looks at the percentage of adults who participate in 
gambling as a leisure activity. The Harrah‘s Entertainment annual survey, for example, reports 
that: ―A quarter of Americans age 21 and older – 52.8 million – gambled at a casino in 2005, 
according to the 2006 Survey. On average, gamblers visited a casino about six times during the 
year. Gamblers made 322 million trips to casinos in 2005.‖34 
The next chart shows three surveys taken over a span of four years that shows casino 
participation rates by income: 
 
                                                 
34 Profile of an American Gambler: Survey 2006, Harrah‘s Entertainment 
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The chart shows a slight decline in participation across all income levels. Yet, it is 
arguably much more significant that the greater participation rates can be found at higher income 
levels.  
The following chart shows gaming vacations by adults in various demographic groups, as 
defined by age: 
 Matures — defined as the generation born in 1945 or earlier — clearly exhibit the 
largest penetration rate for gaming vacations because they have the most available 
time.  
 Boomers were those 78 million adults born between 1946 and 1964. 
 Xers, about 46 million total, were born between 1965 and 1978. 
 Millennials, at least 71 million total, were born after 1978. 
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This series of surveys by Ypartnership and Harrah‘s Entertainment supports the notion 
that casinos rely on consumers with two necessary assets: available time (note that older adults 
tend to be more frequent visitors) and discretionary income. 
The following table is from the 2006 recent Harrah‘s Survey, which relies on a 
combination of face-to-face interviews and a mail-in questionnaire. The following table shows 
the metropolitan areas that generate the largest number of gamblers: 
 
Designated Market Area Population 
(21+) 
Participation 
rate 
 No. of gamblers  
New York City 14,806,436 33%           4,886,124  
Los Angeles 10,527,065 37%           3,895,014  
Chicago 6,716,969 29%           1,947,921  
Philadelphia 5,499,873 33%           1,814,958  
San Francisco-Oakland-Santa Rosa 4,939,763 30%           1,481,929  
Boston 4,506,221 26%           1,171,617  
Dallas-Ft. Worth 4,408,663 20%               881,733  
Washington, DC 4,311,750 17%               732,998  
Phoenix 4,291,254 38%           1,630,677  
Atlanta 4,076,401 15%               611,460  
Houston 3,767,890 22%               828,936  
Detroit 3,572,338 31%           1,107,425  
Seattle-Tacoma-Bellingham 3,175,758 32%           1,016,243  
Miami-Ft. Lauderdale 3,073,237 30%               921,971  
Minneapolis-St. Paul 3,091,439 36%           1,112,918  
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Sarasota 3,047,370 17%               518,053  
Cleveland 2,788,484 23%               641,351  
Sacramento-Stockton 2,731,976 40%           1,092,790  
Denver 2,693,721 33%               888,928  
Orlando-Daytona Beach-Melbourne 2,451,383 22%               539,304  
Total 94,477,991 29%         27,722,349  
Source: Harrah's Survey 2006 
Note that Boston is the sixth-largest designated market area (DMA) in terms of the 
number of gamblers, and is only 3 percentage points less than the average of these areas, despite 
an absence of legal casinos within the Commonwealth. We also note that, in all metropolitan 
areas, the penetration rate does not exceed 40 percent, regardless of the proximity to gamblers. 
Earlier Harrah‘s surveys provided more detail, and were similar in their conclusions. The 
2002 profile reported that Massachusetts adults made 4.8 million casino visits in 2001, equating 
to 3.8 visits per gamblers. Nearly 80 percent of the visits that year were to Connecticut casinos. 
The Boston DMA had 983,000 gamblers that year, about 78 percent of the Massachusetts total. 
The penetration rate in the 2002 report was 27.5 percent in Massachusetts and 24.7 
percent for Boston, while the national rate was 27 percent. Comparing the two surveys, the 
number of gamblers in the Boston area grew by 189,000 since 2001. 
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If the Boston area were to host one casino destination, and its penetration rate reached the 
29 percent average, it would add another 135,000 active casino gamblers. If the penetration rate 
reached 40 percent, the increase would be approximately 631,000 additional casino gamblers. 
For the entire Commonwealth, the number of active casino gamblers would grow by about 
175,000 additional gamblers if the penetration rate reached 29 percent. 
 
Methodology cross-check 
We cross-checked the Harrah‘s Survey as to the percentage of gamblers in the Boston 
DMA through published reports by Scarborough Research, a New York-based survey firm 
known for its research into such areas as the media-buying habits of adults. Scarborough 
reported in 2006 that 29.3 percent of adults in the Boston area visited a casino during the 
previous 12 months.35 That is 3 points higher than the Harrah‘s survey, but in line with national 
averages. 
Gallup has also conducted various national gambling-related polls in recent years, which 
are summarized in the following tables: 
 
 
                                                 
35 http://www.clearchanneloutdoor.com/markets/boston.htm 
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The Gallup surveys demonstrate consistency over time, and consistency with other 
surveys.  
The demographic data, including the various surveys that we have analyzed, indicate 
cause for both optimism and caution for Massachusetts. Optimism can be grounded in the 
conclusion that many Massachusetts residents are already participating in casino gambling, and 
can be expected to repatriate a significant portion of that spending to local casinos. At the same 
54%
56% 57% 57%
49%
46%46%
44% 43% 43%
51%
54%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Apr 4-9, 1989 Nov 20-22, 1992 Jun 27-30, 1996 Apr 30-May 23, 
1999 
Dec 11-14, 2003 Dec 6-9, 2007
Source: Gallup Poll
In the past 12 months, have you bought a state lottery ticket?
Yes
No
9%
12%
6% 4% 5%
91%
88%
94% 96% 95%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
Apr 4-9, 1989 Nov 20-22, 1992 Jun 27-30, 1996 Dec 11-14, 2003 Dec 6-9, 2007
Source: Gallup Poll
During the past 12 months, have you bet on a horse race?
Yes
No
 The Impacts of Expanded Gaming on the Commonwealth of Massachusetts                    53 
time, however, it is clear that adding casinos will not significantly increase visitation to 
Massachusetts from out-of-state visitors. 
The expansion of casinos to more locations, both domestically and internationally, has 
reduced the allure of casinos as unique attractions. Therefore, we suggest that any casinos 
developed in Massachusetts must coordinate their marketing efforts closely with existing tourism 
businesses. Casinos can complement existing attractions, add perceived value to tourists and 
business travelers who are considering Massachusetts as a destination, and help attract 
incremental capital investment for the tourism industry. However, it would be unrealistic to 
expect casinos to become lures for gaming-oriented tourists who already enjoy numerous 
gambling options. 
 
Leisure and hospitality: New England trends 
Any understanding of how destination casinos could be integrated into the existing 
hospitality industry in Massachusetts must be based on an analysis of: 
 Gaming‘s existing role nationwide within leisure and hospitality. 
 Massachusetts‘s existing role within the New England and national hospitality 
industries. 
As our analysis is rooted in the premise that destination casinos must be fully integrated 
into the tourism industry in order to best advance public policy, we are examining long-term 
trends in this industry to determine how the industry in Massachusetts might be impacted by the 
introduction of destination casinos.  
Commercial casinos throughout the United States directly employ about 361,000 
people,36 while the total employment within the leisure and hospitality industries exceeds 13.6 
million.37 Those numbers, however, need further amplification.  
The commercial casino industry does not include most Indian casinos – unless they 
operate under commercial licenses issued by states – or racinos where the slot machines are 
operated by state lotteries, which is the case in such states as Rhode Island, West Virginia, New 
York and Delaware. Indeed, the employment numbers would be much greater if all forms of 
gaming were taken into account. Racetrack casinos employ about 27,000 people.38 
The following tables show that Massachusetts is already host to a vibrant tourism 
industry that is the clear leader in New England. However, the tables also show that employment 
in hospitality and leisure has been relatively static in Massachusetts. The next tables examine 
leisure and hospitality employment data, both seasonally adjusted and non-seasonally adjusted 
over a span of more than a decade: 
 
 
                                                 
36 American Gaming Association. State of the States 2008 
37 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
38 American Gaming Association. State of the States 2008 
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Date  US   NE  CT   ME   MA   NH   RI   CT 
Jan-97  10,921   545.7   113.5   51.3   256.1   52.7   40.6   31.5  
Feb-97  10,952   545.3   113.4   51.1   255.8   52.6   41.0   31.4  
Mar-97  10,968   546.2   113.7   51.2   256.5   52.7   41.2   30.9  
Apr-97  10,984   545.1   113.4   51.3   255.5   52.2   41.0   31.7  
May-97  11,015   549.4   113.9   51.7   257.2   53.7   41.1   31.8  
Jun-97  11,029   550.6   114.7   51.6   257.4   54.0   40.9   32.0  
Jul-97  11,016   547.5   112.9   51.8   255.4   53.7   41.4   32.3  
Aug-97  11,030   550.8   113.4   51.9   257.7   54.4   41.5   31.9  
Sep-97  11,059   553.9   114.9   52.1   258.3   54.8   41.6   32.2  
Oct-97  11,062   555.2   114.9   52.3   259.2   54.7   41.7   32.4  
Nov-97  11,074   555.8   115.1   52.5   260.0   54.5   41.6   32.1  
Dec-97  11,087   558.2   115.4   53.3   261.1   54.6   41.7   32.1  
Jan-98  11,100   555.6   116.2   52.4   259.4   54.2   41.5   31.9  
Feb-98  11,123   559.0   116.4   53.1   261.5   54.5   41.5   32.0  
Mar-98  11,134   558.5   116.8   53.2   260.8   54.6   41.2   31.9  
Apr-98  11,156   558.6   115.3   53.2   261.4   54.6   41.8   32.3  
May-98  11,213   562.0   116.7   53.7   261.9   55.3   41.9   32.5  
Jun-98  11,215   559.7   116.4   53.1   261.5   54.7   42.0   32.0  
Jul-98  11,248   561.8   116.6   52.7   263.1   55.4   42.1   31.9  
Aug-98  11,273   564.2   117.2   53.1   264.2   55.4   42.3   32.0  
Sep-98  11,311   568.1   117.7   53.8   265.4   56.1   42.6   32.5  
Oct-98  11,298   563.7   116.8   53.1   263.9   55.9   41.7   32.3  
Nov-98  11,337   566.7   117.5   53.5   264.9   56.2   42.2   32.4  
Dec-98  11,376   567.9   118.1   53.9   266.0   56.4   42.1   31.4  
Jan-99  11,385   568.7   117.5   53.3   267.0   56.6   42.3   32.0  
Feb-99  11,425   571.7   118.5   53.8   267.4   57.0   42.7   32.3  
Mar-99  11,443   570.4   118.5   53.7   267.0   56.8   42.3   32.1  
Apr-99  11,478   578.9   119.5   54.1   272.9   56.1   43.8   32.5  
May-99  11,506   577.3   119.3   54.3   270.8   56.3   44.0   32.6  
Jun-99  11,539   578.5   119.9   54.0   271.3   56.5   44.4   32.4  
Jul-99  11,546   578.4   120.4   53.8   270.4   57.0   44.1   32.7  
Aug-99  11,567   579.4   120.3   54.2   270.4   57.3   44.4   32.8  
Sep-99  11,597   580.8   120.4   54.5   271.2   57.5   44.5   32.7  
Oct-99  11,648   586.6   120.6   56.7   272.8   58.1   45.3   33.1  
Nov-99  11,682   582.9   120.5   54.3   272.5   57.1   45.3   33.2  
Dec-99  11,706   580.8   120.6   54.2   271.8   56.8   45.8   31.6  
Jan-00  11,713   584.2   120.5   55.2   271.9   57.3   46.4   32.9  
Feb-00  11,719   584.9   120.5   55.4   272.3   57.7   46.0   33.0  
Mar-00  11,788   586.9   121.0   55.9   272.8   57.9   46.3   33.0  
Apr-00  11,834   585.4   120.1   55.5   274.6   58.1   45.9   31.2  
May-00  11,827   582.7   119.6   55.5   271.3   57.9   45.7   32.7  
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Date  US   NE  CT   ME   MA   NH   RI   CT 
Jun-00  11,869   589.0   121.3   56.1   273.6   58.4   46.2   33.4  
Jul-00  11,900   590.6   120.9   56.2   275.4   58.7   46.5   32.9  
Aug-00  11,927   589.2   120.9   56.1   274.7   58.3   46.3   32.9  
Sep-00  11,940   590.7   121.7   55.9   275.4   58.5   46.0   33.2  
Oct-00  11,876   593.1   121.9   56.5   276.7   58.6   46.3   33.1  
Nov-00  11,946   594.8   122.2   56.2   277.8   58.7   46.9   33.0  
Dec-00  11,976   596.3   122.5   56.1   278.2   58.9   46.8   33.8  
Jan-01  11,977   595.6   119.6   56.6   279.8   59.4   46.5   33.7  
Feb-01  11,997   595.8   119.6   56.0   280.8   59.5   46.6   33.3  
Mar-01  12,000   596.0   119.7   56.2   281.0   59.2   46.7   33.2  
Apr-01  12,040   594.4   117.8   57.0   278.8   59.7   47.0   34.1  
May-01  12,068   594.8   119.6   56.4   279.2   59.8   47.0   32.8  
Jun-01  12,076   597.7   119.5   56.8   281.7   59.8   47.0   32.9  
Jul-01  12,110   595.4   119.6   56.8   279.8   59.4   46.8   33.0  
Aug-01  12,093   596.3   120.1   56.9   280.0   59.3   47.0   33.0  
Sep-01  12,061   592.6   118.9   56.5   278.5   59.0   47.1   32.6  
Oct-01  12,015   592.2   119.8   56.4   277.1   59.5   46.8   32.6  
Nov-01  11,985   594.0   119.9   56.5   278.1   59.9   46.7   32.9  
Dec-01  11,967   590.5   120.2   55.2   278.3   59.4   46.8   30.6  
Jan-02  12,006   597.3   121.5   56.5   279.4   59.7   47.1   33.1  
Feb-02  11,962   598.9   121.8   56.6   280.3   59.8   47.3   33.1  
Mar-02  11,965   603.3   122.1   57.2   282.7   60.5   47.9   32.9  
Apr-02  11,928   605.9   122.9   57.0   283.5   61.0   48.2   33.3  
May-02  11,936   607.1   123.0   57.2   284.7   61.0   48.2   33.0  
Jun-02  11,905   607.2   123.1   57.1   285.1   60.7   48.0   33.2  
Jul-02  11,912   607.3   123.1   57.5   285.0   60.8   48.2   32.7  
Aug-02  11,936   608.4   122.9   57.5   286.0   61.0   48.2   32.8  
Sep-02  11,991   608.5   122.8   57.6   286.4   60.8   48.1   32.8  
Oct-02  12,070   612.0   123.7   58.2   287.4   61.5   48.3   32.9  
Nov-02  12,109   611.2   123.3   57.0   287.8   61.9   48.3   32.9  
Dec-02  12,112   613.2   123.4   57.8   289.3   61.3   47.8   33.6  
Jan-03  12,176   613.2   123.4   58.2   288.2   61.2   48.9   33.3  
Feb-03  12,132   610.9   123.6   58.2   286.7   61.0   48.5   32.9  
Mar-03  12,113   610.0   123.7   58.2   285.9   60.6   48.6   33.0  
Apr-03  12,087   605.6   123.4   57.6   283.5   60.4   48.7   32.0  
May-03  12,092   614.0   124.4   58.4   287.8   61.8   48.9   32.7  
Jun-03  12,115   610.7   124.5   58.0   286.9   60.7   48.3   32.3  
Jul-03  12,145   614.8   125.6   58.6   287.4   61.3   49.4   32.5  
Aug-03  12,164   616.7   125.8   58.7   288.2   62.0   49.2   32.8  
Sep-03  12,195   617.3   126.2   58.3   288.7   61.9   49.3   32.9  
Oct-03  12,245   620.3   127.0   58.8   289.9   62.3   49.4   32.9  
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Date  US   NE  CT   ME   MA   NH   RI   CT 
Nov-03  12,284   620.1   127.1   59.1   289.4   62.1   49.4   33.0  
Dec-03  12,333   618.7   126.6   58.9   288.4   62.7   49.3   32.8  
Jan-04  12,360   619.4   126.8   58.4   289.5   62.6   49.2   32.9  
Feb-04  12,377   619.9   126.8   58.7   289.1   63.0   49.2   33.1  
Mar-04  12,421   619.4   126.6   58.4   289.6   63.1   48.9   32.8  
Apr-04  12,433   620.2   126.6   58.5   290.3   63.2   49.3   32.3  
May-04  12,485   622.5   127.0   58.6   290.4   63.7   49.7   33.1  
Jun-04  12,495   622.8   127.3   58.9   290.1   63.5   49.7   33.3  
Jul-04  12,495   626.2   127.6   58.6   292.6   63.9   50.0   33.5  
Aug-04  12,492   625.5   127.9   58.9   291.1   64.1   50.1   33.4  
Sep-04  12,553   628.1   129.1   59.3   291.4   64.5   50.3   33.5  
Oct-04  12,577   627.2   128.3   58.9   291.7   64.4   50.4   33.5  
Nov-04  12,609   627.1   128.1   59.2   291.9   64.5   50.4   33.0  
Dec-04  12,638   627.5   128.6   59.2   292.2   64.3   50.6   32.6  
Jan-05  12,666   625.3   128.0   59.1   291.3   63.4   50.4   33.1  
Feb-05  12,696   627.3   128.9   59.0   292.4   63.3   50.7   33.0  
Mar-05  12,712   625.9   128.9   58.8   291.5   63.1   50.4   33.2  
Apr-05  12,780   630.1   129.8   59.2   293.4   63.8   50.4   33.5  
May-05  12,801   627.6   129.6   59.0   292.5   63.2   50.1   33.2  
Jun-05  12,837   627.8   129.6   59.0   292.7   63.2   50.3   33.0  
Jul-05  12,859   628.8   129.1   59.3   293.0   63.9   50.1   33.4  
Aug-05  12,888   627.8   129.7   59.3   292.9   62.8   50.0   33.1  
Sep-05  12,871   628.7   129.9   59.1   293.4   63.2   50.1   33.0  
Oct-05  12,847   625.3   129.4   59.3   290.9   62.7   50.1   32.9  
Nov-05  12,896   629.5   130.2   59.4   293.4   63.0   50.2   33.3  
Dec-05  12,918   631.7   130.3   60.2   293.5   63.8   50.2   33.7  
Jan-06  12,938   631.3   131.2   59.5   293.9   63.4   50.2   33.1  
Feb-06  12,973   631.3   131.2   59.5   294.4   63.4   49.7   33.1  
Mar-06  13,028   634.4   132.3   59.9   294.8   63.8   50.3   33.3  
Apr-06  13,058   632.5   131.5   59.8   294.7   63.0   50.3   33.2  
May-06  13,045   630.8   131.7   59.5   293.3   62.5   49.9   33.9  
Jun-06  13,057   635.8   132.3   60.4   295.2   63.5   50.2   34.2  
Jul-06  13,127   634.1   132.2   59.4   295.6   64.2   49.9   32.8  
Aug-06  13,159   635.3   132.5   59.4   296.1   63.9   50.2   33.2  
Sep-06  13,166   636.4   132.7   59.6   295.7   64.7   50.6   33.1  
Oct-06  13,202   633.9   132.7   59.3   293.8   64.1   51.0   33.0  
Nov-06  13,247   635.0   132.9   59.8   294.5   64.0   50.7   33.1  
Dec-06  13,288   637.0   133.1   60.5   295.0   64.1   50.8   33.5  
Jan-07  13,306   636.1   134.8   60.0   294.4   63.9   50.0   33.0  
Feb-07  13,331   636.9   135.0   60.0   294.9   63.8   50.1   33.1  
Mar-07  13,351   639.5   135.8   60.3   295.6   64.0   50.3   33.5  
Apr-07  13,375   642.2   135.6   60.6   297.3   63.8   51.0   33.9  
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Date  US   NE  CT   ME   MA   NH   RI   CT 
May-07  13,428   638.5   134.6   59.5   296.0   63.2   51.0   34.2  
Jun-07  13,461   645.9   135.8   61.0   298.6   64.8   51.3   34.4  
Jul-07  13,476   643.5   135.3   59.7   299.3   65.2   51.0   33.0  
Aug-07  13,494   645.9   135.2   59.6   300.8   65.9   51.1   33.3  
Sep-07  13,552   646.9   135.5   59.8   300.4   66.2   51.8   33.2  
Oct-07  13,604   642.9   135.3   59.7   298.4   64.3   51.9   33.3  
Nov-07  13,628   644.6   135.3   60.1   300.1   64.0   51.6   33.5  
Dec-07  13,650   645.8   135.1   60.9   300.7   63.8   51.6   33.7  
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
 
We then examined the region by share of total leisure and hospitality employment: 
Share by state: New England leisure and hospitality employment (not seasonally adjusted) 
 CT ME MA NH RI VT 
Jan-97 21.2% 8.5% 46.7% 9.6% 7.2% 6.7% 
Feb-97 21.1% 8.4% 46.8% 9.6% 7.4% 6.7% 
Mar-97 21.2% 8.5% 47.0% 9.5% 7.4% 6.4% 
Apr-97 21.3% 8.9% 47.4% 9.2% 7.5% 5.6% 
May-97 21.0% 9.5% 47.3% 9.5% 7.6% 5.2% 
Jun-97 20.6% 10.0% 46.7% 9.9% 7.6% 5.3% 
Jul-97 20.0% 10.7% 45.8% 10.4% 7.6% 5.5% 
Aug-97 19.8% 10.7% 45.9% 10.5% 7.5% 5.5% 
Sep-97 20.2% 10.1% 46.5% 10.1% 7.6% 5.6% 
Oct-97 20.4% 9.5% 47.2% 9.7% 7.5% 5.7% 
Nov-97 21.1% 8.9% 47.6% 9.3% 7.6% 5.4% 
Dec-97 21.2% 8.7% 47.0% 9.5% 7.5% 6.2% 
Jan-98 21.3% 8.5% 46.5% 9.7% 7.3% 6.7% 
Feb-98 21.1% 8.6% 46.7% 9.7% 7.3% 6.7% 
Mar-98 21.3% 8.6% 46.8% 9.6% 7.2% 6.5% 
Apr-98 21.2% 9.0% 47.3% 9.4% 7.5% 5.6% 
May-98 21.0% 9.6% 47.1% 9.6% 7.5% 5.2% 
Jun-98 20.6% 10.1% 46.6% 9.9% 7.6% 5.2% 
Jul-98 20.2% 10.6% 46.0% 10.4% 7.5% 5.3% 
Aug-98 20.0% 10.7% 45.9% 10.4% 7.5% 5.4% 
Sep-98 20.2% 10.2% 46.6% 10.0% 7.6% 5.5% 
Oct-98 20.5% 9.4% 47.3% 9.8% 7.4% 5.6% 
Nov-98 21.1% 8.9% 47.6% 9.5% 7.6% 5.4% 
Dec-98 21.3% 8.7% 47.0% 9.7% 7.4% 5.9% 
Jan-99 21.0% 8.5% 46.7% 10.0% 7.2% 6.6% 
Feb-99 21.0% 8.5% 46.6% 10.0% 7.3% 6.6% 
Mar-99 21.1% 8.5% 46.9% 9.8% 7.3% 6.4% 
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 CT ME MA NH RI VT 
Apr-99 21.2% 8.9% 47.7% 9.3% 7.6% 5.4% 
May-99 20.9% 9.5% 47.4% 9.5% 7.7% 5.0% 
Jun-99 20.5% 9.9% 46.8% 9.9% 7.8% 5.1% 
Jul-99 20.2% 10.6% 45.9% 10.4% 7.6% 5.3% 
Aug-99 20.0% 10.6% 45.8% 10.5% 7.7% 5.4% 
Sep-99 20.2% 10.1% 46.6% 10.0% 7.7% 5.4% 
Oct-99 20.3% 9.7% 47.0% 9.8% 7.8% 5.5% 
Nov-99 21.1% 8.7% 47.6% 9.4% 7.9% 5.4% 
Dec-99 21.3% 8.6% 47.0% 9.5% 7.9% 5.8% 
Jan-00 21.0% 8.5% 46.3% 9.8% 7.7% 6.6% 
Feb-00 20.9% 8.5% 46.4% 9.9% 7.7% 6.6% 
Mar-00 21.0% 8.6% 46.6% 9.8% 7.7% 6.4% 
Apr-00 21.0% 9.0% 47.4% 9.6% 7.9% 5.1% 
May-00 20.8% 9.6% 47.0% 9.7% 8.0% 5.0% 
Jun-00 20.4% 10.1% 46.3% 10.0% 8.0% 5.2% 
Jul-00 19.9% 10.8% 45.8% 10.5% 7.9% 5.2% 
Aug-00 19.8% 10.8% 45.8% 10.4% 7.9% 5.3% 
Sep-00 20.1% 10.2% 46.5% 10.0% 7.9% 5.4% 
Oct-00 20.3% 9.5% 47.1% 9.7% 7.8% 5.4% 
Nov-00 20.9% 8.9% 47.5% 9.5% 8.0% 5.2% 
Dec-00 21.0% 8.6% 46.8% 9.6% 7.8% 6.1% 
Jan-01 20.4% 8.6% 46.8% 10.0% 7.6% 6.6% 
Feb-01 20.3% 8.5% 47.0% 10.0% 7.6% 6.6% 
Mar-01 20.4% 8.5% 47.2% 9.9% 7.6% 6.3% 
Apr-01 20.3% 9.1% 47.5% 9.7% 8.0% 5.5% 
May-01 20.4% 9.5% 47.4% 9.8% 8.0% 4.9% 
Jun-01 19.8% 10.1% 47.0% 10.1% 8.0% 5.0% 
Jul-01 19.5% 10.8% 46.1% 10.5% 7.9% 5.2% 
Aug-01 19.4% 10.9% 46.1% 10.5% 7.9% 5.3% 
Sep-01 19.5% 10.2% 46.9% 10.0% 8.0% 5.2% 
Oct-01 20.0% 9.5% 47.3% 9.9% 7.9% 5.3% 
Nov-01 20.6% 8.9% 47.6% 9.7% 8.0% 5.2% 
Dec-01 20.8% 8.6% 47.3% 9.8% 7.9% 5.5% 
Jan-02 20.7% 8.6% 46.6% 10.0% 7.6% 6.5% 
Feb-02 20.6% 8.5% 46.6% 10.0% 7.7% 6.5% 
Mar-02 20.6% 8.6% 46.9% 10.0% 7.8% 6.2% 
Apr-02 20.8% 8.9% 47.4% 9.7% 8.0% 5.2% 
May-02 20.5% 9.5% 47.3% 9.8% 8.1% 4.8% 
Jun-02 20.0% 10.0% 46.8% 10.1% 8.0% 5.0% 
Jul-02 19.7% 10.8% 46.1% 10.5% 8.0% 5.0% 
Aug-02 19.5% 10.8% 46.2% 10.5% 7.9% 5.2% 
Sep-02 19.7% 10.1% 47.0% 10.1% 8.0% 5.1% 
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Oct-02 20.0% 9.5% 47.5% 9.9% 7.9% 5.2% 
Nov-02 20.6% 8.8% 47.9% 9.8% 8.0% 5.0% 
Dec-02 20.6% 8.7% 47.3% 9.8% 7.8% 5.9% 
Jan-03 20.5% 8.6% 46.8% 10.0% 7.7% 6.4% 
Feb-03 20.5% 8.6% 46.7% 10.0% 7.8% 6.3% 
Mar-03 20.6% 8.6% 46.9% 9.9% 7.8% 6.1% 
Apr-03 20.9% 9.0% 47.4% 9.6% 8.1% 5.0% 
May-03 20.5% 9.5% 47.3% 9.8% 8.1% 4.7% 
Jun-03 20.2% 10.1% 46.8% 10.0% 8.1% 4.9% 
Jul-03 19.8% 10.8% 46.0% 10.4% 8.0% 5.0% 
Aug-03 19.6% 10.8% 46.0% 10.5% 8.0% 5.1% 
Sep-03 19.9% 10.1% 46.7% 10.1% 8.1% 5.1% 
Oct-03 20.3% 9.5% 47.2% 9.9% 8.0% 5.1% 
Nov-03 20.9% 9.0% 47.4% 9.7% 8.1% 5.0% 
Dec-03 20.9% 8.8% 46.7% 9.9% 8.0% 5.7% 
Jan-04 20.8% 8.5% 46.5% 10.2% 7.7% 6.3% 
Feb-04 20.8% 8.5% 46.4% 10.2% 7.8% 6.3% 
Mar-04 20.8% 8.5% 46.7% 10.2% 7.7% 6.0% 
Apr-04 20.9% 8.9% 47.4% 9.8% 8.0% 4.9% 
May-04 20.7% 9.4% 47.1% 10.0% 8.1% 4.8% 
Jun-04 20.2% 10.0% 46.4% 10.3% 8.1% 5.0% 
Jul-04 19.8% 10.6% 46.0% 10.6% 8.0% 5.0% 
Aug-04 19.7% 10.7% 45.8% 10.7% 8.0% 5.1% 
Sep-04 20.0% 10.1% 46.3% 10.4% 8.1% 5.1% 
Oct-04 20.3% 9.4% 47.0% 10.1% 8.1% 5.1% 
Nov-04 20.8% 8.9% 47.3% 9.9% 8.2% 4.9% 
Dec-04 20.9% 8.7% 46.7% 10.0% 8.1% 5.6% 
Jan-05 20.8% 8.5% 46.4% 10.2% 7.8% 6.2% 
Feb-05 20.9% 8.5% 46.4% 10.2% 7.9% 6.2% 
Mar-05 21.0% 8.5% 46.5% 10.0% 7.9% 6.0% 
Apr-05 21.1% 8.9% 47.2% 9.8% 8.1% 5.0% 
May-05 20.9% 9.4% 47.0% 9.8% 8.1% 4.7% 
Jun-05 20.4% 10.0% 46.4% 10.2% 8.1% 4.9% 
Jul-05 19.9% 10.7% 45.9% 10.6% 8.0% 5.0% 
Aug-05 19.9% 10.7% 46.0% 10.5% 7.9% 5.0% 
Sep-05 20.1% 10.1% 46.6% 10.2% 8.1% 5.0% 
Oct-05 20.5% 9.5% 47.0% 9.8% 8.1% 5.1% 
Nov-05 21.1% 8.9% 47.4% 9.6% 8.1% 4.9% 
Dec-05 21.1% 8.8% 46.6% 9.9% 7.9% 5.7% 
Jan-06 21.2% 8.5% 46.4% 10.1% 7.7% 6.2% 
Feb-06 21.1% 8.5% 46.4% 10.1% 7.7% 6.1% 
Mar-06 21.3% 8.6% 46.4% 10.0% 7.8% 5.9% 
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Share by state: New England leisure and hospitality employment (not seasonally adjusted) 
 CT ME MA NH RI VT 
Apr-06 21.3% 9.0% 47.2% 9.6% 8.0% 5.0% 
May-06 21.2% 9.4% 46.9% 9.6% 8.0% 4.8% 
Jun-06 20.6% 10.1% 46.2% 10.1% 8.0% 5.0% 
Jul-06 20.2% 10.6% 46.0% 10.4% 7.9% 4.9% 
Aug-06 20.1% 10.6% 46.1% 10.3% 7.9% 5.0% 
Sep-06 20.4% 10.0% 46.5% 10.1% 8.1% 4.9% 
Oct-06 20.8% 9.4% 46.8% 9.9% 8.1% 5.0% 
Nov-06 21.3% 8.8% 47.2% 9.7% 8.1% 4.9% 
Dec-06 21.3% 8.8% 46.4% 9.9% 7.9% 5.6% 
Jan-07 21.5% 8.4% 46.1% 10.2% 7.7% 6.1% 
Feb-07 21.5% 8.4% 46.2% 10.1% 7.7% 6.1% 
Mar-07 21.6% 8.5% 46.3% 10.0% 7.7% 5.9% 
Apr-07 21.6% 8.9% 46.9% 9.7% 8.0% 4.9% 
May-07 21.3% 9.3% 46.7% 9.8% 8.1% 4.8% 
Jun-07 20.8% 10.0% 46.0% 10.1% 8.1% 5.0% 
Jul-07 20.4% 10.5% 45.8% 10.5% 7.9% 4.9% 
Aug-07 20.2% 10.6% 45.8% 10.5% 8.0% 5.0% 
Sep-07 20.5% 10.0% 46.3% 10.2% 8.1% 4.9% 
Oct-07 20.9% 9.4% 46.9% 9.8% 8.1% 5.0% 
Nov-07 21.4% 8.7% 47.3% 9.6% 8.1% 4.9% 
Dec-07 21.4% 8.7% 46.7% 9.7% 8.0% 5.6% 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Note the remarkable consistency of Massachusetts‘ share of employment within the New 
England leisure and hospitality industry: Although there has been some minor fluctuation 
throughout the decade, Massachusetts accounted for precisely 46.7 percent of this industry‘s 
employment at both ends of this 10-year span.  
We also examined wages and salaries within this industry, as noted in the following 
chart: 
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Massachusetts has a slightly higher share of wages and salaries within leisure and 
hospitality (nearly 50 percent) than it does of the number of jobs, which clearly indicates that the 
Commonwealth retains a healthy tourism industry that has not suffered from a lack of gaming. 
At the same time, Connecticut has made gaming a major centerpiece of its leisure and hospitality 
employment (directly accounting for about 15 percent of the industry‘s workforce). Even with 
gaming, however, Connecticut‘s tourism infrastructure is significantly smaller than 
Massachusetts‘; a fact that could bode well for the success of gaming in the Commonwealth. 
Additionally, we looked at hotel occupancy. The following chart demonstrates the 
breadth of seasonality for Massachusetts hotels, but also shows that occupancy has increased 
perceptibly during 2007 over previous years. 
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The next step would be then to examine hotel occupancy within different regions in the 
Commonwealth: 
  Occupancy Rate 
  2007 2006 % Chg 
United States 63.2 63.3 -0.2 
Massachusetts 63.0 62.1 1.4 
Barnstable County, MA 53.5 53.5 0.0 
Berkshire County, MA 47.5 46.5 2.2 
Bristol County, MA 51.7 53.8 -3.9 
Essex County, MA 60.3 58.3 3.4 
Hampden County, MA 54.0 55.0 -1.8 
Hampshire County, MA 58.6 56.4 3.9 
Middlesex County, MA 64.6 63.2 2.2 
Norfolk County, MA 67.0 64.6 3.7 
Plymouth County, MA 58.9 56.4 4.4 
Suffolk County, MA 76.1 76.0 0.1 
Worcester County, MA 55.4 54.2 2.2 
Source: Massachusetts Office of Travel & Tourism 
 
Seasonality is having an apparent impact on leisure and hospitality, largely due to the 
stark shifts in weather patterns. The following two charts examine average highs and lows in 
both Boston and Worcester: 
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Note that the variances between the average temperatures are starker than the seasonal 
shifts in occupancy. This is likely due to the sustainability of business travel, which should 
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operate independently of weather patterns. For example, Suffolk County – which would have the 
highest level of business travel – also exhibits the highest occupancy rates. 
Seasonality is less of an issue in gaming resorts than it would be in other tourist 
destinations that rely on particular seasons. For example, Atlantic City is clearly not as 
dependent on the summer season as other New Jersey shore towns, yet seasonality still plays a 
role: 
Atlantic City automobile traffic, by month: South Jersey Transportation Authority Data 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Average 
January 1,707,387  1,937,993  1,948,775  1,912,756  1,827,175  2,015,719  1,967,799 1,902,515  
February 1,689,029  1,969,819  1,710,465  2,008,456  1,894,555  1,932,387  1,829,950  1,862,094  
March 1,905,696  2,171,512  2,164,954  2,026,672  2,080,965  2,215,707  2,154,194  2,102,814  
April 1,922,309  2,058,979  2,074,527  2,056,619  2,111,822  2,187,467  2,091,741  2,071,923  
May 2,018,674  2,232,071  2,260,437  2,250,030  2,239,191  2,315,949  2,253,545  2,224,271  
June 2,030,908  2,334,737  2,296,337  2,268,694  2,248,950  2,351,451  2,378,374  2,272,779  
July 2,286,862  2,527,093  2,588,064  2,584,076  2,618,367  2,534,737  2,595,586  2,533,541  
August 2,206,208  2,556,632  2,634,026  2,559,652  2,511,614  2,608,799  2,558,347  2,519,325  
September 1,962,000  2,182,509  2,143,972  2,257,909  2,109,960  2,266,751  2,236,052  2,165,593  
October 1,914,461  2,101,481  2,174,069  2,027,974  2,091,127  2,141,169  2,168,434  2,088,388  
November 1,823,758  1,998,934  2,000,494  1,907,578  2,001,640  2,049,855  2,087,411  1,981,381  
December 1,655,416  1,974,025  2,000,000  1,953,963  1,980,519  2,048,693  2,018,437  1,947,293  
Total 23,122,708  26,045,785  25,996,120  25,814,379  25,715,885  26,668,684  26,339,870  25,671,919  
 
Percentage of total Atlantic City automobile traffic, by month: South Jersey Transportation Authority data 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 average 
January 7.4% 7.4% 7.5% 7.4% 7.1% 7.6% 7.5% 7.4% 
February 7.3% 7.6% 6.6% 7.8% 7.4% 7.2% 6.9% 7.3% 
March 8.2% 8.3% 8.3% 7.9% 8.1% 8.3% 8.2% 8.2% 
April 8.3% 7.9% 8.0% 8.0% 8.2% 8.2% 7.9% 8.1% 
May 8.7% 8.6% 8.7% 8.7% 8.7% 8.7% 8.6% 8.7% 
June 8.8% 9.0% 8.8% 8.8% 8.7% 8.8% 9.0% 8.8% 
July 9.9% 9.7% 10.0% 10.0% 10.2% 9.5% 9.9% 9.9% 
August 9.5% 9.8% 10.1% 9.9% 9.8% 9.8% 9.7% 9.8% 
September 8.5% 8.4% 8.2% 8.7% 8.2% 8.5% 8.5% 8.4% 
October 8.3% 8.1% 8.4% 7.9% 8.1% 8.0% 8.2% 8.1% 
November 7.9% 7.7% 7.7% 7.4% 7.8% 7.7% 7.9% 7.7% 
December 7.2% 7.6% 7.7% 7.6% 7.7% 7.7% 7.7% 7.6% 
 
Spectrum expects that Atlantic City, due to its similar seasonal weather patterns, would 
provide useful guidance in what to expect at Massachusetts destination resorts outside of major 
metropolitan areas. In a major urban center such as Boston, which already has a significant 
business travel element, the gaming industry would further smooth out the seasonal shifts, and 
could – depending on the type of facility and the size and quality of the amenities – add 
significant off-season business in other areas. The keys to determining that would include the 
level of access from other areas, as well as the number of hotel rooms. In the off-season, as in 
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mid-week, hotel rooms would primarily function as marketing tools used to reward loyal gaming 
customers. 
 Reducing the sharp dips in seasonality would be one public-policy goal of using gaming 
to advance the leisure and hospitality industries. Another would be to add a significant attraction 
that would expand employment, while working in tandem with existing attractions. 
 
Integrating gaming and tourism 
Gaming can enhance tourism, but will not, by itself, move the visitation needle much 
simply because casinos are becoming increasingly omnipresent in multiple markets. Gaming can 
work best if it: 
 Becomes a catalyst to attract additional capital investment. 
 Extends the length of stay. 
 Extends the tourism season. 
 Is fully integrated into the tourism infrastructure. 
We note, for example, that many of the leaders in Massachusetts who we interviewed in 
preparing this report are asking critical questions and are examining this issue realistically. Some 
of the suggested aspirations include: 
 Boosting the conventions and meetings business by adding a new attraction that could 
also extend the length of stay. 
 Targeting some high-end European travelers who might otherwise visit Las Vegas but 
would find another gaming destination appealing, since Massachusetts is significantly 
closer to Europe. 
As the following chart shows, there might be some opportunity to grow foreign travel: 
 
 The Impacts of Expanded Gaming on the Commonwealth of Massachusetts                    66 
 
 
Foreign gaming-related travel, however, is not an uncontested market. Atlantic City, 
Connecticut and the expanding Seminole Hard Rock properties in Florida (which recently agreed 
to a compact with the state that allows them to develop full-service Class III gaming) will also 
compete for that segment, and have similar geographic advantages. Canada, the United Kingdom 
and Germany were the top three countries of origin of international visitors and accounted for 54 
percent of all international visitors to Massachusetts in 2006. As Massachusetts is already 
growing its share of foreign travel, gaming would offer a positive, yet limited boost to this trend. 
Additionally, the second-home market can potentially boost gaming revenue, as well as 
be boosted by it. We note that, in recent years, Barnstable and Berkshire counties were two of the 
most successful second-home markets in the nation, as measured by price appreciation.39 That 
raises an additional question that would clearly be subject to varying opinions: Would a casino 
help or hurt the ambience of a second-home market? That would, naturally, depend on the buyer. 
All we can do is point out that Las Vegas and the New Jersey shore have – until the recent sub-
prime mortgage crisis struck – served as strong second-home markets as well. 
Three destination casinos spread geographically throughout the Commonwealth can have 
a material – albeit limited – impact on tourism. Three properties would likely not displace any 
existing gaming markets from their current positions. Las Vegas has achieved an effectively 
unassailable position as a national gaming destination. Atlantic City boasts a concentration of 
capital investment in one location that is not burdened by a limit on the number of licenses. 
Atlantic City casinos also operate with a tax rate of 8 percent (plus a 1.25 percent reinvestment 
obligation that offers a below-market return to casinos), which gives Atlantic City a significant 
competitive edge over the proposed 27 percent rate in Massachusetts. 
                                                 
39 ―Everybody's doing it: Prices in coastal towns and resort areas have risen sharply in recent years," January 27, 2004, 
Money.CNN.Com 
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Similarly, the two Indian casinos in Connecticut would have a slight tax advantage over 
Massachusetts (Connecticut receives 25 percent of slot revenue; table revenue is not taxed), and 
also have a head start of more than a decade in developing a critical mass of hotel rooms, retail, 
dining and other attractions. 
Both Atlantic City and Connecticut are migrating away from convenience-driven 
gamblers, moving toward convention attendees and other segments of the population that are 
relatively untapped. To some degree, the existing tourism industry in Massachusetts has a head 
start in attracting the sort of leisure traveler now being targeted by other East Coast destinations. 
If destination casinos are approved, the public policy goals for Massachusetts should be to 
protect its existing market share, and to leverage the new attraction to grow its visitor base. 
The following charts compare Massachusetts40 to Las Vegas as destinations: 
  
 
Massachusetts has a smaller visitor base, yet its visitors are slightly more affluent than 
Las Vegas visitors. The percentage of Massachusetts visitors in 2004 with annual incomes 
exceeding $100,000 was 26.5 percent. In contrast, the percentage of Las Vegas visitors in 2006 
with annual incomes over $100,000 was 24 percent. As noted earlier, the Harrah‘s Survey 
indicates that adults with annual household incomes exceeding $95,000 are the most likely 
income group to visit a casino. This income group has a casino participation rate of 31 percent.  
Massachusetts reports a higher percentage of visitors with annual incomes exceeding 
$75,000 and $100,000 than either Las Vegas or Connecticut casinos.41 Since these higher-income 
adults visit casinos at higher percentage rates than any other income groups, Massachusetts has 
an opportunity to successfully market casino gaming to these adults.  
                                                 
40 Massachusetts figures are reported on a fiscal year basis and, therefore, the 2005 figures represent the last six months of 2005 
and the first six months of 2006 and the 2006 figures are for the 12-month period from July 2006 to June 2007.  
41 Las Vegas Convention and Visitors Authority, Massachusetts Office of Travel & Tourism, Massachusetts Center for Policy 
Analysis 
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Gaming would not likely alter most of the basic characteristics of the Massachusetts 
visitor base:42 
 It still will have a high percentage of day-trip visitors: 32.9 percent at present. 
 The average length of stay in Massachusetts – 3.2 nights for overnight visitors, and 
2.1 nights overall – will not appreciably change. 
 Most visitors – 82 percent at present – will still arrive via ground transportation. 
We issue that cautionary note in large measure because Massachusetts already attracts 
about 23 million annual visitors, and three destination casinos cannot be expected to materially 
shift the demographics or patterns of that visitor base. 
Still, destination casinos can produce positive change in areas that are both growing, and 
are at risk. For example, the Greater Boston Convention & Visitors Bureau indicated that 
extending the length of stay is a priority. Restaurants, hotels and others are fearful that casinos 
will compete against them for either customers or employees. The public-policy challenge then 
would be to require any successful bidder for a gaming license to develop a comprehensive 
marketing strategy that: 
 Leverages and enhances existing attractions. 
 Is fully integrated into the regional and statewide marketing programs. 
 
Strategies for integration of gaming, tourism 
Over the past three decades, gaming has evolved into a form of mainstream 
entertainment. Part of that evolution has been the successful balance between casinos and other 
area attractions. Quite simply, the greater the effort at integration, the more successfully gaming 
can work as a tool of public policy. This has been a relatively recent change in the nature of 
gaming, fueled in part by two internal trends that have started to take hold over the past decade: 
 The casino industry – particularly in hub markets – has moved away from a business 
model that attempted to keep visitors inside the four walls of the property at all costs, 
ignoring outside attractions. 
 The capital-intensive focus on hub properties – which can generate greater returns on 
investment than spoke properties – has allowed operators in such markets to broaden 
their appeal, leveraging tourism as a tool to increase the length of stay and the 
frequency of visitation, as well as expand the geographic and demographic 
boundaries.  
Atlantic City offers unique insights into the trend. The early development of casinos – a 
period we define roughly as between 1978, when the first casino opened, to the early 1990s, 
when Atlantic City faced its first competition from other gaming markets in the East – was 
largely defined by casinos clearly focused on keeping customers inside their properties. Non-
                                                 
42 Massachusetts Office of Travel & Tourism 
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gaming departments, such as food and beverage, were often viewed as cost centers designed to 
reward casino customers, rather than as potential revenue sources. 
For example, Atlantic City had 116 apparel stores in December 1979, a month when its 
third casino hotel opened. By September 1981, shortly before the opening of its ninth casino, the 
number was down to 62, while the number of eating and drinking establishments during the same 
period dropped from 240 to 191.43 
In more recent years, Atlantic City has reported a spectacular rebound in both retail and 
restaurants. Three malls have opened in the past five years, two of which are attached to casinos. 
The number of outlets that serve food is estimated at 800, with about half being classified as 
restaurants.44 
Many of the new outlets in Atlantic City are considered to be top performers. For 
example, Morton‘s, The Steakhouse, a high-end, 140-seat restaurant at Caesars at the foot of the 
Atlantic City Expressway, in its first year generated more sales than all but four of the chain‘s 70 
outlets, and set an internal record by serving 550 covers in one night.45 This turnaround can be 
attributed to several factors, including: 
 Tax incentives introduced by the state (as noted earlier) that encouraged non-casino 
investment by allowing developers to retain some taxes generated on-site to help 
offset the cost of construction. 
 The changing nature of the casino industry, in which destination properties attempt to 
fully integrate themselves into the tourism industry. 
 The growing challenge posed by competition from other states that forced operators 
to move beyond their core base of local customers. 
Casinos, by their nature, generate tremendous volumes of visitation on a daily basis, but 
not all visitors, by definition, are tourists. In fact, in the gaming markets that we defined as 
―spokes,‖ the casino patrons are predominantly ―locals.‖ That is, they are regular patrons within 
a two-hour drive, who gamble for a few hours, then return home. They typically do not respond 
to tourist messages. Casinos with hotels, naturally, will attract patrons who will travel farther, 
stay longer, spend more and may be more receptive to trial of attractions, services and 
establishments beyond the casino property. 
In recent months, we have interviewed approximately a dozen officials around the United 
States with expertise in the merging of gaming and tourism, and many participated in a survey 
that we conducted in 2007.46 Whether gaming is the dominant industry – as it is in Atlantic City – 
or simply another bullet in the region‘s tourism arsenal – as is the Seminole Hard Rock 
Hollywood Hotel & Casino in South Florida – casinos are promoted as just one component of the 
city‘s or region‘s overall tourism mix. Ellen Oppenheim, president and chief executive officer of 
                                                 
43 ―Hostage to Fortune: Atlantic City and Casino Gambling,‖ by Michael Pollock, Center for Analysis of Public Issues, Princeton, 
NJ, 1987, citing Atlantic County Division of Economic Development. 
44 Atlantic City Department of Public Health 
45 Gaming Industry Observer, Vol. 11, no. 14 
46 This section of the report includes a number of quotes and facts gleaned from these interviews with tourism experts. Most of 
these were conducted in 2007. Some – as noted in the text – were interviewed for this specific study. 
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the Reno-Sparks Convention and Visitors Authority in Nevada, addressed the issue succinctly: 
―We don‘t promote casinos. We make people aware that gaming is available.‖ 
Las Vegas, as noted earlier, has limited value as a model for Massachusetts but still offers 
a rather telling example as to how gaming can potentially be both a driving force for tourism and 
a key component in a larger tourism infrastructure. Increasingly, major casino properties in Las 
Vegas are embracing tourism beyond its gaming component. For example, major resort 
properties tend to select a few operators to provide door-to-door tours of the Grand Canyon for 
hotel guests. The operators include small private tours in a Suburban (nine hours door-to-door); a 
motor coach (11 hours door-to-door); and, helicopter tours (three–four hours door-to-door). 
While we do not know the percentage of visits that originate in Las Vegas, the Grand Canyon 
generates 5 million visits per year.47 
Similar tours are offered for Hoover Dam, about 30 miles southeast of Las Vegas, and 
Red Rock Canyon, about 15 miles west of Las Vegas. Additionally, Las Vegas has embraced 
other attractions, from the canopied Fremont Street Experience to outlet shopping. Casinos have 
also developed a close partnership with the Las Vegas Convention and Visitors Authority, an 
agency that has taken the lead on developing general image and marketing campaigns for the 
resort. 
Nationwide, the relationship between casinos and their host tourism agencies is described 
as good but not great, although there are exceptions, such as in southeastern Connecticut, the 
Mississippi Gulf Coast and New Orleans. Casinos support tourism efforts in general, recognizing 
that the more visitors to their host city will result in more visitors to their properties. Casinos, 
however, generally are not active promoters of tourism beyond their property boundaries. Their 
efforts typically are limited to making patrons aware of other establishments and attractions 
through literature racks and concierge services. John M. Hutar, vice president for hotel 
operations for the MGM Grand Detroit Casino, noted that his casino‘s effort to promote tourism 
elsewhere in the city is ―limited to CVB (Detroit Metro Convention and Visitors Bureau) 
collateral made available.‖ Hutar added, ―Since Detroit is primarily a local gaming market, each 
casino markets their property on their own, supporting CVB initiatives as they deem 
appropriate.‖ 
Casinos, however, do seek representation on CVBs and tourism agencies, owing to the 
large visitor counts that casinos generate. In some markets, achieving the proper casino 
representation on a tourism or CVB board is a careful balancing act. Tourism expert Peter 
Yesawich, chairman and chief executive officer of Ypartnership in Orlando, Fla., suggests that 
casino representation be ―proportional with the economic impact of the industry on the 
destination expenditures made by visitors.‖ Allowing casino representation on a tourism board 
can have the additional benefit of securing marketing or operational funds from the casino 
industry. 
An over-emphasis by tourism agencies on the casino product – notably in markets where 
casinos are not dominant – can lead to complaints of favoritism among nongaming 
establishments or attractions. This can further lead to an erosion of support – financial or 
otherwise – among nongaming members of the tourism agency and among the business 
community at large. 
                                                 
47 National Park Service 
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To encourage casino patrons to visit nongaming establishments and attractions, there first 
must be a compelling reason for the patron to leave the casino property. That is, there must be 
―something in it for me.‖ Further, casino management must also recognize that such initiatives 
will add value to their patrons‘ visits in order to lend the gaming industry‘s support to the effort.  
Coupons and similar promotions are an effective means of achieving this result. In 
Atlantic City, for instance, players enrolled in the Harrah‘s Entertainment‘s Total Rewards 
loyalty-card program can redeem their loyalty-club points (similar to frequent-flyer points) to 
buy merchandise and meals at The Pier, a major retail, dining and entertainment complex on the 
Boardwalk. The former Sands Casino Hotel in Atlantic City previously undertook a program in 
which players could redeem their loyalty-club points at The Walk/Atlantic City Outlets, a non-
casino retail complex in midtown Atlantic City. In southeastern Connecticut, area hotels report 
that 30 percent to 70 percent of their business is related to Foxwoods and Mohegan Sun – even 
though those two casinos combined have more than 2,000 hotel rooms of their own. Many 
members of Mystic Coast & Country Travel Industry Association Inc. do have shuttle runs to 
and from the casinos to encourage cross-visitation. Previously, there were programs in which 
casino buses from New York City or Philadelphia would also stop at the Tanger Outlet Center in 
Westbrook or the Clinton Crossing Premium Outlets in Clinton.  
We suggest certain strategies can be implemented to help ensure that gaming advances 
the public policy of boosting the leisure and hospitality industries in Massachusetts. The solution 
in such instances is to weigh applicants for licensure, in part, on how they intend to negotiate 
arrangements between themselves and local businesses and to develop arrangements with those 
businesses that offer the requisite level of service. Such arrangements must recognize and serve 
the interests of both the casino and the outside business. 
The program basics are as follows: As casino customers are identified and their play is 
rated, they are awarded complimentaries or bonuses. Customers are then eligible to redeem these 
rewards at the participating non-gaming partner‘s establishments. The casino is then charged 
back from the non-gaming partner, at a discounted rate off the retail price. Although each casino 
operator‘s programs may have a different name, promotion or packaging, the basic mechanics 
remain the same.  
For example, as a local restaurant partners with a Massachusetts casino resort, the casino 
would direct customers to utilize their awards in that establishment. The restaurant would not 
only reap the benefits of advertising and publicity, but also would be given new customers. If the 
restaurant has reservation policies, they would all be incorporated into the program. The casino 
operator, because of the volume of business it would send, would in essence become one of the 
establishment‘s bigger customers. Although this business is discounted, the incremental returns 
that the restaurant owner receives far exceed any expense.  
Indeed, a casino patron whose meal is free or subsidized is more likely to order higher-
margin, more profitable items, from alcoholic beverages to dessert and coffee. 
The economic structure of these programs has been consistent in most gaming 
jurisdictions. Casino operators will pre-determine the specifics such as volume estimates, 
redemption dates and award values and coordinate all program details and procedures well in 
advance with the non-gaming partners. The non-gaming establishments would charge the casino 
operators for all redeemed awards and be reimbursed by the casino operator within 30 days of 
the transaction.  
 The Impacts of Expanded Gaming on the Commonwealth of Massachusetts                    72 
In exchange for this business, participating non-gaming partners will be required to 
discount the charge back to the casino, usually in range of 5 percent to 25 percent (off retail 
price). So if a customer has dinner at a partnering restaurant and spends $100, the casino would 
reimburse the reconciliation of the discount and the charge back is handled strictly as an internal 
billing system and is not seen by the customers. The program‘s discount percentage may 
fluctuate based on the type of partner (restaurant, retailer, hotel, entertainment attraction, etc.). In 
addition it can be pre-agreed upon to fluctuate during peak and non-peak business times.  
Examples of this include the relationship the Tropicana Casino Resort has with a local 
Atlantic City restaurant, where it sends its best slot customers. The Hard Rock casino in Fort 
Lauderdale sends its premium slot players by bus 20 minutes away to an Italian restaurant that is 
a haunt for celebrities.  
Prominent Biloxi, Miss., restaurateur Bobby Mahoney in 1998 noted the impact of this 
type of partnering arrangement with the city‘s casinos on his landmark Mary Mahoney‘s Old 
French House Restaurant: ―My revenue is up probably 60 or 70 percent (since casinos). When 
people come here, 25 percent do the casino thing; the other 75 percent, they want to get out, walk 
around and see what‘s going on.‖48 
The same newspaper story noted the cooperation between the casino industry and non-
casino business in Biloxi: 
―Casino executives say they understand their role in promoting the whole coast. They 
encourage their guests to play golf (22 courses), go deep-sea fishing (more than 50 
charter boats), attend special events (Mardi Gras, Cruisin‘ the Coast), go shopping 
(antiques to outlet malls), enjoy the beach (26 miles of white sand) and visit attractions 
such as Jefferson Davis‘ Beauvoir estate, the Maritime & Seafood Industry Museum, 
NASA‘s Stennis Space Center, and the Mardi Gras Museum.  
―‗We like to let our guests know what‘s going on in the area. There are wonderful 
synergies between all the other things going on and what we offer,‘ said Jeff Dahl, 
general manager of Casino Magic. 
―Casinos often encourage guests to eat at non-casino restaurants, and in some cases pick 
up the bill.‖49 
Notably, at this writing, the trend toward encouraging third-party restaurants and others 
to develop non-gaming attractions in or near casinos is also evolving in what we have termed the 
―spoke‖ markets in Pennsylvania and elsewhere. The following account is from a newspaper in 
the Poconos region of northeast Pennsylvania: 
―The entry foyer in the Ruth‘s Chris Steak House at Mohegan Sun at Pocono Downs 
will incorporate metal, glass and tile elements. The Bocci chandelier matches lights in 
the dining room. 
―That might sound like a formula for tension, but everyone involved in building new 
restaurants at Mohegan Sun at Pocono Downs is nearly giddy at the prospects for the 
finished product. 
                                                 
48 The Press of Atlantic City, October 18, 1998 
49The Press of Atlantic City, October 18, 1998 
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―Each casino operator has its own approach to filling space beyond the gambling floor; 
some prefer to build and run their own restaurants and shops while others lease out 
space to experienced operators. The permanent casino scheduled to open at the Downs 
in August will blend the two approaches. 
―‗We believe that a mix makes sense,‘ Downs CEO Bobby Soper said on Monday, after 
he announced the eateries and shops that will ring the casino‘s 2,500 slot machines. 
―‗Leased spaces bring in brands and concepts that have instant goodwill and brand 
loyalty,‘ he explained. 
―Three upscale restaurants will be located adjacent to one another and will be accessible 
without entering the casino floor, allowing persons under 21 to go for a meal. 
―‗What they did is they opened the casino up to anyone,‘ said Jim Cafarelli, who will 
open his third Rustic Kitchen Bistro & Bar at the Downs. 
―A Ruth‘s Chris Steak House brings a national brand but with local connections – the 
franchise will be built and operated by The Metz Group of Dallas, which runs the 
employee cafeteria in the Downs‘ interim casino. 
―‗Since they opened I‘ve always thought we‘d try to figure out how to get a restaurant 
inside,‘ said Jeff Metz, president of the family-owned firm.  
―He added that when Soper gave him a crack at one of the spaces, ‗We didn‘t know 
what brand we‘d be looking for.‘ 
―The selection was helped by extensive research the Mohegans conducted to find out 
what the market would support. 
―‗Ruth‘s Chris is something that, from both a brand and relationship standpoint, seemed 
to make sense,‘ Soper said. 
―Bar Louie, which touts itself as a hip, urban bar and restaurant, will round out the trio 
of high-end food and entertainment venues that each occupy about 8,000 square feet. 
―The formula for these partnerships is simple: ‗They gave us the box and we need to fill 
it,‘ Metz said succinctly.‖50 
 
Gaming in historic settings 
Spectrum cautions that such partnerships between casinos and other hospitality 
businesses are not always so simple to establish. Areas of Massachusetts – from Boston to Cape 
Cod and other regions – already have tourism industries that have an existing identity that may or 
may not work well with gaming. Rep. Thomas Conroy, for example, was one who raised a 
number of telling questions, including issues related to how gaming would work with – or 
possibly conflict with – tourism elements in Massachusetts, including Boston, that are tied to 
historical sites. 
                                                 
50 ―Casino Eateries a Mix,‖ by Ron Bartizek, Wilkes-Barre Times Leader, April 3, 2008 
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In part, we can look at Philadelphia, another major northeastern urban center with a rich 
heritage tied to colonial days. Philadelphia, by state law, is allotted two casinos (which could 
open as early as 2010) within its municipal boundaries, and has two more currently operating just 
beyond the city limits. None of the Philadelphia officials with whom we have spoke in recent 
years expects casinos to overshadow Philadelphia‘s cultural heritage, or to alter it in any material 
way. Still, we suggested to them – as we do to leaders in Massachusetts – to take steps to help 
integrate gaming with existing attractions.  
To help address that, we examined two markets that have prominent historic and gaming 
attractions. 
Deadwood, South Dakota 
We interviewed George Milos, executive director of the Deadwood Chamber of 
Commerce, and Chuck Turbiville, executive Director of the Deadwood Economic Development 
Corporation. 
Deadwood markets itself as follows: ―Located in the Black Hills of South Dakota, 
historic Deadwood, with its ongoing restoration, is being transformed back into the Wild West 
place that once drew the likes of Wild Bill Hickok and Calamity Jane. The entire town is a 
registered National Historical Landmark that is full of modern day fun with over 80 gaming halls 
offering a variety of slot machines and live table games.‖51 
Deadwood offers a Historical Deadwood Getaway Package, a National Parks and 
Monuments Package, and other historical, adventure and sightseeing packages, some of which 
include gaming and entertainment coupons for use at casinos. Deadwood also promotes a 
Historical Deadwood Gaming Special, which offers a chance to ―play like a legend in historic 
Deadwood, South Dakota,‖ and ―test your luck in the most notorious town in the Black Hills.‖ 
The Gaming Special offers ―casino style gaming and lots of free attractions at historical sites,‖ 
and includes free trolley tokens, lodging and $350 in Wild Bill‘s gaming and entertainment 
coupons. 
The tourism officials we interviewed indicated that, based on all their research, the visitor 
base of Deadwood is a 50-50 mix of ―strong gamers‖ and ―historical visitors.‖ The strong gamers 
are those visitors who live within a 100-mile radius of Deadwood and, first and foremost, visit 
Deadwood to gamble at the casinos. Since Deadwood is the only casino gaming offered in this 
region, Deadwood‘s marketing efforts are not directed at these visitors, who tend to be repeat 
casino patrons.  
The other group, the historical visitors, is the target of Deadwood‘s tourism marketing 
efforts. This group is typically from outside a 100-mile radius of Deadwood and it is the 
historical aspects of Deadwood that attract this segment to town. This is done through marketing 
special events and promotions featuring Deadwood‘s National Historic Landmark status. Once 
these visitors arrive in Deadwood, it is the individual casino property owners who are 
responsible for marketing casino gaming to these visitors.  
  
                                                 
51 Deadwood Chamber of Commerce, via www.deadwood.org 
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Vicksburg, Mississippi 
Vicksburg first gained national prominence as the site of a siege in 1863 when the Union 
forces captured it, gaining control over the Mississippi River. For nearly 80 years, Vicksburg 
was known for its refusal to celebrate July 4
th
 – the date of its surrender – as a holiday. It is still a 
prominent historic site, but is also home to four riverboat casinos and a 50,000 square-foot 
convention center. 
The Vicksburg Convention and Visitors Bureau informs visitors to visit Vicksburg and 
―you will appreciate all Vicksburg has to offer as you choose how you‘ll spend your days and 
nights.‖52 In addition to 63 historical sites and Civil War landmarks on the National Register of 
Historic Places, quiet antebellum bed and breakfasts, African American heritage sites, and 
recreation activities along the Mississippi River, Vicksburg offers visitors a chance to ―step out 
to the casinos and play until dawn.‖ Vicksburg casinos offer ―around the clock entertainment 
opportunities,‖ shopping, casual and fine dining, and a wide range of lodging. 
Visitors are encouraged to try their luck on the riverboat casinos and enjoy the variety of 
entertainment offered at the ―floating palaces.‖ The emphasis is on the casinos as a nighttime 
destination: ―Nightfall finds me following the bright lights over to the four casinos located along 
the river,‖ where musical entertainment in the casino lounges, gaming and shopping are the 
prime attractions. 
Spectrum interviewed Bill Seratt, executive director of the Vicksburg Convention and 
Visitors Bureau. He indicated that because casino gaming is a relatively new product (10 years) 
for this region, there has been no research to evaluate the local tourism market. He said the initial 
focus of casino gaming in Vicksburg has been to establish a ―universal casino base of gamers,‖ 
which is a ―separate breed‖ from the ―cultural or history based travel tourist.‖ He said there is 
―very little evidence of cross-over‖ between these two distinct segments of the Vicksburg visitor 
base. However, he indicated that as the local casino gaming industry matures, they hope to 
pursue opportunities to cross-market Vicksburg to increase its total visitor base. 
Seratt said that because Vicksburg is located on Interstate 20, which is the major East-
West road in the region, it is able to attract visitors from greater distances than other casino 
markets. He indicated that the cultural/history-based travel tourists tend to travel greater 
distances to visit Vicksburg than the casino patrons.  
                                                 
52 http://www.vicksburgcvb.org/visit/index.html 
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Section II: Economic Impacts 
 
Gaming revenue projections  
This section of our analysis has been developed in two phases. First, we look at the basic 
demand for the type of planned destination casinos, absent any specific marketing programs that 
would rely on hotel rooms to target and reward gaming customers. This allows us to 
conservatively project the level of demand based on population within a reasonable driving 
distance. Second, we follow that with certain assumptions regarding the potential use of hotel 
rooms as marketing tools to develop our revenue estimates. 
In endeavoring to project a range of gaming revenues for three destination casinos in the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, we began with certain assumptions. Each casino, according to 
the proposed legislation, would be situated in one of three regions: 
 Region 1 - Suffolk, Middlesex and Essex counties 
 Region 2 - Norfolk, Bristol, Plymouth, Nantucket, Dukes and Barnstable counties 
 Region 3 - Worcester, Hampshire, Hampden, Franklin and Berkshire counties 
We were not able to project precise locations, nor should anyone infer from this analysis 
that we are suggesting specific locations. We are, in this analysis, assuming that each of the three 
would be located near the geographic center of each region. While we assume there will be 
destination casinos, as defined in the legislation, we did not make any assumptions beyond what 
would be considered a base project that meets the criteria. 
 Spectrum has constructed a capital investment model for a resort prototype, which would 
be of the nature of the Borgata in Atlantic City, NJ. As a model, this type of facility would be an 
attraction and at least somewhat competitive to the Connecticut tribal operators. The following 
assumptions were used in Spectrum‘s model: 
 160,000 square-foot casino 
 3,000 slot machines 
 180 live table games: 120 traditional, 60 poker 
 Six restaurants: 400-seat buffet, 150-seat coffee shop, 150-seat casual outlet, two 150-
seat specialty outlets, 150-seat deli  
 Two bars 
 One nightclub 
 2,000-room hotel at 530 square feet per regular room, four-fixture bathroom 
 100,000 square feet of convention/meeting/event space 
 20,000 square feet of retail space 
 5,000-space guest parking garage 
 1,800-space employee parking facility 
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 One indoor pool and spa 
While the assumptions above may be less than those found in Connecticut and other 
destination markets, we built these assumptions for reasons that we believe are both necessary 
and compelling: 
 Projects of such magnitude rarely build out to their full potential at the outset, and are 
more likely phased in as operators develop more brand awareness, build a loyalty 
program and its attendant database and – most importantly – gain confidence in the 
market. This latter point requires a high level of confidence in the regulatory and 
political climate, and an understanding that the rules – including the tax rate – do not 
change for the worse insofar as the business is concerned. 
 Our mandate in any such endeavor is to be conservative. The suggested legislation is 
fraught with too many unknowns – particularly with respect to precise locations, 
capital budgets and other relevant factors – that render it impossible to develop 
projections that are more precise. 
Our assumptions are also built on real-world knowledge of how gaming markets operate, 
and this includes certain factors that we believe need to be considered in any such analysis: 
 Properties of such magnitude take approximately three years to fully develop their 
business model. This length of time is necessary to adjust staffing levels, to ensure the 
right mix of games and amenities and, most important, to build a database of loyal 
customers that can be effectively mined and marketed. That is why our analysis 
focuses on a stabilized Year 3. 
 Existing properties, particularly in Connecticut, will not stand idly and accept a 
significant decline of business from one of their primary markets. Such properties 
already have access to a large database of Massachusetts adults, and they can be 
expected – wherever possible – to increase the value and variety of offerings to these 
customers to hold on to their present level of revenue. Additionally, we can expect 
Connecticut casinos to leverage other advantages – such as the ability to provide 
smoking areas as well as the absence of any tax on table-games revenue – to limit any 
damage from Massachusetts‘ competition. 
In this initial phase of our revenue projections, we do not assume the existence of 
marketing programs that would leverage hotel rooms. Later in this section, we will make certain 
assumptions regarding the use of hotel rooms. 
Our methodology in developing this phase of the model is to examine a variety of factors 
for each of these properties, which we assumed to be in the center of each of these regions. These 
factors include, but are not limited to: 
 Total population 
 Number of adults 
 The number and quality of competitors with in a two-hour drive  
 Number of slots and tables within that drive time 
 The type and quality of amenities of each competitor 
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 Each competitor‘s distance from center of each region  
 The gaming value of each region adjusted for household income levels 
 
With that in mind, we have developed the following projections. As noted, these are 
projections for Year 3, which we would consider the first stabilized year: 
 
 
Region 1 
Stabilized Year 3 Low Case Moderate Case High Case 
Adults  7,784,294   7,784,294   7,784,294  
Avg. annual trips per gaming adult 6.7 6.7 6.7 
Region One Share of Visits 16.0% 20.0% 24.0% 
Gaming Value per Visit  $150   $150   $150  
Gross Gaming Revenue  $ 350,480,031   $ 438,100,038   $ 525,720,046  
Slot Win per Unit per Day  $224   $280   $336  
Table Win per Unit per Day  $ 2,741   $ 3,421   $ 4,101  
Poker Win per Unit per Day  $350   $450   $550  
Calculated Gaming Tax @ 27%  $ 94,629,608   $ 118,287,010   $ 141,944,412  
Actual Gaming Tax Paid  $ 100,000,000   $ 118,287,010   $ 141,944,412  
Effective gaming Tax Rate 28.5% 27% 27% 
 
 
Region 2 
Stabilized Year 3 Low Case Moderate Case High Case 
Adults  7,046,663   7,046,663   7,046,663  
Avg. annual trips per gaming adult 6.7 6.7 6.7 
Region One Share of Visits 16.0% 20.0% 24.0% 
Gaming Value per Visit  $161   $161   $161  
Gross Gaming Revenue  $ 339,477,794   $ 424,347,242   $ 509,216,691  
Slot Win per Unit per Day  $217   $271   $326  
Table Win per Unit per Day  $ 2,650   $ 3,488   $ 3,965  
Poker Win per Unit per Day  $350   $450   $550  
Calculated Gaming Tax @ 27%  $ 91,659,004   $ 114,573,755   $ 137,488,506  
Actual Gaming Tax Paid  $ 100,000,000   $ 114,573,755   $ 137,488,506  
Effective Gaming Tax Rate 29.5% 27.0% 27.0% 
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Region 3 
Stabilized Year 3 Low Case Moderate Case High Case 
Adults  7,154,330   7,154,330   7,154,330  
Avg. annual trips per gaming adult 6.7 6.7 6.7 
Region One Share of Visits 16.0% 20.0% 24.0% 
Gaming Value per Visit  $130   $130   $130  
Gross Gaming Revenue $279,597,149  $ 349,496,437   $ 419,395,724  
Slot Win per Unit per Day  $179   $223   $268  
Table Win per Unit per Day  $ 2,158   $ 2,693   $ 3,227  
Poker Win per Unit per Day  $350   $450   $550  
Calculated Gaming Tax @ 27%  $ 75,491,230   $ 94,364,038   $ 113,236,845  
Actual Gaming Tax Paid  $ 100,000,000   $ 100,000,000   $ 113,236,845  
Effective Gaming Tax Rate 35.7% 28.6% 27.0% 
 
 
The tables above are summarized for all of Massachusetts in the following table: 
 
Total State 
Stabilized Year 3 Low Case Moderate Case High Case 
Adults  8,140,831   8,140,831   8,140,831  
Avg. annual trips per gaming adult  6.7   6.7   6.7  
MA Share of MA feeder Visits 43.2% 54.0% 64.8% 
Gaming Value per Visit  $147   $147   $147  
Gross Gaming Revenue $969,554,974  $1,211,943,717   $1,454,332,460  
Slot Win per Unit per Day  $211   $261   $313  
Table Win per Unit per Day  $ 2,577   $ 3,234   $ 3,801  
Poker Win per Unit per Day  $350   $450   $550  
Calculated Gaming Tax @ 27%  $ 261,779,843   $ 327,224,804   $ 392,669,764  
Actual Gaming Tax Paid  $ 300,000,000   $ 332,860,766   $ 392,669,764  
Effective Gaming Tax Rate 30.9% 27.5% 27.0% 
 
This analysis – which does not include the use of hotel rooms as marketing tools – shows 
that the three properties would generate between 6.6 million and 9.9 million annual visits, which 
would translate into between 18,000 and 27,000 daily visits to casinos. 
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The following tables provide the detailed assumptions for each region, based on three 
scenarios, for a stabilized Year 3: 
 
  Region 1  
Stabilized Year 3 Low Case Moderate case High case 
2-hour drive population 10,379,058  10,379,058  10,379,058  
Adult % 0.75 0.75 0.75 
Adults 7,784,294  7,784,294  7,784,294  
Gaming Incidence Rate 0.28 0.28 0.28 
Adult visitors (“gamers”) 2,179,602  2,179,602  2,179,602  
Avg. annual trips per adult 6.7 6.7 6.7 
Annual Gaming Visits 14,603,335  14,603,335  14,603,335  
Region One Share of Visits 16.0% 20.0% 24.0% 
Region One Gaming Visits 2,336,534  2,920,667  3,504,800  
Gaming Value per Visit  $150.00   $150.00   $150.00  
Gross Gaming Revenue  $350,480,031   $438,100,038   $525,720,046  
Days 365 365 365 
Gross Slot Win  $245,336,021   $306,670,027   $368,004,032  
Slot Win per Unit per Day  $224.05   $280.06   $336.08  
Units 3,000  3,000  3,000  
Gross Table Win  $100,034,009   $124,860,011   $149,686,014  
Table Win per Unit per Day  $ 2,740.66   $ 3,420.82   $ 4,100.99  
Table Units 100 100 100 
Gross Poker Win  $ 5,110,000   $ 6,570,000   $ 8,030,000  
Poker Units 40  $ 6,570,000  40 
Poker Win per Unit Per Day  $350  40  $550  
 
 
   Region 2  
Stabilized Year 3 Low Case Moderate case High case 
2-hour drive population 9,395,551  9,395,551  9,395,551  
Adult % 0.75 0.75 0.75 
Adults 7,046,663  7,046,663  7,046,663  
Gaming Incidence Rate 0.28 0.28 0.28 
Adult visitors (“gamers”) 1,973,066  1,973,066  1,973,066  
Avg. annual trips per adult 6.7 6.7 6.7 
Annual Gaming Visits  13,219,540  13,219,540  13,219,540  
Region Two Share of Visits 16.0% 20.0% 24.0% 
Region Two Gaming Visits 2,115,126  2,643,908  3,172,690  
Gaming Value per Visit  $160.50   $160.50   $160.50  
Gross Gaming Revenue  $339,477,794   $424,347,242   $509,216,691  
Days 365 365 365 
Gross Slot Win  $237,634,456   $297,043,070   $356,451,683  
Slot Win per Unit per Day  $217.02   $271.27   $325.53  
Units  3,000  3,000  3,000  
Gross Table Win  $96,733,338   $127,304,173   $144,735,007  
Table Win per Unit per Day  $2,650.23   $ 3,487.79   $ 3,965.34  
Table Units 100 100 100 
Gross Poker Win  $5,110,000   $ 6,570,000   $ 8,030,000  
Poker Units 40 40 40 
Poker Win per Unit Per Day  $ 350   $450   $550  
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Region 3  
Stabilized Year 3 Low Case Moderate case High case 
2-hour drive population 9,539,106  9,539,106  9,539,106  
Adult % 0.75 0.75 0.75 
Adults 7,154,330  7,154,330  7,154,330  
Gaming Incidence Rate 0.28 0.28 0.28 
Adult visitors (“gamers”) 2,003,212  2,003,212  2,003,212  
Avg. annual trips per adult 6.7 6.7 6.7 
Annual Gaming Visits  13,421,522   13,421,522  13,421,522  
Region Three Share of Visits 16.0% 20.0% 24.0% 
Region Three Gaming Visits 2,147,444  2,684,304  3,221,165  
Gaming Value per Visit  $130.20   $130.20   $130.20  
Gross Gaming Revenue  $279,597,149   $349,496,437   $419,395,724  
Days 365 365 365 
Gross Slot Win  $195,718,004   $244,647,506   $293,577,007  
Slot Win per Unit per Day  $178.74   $223.42   $268.11  
Units  3,000   3,000  3,000  
Gross Table Win  $78,769,145   $98,278,931   $117,788,717  
Table Win per Unit per Day  $2,158.06   $2,692.57   $ 3,227.09  
Table Units 100 100 100 
Gross Poker Win  $5,110,000   $6,570,000   $ 8,030,000  
Poker Units 40 40 40 
Poker Win per Unit Per Day  $ 350   $ 450   $550  
 
Hotel rooms as casino marketing tools 
These revenue assumptions, by design, do not represent the full potential of three 
destination casinos in Massachusetts. Hotel rooms can be used quite effectively as marketing 
tools that would generate additional incremental revenue. We note that, in a seasonal market 
such as Massachusetts, the rooms would likely be targeted during the off-season and midweek to 
casino customers. If, for example, one 2,000-room hotel sets aside half of its available room 
nights to casino customers who have a theoretical value (i.e., projected gambling loss) of at least 
$200 per day, that alone would add $73 million in gaming revenue to our estimates per property. 
That is a conservative scenario, and the use of rooms to reward gaming customers and encourage 
loyalty and repeat visitation could be much higher than that. 
We have used our existing scenarios to calculate the incremental gaming ―lift‖ that could 
be generated in the three regions from the use of hotel rooms as marketing tools. The next table 
reflects certain assumptions, including an assumed 50 percent of all room nights would be set 
aside for casino customers. (In Atlantic City, the figure is at least 64 percent, based on an 
extrapolation of publicly available data.) The value of those overnight casino guests varies, as 
measured as a multiple of the gaming values established in the models that were delineated 
earlier. The assumptions in this model are that this is incremental revenue, over and above the 
projections in our base model. With an expectation that there is more than one adult per occupied 
room, in most rooms, this section of our model does not show the total gaming revenue that 
would be generated per room night, but focuses on the incremental revenue that could be 
generated by such marketing programs. 
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The results are as follows: 
Low Case 
 Region 1 Region 2 Region 3 
Rooms          2,000           2,000           2,000  
Occupancy rate, gaming customers 50% 50% 50% 
Ratio of overnight guest value to standard visitor              1.9               1.7               1.2  
Incremental $ value of room night, gaming customers  $279.0   $253.0   $180.0  
 Incremental gaming revenue (in millions)   $101.8   $98.6   $56.9  
Moderate Case 
 Region 1 Region 2 Region 3 
Rooms          2,000           2,000           2,000  
Occupancy rate, gaming customers 50% 50% 50% 
Ratio of overnight guest value to standard visitor              1.9               1.8               1.8  
Incremental $ value of room night, gaming customers  $285.0   $ 281.0   $228.0  
 Incremental gaming revenue (in millions)   $104.0   $102.5   $83.2  
High Case 
 Region 1 Region 2 Region 3 
Rooms          2,000           2,000           2,000  
Occupancy rate, gaming customers 50% 50% 50% 
Ratio of overnight guest value to standard visitor              2.2               2.0               1.9  
Incremental $ value of room night, gaming customers  $323.0   $313.0   $247.0  
 Incremental gaming revenue (in millions)   $117.7   $114.2   $90.3  
 
In a practical sense, we suggest that the judicious use of marketing programs and 
amenities to expand gaming revenue could add significantly to annual gaming revenue statewide. 
We note, additionally, that three new properties in Massachusetts would compete against each 
other, as well as with properties in Connecticut and elsewhere and could not take such 
incremental growth for granted. Based on our conservative assumptions, this summarizes our 
gaming revenue scenarios: 
 
Total est. gross gaming revenue (in millions) 
 Region 1 Region 2 Region 3 Total 
Low case $452.3  $438.1   $  336.4   $  1,226.8  
Moderate case $542.1  $526.8   $  432.7   $  1,501.6  
High case $643.4  $623.4   $  509.7   $  1,776.5  
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3,000 slots vs. 5,000 slots: optimizing units 
In reviewing much of the analysis provided by others and in listening to debates 
regarding this issue in Massachusetts, we recognize that there is the potential for a 
misunderstanding as to the importance of projecting the number of slot machines that should be 
on a casino floor. The number of slot machines on the floor is a function of the perceived 
demand; it does not drive the perceived demand. Adding more slot machines would not 
necessarily translate into more revenue. 
We must emphasize that, in our experience and in the experience of most gaming 
operators, slot managers strive to determine the optimal number of units that should be placed on 
the floor. The factors that help make that determination include answering the following 
questions: 
 Is there a sufficient variety of machines to meet the demand in all market 
segments? 
 Is there a sufficient number of machines, in the necessary categories, to meet the 
demands at peak periods? 
Note that slot machines appeal to a variety of different players, from those who favor 
video poker machines to those who favor mechanical reels, and to those who play for progressive 
jackpots as well as those who favor frequent payouts, elaborate bonus rounds, multi-line/multi-
coin games and so forth. 
Additionally, casinos are often configured to determine the optimal number of machines 
that would meet peak demand on, say, Saturday nights in summer. Casino managers would 
rather be in a position where certain machines are empty at peak periods, rather than have 
players turned away because they cannot find a spot at their favorite games. 
With that in mind, we reiterate that the number of machines will not drive demand. 
Revenue would not necessarily be greater with 5,000 slots than with 3,000.  
A similar debate unfolded in 2005 and 2006 when Pennsylvania began planning its 
casino industry. Casinos were authorized to install up to 5,000 machines, but it was expected that 
they would start with fewer. At the February 2005 Pennsylvania Gaming Congress, analyst 
Aimee Marcel of Jefferies & Co. made the point that the initial installations would be likely 
lower to avoid the risk of being perceived as ―empty.‖  
Indeed, many gaming facilities in the East have grown that way. In most instances, the 
growth in the number of machines was accompanied by a perceptible decline in the daily win per 
unit.53 
In Connecticut, both Foxwoods and Mohegan Sun had a combined daily gross gaming 
revenue (GGR or ―win‖) per unit of $402 for all of 2002, when they had 8,858 slots. After a 50 
                                                 
53 “Win” is gross gaming revenue. It is the equivalent of what is left over after all winning wagers have been paid, 
and is not synonymous with “handle.” The latter term refers to “coin in,” or the total amount wagered. Daily win per 
unit is a commonly applied metric in the gaming industry to determine the relative production of individual slots. 
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percent increase in the number of slots, as well as significant increases in hotel rooms and other 
amenities, the win per unit was $340 in 2003.54  
Racinos in West Virginia experienced similar drops in GGR per unit as the number of 
units expanded during the period from 2003 to 2004, as shown in the chart below: 
 
 
Note that, for the most part, this period of significant expansion in the number of 
machines was accompanied by a decline in revenue per unit. Still, expansions tend over time to 
help grow overall revenue by striving to ensure that a property can address the demand from all 
segments of the market. 
 
Geographic market overview 
As detailed more fully in our Gaming Revenue Projections section, we began our 
assessment by reviewing the location specific requirements detailed in the pending legislation as 
described below: 
 Region 1 - Suffolk, Middlesex and Essex counties 
 Region 2 - Norfolk, Bristol, Plymouth, Nantucket, Dukes and Barnstable counties 
 Region 3 - Worcester, Hampshire, Hampden, Franklin and Berkshire counties 
In order to ascertain the potential of each region – while not selecting a definitive 
location for each destination resort casino – we plotted unspecific locations in the geographic 
center of each region. While Spectrum examined the gaming market populations within a 150-
mile radius of each of the three casinos, we used the populations within a 2-hour drive-time of 
                                                 
54 Connecticut Division of Special Revenue 
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each approximate site to forecast visitation and gaming revenue potential. This defined subset of 
the broader regional population was utilized for several reasons: 
 This allows us to maintain our realistic approach in presenting conservative estimates 
which contain a high degree of confidence, rather than aggressive estimates with 
lower levels of confidence. 
 Geographic radius-based analyses may provide a sufficient basis for visual map 
examination and/or textual discussion of demographic characteristics, but 
mathematical visitation estimates are better calculated using more behavior-based 
drive-time models, as opposed to straight-line distance areas which do not necessarily 
correspond to driving distance or associated time to destination. 
 There must be substantial and plausible overlap of feeder populations in any realistic 
model for three casinos in Massachusetts, but if and to the extent such feeder regions 
are expanded, such overlap continues to increase while the certainty or likelihood of 
cross-visitation declines, again reducing desirable confidence in the model. 
 As one examines the northeast regional map and market, both Foxwoods and 
Mohegan Sun lie either between or closer to the population centers of greater New 
York and Philadelphia to the southwest and the potential new Massachusetts sites. 
These sites present a formidable barrier to any significant Massachusetts visitation 
from greater distance in that direction than we propose herein. 
 We further examined the entire region for competitors and will discuss the competitors 
in the next section of this report.  
Region 1 is located in the center of Suffolk, Middlesex and Essex counties and has an 
approximate feeder population of 10.4 million. In the drive time range of two hours, it would 
directly compete with Foxwoods, Mohegan Sun, Twin River and Newport Grand.  
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REGION 1 - Two Hour Drive Time Population 
County State Population (2006) by County  
Hartford Connecticut 876,927 
New London Connecticut 263,293 
Tolland Connecticut 148,140 
Windham Connecticut 116,872 
Cumberland Maine 202,232 
York Maine 274,598 
Barnstable Massachusetts 224,816 
Bristol Massachusetts 545,379 
Essex Massachusetts 735,958 
Franklin Massachusetts 72,183 
Hampden Massachusetts 460,520 
Hampshire Massachusetts 153,471 
Middlesex Massachusetts 1,467,016 
Norfolk Massachusetts 654,753 
Plymouth Massachusetts 493,623 
Suffolk Massachusetts 687,610 
Worcester Massachusetts 784,992 
Belknap New Hampshire 61,562 
Cheshire New Hampshire 77,393 
Hillsborough New Hampshire 402,789 
Merrimack New Hampshire 148,085 
Rockingham New Hampshire 296,267 
Strafford New Hampshire 119,990 
Sullivan New Hampshire 42,979 
Bristol Rhode Island 52,256 
Kent Rhode Island 170,053 
Newport Rhode Island 82,144 
Providence Rhode Island 635,596 
Washington Rhode Island 127,561 
Total   10,379,058 
 
Region 2 is located in the center of Norfolk, Bristol, Plymouth, Nantucket, Dukes and 
Barnstable counties and has an approximate feeder population of 9.4 million. In the drive time 
range of two hours, it would directly compete with Foxwoods, Mohegan Sun, Twin River and 
Newport Grand.  
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REGION 2 - Two Hour Drive Time Population 
County State 
 Population (2006) by 
County  
Hartford Connecticut 876,927 
New London Connecticut 263,293 
Tolland Connecticut 148,140 
Windham Connecticut 116,872 
Barnstable Massachusetts 224,816 
Bristol Massachusetts 545,379 
Dukes Massachusetts 15,515 
Essex Massachusetts 735,958 
Hampden Massachusetts 460,520 
Hampshire Massachusetts 153,471 
Middlesex Massachusetts 1,467,016 
Norfolk Massachusetts 654,753 
Plymouth Massachusetts 493,623 
Suffolk Massachusetts 687,610 
Worcester Massachusetts 784,992 
Hillsborough New Hampshire 402,789 
Rockingham New Hampshire 296,267 
Bristol Rhode Island 52,256 
Kent Rhode Island 170,053 
Newport Rhode Island 82,144 
Providence Rhode Island 635,596 
Washington Rhode Island 127,561 
Total   9,395,551 
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Region 3 is located in the center of Worcester, Hampshire, Hampden, Franklin and 
Berkshire counties and has an approximate feeder population of 9.5 million. In the drive time 
range of two hours, it would directly compete with Foxwoods, Mohegan Sun, Twin River, and 
Newport Grand, as well as Saratoga Gaming and Raceway.  
 
REGION 3 - Two Hour Drive Time Population 
County State 
 Population (2006) by 
County  
Hartford Connecticut 876,927 
Litchfield Connecticut 190,119 
Middlesex Connecticut 163,774 
New Haven Connecticut 845,244 
New London Connecticut 263,293 
Tolland Connecticut 148,140 
Windham Connecticut 116,872 
Berkshire Massachusetts 131,117 
Bristol Massachusetts 545,379 
Franklin Massachusetts 72,183 
Hampden Massachusetts 460,520 
Hampshire Massachusetts 153,471 
Middlesex Massachusetts 1,467,016 
Norfolk Massachusetts 654,753 
Suffolk Massachusetts 687,610 
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REGION 3 - Two Hour Drive Time Population 
County State 
 Population (2006) by 
County  
Worcester Massachusetts 784,992 
Cheshire New Hampshire 77,393 
Hillsborough New Hampshire 402,789 
Sullivan New Hampshire 42,979 
Albany New York 297,556 
Columbia New York 62,955 
Rensselaer New York 155,292 
Bristol Rhode Island 52,256 
Kent Rhode Island 170,053 
Providence Rhode Island 635,596 
Bennington Vermont 36,929 
Windham Vermont 43,898 
Total   9,539,106 
 
Additionally, we then analyzed the populations of the counties within each region and 
their associated median incomes. In order to create differentials for our three gaming regions, we 
utilized the information in the following chart to estimate the gaming spend per adult, with 
Region 2 offering the highest spend and Region 3 offering the lowest spend per adult.  
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USA Counties 
Resident total 
population estimate 
(July 1) 2006 
Median household 
income 2004 
  
 
  
Region 1 
 
  
Middlesex, MA 1,467,016  $62,854 
Essex, MA 735,958  $52,050 
Suffolk, MA 687,610  $41,517 
Subtotal 2,890,584 
 
Weighted average   $55,028 
  
  
Region 2   
Norfolk, MA  654,753  $67,066 
Bristol, MA 545,379  $46,986 
Plymouth, MA 493,623  $60,359 
Barnstable, MA 224,816  $50,334 
Dukes, MA 15,515  $51,490 
Nantucket, MA 10,240  $58,525 
Subtotal 1,944,326  
 
Average 
 
$57,627 
  
  
Region 3 
  
Worcester, MA 784,992  $51,354 
Hampden, MA 460,520  $40,595 
Hampshire, MA 153,471  $48,359 
Berkshire, MA 131,117  $41,589 
Franklin, MA 72,183  $44,393 
Subtotal 1,602,283  
 
Average   $46,862 
    
MASSACHUSETTS Total  6,437,193  $53,657 
Source: US Census Bureau 
 
Gaming market overview 
All three Massachusetts casinos would directly compete with four gaming facilities – 
including two of the largest and most successful in the United States, Foxwoods and Mohegan 
Sun – and the Region 3 casino, depending on its ultimate location, might additionally compete 
with Saratoga Gaming and Raceway in upstate New York. The following table provides the key 
attributes of each of the competing gaming facilities: 
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Competitors 2008 
Property 
Casino/ 
Resort 
Type 
 # of 
Slots  
 # of 
Tables  
 # of 
Hotel 
Rooms  
 
Restaurants  
 
Theater 
Seats  
 
Meeting 
Space  
 
Parking  
 
Smoking  
Competitor - 
MA Region 
Newport 
Grand*** 
Racino 1,070 n/a n/a 3 n/a n/a yes Yes 1, 2,3 
Twin 
River*** 
Racino 4,701 n/a n/a 6 2,500 29,000 6,500 Yes 1, 2, 3 
Saratoga Racino 1,770 n/a n/a 8 n/a n/a yes No 3 
Mohegan 
Sun 
Indian 
full-
service 
resort 
6,119 315 1,176** 27 10,710 100,000 13,000 Yes 1, 2, 3 
Foxwoods 
Indian 
full-
service 
resort 
8,594 453 2,241 28 5,400 200,000 19,000 Yes 1, 2, 3 
Average 
 
4,451 384 1,709 14 6,203 109,667 12,833 
  
** 1,000 additional rooms in development; *** 2008 expansions in progress 
 
Current competitive landscape 
The following section provides an overview of each facility within a 150-mile radius.  
Competitors 
Property 
Driving Miles from 
Region 1 
Driving Miles from 
Region 2 
Driving Miles from 
Region 3 
# of Slots 
Share of 
Market 
Newport Grand 39.5 44.1 120.7         1,070  5.2% 
Foxwoods 54.7 89.8 98.4         6,808  33.2% 
Mohegan Sun 60.7 95.2 93.9         6,172  30.1% 
Twin River 63.9 42.2 82.0         4,701  22.9% 
Saratoga 187.6 218.3 129.5         1,770  8.6% 
Total             20,521  100% 
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Along with competition from the existing casino properties, each of the three new 
destination resort casinos will compete with each other as shown on the following map, which 
shows the two-hour drive times from the geographic center of each of the three regions:  
 
 
 
Project comparison 
It is our assumption that the scope of each casino project would initially be:  
 
Massachusetts Casino Project Scope 
Location Three locations in state 
Casino  140,000 sq. ft.  
Tables 100 
Slots 3,000 
Poker 40 
Restaurants 
Four: Buffet (seats 400);  Three-meal coffee shop (seats 250); 
Specialty -Moderate (seats 175); Deli (seats 175) 
Bars/Lounges 2 Lounge (100 seats each); 1 Nightclub (300 seats) 
Hotel Rooms 2,000 
Event Center/Meeting Space 100,000 sq. ft. event center  
Parking Spaces 2,880 spaces  
Cost $1 - $1.5 billion 
Opening Date TBD 
Region 1 - Red  
Region 2 - Blue 
Region 3 - Pink 
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We compared one individual project to the potential competition in 2010: 
Competitors 2010 
 
Property 
Casino/ 
Resort 
Type 
No. 
slots 
# of 
Tables 
# of 
Hotel 
Rooms 
Restaurants 
Theater 
Seats 
Meeting 
Space 
Parking Smoking 
Newport Grand Racino 2,100 n/a n/a 3 n/a n/a yes Yes 
Twin River Racino 4,701 n/a n/a 6 2,500 29,000 6,500 Yes 
Saratoga Racino 1,770 n/a n/a 8 n/a n/a yes No 
Mohegan Sun 
Indian - 
full-
service 
resort 
6,944 377 2,176 32 10,710 100,000 13,000 Yes 
Foxwoods 
Indian - 
full-
service 
resort 
8,594 453 2,241 28 5,400 200,000 19,000 Yes 
Average 
 
4,822 415 2,209 15 6,203 109,667 12,833  
Massachusetts Project 
 
3,000 140 2,000 4 TBD 100,000 2,880 no 
Variance to Average 
 
-1,822 -275 -209 -11 n/a -9,667 -9,953  
% Variance 
 
(37.8) (66.3) (9.4%) (74.0%) n/a (8.8%) (77.6)  
 
There is overlap in the available populations between the three markets and all markets 
certainly will compete for a share of consumer discretionary income, but we believe that given 
the design and amenity plans for each project, combined with the untapped population in the 
region, there is room in the market for three new projects, but the location and scope of each 
project will be paramount to their success. 
 
Recapturing gaming dollars 
One area of critical interest to Massachusetts‘ policymakers and residents alike is the 
issue of repatriating some of the significant gaming dollars that are now spent by Massachusetts 
adults in other states. Various studies support the notion that Massachusetts is an important 
feeder market for casinos elsewhere. 
As noted earlier, the annual Harrah‘s Survey projects that Massachusetts generates more 
than 2 million casino visits annually, and has a gambling participation rate higher than the 
national average.55 Since 2001, Massachusetts has added nearly 200,000 casino gamblers among 
its adult population – despite the absence of legal casinos in the state. 
The Center for Policy Analysis at the University of Massachusetts-Dartmouth reported in 
2006 that Massachusetts is an important feeder market for both Connecticut casinos (which we 
have subsequently confirmed in private conversations with present and former executives at both 
                                                 
55 Harrah‘s Survey 2006, p. 20 
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properties) and that Massachusetts ―indirectly paid $220.5 million in gaming taxes to 
Connecticut and Rhode Island in 2006.‖ The center goes on to suggest that Connecticut and 
Rhode Island ―exported $71 million in gambling related social costs back to Massachusetts.‖56 
While Spectrum did not confirm that specific estimate, we certainly support the notion that 
Massachusetts – as a feeder market that does not have its own casino industry, and hence cannot 
generate tax revenue – is clearly an importer of social costs, and an exporter of casino taxes. The 
CFPA confirmed the continuing outflow trend for last year, estimating that Massachusetts 
residents in 2007 contributed $232.9 million to the combined state coffers of Connecticut and 
Rhode Island.57 
Spectrum, using our own methodology, estimates that Massachusetts residents have been 
spending an estimated $1.1 billion annually on gaming (alone) in Connecticut and Rhode Island. 
This estimate is extrapolated from our existing Massachusetts gaming population model, adapted 
for the out-of-state destinations. This conservative estimate accounts for gaming spending only. 
The value of other spending dollars such as hotel, retail shopping, entertainment and 
food/beverage, has not been estimated in the model below which focuses on those counties that 
we believe would be the primary feeder markets for those nearby states.  
 
Massachusetts Gaming Revenue Outflow   
   Population (2004) by County  
Bristol  550,668 
Franklin  72,431 
Hampden  462,756 
Hampshire  155,980 
Middlesex  1,472,613 
Norfolk  655,356 
Plymouth  491,878 
Suffolk  677,616 
Worcester  784,595 
 Massachusetts total 5,323,893 
 Estimated adults 3,992,920 
 Gaming Participation rate 0.28 
 Annual trip average 6.7 
 Average trip gaming spend $147 
   
 Annual total $1,101,135,465 
 
Since this model includes areas that are very close to nearby casinos, the participation 
rate that we use is 28 percent, which is higher than the rate projected by the Harrah‘s Survey for 
the Boston area. Note, however, that participation rates and spending per visit, along with 
frequency of visitation, often move in inverse directions. Adults who travel greater distances to 
casino destinations visit less frequently, but tend to stay longer and spend more per visit. 
                                                 
56 ―Taking the Gamble in Massachusetts,‖ Clyde Barrow, University of Massachusetts-Dartmouth, 2007 
57 ―New England Casino Gaming - Update, 2008,‖ CFPA, UMASS – Dartmouth, March 2008, pgs. ii-iii. 
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Spectrum‘s moderate- to high-revenue models indicate that, taken together, the three 
Massachusetts casinos would draw between 54 percent and 65 percent of all Massachusetts 
gaming trips/spending, or between $718 million and $864 million annually. That includes some 
new Massachusetts-only gaming from the counties farthest from Connecticut according to our 
models – Berkshire, Essex, Barnstable and Dukes. Discounting those counties, Massachusetts 
still retains, or reclaims, between $594 million and $715 million of the gaming dollars presently 
leaving the state, or well over half the total now being exported. The substantial balance of the 
projected Massachusetts total gross gaming revenue – between about $650 million and $900 
million – will come from outside the state. Overall spending on casino gambling by 
Massachusetts residents would increase by $125 million to $150 million over present levels. 
It is important to reiterate that the Connecticut and Rhode Island properties likely will 
respond to competition from Massachusetts in any number of ways, from adding amenities to 
increasing promotional spending. Additionally, Massachusetts adults who are longstanding 
members of loyalty programs in other states have a perceived vested interest in continuing to 
visit those properties to some degree.  
 
Revenue analysis: policy implications 
Our analysis indicates that there is a huge untapped potential of population within a two-
hour drive time of each of the three regions and that each region‘s average median income is 
well above the U.S. average of $44,334. That certainly should not be interpreted that each of 
three casinos will generate the same level of profitability or returns on investment. Clearly, they 
would not. 
The bidding process represents an opportunity for the Commonwealth to foster the 
climate that would ensure such efforts to maximize revenue would be taken. Applicants should 
be weighed on factors that include efforts to promote conventions and meetings, as well as other 
ancillary activities that would ultimately grow revenue. 
We caution that our analysis indicates that three properties in Massachusetts would not 
perform at equal levels, and likely would not justify the same level of capital investment.  
It is therefore possible that one or two regions will fail to attract bids that the 
Commonwealth deems to be in the public interest. With that in mind, it is likely that the stronger 
bidders would focus their efforts on Region 1, which stands the greatest likelihood of success. 
Therefore, we recommend a staggered bidding process, focusing on Region 1 as the first license 
to be awarded. This would allow stronger bidders that are not successful in one region to pursue 
plans in another.  
 
Review of other Massachusetts gaming revenue projections 
Prior Massachusetts gaming revenue estimates and/or commentary reviewed herein: 
 University of Massachusetts-Dartmouth, Center for Policy Analysis (CFPA) report 
―Maximum Bet: A Preliminary Blueprint for Casino Gaming & Economic 
Development in Massachusetts‖ March 2007 
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 Innovation Group study ―Massachusetts Gaming Market Potential and Economic 
Impact Assessment: The Venetian Casino Resort‖ May 2007 
 Suffolk Downs ―Report to the Executive Working Group on Gaming‖ July 2007 
 Massachusetts EOHED proposal ―Destination Resort Casinos: Creating Jobs, 
Growing the Economy‖ October 2007 
 Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce-commissioned UHY Advisors FLVS study 
―Casino Gaming in Massachusetts: An Economic, Fiscal & Social Analysis‖ March 
2008. 
The University of Massachusetts-Dartmouth CFPA report ―Maximum Bet‖ is one in a 
series of surveys and feasibility studies led by Professor Clyde Barrow. This particular report 
details projections of state and local tax revenues that Massachusetts would derive from, in part, 
$1.495 billion in annual casino gross gaming revenue (GGR).  
In a letter to Spectrum,58 Barrow emphasized that his ―Maximum Bet‖ projections were 
preliminary and conservative, in anticipation of future, more elaborate modeling by others. He 
further states that the CFPA‘s $1.5 billion is largely exclusive of existing regional GGR, some of 
which Massachusetts could conceivably recapture from Connecticut and Rhode Island, which he 
defines as incremental market upside potential of $500 million to $600 million: 
―Thus, our estimate of the market potential is actually in the $2.0 to $2.1 billion range, 
which is comparable to that estimated by the Governor‘s staff and by UHY Advisors. I 
reiterated this estimate in my oral and written testimony to the Joint Committee on 
Bonding, Capital Expenditures, and State Assets (12-18-08).‖ 
Note that while the CFPA‘s $500 million to $600 million recapture estimate is similar to 
Spectrum‘s, we include such revenue capture in our $1.5 billion total, whereas it is incremental 
in the CFPA estimate. It is noteworthy that the CFPA‘s $1.495 billion GGR estimate is in line 
with our moderate case scenario, assuming a lift from the use of hotel rooms as marketing tools. 
Note also that Spectrum‘s estimates reflect only gross gaming revenues from patrons 
within approximate two-hour drive-time distances from hypothetical sites, as part of our effort to 
be both realistic and conservative, and revenues from farther away would be incremental gains to 
the Spectrum model totals. As noted elsewhere herein, some level of gaming trips to the 
Massachusetts sites from beyond a two-hour drive will of course occur, as will trips from outside 
the region. While such visits would provide additive gaming and other revenues, they are simply 
not quantified in our conservative estimates. A broader drive-time model would also introduce 
such factors as lower trip frequency, greater competitive trip tendencies between venues, and 
thus lower degrees of certainty and confidence in the model estimates. 
The Innovation Group‘s ―Venetian‖ feasibility study details the potential revenues of one 
very large casino resort as part of a mix that is different from the Spectrum model of three 
similarly sized resorts. The Venetian casino resort would be located in an east-central location, 
developed in parallel with only one other full-sized – but smaller – casino in southeast 
Massachusetts and the installation of slot machines only at the state‘s four racetracks. The 
Venetian revenue projections are modeled on a resort with a 150,000-square-foot casino, 5,000 
                                                 
58See full text of letter in Appendix B, Barrow Letter to Spectrum Gaming, May 19, 2008. 
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slot machines, 350 table games, 2,500 hotel rooms, and more than 1 million square feet of 
convention and meeting space, all at a cost of $3 billion. 
This would be the largest, by far, of the proposed casinos in any scenario, and 
substantially larger than the three casinos in the Spectrum model. This difference not only 
disallows a fully equivalent, or apples-to-apples comparison, but Innovation Group does not 
extend its modeling to a Massachusetts total for all the new venues, as the Spectrum study does. 
However, to the extent the two approaches can be compared, on such measures as market 
demographics, average gaming trip behaviors, etc., the two methodologies produce similar 
content and results, including: 
 Innovation Group estimates about 9.3 million adults within about 150 miles of the 
east-central Massachusetts site. Spectrum estimates about 9.2 million adults within a 
two-hour drive of one of three sites. 
 Innovation Group estimates about $353 average gaming win per position per day at 
the Venetian facility from the above population. We estimate up to about $346 
average daily win per position among the three regional Massachusetts sites. 
Despite the differing study parameters, such congruent findings present a measure of 
cross-validation between the two methodologies. To put these numbers in context, the two 
Connecticut casinos – with more than 13,000 slot machines combined – generated an average 
daily win per slot of $337 over the last 12 months. Mohegan Sun, with more than 6,000 slots 
generated $398, while Foxwoods – with more than 7,200 slots – generated $287. Table data is 
not publicly available in Connecticut. 
The Suffolk Downs proposal was completed with market and feasibility assistance from 
KlasRobinson Q.E.D. This report was done in support of resort casino development that used 
different model parameters than the Spectrum study. Its model envisioned two equivalent 
Massachusetts casinos, each with 5,000 slot machines, 150 table games, and 1,000-room hotels: 
one development to be added to the existing Suffolk Downs track near downtown Boston, and 
the other, similar to the second Innovation Group site, to be built on Indian lands in southeast 
Massachusetts (no other Massachusetts gaming). KlasRobinson Q.E.D. projects the Boston-area 
site at $408 average win per gaming position per day, and the southeast at $303. Taken together, 
however, KlasRobinson Q.E.D. projects a combined Massachusetts gaming win of $355 per 
position daily, quite close to Spectrum‘s current and Innovation Group‘s prior estimates. 
The Executive Office of Housing and Economic Development (EOHED) referenced a 
variety of reasonable casino resort examples elsewhere, notably in Connecticut and Atlantic City, 
in constructing its revenue models. It built reasonable casino capacity and win-per-unit models 
based on the larger and more successful operations among those in this northeast regional 
market. The EOHED model, while it borrows implicit demand characteristics from those 
examples, is not in itself demand-driven, or checked against likely demand characteristics 
specific to the Massachusetts locations.  
Projected consumer spending patterns – given convenient, adequate peak usage supply – 
should be combined with desirable operator win-per-unit levels to then determine optimal unit 
capacities for the location and/or market. The Spectrum study performed this additional step. The 
Innovation Group and the KlasRobinson analyses did so as well, along with other methods. That 
is a necessary step, as the number of gaming positions should not be viewed as a driver of 
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demand. Indeed, in a real-world setting, that is a function of demand. The model‘s total gaming 
revenue projection of about $2.05 billion, while entirely possible, may not be the most probable 
outcome in Year 1. 
The EOHED model selected a reasonable daily win per slot machine of $300, and paired 
that with feasible inventory of 15,000 slots. It would likely take a combination of factors that are 
difficult to analyze and project at this early stage – including precise locations, marketing plans, 
quality of the gaming and non-gaming amenities – to reach this level of revenue within two or 
three years of operation.  
The UHY ―Casino Gaming in Massachusetts‖ analysis, commissioned by the Greater 
Boston Chamber of Commerce, includes a fairly thorough, macro-focused demand model for 
Massachusetts gaming revenue. It takes a New England regional or state-by-state approach to 
existing and likely spending patterns. The study examined factors that are apparent with regard 
to existing gaming competitors, rather than building a more granular county or ZIP-code based 
model. The study projects total New England demand for gross gaming revenue in 
Massachusetts at between $1.7 billion and $1.95 billion annually, which is about 13 percent to 30 
percent higher than the Spectrum model. This is then augmented by $300 million to $350 million 
additional GGR from outside New England, bringing the total relatively in line with the EOHED 
projections, if not potentially even higher.  
While the Spectrum study does not quantify it, our projections acknowledge that there 
would likely be some incremental gaming revenue from outside the region.59 Other analyses, 
such as the Innovation Group‘s work, put that increment at about 6 percent to 7 percent over the 
regional total. UHY‘s estimate of a 17 percent to 18 percent increment from outside the region is 
based in part on data showing that 16 percent of Connecticut‘s GGR is from ―outside New 
England.‖ We note, however, that most of that is from neighboring New York, as well as some 
from New Jersey. Such capture would be difficult to replicate in Massachusetts, which is farther 
and partially cut off from such markets by Connecticut casinos. The other reason cited by UHY 
for the Massachusetts increment is that Massachusetts currently enjoys a much higher level of 
international visitor non-gaming spending than does Connecticut. We concur, as noted in our 
report, that the robust tourism industry in Massachusetts, including conventions and meetings, 
would generate greater gaming spends, but this cannot be readily quantified in a conservative 
revenue model.  
 
New England market: approaching saturation? 
A critical question that needs to be addressed is: Is the New England gaming market 
approaching a saturation point? This question has been prompted, in part, by announcements in 
2008 that revenues at existing casinos in Connecticut and Rhode Island have declined. 
In response to the slot-revenue decline of more than 6 percent at Foxwoods and Mohegan 
Sun in the five months ending January 31, University of Connecticut economist Arthur Wright 
                                                 
59 It is difficult to quantify such outside revenue, absent information on precise locations, marketing strategies, level of amenities 
or other factors. Our model is built largely on quantifiable revenue emanating from within New England. 
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said: ―We're getting an indication of market saturation.‖60 We address that issue, in light of the 
recent downturn in revenue, with a few key points: 
 
1. Gaming is not recession proof, and is increasingly not recession resistant. 
2. Combining Connecticut casinos, Rhode Island racinos and potential Massachusetts 
casinos into one market scenario is unrealistic and inaccurate, since destination 
resorts and high-tax racinos operate under different business models, as noted earlier. 
This means that different markets will have different saturation points, depending on 
such issues as the variety and quality of their amenities.  
3. Market growth is possible beyond what would otherwise be perceived as a limit if 
destination casinos: 
a. Expand beyond their traditional core demographic base. 
b. Increase the frequency of visitation. 
c. Increase the length of stay. 
d. Target additional markets, such as tourists and convention attendees. 
The notion of gaming as recession-proof or recession-resistant is less true today than at 
any time in the industry‘s history, particularly for destination properties. Such properties, by 
definition, are designed to attract a wide range of customers. The wider the range of customers, 
the more likely that a property will be buffeted by macro-economic trends. 
Historically, the notion that casinos were resistant to such trends could be tied to their 
relatively small demographic base, and dependence on customers who are gaming-centric in 
their spending habits, i.e., they view gaming as a serious pastime. Such customers would be less 
willing to reduce their gaming budgets, and would, in many cases, view casino visitation as 
value-oriented: They enjoy complimentaries, and have the potential of leaving with more than 
they came with. Any movement beyond that base will inevitably link the industry more closely 
to economic trends. 
Additionally, we do not know if this present economic downturn will be worse than 
previous recessions. Economists note, for example, that the current downturn (which, at this 
writing, cannot be referred to as a recession as it does not meet the definition of a recession, 
which is two consecutive quarters of a decline in gross domestic product) is more linked to 
declines in housing prices.61 Previous recessions, such as the 2000-2001 downturn, were actually 
ameliorated by rising housing prices. In our view, housing is much more linked to gaming 
spending than the stock market. 
To better understand whether or not additional casino development can be supported, it 
would be helpful to understand the thought processes that gaming operators use to determine 
market potential. Revel Entertainment is in the early stages of constructing a $2 billion casino 
hotel in Atlantic City that would clearly meet the statutory requirements under consideration in 
Massachusetts. Revel CEO Kevin DeSanctis made a presentation at the East Coast Gaming 
Congress in Atlantic City that included the following analysis of the Northeast market: 
                                                 
60 ―Slot machine revenue drops at N.E. casinos,‖ by Sean P. Murphy, Boston Globe, March 12, 2008 
61 ―Just How Bad Will the Economy Get?‖ MSNBC, March 31, 2008 
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  No. of Facilities Positions Revenue 
Atlantic City  11 45,871  $     4,920,677,425  
Pennsylvania  4 8,683  $        768,466,197  
Connecticut  2 17,365  $     2,499,116,378  
Rhode Island  2 5,300  $        400,610,454  
Delaware  3 7,225  $        612,407,100  
West Virginia  1 4,765  $        463,367,816  
New York  7 14,147  $     1,045,103,506  
Total 30 103,356  $   10,709,748,876  
 
Revel then looked at the potential market in the region, using a 300-mile radius from its 
site on the Boardwalk in Atlantic City: 
 
Gaming Demand  (300-mile Radius)  
Adult Population (est. 2011)  47,287,590 
Average Participation (%)  33 
Frequency (Visits per Year)  6.1 
Total Annual Visits  95,189,919 
Spend per Visit ($)  $145 
Gaming Market Potential ($)  $13,802,538,207 
 
This analysis would indicate that – at a 33 percent participation rate – the region has 
approximately $3 billion in untapped annual gaming potential. Note that, while this is a different 
market, it would clearly overlap the potential market of any property in Massachusetts, as Boston 
and Atlantic City are approximately six hours drive time – or about 340 driving miles – from 
each other. 
Taking Revel‘s analysis a step further, it supports the point that destination casinos are 
more likely to attract that untapped market, as they would have significantly greater capital 
investment in amenities that would appeal to a broader demographic. Using Revel‘s numbers, we 
calculated the level of gaming revenue per position, which shows that destination casinos in low-
tax markets generate significantly greater revenue per position. 
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 Indeed, Connecticut and New Jersey are the only states that exceed the regional average, 
significantly pulling that average up, supporting the point that destination casinos – supported by 
relatively lower tax rates – are best equipped to capture market share and indeed grow the 
market. 
Clearly, any future Massachusetts destination casinos will face competitive and other 
challenges, ranging from the potential expansion of gaming in other New England states, as well 
as in New York, to economic downturns. In our experience, a destination casino can best 
withstand external economic and competitive forces by targeting additional markets, with a 
particular focus on conventions and meetings. 
We add a cautionary note: While destination casinos largely compete on the basis of their 
amenities and their ability to successfully target a variety of niche markets, that is not always the 
case. In Connecticut, for example, the history of competition between Foxwoods and Mohegan 
Sun has predictably focused on adding hotel rooms, retail and other attractions that essentially 
grow the market. Massachusetts, however, must anticipate that those properties – as well as more 
distant properties in Atlantic City – may choose to leverage the financial advantages afforded by 
their lower tax rates to gain a pricing edge over Massachusetts. This possibility has been built 
into our conservative revenue projections. 
 
Fiscal, economic impacts of destination casinos 
Spectrum worked with the professional staff of the Boston Redevelopment Authority, 
using advanced modeling tools to analyze and project the economic and fiscal impacts of having 
up to three casino destinations in Massachusetts.  
This analysis includes the use of modeling software developed by Regional Economic 
Models Inc., which is based in Amherst, Mass. The REMI model is robust, and uses a variety of 
variables based on economic, demographic, industry and other data to develop outputs. 
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We developed a number of assumptions in using this model. For example, our scenarios 
assume that 50 percent of the employment base at casinos would not be competitive with jobs at 
those of existing industries, as there are no casinos now in Massachusetts. This makes sense 
intuitively, as many of the casino jobs have counterparts at existing industries, ranging from 
housekeeping to accounting, while many are clearly unique to this industry. At the same time, we 
cross-checked this assumption with those of other economic models, such as RIMS II, an 
input/output model that was developed by the Bureau of Economic Analysis in the U.S. 
Department of Commerce.  
The REMI model generated an employment multiplier of about 1.5, depending on the 
scenario, which means that every job created in the casino industry generates 0.5 indirect and 
induced jobs in other industries. Such jobs would be the result of new employment from 
suppliers to the gaming industry, as well as jobs created by the new spending power of 
employees. This is clearly in line with a range of RIMS II models that we have used and 
analyzed in urban, suburban and rural markets throughout the United States. 
Other input assumptions for this first scenario are: 
 The licensing fee is assumed to be $200 million, to be renewed every 10 years, 
resulting in an amortized $20 million annual cost. 
 The hotel tax rate is 5.7 percent for the state, while in such areas as Boston, 
Worcester, Cambridge and Springfield hotels are charged an additional 2.75 percent 
to pay off convention center bonds. Boston has an additional 4 percent add-on to 
hotel rooms. The sales tax rate is 5 percent, with exemptions for food and clothing. 
For personal income tax, we assume the effective rate is 4.7 percent, which is lower 
than the state rate but projects some anticipated level of deduction. The income tax in 
the model is based on total personal income generated.  
 The property tax rate used in Region 1 (limited to Suffolk County in this model) is 
$25.92 per $1,000 of assessed value. For the other regions, this ratio was averaged 
based on differing tax rates, which amounted to $12.36 in Region 2 and $18.48 in 
Region 3.  
 We assumed the assessed value of each casino is $800 million, which we 
conservatively suggest would be a reasonable net increase in the value of existing 
property, i.e., not all of the capital investment would be an increase to the assessed 
valuation of an existing property. 
 Staffing for each property is 4,377 positions. 
 The property tax credit is based on an assumed $500 million in gaming revenue per 
property, assuming 2.5 percent for public health mitigation and an additional 2.5 
percent for other mitigation funding. This leaves 22 percent (27 percent minus these 
allocations) which would be split 50-50 between property tax relief and transportation 
funding. 
 For purposes of our analysis, we assume that none of the government‘s share of 
revenue will be used to mitigate any negative impact to the Massachusetts Lottery, as 
explained in more detail elsewhere in the report. 
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For the first scenario, for each of three properties, we assumed that gross gaming revenue 
equates to 65 percent of net revenue.62 It assumes a 90 percent occupancy rate for the hotel, and 
$92.50 in cash revenue per occupied room night. This is a reasonable set of assumptions for a 
casino hotel, which would likely operate under a business model that offers complimentary or 
reduced–rate rooms to gaming customers to generate occupancy and gaming revenue year-round. 
We will adjust this assumption in some subsequent scenarios. 
While the occupancy rate may seem high and the cash revenue per occupied room night 
might seem low, we are basing this on a casino hotel model, rather than a hotel model. This 
means that occupancy rates can be inflated by using hotel rooms as marketing tools to reward 
gaming customers and encourage incremental casino revenue. Such a policy, based on 
complimentary or reduced-rate room nights, has the concomitant effect of lowering cash revenue 
per room night. 
With those assumptions in mind, our first scenario resulted in the following fiscal 
impacts: 
Scenario 1: Local and State Government Revenue per year  
Tax / Fee Massachusetts Region 1 Region 2 Region 3 Total Local & State   
Licensing fee $60,000,000  $  -     $ -    $ - $60,000,000    
Operational Fee $405,000,000  $  -     $ -    $ - $405,000,000    
Hotel tax (Direct) $15,405,000  $2,430,769   $2,430,769  $2,430,769  $22,697,308    
Income tax (Direct) $16,930,879  $  -     $ -    $  - $16,930,879    
Income tax 
(Indirect and 
Induced) $22,361,121  
   
$22,361,121  
  
Sales tax (Direct) $31,269,231  $  -     $ -    $ - $31,269,231    
Property Tax 
(Direct) 
 
$20,736,000   $9,888,000  $14,784,000  $45,408,000  
  
TOTAL (Direct) $528,605,110  $23,166,769  $0  $17,214,769  $581,305,418    
TOTAL (Direct, 
Indirect and 
Induced)) $550,966,231        $603,666,539  
  
 
This scenario would generate a direct total of $581.3 million for government at all levels 
in Massachusetts, plus an additional $22.3 million from income taxes generated by the indirect 
and induced employment. Those totals do not reflect projected net increases to government 
budgets, as it also includes an estimated $165 million in property tax relief that would be 
distributed to Massachusetts residents, an obligation suggested in the proposed legislation. The 
total net benefit to the public sector and taxpayers equates to about 40 percent of all projected 
gaming revenue. 
That is an important point that must be underscored in this analysis: Any analysis of the 
economic benefits of gaming must take into consideration tax revenue from all sources, not just 
the gaming tax.  
The following table looks at the economic impacts of three properties, as determined by 
the REMI model, on Boston and on Massachusetts as a whole. This scenario is in 2007 dollars. 
Note that three destination casinos, with one in Suffolk County, would create more than 20,000 
                                                 
62 Net revenue in gaming equates to total revenue from all sources, net of any complimentaries to gaming patrons. 
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jobs in Massachusetts, and add more than $2 billion into the economy, as measured by the gross 
regional product. Boston, as a major metropolitan center, would get an outsized share of the GRP 
(a measure of the dollars injected into the local economy), but that percentage could shift based 
on the precise locations of the casinos. ―Output,‖ in the following table, is defined by REMI as 
―the amount of production, including all intermediate goods purchased as well as value-added 
(compensation and profit). (It can) also be thought of as sales or supply. The components of 
Output are Self Supply and Exports (Multi-regions, Rest of Nation, and Rest of World)[2].‖ 
 
 Scenario 1 Boston Massachusetts 
Employment (direct, indirect and Induced)                       6,691                     20,470  
Gross Regional Product  $  1,028,657,300   $  2,044,928,600  
Personal Income (by place of residence)  $      101,700,000   $      836,000,000  
Output  $  1,579,215,000   $  2,894,608,200  
 
We then performed a sensitivity analysis to determine the relationship between 
government funding and the success of each casino. The following table shows the difference in 
the amount of revenue (net of property tax relief payments) that would be generated for the 
Commonwealth from each casino, based on changes in two important factors: 
 The level of annual gaming revenue per casino.  
 The ratio of casino revenue to overall net revenue. 
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 Annual gaming revenue per destination casino 
   $     500,000,000   $     475,000,000   $     450,000,000   $     425,000,000   $     400,000,000   $     375,000,000  
65% $121,242,299  $116,464,395  $111,686,491  $106,908,587  $102,130,683  $97,352,779  
60% $122,538,805  $117,696,076  $112,853,347  $108,010,618  $103,167,888  $98,325,159  
55% $124,071,040  $119,151,699  $114,232,358  $109,313,017  $104,393,676  $99,474,335  
50% $125,909,722  $120,898,447  $115,887,172  $110,875,897  $105,864,622  $100,853,347  
45% $128,156,999  $123,033,361  $117,909,722  $112,786,083  $107,662,444  $102,538,805  
The table shows that each $25 million decline in gaming revenue results in a decline of 
about $4.8 million in annual revenue for state government. This is less than $6.75 million, which 
would be the direct decline in tax revenue based on 27 percent of gross gaming revenue. This 
softened impact can be attributed to the assumption that a decline in gaming revenue would not 
lead to a significant decline in employment levels or hotel occupancy, both of which are sources 
of tax revenue for the Commonwealth. 
Note also, however, that state revenue increases markedly, albeit at a lesser rate, as 
gaming declines as a percentage of overall net revenue. As that percentage declines, it means 
more overall revenue (the same gaming dollars equate to a relatively lower percentage of a 
                                                 
[2] Regional Economic Models, Inc. (www.remi.com)  
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greater revenue base), so the state‘s share increases as more dollars are spent in restaurants, hotel 
rooms and other areas. 
These two factors – the state‘s interest in non-gaming revenue and the importance of 
income taxes and other sources of revenue – clearly support the notion that destination casinos, 
which offer a variety of amenities and employ more people than convenience-based local 
casinos, are better positioned to advance the public interest in Massachusetts. 
Our second scenario used assumptions that remained unchanged for Region 1. We 
assumed $424 million in gaming revenue for Region 2, and $419 million for Region 3, which 
would assume they get no material lift in gaming revenue from their hotel rooms. 
 
Scenario 2: Local and State Government Revenue per year  
Tax / Fee Massachusetts Region 1 Region 2 Region 3 Total Local & State   
Licensing fee $60,000,000   $             -     $             -     $             -    $60,000,000    
Operational Fee $362,810,601   $             -     $             -     $             -    $362,810,601    
Hotel tax (Direct) $13,800,240   $  2,430,769   $  2,062,980   $  2,038,908  $20,332,898    
Income tax (Direct) $16,930,879   $             -     $             -     $             -    $16,930,879    
Income tax (Indirect and Induced) $20,598,621  
   
$20,598,621    
Sales tax (Direct) $28,011,873   $             -     $             -     $             -    $28,011,873    
Property Tax (Direct) $0   $20,736,000   $  9,888,000   $14,784,000  $45,408,000    
TOTAL (Direct) $481,553,593  $0  $0  $0  $533,494,251    
TOTAL (Direct, Indirect and 
Induced)) $502,152,214        $554,092,872  
  
 
The hotel tax and income tax revenues remained unchanged in the scenarios, as we 
assumed the same level of employment and hotel revenue. However, the level of sales taxes 
generated (since the level of retail and restaurant sales were pegged at a percentage of net 
revenue), as did the casino revenue tax. 
Not surprisingly, government revenue declined overall, since such revenue is tied to the 
success of the casinos. However, as a percentage of the smaller revenue pie, government revenue 
increased by about 1 percent. 
The following table looks at the economic impacts of three properties, as determined by 
the REMI model, on Boston and on Massachusetts as a whole in this second scenario.  
 
Scenario 2  Boston Massachusetts 
Employment (direct, indirect and Induced)                       6,514                     19,600  
Gross Regional Product  $  1,018,748,500   $  1,981,760,000  
Personal Income (by place of residence)  $        98,910,000   $      798,500,000  
Output  $  1,566,829,000   $  2,822,769,400  
 
Note that employment generation goes down, as does the GRP, even in Boston – even 
though the Region 1 casino would maintain the same level of revenue. This indicates the close 
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economic ties between regions of Massachusetts to the point where gaming revenues – and tax 
dollars – generated anywhere will affect employment and economic activity everywhere else. 
For the third scenario, we raised the gaming revenue at a Region 1 casino to $600 million 
and the average cash per occupied room night to about $110. Everything else is unchanged from 
the second scenario: 
 
Scenario 3: Local and State Government Revenue per year  
Tax / Fee 
Massachusetts Region 1 Region 2 Region 3 
Total Local & 
State 
  
Licensing fee $60,000,000   $             -     $             -     $             -    $60,000,000    
Operational Fee $389,810,601   $             -     $             -     $             -    $389,810,601    
Hotel tax (Direct) $14,827,240   $  2,916,923   $  2,062,980   $  2,038,908  $21,846,052    
Income tax 
(Direct) $16,930,879   $             -     $             -     $             -    $16,930,879  
  
Income tax 
(Indirect and 
Induced) $21,590,321  
   
$21,590,321  
  
Sales tax (Direct) $30,096,488   $             -     $             -     $             -    $30,096,488    
Property Tax 
(Direct) $0   $20,736,000   $  9,888,000   $14,784,000  $45,408,000  
  
TOTAL (Direct) $511,665,208  $0  $0  $0  $564,092,020    
TOTAL (Direct, 
Indirect and 
Induced)) $533,255,529        $585,682,341  
  
 
This resulted in $585.7 million in total revenue to government at all levels, with an 
increased share of the dollars inuring to the Boston region.  
The following table looks at the economic impacts of three properties, as determined by 
the REMI model, on Boston and on Massachusetts as a whole in this third scenario. 
Scenario 3 Boston Massachusetts 
Employment (direct, indirect and Induced)                 6,633                20,090  
Gross Regional Product  $1,025,065,360   $2,016,440,800  
Personal Income (by place of residence)  $   100,700,000   $   819,600,000  
Output  $1,574,260,600   $2,861,166,000  
That incremental gaming revenue of $100 million offers a material, but relatively small 
impact on employment throughout the Commonwealth. The employment at the casino hotels 
themselves was assumed to be unchanged. This change in employment is largely reflective of 
other spending, such as government funding, which would lead to increases in employment. 
The first three scenarios, as detailed, help illustrate the relationship between gaming 
revenue and the overall economy, and how changes in certain factors can have a ripple effect. 
The next two scenarios were designed to be more conservative in the assumptions, and 
each assumes an opening in 2013, which would likely be Year 1 for a casino destination in 
Massachusetts, as noted later in the report. These do not anticipate any material lift in gaming 
revenue from the use of hotel rooms as marketing tools for casino guests, in part because it takes 
time to build a database and identify the profitable casino customers. 
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The fourth scenario closely follows the previous scenario, but we assume significantly 
less cash business for both the hotel and food-and-beverage. This assumes 90 percent occupancy 
for the Region 1 property, with 75 percent for the other regions. As expected, the net cash per 
occupied room night (all the scenarios assume a large number of complimentary room nights for 
casino customers) is about $81 for Region 1, and about $68 for the other regions. 
 
Scenario 4: Local and State Government Revenue per year 
Tax / Fee Massachusetts Region 1 Region 2 Region 3 Total Local & State 
Licensing fee $60,000,000   $             -     $             -     $             -    $60,000,000  
Operational Fee $389,810,601   $             -     $             -     $             -    $389,810,601  
Hotel tax (Direct) $10,764,378   $  2,117,647   $  1,497,696   $  1,480,220  $15,859,941  
Income tax (Direct) $16,930,879   $             -     $             -     $             -    $16,930,879  
Income tax (Indirect and Induced) $20,471,721  
   
$20,471,721  
Sales tax (Direct) $6,369,454   $             -     $             -     $             -    $6,369,454  
Property Tax (Direct) $0   $20,736,000   $  9,888,000   $14,784,000  $45,408,000  
TOTAL (Direct) $483,875,312  $0  $0  $0  $534,378,875  
TOTAL (Direct, Indirect and Induced)) $504,347,033        $554,850,596  
 
Note that, while many of the projects are unchanged from the previous scenario, the sales 
and hotel taxes decline dramatically, as these are tied to non-gaming spending. As suggested 
later in the report, Massachusetts should consider a flat rate per occupied room night, as opposed 
to a percentage of sales, as a way to ensure a greater revenue stream. The following table shows 
the economic output from this scenario: 
 
Scenario 4 Boston Massachusetts 
Employment (direct, indirect and Induced)                       6,477                     19,520  
Gross Regional Product  $  1,018,748,500   $  1,979,282,800  
Personal Income (by place of residence)  $        98,750,000   $      795,800,000  
Output  $  1,568,067,600   $  2,827,723,800  
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Our fifth scenario should be considered our worst case. We dropped the annual gaming 
revenue in our Region 1 casino to $500 million, while leaving the other regions unchanged from 
the previous scenario. Occupancy for the Region 1 casino dropped to 80 percent, while the cash 
revenue declined to about $75 per occupied room night. 
 
Scenario 5: Local and State Government Revenue per year  
Tax / Fee Massachusetts Region 1 Region 2 Region 3 Total Local & State   
Licensing fee 
$60,000,000   $             -     $             -     $             -    $60,000,000    
Operational Fee 
$362,810,601   $             -     $             -     $             -    $362,810,601    
Hotel tax (Direct) 
$10,018,789   $  1,764,706   $  1,497,696   $  1,480,220  $14,761,412    
Income tax (Direct) 
$16,930,879   $             -     $             -     $             -    $16,930,879    
Income tax (Indirect and Induced) 
$19,555,221  
   
$19,555,221    
Sales tax (Direct) 
$5,928,278   $             -     $             -     $             -    $5,928,278    
Property Tax (Direct) 
$0   $20,736,000   $  9,888,000   $14,784,000  $45,408,000    
TOTAL (Direct) 
$455,688,547  $0  $0  $0  $505,839,170    
TOTAL (Direct, Indirect and Induced)) 
$475,243,768        $525,394,391    
 
Even in this scenario, total government revenue would exceed $505.6 million in direct 
revenue, and $525.4 million in overall revenue. The following table examines the economic 
outputs: 
 
Scenario 5 Boston Massachusetts 
Employment (direct, indirect and Induced)                       6,371                     19,070  
Gross Regional Product  $  1,012,927,080   $  1,947,079,200  
Personal Income (by place of residence)  $        97,090,000   $      776,300,000  
Output  $  1,560,636,000   $  2,791,804,400  
This scenario shows a reasonable employment multiplier of 1.45, assuming 4,377 direct 
positions.  
Our final scenario essentially mirrors the core assumptions in our moderate revenue 
projections, assuming a reasonable lift in gaming revenue from the use of hotel rooms as 
marketing tools. The gaming revenue assumptions are $542.1 million for Region 1, $526.8 
million for Region 2 and $432.7 million for Region 3. 
Note that we conservatively project that casino revenues would amount to 75 percent of 
net revenue for all three projects: 
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Scenario 6: Local and State Government Revenue per year  
Tax / Fee Massachusetts Region 1 Region 2 Region 3 Total Local & State   
Licensing fee $60,000,000   $                   -     $                   -     $                   -    $60,000,000    
Operational Fee $405,432,000   $                   -     $                   -     $                   -    $405,432,000    
Hotel tax (Direct) $13,365,241  $2,284,048  $2,219,584  $1,823,109  $19,691,982    
Income tax (Direct) $16,930,879   $                   -     $                   -     $                   -    $16,930,879    
Income tax (Indirect and 
Induced) $22,097,921  
   
$22,097,921  
  
Sales tax (Direct) $27,128,907   $                   -     $                   -     $                   -    $27,128,907    
Property Tax (Direct) $0  $20,736,000  $9,888,000  $14,784,000  $45,408,000    
TOTAL (Direct) $522,857,027  $23,020,048  $12,107,584  $16,607,109  $574,591,768    
TOTAL (Direct, Indirect and 
Induced)) $544,954,948        $596,689,689  
  
 
The economic impacts are: 
Scenario 6 Boston Massachusetts 
Employment (direct, indirect and Induced)                      6,657                    20,330  
Gross Regional Product  $ 1,027,170,980   $ 2,036,258,400  
Personal Income (by place of residence)  $     101,300,000   $     830,400,000  
Output  $ 1,577,976,400   $ 2,887,176,600  
 
The scenario shows that the three casinos would generate government revenue (including 
funds to be distributed as property tax relief) equaling 39.7 percent of gaming revenue. 
This scenario, based on our moderate revenue model, is also quite similar to the first 
scenario we ran, but shifts more gaming revenue to Region 1. At the same time, it is more 
conservative in that it assumes gaming plays a much larger role in the overall revenue 
projections. With that in mind, Spectrum suggests that this is a likely, supportable scenario. 
 
Construction impacts 
For purposes of estimating the impact of construction work on the economy, we are 
assuming 3,000 direct jobs, a number affirmed by a methodology suggested by Perini Building 
Company and by the actual number of construction jobs created by the initial building of Borgata 
Hotel, Casino & Spa in Atlantic City. We also assumed: 
 Local construction companies in each region would oversee the work. 
 Estimates are in 2007 dollars. 
 Construction period is assumed to be three years, starting in 2010. 
 Employment is annualized over the three-year period. 
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The REMI model, which broke the impacts down into the Boston area and statewide, 
reported the following results for three properties: 
 
  Boston Massachusetts 
Employment                         4,749                        16,760  
     Construction                         2,296                          7,321  
     Professional Services                         1,008                          2,991  
     Other                         1,444                          6,447  
Gross Regional Product  $     1,862,869,810   $     4,744,965,500  
Personal Income (by place of resident)  $        593,900,000   $     3,347,000,000  
Output  $     3,104,337,480   $     7,903,010,400  
Wage & Salary Disbursements (by place of work)    $     2,922,100,000  
Income Tax Revenue    $        137,338,700  
 
Construction employment would include all those workers on-site, while professional 
services would include support personnel and others, such as architects and designers. The 
―other‖ category would include all spin-off employment generated by the construction work. 
Note that the model projects more actual construction work than what would be 
generated at the casino properties. That clearly makes sense, in our experience, as gaming will 
likely lead to additional capital investment in surrounding businesses, among other impacts. 
 
IRR, NPV analysis 
The creation of casinos in Massachusetts cannot succeed unless there is clear goal 
congruence between the public and private sectors. In part, this means that the Commonwealth 
benefits when casino operators invest in their facilities and generate an acceptable return on that 
investment. This part of our analysis examines a range of potential returns based on our 
projections. We examined returns from both an operational and a financial standpoint.  
From an operational standpoint, the two key variables that we examined were the 
potential margins and projected net revenue. The margins are determined by EBITDA (earnings 
before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization) as a percentage of net revenue. 
From a financial standpoint, the two key variables that we examined are the discount rate, 
which is used to determine the present value of future cash flows, and the Year 6 multiplier used 
to determine the potential market value of a project at the end of this period.  
The multiplier – the inverse of the capitalization rate – projects the ratio of dollars 
invested to dollars earned, and reflects the market value of a project. It translates into how many 
dollars a potential buyer or investor would be willing to invest at a future point for every $1 in 
potential earnings. 
The discount rate would reflect either the weighted average cost of capital or the ―hurdle 
rate‖ – that is, the average return on invested capital – which projects would have to achieve to 
justify an investment.  
Based upon our collective industry experience, and discussions with gaming industry 
leaders and decision-makers, a realistic hurdle rate for return on new capital investment would be 
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15 percent. Therefore, any proposed investment of capital that would yield results below this 
figure would most likely not occur in Massachusetts. 
This 15 percent hurdle rate is supported by recent experience. For example, we examined 
the most recent new casino hotel project constructed in Atlantic City, the Borgata, which opened 
in July 2003. Through the first three years of operations (first three years reflect results prior to 
ongoing expansions throughout the facility), Borgata generated an average annual return on 
invested capital (ROIC) of 18.9 percent. This 18.9 percent clearly justifies the use of a 15 percent 
hurdle rate. 
Any investor considering Massachusetts would likely examine the potential net present 
value (NPV) of any future cash flow or other income stream, as well as the internal rate of return 
(IRR) which measures the effective discount rate if the NPV was set at zero, i.e., the present 
value of future cash flows or other income streams equaled the value of cash outflows. A 
positive NPV could lead to a potential decision to invest, as could an IRR that exceeds either the 
hurdle rate or the weighted average cost of capital. 
Our first scenario for a hypothetical Massachusetts casino assumes that an operator 
makes the minimum investment required by the proposed legislation: $1 billion, net of any land 
acquisition costs. We assumed that would equate to a total investment of $1.1 billion, with at 
least $1 billion of eligibility toward the legislative requirement. 
We assume also, for purposes of this model, that gaming revenue equates to 65 percent of 
net revenue. Year 1 gaming revenue equals 80 percent of Year 3 gaming revenue, while Year 2 
equals 90 percent. After Year 3, growth continues at a 3 percent annual growth rate. 
We examined changes in two key variables: the EBITDA margin and the level of Year 3 
gross gaming revenue. The following table examines the IRR based on changes in those 
variables: 
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 EBITDA margins 
  20% 21% 22% 23% 24% 25% 26% 
 $     450  9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15% 
 $     500  11% 13% 14% 15% 16% 17% 18% 
 $     550  14% 15% 16% 18% 19% 20% 21% 
 $     600  16% 17% 19% 20% 21% 22% 23% 
 $     650  18% 20% 21% 22% 23% 25% 26% 
 $     700  20% 22% 23% 24% 26% 27% 28% 
 $     750  22% 24% 25% 27% 28% 29% 30% 
 
Note that an investment of $1.1 billion would likely be justified under these various 
scenarios, based on a minimum IRR of 15 percent. 
We then examined the potential IRR, using the same projected gaming revenues but 
changing the level of capital investment. 
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IRR outcomes 
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 Total capital investment (in millions) 
   $     1,100   $     1,200   $   1,300   $   1,400   $   1,500   $   1,600   $   1,700  
 $     450  14% 12% 10% 8% 7% 5% 4% 
 $     500  17% 15% 13% 11% 9% 8% 6% 
 $     550  20% 17% 15% 13% 12% 10% 9% 
 $     600  22% 20% 18% 16% 14% 12% 11% 
 $     650  25% 22% 20% 18% 16% 14% 13% 
 $     700  27% 24% 22% 20% 18% 16% 15% 
 $     750  29% 26% 24% 22% 20% 18% 16% 
Under this scenario (which assumes a 25 percent EBITDA margin), the IRR diminishes 
markedly as the level of capital investment increases. Note that, at an investment level of $1.5 
billion, the gaming revenue would have to exceed $600 million to reach an acceptable IRR at a 
25 percent EBITDA margin. 
We then examined the same levels of investment, while assuming Year 3 gaming revenue 
of $500 million, by adjusting the margins: 
IRR outcomes 
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 Total capital investment (in millions) 
   $     1,100   $     1,200   $   1,300   $   1,400   $   1,500   $   1,600   $   1,700  
23% 15% 13% 11% 9% 7% 6% 5% 
24% 16% 14% 12% 10% 8% 7% 5% 
25% 17% 15% 13% 11% 9% 8% 6% 
26% 18% 16% 14% 12% 10% 9% 7% 
27% 19% 17% 15% 13% 11% 10% 8% 
28% 20% 18% 16% 14% 12% 10% 9% 
29% 21% 19% 17% 15% 13% 11% 10% 
 
This table demonstrates that greater investment would be more difficult to justify unless 
either gaming revenue or EBITDA margins (which are a function of many factors, including the 
gaming tax rate) increase significantly. For example, if Year 3 gaming revenues are $500 
million, the EBITDA margin would have to reach 31 percent to justify a $1.5 billion investment. 
We then examined the potential NPV based on a $1.5 billion investment, and Year 3 
gaming revenue of $600 million. The two variables that we examined include the discount rate, 
which would in this instance be the weighted average cost of capital for a developer, and the 
terminal value multiplier, which would be the multiple of earnings that a property would 
theoretically command in Year 6. 
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NPV outcomes ($ in millions) 
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Terminal value multiplier 
 
4 5 6 7 8 9 
14.0% $             (307) $            (196) $              (84) $               27 $             139 $ 250 
14.5% $             (328) $            (220) $            (111) $               (2) $             106 $ 215 
15.0% $             (349) $            (243) $            (137) $              (31) $               75 $ 181 
15.5% $             (369) $            (265) $            (162) $              (59) $               44 $ 147 
16.0% $             (388) $            (287) $            (187) $              (86) $               14 $ 115 
16.5% $             (407) $            (309) $            (211) $            (113) $              (15) $ 83 
17.0% $             (425) $            (330) $            (234) $            (139) $              (43) $ 52 
 
The table shows that operators with a higher cost of capital are less likely to generate the 
necessary cash flows in that scenario to justify an investment at that level. When we reduced the 
assumed capital investment to $1.1 billion, it resulted in the following: 
 
NPV outcomes ($ in millions) 
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Terminal value multiplier 
 
4 5 6 7 8 9 
14.0% $                      93 $                  204 $                  316 $                  427 $                  539 $ 650 
14.5% $                      72 $                  180 $                  289 $                  398 $                  506 $ 615 
15.0% $                      51 $                  157 $                  263 $                  369 $                  475 $ 581 
15.5% $                      31 $                  135 $                  238 $                  341 $                  444 $ 547 
16.0% $                      12 $                  113 $                  213 $                  314 $                  414 $ 515 
16.5% $                       (7) $                    91 $                  189 $                  287 $                  385 $ 483 
17.0% $                    (25) $                    70 $                  166 $                  261 $                  357 $ 452 
 
The implications in this section of the analysis are that acceptable returns on investment 
are going to require a combination of strong gaming revenues, operational efficiencies and a 
relatively low cost of capital. This effectively means that the major gaming operators – who 
possess the experience, the national databases and the more powerful brands – would be best 
positioned to succeed, particularly in regions 2 and 3. Since Region 1 offers the greatest potential 
profitability, it could be in the best interests of the Commonwealth to stagger the bidding process 
to allow such operators additional opportunities to participate in Massachusetts. 
 
Revenue optimization 
The previous sections underscored the public-policy rationale behind the establishment of 
destination casinos at a tax rate of 27 percent, rather than following the model used in 
Pennsylvania, New York and other states to establish casinos that operate at significantly higher 
tax rates: 
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 The lower tax rates allow for a greater return on investment, and thus justify more 
amenities that will result in more employment and greater capital investment. 
 Because such destination properties have more amenities, they will generate more 
gaming revenue (by attracting a broader demographic, by increasing the frequency 
and length of visitation and by being more attractive to better customers.) 
 Such destinations will also prove less vulnerable to expanded competition, and better 
positioned to capture gaming dollars now going to other markets in New England. 
 Destinations are better positioned to generate revenue from more sources, thus 
capturing more overall tax dollars. 
 Destinations result in greater direct employment. 
Note, for example, in the earlier scenario, that total government revenue, including the 
funding for property tax relief, was $525.4 million, or 39 percent of gaming revenue. Would the 
Commonwealth realize more revenue if it simply raised the tax rate to, say, 39 percent? No, 
because gaming revenue would likely be lower, or at least more vulnerable to being captured by 
other states that have lower tax rates. The returns on investment would be lower as well, due to 
the higher tax rate, and thus the properties would not be able to justify capital investment that 
would lead to greater employment and overall spending. 
In the 11 states with commercial casinos in operation in 2007, commercial casinos 
contributed more than $5.8 billion in tax revenue to state and local governments, an 11.3 percent 
increase over 2005 data and in the 11 states with racetrack casinos in operation in 2007, 
racetrack casinos contributed more than $2.22 billion in tax revenue to state and local 
governments, a 54.6 percent increase over 2006 data as shown in the following tables:63 
 
2007 Commercial Casino Tax Revenue 
Colorado $115.4 million 
Illinois $833.9 million 
Indiana $842.0  million 
Iowa $314.8 million 
Louisiana $559.3 million 
Michigan $365.6 million 
Mississippi $350.4 million 
Missouri $417.3 million 
Nevada $1.034 billion 
New Jersey $474.7 million 
South Dakota $14.9 million 
TOTAL $5.8 billion 
Source: American Gaming Association and State Gaming Regulatory Agencies 
 
                                                 
63
 American Gaming Association, State of the States 2008 
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2007 Racetrack Casino Tax Revenue 
Delaware $216.63 million 
Florida $101.15 million 
Iowa $109.90 million 
Louisiana $68.15 million 
Maine $20.59 million 
New Mexico $63.64 million 
New York $449.90 million 
Oklahoma $10.17 million 
Pennsylvania $461.07 million 
Rhode Island $283.61 million 
West Virginia $439.94 million 
TOTAL $2.22 billion 
Source: American Gaming Association and State Gaming Regulatory Agencies 
 
Tax revenue for states with legalized gaming varies significantly from state to state. For 
the commercial casinos, from riverboat admissions fees of $2 per person in Indiana and $3 per 
person in Missouri to graduated tax rates of up to 50 percent on gross gambling revenue in 
Illinois, all states utilize some formulation to tax gross gambling revenue, with higher-tax rates 
often associated with the absence of other taxes and or fees. Additionally, many states 
supplement the tax on gross gaming revenues with additional taxes or fees on the non-gaming 
amenities. In New Jersey, for example, the state assesses casinos a $3 per day fee for any parked 
car, $3 per day for each hotel room occupied, and an added tax on cash retail sales of alcoholic 
beverages, at 3 percent, and on other taxable items, at 9 percent. We must note that New Jersey 
also pays one of the lowest gross gaming tax rates in the United States at 8 percent, not including 
the required reinvestment fee.  
As there is a wide range of formulation for the tax structures in each state, there is an 
equally wide range of spend, with many states earmarking funds to assist with education, local 
government and the social costs associated with gambling. The table below compares the details 
for each state with commercial casinos:  
  
 The Impacts of Expanded Gaming on the Commonwealth of Massachusetts                    116 
 
2007 Commercial Casino Tax Comparison 
State Gaming Format 
2007 Casino 
Tax Revenue 
How Taxes Spent State Gaming Tax Rate 
Colorado 
Land-based 
(limited stakes) 
$115.4 million 
Local communities, historic 
preservation, general fund 
Graduated tax rate with a 
maximum tax of 20% on gaming 
revenue 
Illinois Riverboat $833.9 million 
Education assistance, local 
government 
Graduated tax rate from 15% to 
50% of gross gaming revenue, $2-
3 per patron admissions tax 
Indiana 
Riverboat, 
dockside and 
land-based 
casinos 
$842.0 million 
Economic development, local 
government 
Graduated tax rate from 15% to 
35% of gross gaming revenue, $3 
per patron admissions tax 
Iowa 
Riverboat, 
racetrack and 
land-based 
casinos 
$314.8 million 
Infrastructure improvements, local 
government, general fund, schools and 
universities, the environment 
Graduated tax rate with a 
maximum tax of up to 22% on 
gross gaming revenue at 
riverboats and up to 24% at 
racetracks with slots and table 
games 
Louisiana 
Riverboat, land-
based, racetrack 
casino 
$559.3 million 
General fund, city of New Orleans, 
public retirement systems, state capitol 
improvements, rainy day fund 
Riverboat casinos: 21.5% 
Land-based casino: $60 million 
annual tax or 21.5% of gross 
gaming revenue, 
whichever is greater 
Racetrack casinos: 18.5% tax on 
gross gaming revenue, 18% of net 
revenue paid to horsemen, 4% of 
the above net revenue then paid to 
local  parish 
Michigan Land-based $365.6 million 
Public safety, capital improvements, 
youth programs, tax relief, 
neighborhood development and 
improvement, infrastructure repair and 
improvement 
24% tax on gross gaming revenue 
(11.9% to city of Detroit, 12.1% to 
state of Michigan) 
Mississippi 
Dockside, land-
based 
$350.4 million 
Housing, education, transportation, 
health care services, youth counseling 
programs 
Graduated tax rate on first 
$134,000 of gaming revenue, with 
all subsequent gaming revenue 
taxed at 8%; up to 4% additional 
tax on gaming revenues may be 
imposed by local governments 
Missouri 
Riverboat 
(continuous 
boarding) 
$417.3 million 
Education, local public safety 
programs, disordered gambling 
treatment, veterans' programs, early 
childhood programs 
20% tax on gross gaming revenue, 
$2 per patron admission fee, per 
excursion, split between home 
dock community and the state 
Nevada Land-based $1.034 billion 
Education, local governments, general 
fund, problem gambling programs 
Graduated tax rate with a 
maximum tax of 6.75% on gross 
gaming revenue; additional fees 
and levies may be imposed by 
counties, municipalities and the 
state adding approximately 1% to 
the tax burden 
New 
Jersey 
Land-based $474.7 million 
Senior citizens, disabled, economic 
revitalization programs 
8% tax on gross gaming revenue, 
plus a community investment 
alternative obligation of 1.25% of 
gross gaming revenue (or an 
investment alternative 2.5% on 
gross gaming revenue); 4.25% tax 
on casino complimentaries 
South 
Dakota 
Land-based 
(limited-stakes; 
$100 maximum 
bet) 
$14.9 million 
40% Department of Tourism, 10% 
Lawrence County, 50% commission 
fund 
8% tax on gross gaming revenue, 
gaming device tax of $2,000 per 
machine per year 
TOTAL   $5.8 billion     
Source: American Gaming Association and State Gaming Regulatory Agencies  
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For the 11 states with racetrack casinos, although the distributions to state and local 
governments is derived from a formula based on percentage of revenue retained by operator, the 
percentage varies greatly by the state, up to 76 percent in Iowa, which has non-profit and 
privately run racetracks. New York amended its law in February 2008, and has increased the 
percentage retained by operator to between 32 and 42 percent, depending on the number of 
machines, population within a 40-mile radius, and/or whether the location is within 15 miles of 
an Indian casino. 
 Many of these states earmark their funds for the general fund, however many also 
contribute to education, local government, purses and the social costs associated with gambling. 
The table below compares the details for each state with racetrack casinos:  
   
2007 Racetrack Casino Tax Comparison 
State Gaming Format 
2007 Distributions to 
State/Local 
Government 
How Taxes Spent 
Percentage of 
Revenue 
Retained by 
Operator 
Delaware 
Racetrack - Publicly run 
video lottery terminals with 
distributions to operators 
$216.63 million General fund 48% 
Florida 
Racetrack - Privately 
operated facilities with slot 
machines 
$101.15 million Statewide education 50% 
Iowa 
Racetrack - Nonprofit and 
privately operated facilities 
with slot machines and 
table games 
$109.90 million 
Infrastructure improvements, 
local government, general fund, 
schools and universities, the 
environment 
76.30% 
Louisiana 
Racetrack - Privately 
operated facilities with slot 
machines 
$68.15 million 
General fund, purses and local 
parishes 
63.60% 
Maine 
Racetrack - Privately 
operated facilities with slot 
machines 
$20.59 million 
Education, health care, 
agriculture and gambling control 
board administration 
51.80% 
New Mexico   
Racetrack - Privately 
operated facilities with slot 
machines 
$63.64 million 
General fund, problem gambling 
treatment 
54.75% 
New York   
Racetrack - Publicly run 
video lottery terminals with 
distributions to operators 
$449.90 million Public education 35.2%* 
Oklahoma 
Racetrack - Privately 
operated facilities with slot 
machines 
$10.17 million Education and purses 59% 
Pennsylvania 
Racetrack - Privately 
operated facilities with slot 
machines 
$461.07 million 
Property tax relief, economic 
development, tourism, horse 
racing industry, host local 
government 
45% 
Rhode Island   
Racetrack - Publicly run 
video lottery terminals with 
distributions to operators 
$283.61 million General fund 27.60% 
West Virginia   
Racetrack - Publicly run 
video lottery terminals with 
distributions to operators 
$439.94 million 
Education, senior citizens and 
tourism 
42.40% 
TOTAL   $2.22 billion     
 Source: American Gaming Association and State Gaming Regulatory Agencies 
*NY Bill A09998 amended the law on 2/13/08 to increase the % retained by operator up to 42%, depending on machine numbers, 
population and location. 
 
Pennsylvania, like many other states, went through a long political battle over the 
potential legalization of gaming. It finally crafted legislation authorizing slot machines at 14 
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venues, seven of which are tracks, five are non-track parlors, and two are resort-based locations. 
Slots licensees pay 34 percent of their gross revenue to the state, with most proceeds going to the 
property-tax relief fund. The remaining funds will also go to aid the horseracing industry (12 
percent), local communities that host slots to create programs to prevent and treat compulsive 
gambling facilities, and to economic and tourism development (5 percent). Track and non-track 
licensees pay a $50 million fee up front to operate slots, while resort licensees pay a $5 million 
fee.  
Pennsylvania chose to limit competition and gaming development, thereby justifying a 
higher gaming tax rate. And, although Pennsylvania has an effective tax rate of 55 percent, it 
chose to exclude non-cash wagers and promotional credits from the tax calculation, giving the 
operators a mitigating differential over their neighboring operators in New Jersey who pay tax, 
albeit at a much lower rate, on non-cash wagers and promotional credits.  
 
Relationship between tax rates, license fees, and capital investment: 
The following chart was presented by Gary Loveman, chairman, president and chief 
executive officer of Harrah‘s Entertainment, at the East Coast Gaming Congress in Atlantic City 
on May 20, 2008: 
 
 
Similar to most other industries, in the gaming business there is a direct inverse 
relationship between revenue tax rates and profitability margins as well as rates of return on 
investment. Higher such taxes then of course tend to suppress levels of capital spending by 
developer-operators, and relatively lower tax rates tend to encourage increased capital outlays. 
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Effective tax rates, U.S. commercial casino states
Other
Gaming/Admission Tax
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Initial license fees required of successful development bidders are generally viewed as 
part of their capital investments and therefore: 
 Have a detractive effect on capital development spend, as the licensing expense 
competes internally for capital with construction spending. 
 Pose a dampening effect on development interest among potential candidates, as the 
fees raise the cost of entry with no direct return on that expense, and thereby 
simultaneously reduce projected ROIC rates. 
This is not to say government entities should not impose substantial operator license fees, 
to both winnow out under-resourced bidders and help recoup the state‘s own start-up and other 
infrastructure costs, but rather to make clear the underlying considerations. 
At a $200 million minimum bid, the Massachusetts casino licensing fee, combined with 
the minimum development requirements, will ensure that only financially strong companies will 
apply. On the other hand, this is potentially $200 million less in capital invested into each of the 
destination casinos. This fee could be viewed by both the state and license applicants as the price 
of operating in a closed, geographically protected environment. 
Massachusetts is continuing an emerging trend among states of charging a significant 
one-time, flat-rate licensing or privilege fee, and its effective yearly rate would place it near the 
top of the list of such states: 
 Indiana: $250 million one-time licensing fee for racinos 
 Massachusetts: $200 million licensing fee for 10 years; based on discussions with the 
governor‘s administration, we believe this is contemplated to be a one-time fee 
 Pennsylvania: $50 million one-time licensing fee 
 Kansas: $25 million one-time privilege fee  
We note that one prospective Massachusetts gaming operator said that the 
Commonwealth ―could reasonably command $800 million in total license fees‖ (for three 
casinos) and was ―prepared to pay our proportionate share.‖64 A financial adviser for this 
operator further said that paying its share of $800 million in total licensing fees is ―reasonable 
given the proposed exclusivity of operation in return.‖65  
Ongoing gaming tax rates, however, are seen as the more important determinant of initial 
and future capital investment by operators. Philadelphia vs. Atlantic City provides a good case 
study. The more highly taxed eastern Pennsylvania properties are, aside from their racetrack 
operations, essentially slot machine venues enhanced only by sufficient food and beverage 
offerings to service their customers. In Atlantic City, meanwhile, existing casino operators – 
without even considering new or proposed casinos – are spending, or in the last three years have 
spent, roughly $2 billion for additional hotel towers, retail centers, restaurants, bars, nightclubs, 
swimming pools, spas, casino expansions and other amenities. 
                                                 
64 Letter from Richard Fields, Chairman and CEO, Coastal Development LLC (owner of Suffolk Downs), to Daniel O‘Connell, 
Secretary, Massachusetts Office of Housing and Economic Development, December 14, 2007. 
65 Letter from John Thompson, Managing Director, Normandy Financial LLC, to Richard Fields, Chairman and CEO, Coastal 
Development LLC, December 14, 2007,  
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While due in part to legislative limits on allowed forms of gaming in Pennsylvania, the 
difference between the capital investment – and thus the types and range of amenities – in the 
two states is due chiefly to their respective tax structures. The proposed Massachusetts model, 
although it would not fall in the ―low tax‖ end of the gaming industry tax spectrum, is closer to 
that of New Jersey (8 percent) than Pennsylvania (55 percent). Such product development also 
brings with it more collateral visitor spending, as well as broader local employment than has 
been in high-tax states such as Pennsylvania. 
The following chart illustrates the clear, albeit imperfect relationship between tax rates 
and employment: 
 
Note that Nevada – which had the lowest tax rate, at 6.75 percent, and the most 
employees, at more than 215,000 – is not included above, as its data would be literally off the 
chart. 
Tax policy implications 
At 27 percent, Massachusetts would not have the lowest gaming tax in the country, but 
would be competitive. Operators could realize an acceptable return on investment, as noted 
earlier. Still, we caution that the proposed rate would put Massachusetts casinos at a material 
disadvantage against their most direct competitors in Connecticut, as well as against some more 
distant competitors in New Jersey and elsewhere. 
Connecticut tribal casinos pay 25 percent of slot revenue to the state, and pay no state 
taxes or fees on table games revenue. That 2 percent differential on slot revenue could allow 
Connecticut casinos to competitively lower the hold percentage on their slots, thus making them 
more attractive to players. The severe differential on table revenue could prove to be a 
particularly powerful competitive weapon for Connecticut casinos in the high-end table market. 
We do not suggest that Massachusetts lower the rate further, as we acknowledge that 
there are likely political considerations at play that have determined that 27 percent is an 
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acceptable floor for tax rates. The legislation, however, would apparently allow bidders to 
compete on the basis of their gaming tax rate. Still, we caution that – if 27 percent remains the 
minimum tax rate – regulators should highly scrutinize any bids that attempt to win licensure by 
promoting higher rates. As we have noted, higher rates would likely result in less investment, 
fewer jobs and potentially less overall gaming revenue.  
 
Potential impact on Massachusetts Lottery 
To allay fears that casinos would negatively impact the highly successful Massachusetts 
Lottery, the proposed legislation would guarantee a growth rate of 3 percent in net profits, or the 
amount each year that is deposited into a special fund distributed to municipalities in 
Massachusetts. The ability of the proposed legislation to fund all of its programs is largely 
dependent on how much casino revenue will be needed to generate that growth rate of 3 percent. 
The more that is needed means there is that much less to pay for property tax relief and 
transportation improvements, the two main recipients of casino revenue. 
Five percent of gross gaming revenue would be distributed to community and public 
health mitigation funds. Additional funds would then be used to assist the Lottery, and whatever 
is left would be split evenly between tax relief and transportation improvements. The 
administration‘s analysis – based on projected casino revenue of $2.05 billion – expects to 
contribute $200 million each for transportation and property tax relief, after funding $51 for 
lottery mitigation.  
The Massachusetts Lottery guaranteed funding level is computed by taking the 2003-
2007 annual average of ―the total amounts deposited in the state lottery fund.‖ That number 
would then be increased each year by 3 percent. Once all three casinos are open, the 
administration expects to spend no more than $51 million on lottery mitigation. Other studies, 
which will be discussed later in this report, estimate the figure to be much higher. 
Even without casinos, it may be difficult for the Lottery to generate 3 percent growth. 
From 2000 to 2007, the average annual growth rate was less than 1 percent. In fiscal 2007, net 
profit fell by nearly 5 percent. The figure is expected to increase this year by about 3 percent, as 
noted in the following table: 
Year Massachusetts Lottery, annual net 
profit (in millions) 
Percent change 
2000  $            853  
 
2001  $            864  1.3% 
2002  $            899  4.1% 
2003  $            889  -1.1% 
2004  $            912  2.6% 
2005  $            936  2.6% 
2006  $            951  1.6% 
2007  $            892  -6.2% 
2008*  $            919  3.0% 
2000-2007 Growth Rate 4.6% 0.7% 
* Lottery Commission projection 
Source: Massachusetts State Lottery Commission 
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 The legislation relating to Lottery mitigation uses the language: ―total amounts deposited 
in the state lottery fund.‖ A number of studies have interpreted the language in different ways. 
The Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation interprets it to mean ―net profits before distribution.‖ 
All of the lottery revenues are deposited into the state lottery fund. Taken literally, that would 
mean that the legislation is referring to gross lottery revenues as opposed to the amount that is 
deposited into special funds to assist local governments.  
We agree with the Taxpayers Foundation‘s interpretation. Lottery officials define net 
profits to mean money left over after prize money and administrative expenses are paid. They 
say that is the most accurate way to gauge the Lottery‘s performance. UHY Advisors, in its 
report for the Boston Chamber, used actual transfers to the General Fund made by the 
Legislature, which is sometimes more than the Lottery‘s net profit. 
To avoid confusion, we suggest that the language be clarified and that ―net profit‖ be the 
measure used to calculate the Lottery mitigation. 
A number of experts have weighed in on the impact of casinos on lottery revenues. Not 
all the numbers are projections. In some cases, they are simply assumptions or allowances for the 
sake of argument, that are used to determine the potential impact on the fiscal model. 
The Lottery Commission itself expects a decline of 3 percent to 8 percent once the first 
casino opens. Within five years, the commission‘s consultant sees revenue recovering to pre-
casino levels, but that figure is not adjusted for inflation. And if an additional two casinos open, 
the negative impact on the Lottery would be much greater.
66
  
An August 2007 report by University of Massachusetts-Dartmouth Professor Clyde 
Barrow estimates a worst-case scenario of an 8 percent decline in the casinos‘ first year.67 A 
2006 study by the House Committee on Economic Development estimates a potential decline of 
15 percent through the casinos‘ first two years. 
The Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation assumes a 5.5 percent decrease in 2012, when 
the first casino is expected to open, with a 1.5 percent growth rate resuming in 2013. The 
Foundation assumes a 1.5 percent growth rate from 2008 to 2011. 
 UHY Advisors allows, in its Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce report, for a decline 
of as much as 10 percent in 2012, nearly double that of the Foundation‘s assumed allowance in 
its models.  
It is important to note that under the administration proposal, the amount to be made up 
with casino revenues is not just the decline, should one occur, but the amount needed to ensure 3 
percent growth as well. The lottery mitigation figure in 2012 could range anywhere from $120 
million to $217 million, according to those surveys, which are summarized in the following 
table: 
                                                 
66 2003 Christiansen Capital Advisors report 
67 Maximum Bet: A Preliminary Blueprint for Casino Gaming & Economic Development in Massachusetts 
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Projected 
annual 
decline in 
net profit, 
 $ in 
millions 
(2012) 
Lottery 
Commission 
best case: 3% 
decline * 
Lottery 
Commission 
worst case: 8% 
decline* 
Massachusetts 
Taxpayers 
Foundation 5.5% 
decline 
University of 
Massachusetts –
Dartmouth, 
worst case 8 
percent decline 
House 
Committee 
7.5% decline  
UHY 
Advisors, for 
Greater 
Boston 
Chamber, 
worst case 
scenario: 10 
% decline 
 
$120  $150  
                       
$144   $169   $164    $217 
  
State Treasurer Timothy P. Cahill, who supports the destination casino proposal and 
serves as chairperson of the Lottery Commission, notes that there would be an impact on the 
Lottery if casinos are built. But he noted in a September 18, 2007, op-ed in the Boston Globe68 
that the Lottery is already struggling to meet the growing revenue needs of cities and towns. If 
the revenues from casinos are combined with net lottery revenues and deliver the combined 
amounts to the state‘s 351 cities and towns, there will be a dramatically reduced need to rely on 
property taxes as the major generator of local revenue, according to Cahill. 
There is also evidence to indicate that the casino proposal might not negatively impact 
the Massachusetts Lottery based on a review of what occurred in lottery states that became 
casino gaming states as well. 
Although previous states that have legalized casinos can provide a guide, which might 
reflect what can be expected to happen to Massachusetts, there is no guarantee that one state 
lottery will be affected by casinos in the same magnitude as in another state. 
We begin with a conceptual discussion of how casino introduction might affect the 
Massachusetts Lottery. Then we review some of the economics literature that has examined the 
relationship between casinos and lotteries. Finally, we present some data on lotteries from a 
variety of states and analyze what might be expected to happen in Massachusetts, relative to 
other states.  
Theoretical discussion 
Since casinos and lotteries both represent a form of gambling, one might reasonably 
expect that the two products would be substitutes for each other. If this is the case, then it is 
conceivable that any spending by Massachusetts residents at casinos might come at the expense 
of lottery sales. For example, in the extreme case, if each $1 spent at casinos by Massachusetts 
residents means $1 less on lottery sales, then we can be confident that the introduction of casinos 
would lead to a steep reduction in overall state lottery revenues. This is because the state retains 
between 44 and 50 cents from each $1 of lottery sales, depending on the specific game,
69
 
whereas the proposed casino legislation includes a 27 percent tax on gross gaming revenue.  
If we ignore administrative costs for the lottery and casinos and income taxes paid by 
casinos, then a dollar-for-dollar substitution of casinos spending for lottery spending would 
                                                 
68 ―Massachusetts‘ fortune is with gaming,‖ Timothy P. Cahill, Boston Globe, September 18, 2007 
69 See Thomas Garrett (2001), ―The Leviathan lottery? Testing the revenue maximization objective of State lotteries as evidence 
for Leviathan,‖ Public Choice vol. 109, pp. 101-117.  
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reduce tax receipts from gambling. Clearly, such a scenario is unlikely to occur in reality. We 
can divide the Massachusetts population into gamblers and non-gamblers. If non-gamblers do 
not buy lottery tickets and would not go to casinos, then we can ignore them in the subsequent 
analysis. For the remaining Massachusetts population that gambles, the introduction of casinos 
will mean an additional option for gambling expenditures.  
It is true that some people could substitute dollar-for-dollar casino spending for lottery 
spending. We view the size of this group as being relatively small, since the casino games and 
lotteries are different products.  
We do not suggest that casinos would not necessarily impact other entertainment or 
gambling experiences. For example, casinos could have an impact on bingo. One anecdotal 
indicator of that has been the recent introduction of slots-only casinos in Pennsylvania. The 
Homewood Volunteer Fire Department in Beaver County, western Pennsylvania, once hosted 
bingo games that brought in players from as far away as Ohio and West Virginia. Such games 
funded 100 percent of the department‘s $150,000 annual budget. In recent years, two casinos – 
Mountaineer Casino, Racetrack & Resort, 29 miles away in West Virginia, and the Meadows 
Racetrack & Casino, 55 miles away in Pennsylvania – opened. The number of nightly players 
has declined from as many as 500 to 100 or fewer. And bingo now covers only one-third of the 
department‘s budget.70 
The question is: Is bingo comparable to the lottery? In our experience, bingo is largely 
viewed as a social activity as much as it is a gambling experience. That gives it common 
characteristics with casinos, and points out a material difference between bingo and lotteries. 
Lotteries are largely a convenience-driven product, with little social interaction. Casinos 
– particularly destination resorts – are centered on the entertainment experience. At the same 
time, studies have shown that the demographics of these two forms of gambling are markedly 
different. A 2006 survey of 2,250 adults across the nation – including 1,473 who had gambled 
within the previous year – illustrates the demographic differences among participants in different 
forms of gambling: 
                                                 
70 ―Study says casinos cut into bingo profits,‖ Pittsburgh Tribune-Review, May 13, 2008 
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Profile of Gamblers in the United States 
 Any type of 
gambling 
Bought lottery 
ticket 
Visited 
casino 
Bet on 
sports** 
Played cards for 
money 
All adults 67% 52% 29% 23% 17% 
 
Gender 
Men 72% 56% 31% 32% 25% 
Women 62% 48% 27% 15% 10% 
 
Race/Ethnicity 
White 68% 53% 30% 23% 18% 
Black 62% 45% 24% 24% 14% 
Hispanic* 62% 47% 22% 16% 12% 
Age 
18-29 71% 48% 30% 30% 32% 
30-49 69% 56% 30% 25% 17% 
50-64 68% 55% 31% 22% 11% 
65+ 58% 43% 22% 13% 10% 
 
Education 
College 
graduates 
65% 48% 31% 25% 15% 
Some college 71% 55% 32% 23% 21% 
H.S. grad or less 66% 52% 27% 22% 17% 
 
Family income 
$100,000+ 79% 57% 40% 39% 24% 
$50K-$99k 74% 60% 37% 27% 22% 
$30K-$49k 67% 54% 27% 22% 21% 
Less than $30k 59% 44% 21% 16% 11% 
 
Region 
Northeast 77% 63% 31% 26% 20% 
Midwest 64% 52% 26% 23% 18% 
South 62% 48% 24% 21% 15% 
West 68% 47% 38% 23% 17% 
 
Religion 
Protestant 61% 48% 24% 19% 13% 
Catholic 77% 62% 39% 30% 23% 
Secular 72% 52% 29% 24% 23% 
 
White Protestants 
Evangelical 50% 40% 19% 14% 11% 
Mainline 73% 58% 29% 24% 17% 
*Hispanics are of any race 
** Betting on sports includes professional sports, college sports or an office pool 
Source: Pew Research Center 
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The introduction of a new good to the state‘s entertainment offerings – such as casinos – 
will likely cause a modest increase in expenditures. If consumers are offered a new product that 
is in demand, they may divert spending from other items, or may use savings to purchase the 
new good or service. Hence, the introduction of casinos might have a positive stimulus effect on 
overall demand for goods and services in the state. This effect would tend to be positive for the 
state, as overall expenditures increase. This is essentially an increase in economic activity, which 
represents a source of economic growth and higher incomes. This is a well-known principle in 
economics which was famously expounded by Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter.
71
 
Another possible effect of introducing casinos in Massachusetts is to stimulate the 
purchase of lottery tickets from out-of-state visitors. Given that the lottery is widespread in the 
United States, this is unlikely to be a large source of lottery sales. But it is conceivable that, if the 
lottery is marketed within casinos, out-of-state visitors can be expected to spend money at the 
casinos and may purchase lottery tickets as well. We view this effect on the lottery as being quite 
small. 
As discussed above, there could be several conflicting effects to a state‘s lottery when 
casinos are introduced. Although each state has unique features that may not be replicated in 
other states, we can obtain important information by looking to the experiences and data from 
other states. There have been numerous economic studies of lotteries. A small body of literature 
has examined how different types of gambling affect each other. We review this literature, and 
then focus on the relationship between lotteries and casinos. 
We review two types of studies. The first type includes papers that primarily analyze the 
relationships among gambling industries, whether or not state tax revenue is explicitly 
considered. The second type includes papers that focus specifically on the relationship between 
gambling industries and tax revenues. One important caveat is that most of these studies do not 
provide information on the overall effect of all types of legalized gambling on other industries or 
on state tax revenues. In particular, most of the published studies: 
 Concern the impact of a single industry on one other industry, and not vice versa; 
 Concern the impact of a single industry on state tax revenue; 
 Are for relatively short time periods; or 
 Concern a single state or a small number of states. 
In short, the problem with the existing literature is that the results are applicable to 
specific jurisdictions, during specific time periods, and for specific industry relationships. Few 
studies have examined the more general relationships among gambling industries and the effects 
of these industries on overall state tax revenues. Thus, the results reported in previous studies 
may not be directly applicable to Massachusetts. 
The most recent example of data as to how casinos can impact the lottery comes from 
Pennsylvania, where six casinos have been introduced at various geographical locations at 
various times over the past two years, with six more coming (as well as two 500-slot casinos at 
resort hotels that will be used for hotel guests only). A recent study of the impact of slots gaming 
                                                 
71 Joseph Schumpeter (1934 [1983]), The Theory of Economic Development, chapter 2. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction 
Publishers. 
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on Pennsylvania lottery sales may provide some insight into what has occurred in Pennsylvania. 
The study, released June 11, 2008, by the Legislative Budget and Finance Committee, was 
required by Pennsylvania state law.
72
 
 
 
Between 2001 and 2006, the Pennsylvania Lottery experienced a period of unprecedented 
73 percent sales growth. The growth spurt included four consecutive years of double-digit 
increases, capped by a 16 percent rise in fiscal 2005-2006. 
73 
According to the report, the 
significant growth rate in recent years can largely be attributed to a significant increase in the 
vendor network.  
By concentrating on recruitment and focusing on corporate accounts, the Lottery reversed 
a 16-year decline in retailer counts, from 1986 to 2002. The number of retailers increased by 20 
percent from January 2003 through June 2006. Nearly 1,500 new retailers were added to the 
lottery retailer network during that period, bringing the total to more than 8,400. 
In fiscal 2007, another 129 retailers were added, which is about a third of the figure for 
three previous years.74 The increase in lottery sales fell to just 0.2 percent in fiscal 2007. The 
state‘s first slots parlor opened in November 2006. Lottery officials acknowledge that the slots 
parlors probably had some impact on sales but claim it is difficult to estimate how much of an 
impact it had.  
―The slots wagering of nearly $14 billion between November 2006 and January 2008 
would appear to have some impact on the availability of personal discretionary income for 
lottery purchases. But, the extent to which slots wagering may shift individuals‘ gaming attention 
                                                 
72 Act 2004-71 
73 Pennsylvania Lottery Commission 
74 Pennsylvania Department of Revenue 
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and resources away from lottery games is difficult, if not impossible, to quantify,‖ according to 
the study.
75
 
In releasing the lottery report, Revenue Secretary Thomas Wolf, who oversees the lottery, 
noted results are affected by a ―myriad of factors such as jackpot sizes, marketing efforts, the 
economy and even the weather. We cannot attribute any single factor as the sole reason for an 
increase or decrease in lottery sales.‖76 
 The study noted that the single biggest negative effect on sales may have been the 
relatively small Powerball jackpots in 2007.
77
 On the other hand, Mega Millions jackpots in 
states that border Pennsylvania were high. The result was that lottery players bought Mega 
Millions tickets rather than Powerball tickets.
78
  
The report appears to show, however, that there is an impact on sales in counties with 
casinos and on counties adjacent to where casinos are located.
79
 
The study analyzed lottery sales in each of Pennsylvania‘s 67 counties, comparing data 
from 2007, when slot parlors were open, with that of 2006. It found that sales in the six casino 
home counties declined by 4.2 percent. Sales were just about flat in the 20 counties adjacent to 
casinos and increased by 3.8 percent in the 41 non-adjacent counties.
80
 
 
                                                 
75 An Assessment of the impact of slots gaming on Pennsylvania Lottery Sales, June 11, 2008. 
76 Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, June 12, 2008 
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But the spread between casino counties and non-casino ones would have been even 
greater had the study looked at just the months that facilities were open in 2007. One of them 
opened in June; another in November. Yet the study considered sales for the entire calendar year.  
After disregarding the data for the months that the facilities were not open, the six casino 
home counties actually registered a sales decline of nearly 5 percent in 2007, not the 4.2 percent 
quoted in the report. 
More telling is that only 19 of the 67 counties in the state registered sales declines. 
Fourteen of them were in counties where a slots facility is located or in counties that bordered 
them. Of the 41 non-slots counties that were not adjacent to casinos, only five had lower annual 
sales in 2007 than in 2006.
81
 
Luzerne County, where Mohegan Sun at Pocono Downs is located, sustained a sales 
decline of 7.7 percent, the second largest decline of any of the state‘s 67 counties.  
In the most recent fiscal year, which ended June 30, Pennsylvania reported additional 
growth in lottery sales of $12.8 million, including a $3.3 million increase in sales of instant 
games. Sec. Wolf told the media: "In these tough economic times, the Pennsylvania Lottery had 
an extraordinary year.82‖ 
Of concern to the lottery in Massachusetts would have to be its successful Keno game, 
which accounts for between 15 and 20 percent of sales. The game is more of a social one and 
would be more likely to be impacted by casino gaming. 
In New York State, lottery sales involving Keno dropped precipitously in Niagara County 
after the Seneca Niagara Casino Hotel opened on December 30, 2002.83 Lottery officials 
provided us with fiscal year data for 2002 and compared it with fiscal 2004, the 12-month period 
after the casino opened. The lottery‘s Quick Draw keno-type game fell 21 percent. In the rest of 
the state, sales increased by 2 percent. 
The negative trend for Quick Draw has continued over the years. In fiscal 2008, Keno 
sales dropped 36 percent compared to the year before the Seneca casino opened. The statewide 
figure was a 9 percent decline.  
The New York Lottery reported significant growth in fiscal 2008 of 4 percent, and cited 
two factors: the success of video lottery terminals, particularly at Yonkers Raceway, outside 
New York City, and the increased popularity of certain instant games, which collectively account 
for half of the New York Lottery‘s revenue. In the first quarter of the current fiscal year, Mega 
Millions lottery ticket sales grew by 40 percent in the quarter, while sales for $10 and $20 instant 
games grew by 26 percent84. 
                                                 
81 Ibid 
82 ―Economy, Casinos not Hurting Pa. Lottery Sales,‖ Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, July 21, 2008 
83 New York State Lottery, interview June 16, 2008 
84 ―New York Lottery Revenue Increases,‖ Binghamton Press & Sun-Bulletin, July 12, 2008 
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Clearly, the Pennsylvania and New York state experience would indicate that lottery 
sales near three destination casinos in Massachusetts would decline, at least in the short term. We 
have to look at other examples to gain some insight into long-term trends. 
The papers discussed below are relevant for two specific parts of this report: the 
anticipated short-term and long-term impact on the Massachusetts lottery, and the potential 
impact and anticipated substitution effect on existing Massachusetts businesses, such as dining 
and retail.  
Elliot and Navin
85
 model the determinants of lottery sales in 48 states, from 1989-95. In 
analyzing how other gambling industries affect lottery sales, they use the number of Indian 
casinos in the state and the highest gross revenues per capita for a lottery and gaming in any 
neighboring state. They find that casinos and pari-mutuels harm the lottery, and that adjacent 
state lotteries have a small negative effect on in-state lottery sales. The number of Indian casinos 
in a state and riverboat casinos in neighboring states do not significantly affect lottery sales.  
Fink and Rork
86
 argue that low-revenue lottery states are more likely to legalize casinos. 
This partly explains the negative relationship between casinos and lotteries.  
Kearney
87
 examined household expenditure data from 1982-98, a period during which 21 
states implemented a state lottery. Among other issues, she studied the source of lottery ticket 
expenditures. Kearney finds that spending on lottery tickets is financed completely by a 
reduction in non-gambling expenditures. This implies that other forms of gambling are not 
harmed by a lottery, but that non-gambling industries are. Even so, we could reasonably expect 
that the lottery would therefore increase overall state tax revenues since the lottery tax is 
significantly higher than taxes on most other types of expenditure.  
Siegel and Anders
88
 tested the effect of Arizona Indian casinos on the state‘s lottery sales 
from 1993-98. Explanatory variables included the number of Indian casino slot machines and 
horse and greyhound racing handle. They found the number of Indian slot machines to have a 
significantly negative effect on lottery sales.  
Several studies have focused more specifically on the tax revenue question. Anders et 
al.
89
 examine the effect of Indian casinos on transactions tax revenue of one Arizona county. 
Since Indian casino revenues in many states are not directly taxed by the state, officials may be 
concerned that increases in casino expenditures will result in less spending on taxable goods and 
services. (Different states may negotiate different terms in developing agreements to allow 
Indian casinos.) In their model estimating state tax revenues from 1990-96, the authors consider 
the introduction of casinos. They find that the decline in the Transaction Privilege tax from the 
                                                 
85 Donald S. Elliott and John C. Navin (2002), ―Has Riverboat Gambling Reduced State Lottery Revenue?‖ Public Finance 
Review, vol. 30, pp. 235-247. 
86 Stephen Fink and Jonathan Rork (2003), ―The importance of self-selection in casino cannibalization of state lotteries.‖ 
Economics Bulletin, vol. 8, pp. 1-8. 
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retail, bar, hotel, and amusement sectors, associated with the opening of casinos was about 0.44 
percent. These results suggest that there was, at least in this case, a small substitution effect away 
from other goods and services toward the casinos.  
Popp and Stehwien
90
 can be seen as a complement to the study by Anders et al. (1998), 
but applied to New Mexico county-level tax revenue, from 1990-97. They find that Indian 
casinos have a negative effect on tax revenues within the county. 
Borg et al.
91
 (1993) found that $1 in net lottery revenue has a cost of 15 cents to 23 cents 
in other types of government revenue, particularly sales and excise taxes, but that the lottery 
leads to an overall increase in revenues. Fink et al.
92
 also study the overall tax revenue effects of 
lotteries. Their results are partially consistent with those of Borg et al. (1993). However, Fink et 
al. (2004) find that overall state tax revenue decreases when lottery revenues increase. Both of 
these papers consider lotteries, but do not account for other types of gambling in their models.  
Siegel and Anders
93
 examine Missouri sales tax revenues at the county level (1994-96) as 
a result of introducing riverboat casinos. Like Anders et al. (1998), they find taxes from certain 
amusement industries are negatively impacted. Siegel and Anders estimated that a 10 percent 
increase in gambling tax revenue leads to a 4 percent decline in tax revenues from other 
amusement and recreation sources. However, there is no clear and consistent negative effect on 
other types of tax revenues.  
We suggest that the likelihood of advancing public policy through the establishment of 
legal casinos can be best advanced in Massachusetts by requiring that all successful bidders for 
licenses put forth comprehensive plans that are designed to optimize a number of factors, 
including: 
 Out-of-state visitation 
 Employment 
 Capital investment  
 Collaborative marketing with other segments of the leisure and hospitality industries. 
This latter point should be underscored with respect to the Massachusetts Lottery. In our 
experience, lotteries and casinos in other states have developed cross-marketing plans of varying 
success. The New Jersey Lottery, as one example, developed instant games in which players 
could win prizes at Las Vegas casinos. In one game, 3.3 million $5 scratch-off tickets were 
printed in 2004 in which 300 tickets included four-day, three-night packages at Caesars Palace in 
Las Vegas, including round-trip coach airfare and $500 in spending money.
94
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All bids for any future casino destinations in Massachusetts should include plans 
designed to minimize any negative impact on the lottery, while increasing ticket sales to out-of-
state residents. 
The Commonwealth should follow Pennsylvania‘s lead. The Legislature in that state 
mandated that lottery terminals be installed in prominent areas of the casino floor. The 11 
terminals at the six casinos generated more than $1.3 million in sales from July 10, 2007, 
through February 27, 2008.  
Historical lottery and casino data 
Few of the studies above focus specifically on the relationship between commercial 
casinos and lotteries. In addition, those studies often used varying methodologies, time periods 
and jurisdictions, which may explain the inconsistencies often seen in their results. In this section 
we provide more basic data on the relationships between lotteries and casinos.  
Commercial casinos began to spread in the United States (outside Nevada and New 
Jersey) in the late 1980s. In order to see the effect casino gambling has had on state lotteries, it is 
informative to look at rates of change for lottery revenues. Below we present two tables.  
The first table shows that lottery growth rates in non-casino states have varied drastically. 
However, the average growth rate in lotteries is significantly lower during the 2000-2005 period 
than in the previous period. This overall decline in lottery growth rates is perhaps due to a 
―saturation‖ effect. Still, lotteries are seeing positive growth rates even adjusted for inflation. As 
lotteries have been adopted in most states, perhaps now there is relatively little cross-border 
purchasing which may have stimulated earlier, more isolated state lotteries. During both pre-
2000 and post-2000 time periods, the growth rates in lottery revenues outpaced the growth rate in 
the population. This suggests that the lottery is still a popular and growing government product. 
Average annual lottery and population growth rates, selected non-casino states 
State  (a) 
1
st
 year 
of data 
(b) 
Lottery growth,  
1
st
 yr.–2000  
(c)  
Population 
growth, 1990-
2000
b
 
 (d) 
Lottery growth, 
2000-2005
 a
 
(e)  
Population 
growth,  
2000-2005
b
 
Georgia 1993 10.3% 2.6%  3.2% 2.2% 
Kentucky 1989 11.0% 0.9%  2.2% 0.6% 
Maine 1985 16.3% 0.4%  6.3% 0.6% 
Maryland 1985 -0.4% 1.1%  3.1% 1.0% 
Massachusetts 1985 6.2% 0.6%  1.3% 0.2% 
Nebraska 1995 -5.2% 0.8%  7.7% 0.5% 
New Hampshire 1985 17.7% 1.1%  3.8% 1.1% 
Ohio 1985 3.4% 0.5%  -2.0% 0.2% 
Pennsylvania 1985 -1.3% 0.3%  9.7% 0.2% 
Texas 1993 4.4% 2.3%  4.4% 1.9% 
Vermont 1985 13.1% 0.8%  4.1% 0.4% 
Virginia 1990 6.1% 1.4%  4.2% 1.3% 
Averages  6.8% 1.1%  4.0% 0.9% 
Notes: All averages calculated by Walker using data from Walker and Jackson (2008) and the U.S. Census Bureau.  
a
 Average growth rates in lottery sales between 2000 and 2005 are calculated assuming a constant compound rate of change 
between 2000 and 2006 revenues. Delaware, Rhode Island, and West Virginia are omitted because their 2006 data include 
revenues from video lottery terminals.  
b
 These rates are calculated by dividing the 10-year and 5-year growth rates, 1990-2000 and 2000-2005, by 10 and 5, respectively. 
This method ignores compounding, but the difference is modest.  
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The next table shows the growth rates in population and lottery revenues overall and 
decomposed into pre- and post-casino introduction periods. (Rates in both tables below use 
inflation-adjusted data.) Note that the earliest year for which data are presented in both tables is 
1985. This is because we are trying to focus on how lotteries were affected by the spread of 
casinos that occurred mostly during the 1990s. The same time period is chosen for the non-
casino states to serve as a comparison to the casino states.  
 
Average annual lottery and population growth rates, selected casino states, 1985-2005. 
State  
 
(a) 
1
st
 
year 
of 
data 
(b) 
Lottery 
growth,  
1
st
 yr.-
2000 
(c ) 
Population  
growth,  
1990-2000 
(f) 
Year 
Casinos 
Opened 
(g)  
Lottery 
growth 
before 
casinos 
(h)  
Lottery 
growth after 
casinos 
opened  
(through 
2000) 
(d) 
Lottery 
growth, 
2000-
2005 
(e) 
Population 
growth,  
2000-2005 
Colorado 1985 7.2% 3.1% 1992*** 9.5% 5.7% 2.0% 1.6% 
Connecticut 1985 3.1% 0.3% 1992* 3.1% 3.1% 0.3% 0.5% 
Illinois 1985 -1.6% 0.8% 1991** 1.0% -2.8% 3.2% 0.5% 
Indiana 1990 1.2% 1.0% 1995** 8.7% 1.3% 4.2% 0.6% 
Iowa 1986 3.2% 0.5% 1992*** 8.7% -1.3% 10.8% 0.3% 
Louisiana 1992 -5.1% 0.6% 1988***   1.0% 0.2% 
Minnesota 1990 -0.1% 1.2% pre-1985*   -0.2% 0.8% 
Missouri 1986 6.0% 0.9% 1994** 3.6% 8.1% 9.5% 0.7% 
New Jersey 1985 1.6% 0.9% pre-1985**   2.7% 0.6% 
New York 1985 4.3% 0.5% pre-1985*   9.4% 0.3% 
Averages  2.2% 1.0%  5.8% 1.2% 4.3% 0.6% 
Notes: * Indian casinos only, as of 2000; ** Commercial casinos only, as of 2000; *** Commercial and Indian casinos 
Comparing columns (d) and (e) from the table above, we see that on average, adjusted for 
population, the lottery growth rates in casino states exceeds those in non-casino states. As 
cautioned earlier, any particular state may see results substantially different from the average 
experiences of other states. This may suggest that, after an initial negative casino effect on the 
lottery, the lottery recovers and sees even higher growth rates than before casinos.
95
 
Indeed, while we caution that experience in other states is limited because so many 
factors can differ, the experience in Connecticut – a state that introduced two destination casinos 
in the 1990s – shows that the destination business model can successfully co-exist with a lottery. 
From 1992 through 1996, Connecticut Lottery sales grew by 30 percent, from $544 
million in fiscal 1992 to $707 million in fiscal 1996.
96
 Foxwoods in Connecticut opened in 1992, 
and had been expanding throughout that period of study. Mohegan Sun opened in October 1996, 
and thus overlapped that study by less than a year. Still, the data indicate that casino destinations 
did not hurt lottery sales, despite the opening of the two of the world‘s most successful gaming 
                                                 
95 In his paper, Jeff Dense argues that there ―continues to be minimal substitution between state lotteries and commercial 
casinos.‖ His analysis shows that state government receipts from lotteries and casinos are both positive over time. However, it is 
unclear whether or not he adjusted his data for inflation. See Jeff Dense, ―State lotteries, commercial casinos, and public finance: 
An uneasy relationship revisited.‖ Gaming Law Review, vol. 11, pp. 34-50.  
96 ―A Study Concerning the Effects of Legalized Gambling on the Citizens of the State of Connecticut,‖ The WEFA Group, 1997 
 The Impacts of Expanded Gaming on the Commonwealth of Massachusetts                    134 
properties. The WEFA Group, in its study, attributed that growth, in large measure, to the 
introduction of instant games priced at $2 or more.  
The Massachusetts Lottery has been one of the highest revenue-generating lotteries in the 
country, even though its growth rate has been modest. Note that even in the recent 2000-05 
period, growth in lottery receipts has outpaced population growth. So even though the growth 
rate in Massachusetts lottery receipts has slowed over the past decade, it is still seeing strong 
performance.  
One question that needs to be addressed in any analysis of the potential impact of casinos 
on the Massachusetts Lottery is: Why is the lottery so successful? The Massachusetts Lottery has 
indeed achieved astounding success, compared to its peer group, as shown in the following table, 
which lists fiscal year 2006 data: 
 
  Population (millions)   Lottery sales (millions)  Sales per capita 
Massachusetts          6.44   $ 4,501.24   $ 698.95  
New York        19.31   $ 6,487.14   $ 335.95  
Georgia          9.36   $ 2,955.38   $ 315.75  
New Jersey          8.72   $ 2,406.50   $ 275.97  
Pennsylvania        12.44   $ 3,070.27   $ 246.81  
Michigan        10.10   $ 2,212.37   $ 219.05  
Florida        18.09   $ 3,929.03   $ 217.19  
Ohio        11.48   $ 2,220.93   $ 193.46  
Texas        23.51   $ 3,774.69   $ 160.56  
California        36.46   $ 3,585.00   $   98.33  
Source: LaFleur’s 2007 World Lottery Almanac 
Such a dramatically different penetration rate among lottery sales cannot be attributed to 
any particularly unusual demographic characteristics regarding the adult population of 
Massachusetts. It cannot be attributed to the absence of casinos in the region, since nearby states 
have casinos – and we note that Massachusetts dramatically outperforms states such as Georgia, 
Texas and Ohio that do not have casinos. 
Massachusetts has continued to grow its successful lottery, and recently reported a $237 
million increase in sales last year for a record $4.7 billion97. 
We believe that the success of the Massachusetts Lottery can largely be attributed to 
innovative, creative leadership. This has long been the case, since Massachusetts was the first 
state to introduce instant games, in 1974. The lottery still introduces 24 to 28 new instant games 
annually, and such games account for 69 percent of overall lottery sales.
98
 
Indeed, lottery officials introduced a new Billion Dollar Blockbuster game that passed 
$600 million in sales as of the end of May, placing the game on track to reach its goal of $1.3 
                                                 
97 ―In Recession, Lottery Players Dream Big,‖ Boston Herald, July 18, 2008 
98 Massachusetts State Lottery Information Packet, 1971-2006 
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billion in sales in a year.
99
 Lottery officials say the Blockbuster sales have played a major role in 
growing revenue. 
And in early June, the lottery announced it was adding a second daily drawing, a move 
that is expected to generate additional yearly sales of $27 million. The lottery has also added a 
$20 scratch-off ticket and made a number of changes to its Keno game, including a mobile 
version.
100
  
Clearly, a talent for innovative marketing – coupled with a strong network of about 7,500 
agents – would not be adversely affected by the introduction of casinos. Since the lottery has 
already demonstrated willingness and an ability to identify cross-marketing opportunities with 
sports teams and others, it would likely be a willing partner in any such opportunity to join forces 
with casinos in a potentially effective campaign as well.  
We note two conflicting pieces of evidence. Walker and Jackson (2008a, b) provide 
evidence from nationwide studies that suggest that casinos will have a negative impact on the 
lottery and on state tax receipts. On the other hand, anecdotal evidence from growth rates of state 
lotteries show that states that have introduced casinos see a decline in lottery growth, but 
typically those states still see positive growth of lottery receipts. 
These apparently conflicting results can be reconciled by considering that the 
econometric modeling employed by Walker and Jackson accounts for other factors that affect the 
gambling industries and overall tax receipts.  
In view of this evidence, we believe that the introduction of commercial and Indian 
casinos would have a short-term negative effect on the Massachusetts State Lottery. Since, as the 
Pennsylvania experience shows, the precise impact will depend on the location of destination 
casinos, we cannot quantify that impact at this early stage. This result will be very sensitive to 
the extent to which the conditions of the Patrick Administration‘s plan are implemented so that 
the lottery is promoted within the casinos, and by casinos. If these efforts are successful, it is 
possible that the Massachusetts Lottery could quickly see an increase in the rate of growth. 
Missouri provides another example of this situation, where the lottery growth rate increased 
significantly after the introduction of casinos.  
Additionally, if casino operators develop and follow through on cross-marketing 
strategies designed to boost lottery sales, there will be increased potential of actual growth in 
lottery sales as a result of the introduction of casinos in Massachusetts. 
With that in mind, we suggest the following: For the first three years following the 
opening of each destination casino, the revenue required to ensure that the lottery‘s ability to 
distribute funds should be the responsibility of the casino operators, rather than requiring that it 
be funded from the Commonwealth‘s share of gross gaming revenue, as presently proposed. 
The Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation assumes that lottery net profits before 
distribution (the amount returned to the Commonwealth) would be about $1.07 billion in 2012, 
                                                 
99 ―Blockbuster lottery ticket $600 million Lottery Hit,‖ Boston Herald, May 26, 2008,  
http://www.bostonherald.com/business/general/view/2008_05_26_Blockbuster_lottery_ticket__600_million_Lottery_hit:_Game
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100 ―Lottery adds 2nd drawing,‖ Boston Globe,  June 7, 2008, 
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the base year. Thus, each 1 percent annual increment would be $10.7 million. If we accept the 
foundation‘s analysis, which assumes a 5.5 percent decline in lottery revenue followed by a 1.5 
percent growth rate in 2013, the annual amount needed to ensure that the Lottery maintains its 3 
percent growth rate is not adversely affected, as per the proposed legislation, would be $144 
million, under the legislation as constituted. 
While this could add materially to the casinos‘ effective tax burden in the early years of 
operation, the impact would decline in subsequent years as the lottery resumes its growth. 
Additionally, such a scenario would be a further incentive to casino operators to develop 
effective strategic alliances and cross-marketing opportunities with the lottery. Such a move 
would in effect make the casinos a partner with the lottery. This would also help ensure that 
casinos are fully integrated into the overall tourism economy, since a focus on tourists would be 
least likely to cause any disruption to lottery revenue. Essentially, by requiring that casino 
operators shoulder the burden of ensuring that the lottery is not adversely affected, it would help 
ensure goal congruence by the casinos, the lottery and the entire Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts. 
Spectrum also suggests that at least one of the two gubernatorial appointees to the 
Massachusetts State Lottery Commission be a representative of the casino industry as a step that 
could help ensure coordination among all efforts to grow lottery revenues. 
We also suggest that the proposed 3 percent guaranteed long-term growth rate be 
reconsidered, as it is perhaps too ambitious for a lottery that has proven to be so successful. 
Indeed, the lottery‘s success will make it increasingly difficult to achieve such growth over time, 
requiring higher per capita spending from adults who are already spending more on lottery 
tickets than their counterparts in other states. 
When it comes to protecting the highly important Massachusetts Lottery as a reliable 
source of revenue, the Legislature essentially faces at least two choices: Protect the lottery by 
using the state‘s share of casino revenue to ensure its continued success, or require the casinos 
themselves to protect that source for at least the first three years. 
The first choice, as outlined in the legislation, is potentially unpalatable – as the 
Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation noted – because it would materially siphon off funds that 
would have been targeted for other uses, such as transportation funding. The legislation, as 
presently constituted, guarantees the Lottery‘s success by shifting public resources from one 
source to another. Moreover, it guarantees a 3 percent growth rate, regardless of economic 
conditions, which the free market itself could never guarantee. 
The second option is potentially unpalatable as well, because it could reduce the potential 
investment by casino operators. Clearly, any material demand on casinos to subsidize the 
Lottery‘s growth would dampen potential returns on investment, and could adversely reduce the 
amount of invested capital, as well as overall employment. Additionally, casino operators would 
likely object to any long-term subsidy as being unfair. In essence, an industry that has put forth a 
more competitive, attractive option would have to subsidize an option that has proven less 
attractive to consumers by contrast. 
The competitive bidding process could offer a means of making that second option more 
acceptable to potential casino operators: Allow them to develop plans to assist the lottery for at 
least three years. These plans could range from financial subsidies to marketing assistance to 
 The Impacts of Expanded Gaming on the Commonwealth of Massachusetts                    137 
some combination of the two, or through creative means that we cannot anticipate in this 
analysis. 
Any projection of the impact of casinos on the lottery requires information that is not 
presently available, including the location of potential casinos, as well as information regarding 
marketing plans designed to improve lottery sales. The Lottery Commission‘s range of a 3-8 
percent decline is sufficiently conservative and reasonable, and the credible studies we have 
reviewed assume a recurrence of growth over time. We also accept the wisdom in this quote 
from UHY Advisors: ―All else equal, if income rises over time, consumers will have more 
resources to spend on all forms of consumption, including casino gaming and lottery play101.‖ 
Indeed, the continued success of the Massachusetts Lottery depends in large measure on 
continued economic health, which legalized casinos would be expected to enhance. Since the 
Commonwealth would have significant leverage at the outset of the competitive bidding process, 
it would be prudent and reasonable to expect competitors for casino licenses to put forth plans of 
at least three years‘ duration that can realistically protect the lottery. 
Casino applicants are expected to compete on the basis of which bidder puts forth an 
overall plan designed to advance public policy in Massachusetts. Protecting the lottery should be 
an important part of that. 
 
New Jersey case study 
In May 2000,102 the New Jersey Lottery reported that its top 1,200 agents – the top 20 
percent of its network – generated $18.7 million in average weekly sales during a 13-week 
period. Annualized, that means that the top 1,200 agents generated about half of all lottery sales 
that year. 
Atlantic County – which hosts the casino industry in New Jersey – was home to 29 of the 
top agents, and those agents combined sold an average $450,436 in weekly tickets. This 
amounted to 2.4 percent of the total generated by all 1,200 top agents. 
Atlantic County was home to about 3 percent of New Jersey‘s population in 2000. That 
discrepancy – 3 percent vs. 2.4 percent – might indicate that per capita lottery sales were 
relatively weak in Atlantic County. That does not tell the entire story, however. 
The Atlantic County economy had clearly been growing significantly during that period, 
and its population growth was twice the state‘s average.103 Still, Atlantic County, which has long 
been dependent on agriculture and seasonal tourism, had a lower per capita income – $44,782 – 
than New Jersey overall – $57,338, and lagged in other economic indicators as well. Since 
lottery sales are dependent on a healthy economy and relative levels of disposable income, this 
disparity would have accounted for the difference in lottery sales. 
                                                 
101 ―Casino Gaming in Massachusetts: An Economic, Fiscal & Social Analysis,‖ UHY Advisors, p. 115. 
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What is particularly interesting about the 2000 data is that four of the top five lottery 
agents in Atlantic County, as well as five of the top seven, were casinos. At the time, Atlantic 
City hosted 12 casino hotels. Trump Taj Mahal averaged $30,379 in weekly sales during that 
period.  
Of the 1,200 top-performing lottery agents, the average weekly sales per agent at the time 
was $15,613. Five casinos exceeded that average. 
Atlantic City casinos have never been required to sell lottery tickets, and most limit sales 
to non-prominent locations, such as gift shops. The ability to become top sellers, however, is 
clearly a function of the level of traffic generated by casinos. Casinos in Atlantic City generate 
about 34 million visitor trips per year,104 which is about four times the entire population of New 
Jersey. If casinos in Atlantic City were required to become aggressive marketers of lottery 
tickets, clearly the sales would increase significantly higher. This case study supports the notion 
that a pro-active approach by the Massachusetts Lottery and any future casinos could effectively 
leverage the opportunities afforded by that additional traffic. 
 
Anticipated substitution effect on Massachusetts businesses 
Legalized casinos can have a variety of impacts on the local economy within various 
regions of Massachusetts. These effects are not limited to tax receipts or the potential 
cannibalization of lottery revenues. Casinos can be thought of as a new industry entering a state 
that will represent a significant source of competition for the consumers‘ discretionary spending. 
Existing industries and firms are justifiably concerned that the introduction of casinos could spell 
increased competition for them. But is this aspect of casinos an argument against their 
legalization? In this section we discuss the theoretical ―substitution effects‖ of new casinos in a 
state. We also consider some general characteristics of increased competition and the effects on 
product variety, prices, and labor markets. Then we review some of the basic economic 
arguments on the potential benefits from legalizing casinos. This discussion is then framed in the 
context of the employment and expenditure effects estimated elsewhere in this report, in the 
academic literature, and in light of the Patrick Administration‘s casino proposal. 
As casino gambling has expanded throughout the nation in recent decades, numerous 
studies have been published examining the potential economic effects of casinos, but few studies 
have been backward-looking to analyze exactly what has happened. In the case of the proposed 
Massachusetts legislation, voters and politicians are understandably concerned about the 
potential effects of legalizing commercial casinos, or approving an Indian casino, in 
Massachusetts. 
A variety of authors, advocates, and media reports has expressed concern that expansion 
in the casino industry is likely to lead to decline in other industries, with a net result of little 
overall economic stimulus, or worse, a negative impact. There is a grain of truth in this 
argument; it is a possibility that deserves consideration. However, the actual economic effects of 
casinos are not as simple as is commonly suggested. There are three basic varieties of the 
―substitution effect‖ argument relative to casinos:  
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 ―Industry cannibalization‖ 
 Export base theory of growth 
 Money inflow (mercantilism) 
The three arguments are closely related; each is discussed below.  
One of the most common concerns about legalized casinos is that any additional 
economic activity resulting from casinos comes at the expense of activity in other industries. 
According to this argument, the introduction of casinos simply shuffles spending among 
industries, so any positive employment or state income effects from gambling are offset by 
losses in existing industries, which see lower sales volume and decreased employment. This idea 
is typically referred to as ―industry cannibalization.‖ This argument is quite common among 
gambling opponents and is often heard in debates over casino gambling. The argument is similar 
to that with lotteries, as described earlier. However, theoretically, this effect is no different than 
standard market competition that occurs when any new business opens in a market. It promotes 
economic efficiency, more variety, and lower prices – all beneficial to consumers. Moreover, 
there has been very little empirical evidence presented on the issue – either for or against 
casinos. Some of the studies previously reviewed present some case studies, but little general 
empirical evidence exists on the relationships between casinos and non-gambling industries.  
Legalized casinos may replace some other businesses, or at least lead to a reduction in 
revenue in some industries. At the same time, however, there may be industries that thrive with 
the introduction of casinos. For example, casinos in Massachusetts may attract new tourists, or 
residents may increase their spending on nights out. From a social welfare perspective, the 
significant issue is not whether some firms are harmed or helped by legalizing casinos, but 
whether the introduction of a new industry increases societal welfare; this should be the goal of 
politicians and public policy in Massachusetts.  
(The key issue that differentiates casino from other typical firms is that casino gambling 
availability may contribute to problem gambling behaviors, which may be considered to be 
social costs, and need to be considered prior to authorizing casinos. Importantly, the Patrick 
Administration‘s proposal provides for funding to help provide prevention and treatment 
resources for problem gamblers. However, gambling problems may exist even if Massachusetts 
does not introduce casinos, simply because so many residents already play the lottery or travel to 
neighboring states to gamble. This will be dealt with in more detail in later sections of the 
report.) 
Some proponents of the cannibalization theory suggest that economic growth from 
casinos is unlikely under any circumstance. A related argument is that casinos cannot provide 
economic benefits unless they act as ―exporters.‖ That is, casinos must attract tourists from out-
of-state. This is a version of the ―export base‖ theory of economic growth. Although exports do 
play a large role in some economies, they are not a prerequisite for growth. A common quip on 
this issue is that the global economy has seen significant growth without any exports to aliens. 
Therefore, exports cannot possibly be the only source of economic growth. More importantly, it 
is obvious that economic benefits may accrue to a state such as Massachusetts if casinos merely 
keep some of the state‘s gamblers in-state, rather than driving to Connecticut casinos. Of course, 
additional benefits may accrue if tourism can be enhanced by the introduction of casinos.  
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One will occasionally hear comments surrounding the effects of casino gambling that 
focus on the flow of money. This is a variant on the export base theory. There are a number of 
surprising examples in the literature where obvious errors have been made in emphasizing the 
importance of simple money flows. One example is from a report written on the South Carolina 
video gaming machine debate in the late 1990s, just prior to the state banning the machines. The 
report suggested that the purchase of the machines represented a social cost to the state because 
the machines had to be purchased from out-of-state and money was therefore leaving the state.105 
The analogous argument is that casinos are beneficial only if there is net monetary inflow. 
Among the numerous other problems with this view, the most obvious is that market transactions 
are mutually beneficial. This means that the buyer places a higher value on what is being 
purchased than on the money being used to buy the object. So the flow of money is not as 
important as one might initially suspect. 
Firms in industries that expect to compete with casinos are understandably concerned that 
consumers may divert their expenditures away from a variety of goods and services in favor of 
casino gambling. However, casinos represent an increase in competition just like any other new 
industry. Would people become concerned when a new restaurant chain announces it wishes to 
open 25 new restaurants in Massachusetts? Why is this case any different than casinos? 
Conceptually, the two cases are identical. However, the current ban on casinos gives a 
strong status quo bias against introducing casinos.106 Another difference is that the casinos would 
be very large and limited in number; they are well-known for attracting customers from a long 
distance, much more so than the typical restaurant. A third distinction is the potential for 
problem gambling behaviors to become more common if casinos are introduced within 
Massachusetts, as noted previously.  
From an economic perspective, it is understandable that existing firms would prefer not 
to have additional competition. Since a change in law is necessary to introduce casinos, lobbying 
efforts by opponents of casino gambling are likely to be much more effective than if similar 
efforts are taken to prevent new restaurants from opening.  
Spectrum also recognizes that the proposed legislation would create regional monopolies 
among gaming properties, ensuring that no other casinos would be built within a proscribed 
geographic area. As we noted, this creates additional responsibilities for both the operator and 
the Commonwealth to help protect the interests of existing businesses that enjoy no such 
geographic protection. 
Whatever the motivation of those who raise the ―substitution effect‖ issue, the essence of 
the argument is conceptually valid. Obviously a new firm or industry will cause a reallocation of 
consumer spending. With the reallocation in spending comes a potential change in tax revenues, 
employment, and wages. 
 
                                                 
105  William Thompson and Frank Quinn (2000), ―The Video Gaming Machines of South Carolina: Disappearing Soon? Good 
Riddance or Bad News? A Socio-Economic Analysis.‖ Paper presented at the 11th International Conference on Gambling and 
Risk-Taking. Las Vegas, NV. 
106 As a related example, consider the legality of alcohol, even though it arguably causes incalculably more harm than problem 
gambling has ever been accused of causing. 
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Consumer spending 
Casinos in Massachusetts may, in fact, mean that revenues in competing firms and 
industries decline to some extent. At the same time, however, the introduction of new goods to 
the menu of available options for consumers may lead consumers to increase their overall 
expenditures. This effect would tend to lessen the amount of expenditures lost to competing 
industries. As yet, no empirical studies have addressed this issue in a rigorous way. 
It is clear that the introduction of casinos in Massachusetts will create new competition 
for other entertainment industries, and even some other non-entertainment industries. Such firms 
will face increased competition, just as they do anytime any new firm enters the market. Those 
firms or industries that do not effectively compete against the casinos can be expected to see a 
decrease in revenues, and may be unable to remain profitable in some cases.  
 
Employment and wages 
It has been indicated above that the introduction of casinos in Massachusetts is likely to 
lead to some measure of substitution away from other industries. To the extent that this occurs, 
one would expect a similar shift in employment from some industries to others. Typically in 
market economies, employment shifts among industries reflect the preferences of consumers; 
where consumers spend their money is where the jobs go. Firms or industries that cannot 
compete effectively with casinos may, in fact, see a decline in employment along with revenues.  
This substitution effect with respect to jobs is arguably one of the primary concerns in the 
consideration of casino adoption/expansion. But to what extent does a shift of jobs among 
industries present reason for concern? One issue that has been raised is that casino jobs are 
relatively low-skill and low-paid. Yet, workers would not choose to take those jobs if they did 
not offer some advantage over existing jobs.  
However, if competing industries fail because of the competition from casinos, then the 
jobs in competing industries disappear. If the jobs that casinos create simply replace existing 
jobs, then casinos do not change net employment. Alternatively, even if the casinos do have a net 
positive impact on the number of jobs in Massachusetts, there is no guarantee that these jobs will 
be better than the existing jobs in the state. 
In reality, the introduction of casinos is likely to have little substitution effect on other 
industries. That is, while there may be some declines in revenues and employment in some firms 
and industries, it is unlikely that entire industries will shut-down. Therefore, one can view the 
likely employment effects of casinos as being positive, since the casinos will increase 
competition among firms for qualified employees. This should lead to higher wages and less 
unemployment in the state. 
 
Tax revenues 
To the extent that the primary motivation for casino legalization is a potential fiscal crisis or a 
desire to increase tax receipts, then voters and politicians may have an interest in understanding 
what the likely tax effects from casinos are. This issue has been addressed in a variety of studies, 
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as reviewed in the previous section of the study (lottery). The key factors that will determine 
whether casinos will increase tax revenue are (i) the relevant tax rates applied; (ii) the extent to 
which ―substitution‖ occurs among industries; (iii) the degree to which the casino industry 
attracts tourists; and (iv), the extent to which Massachusetts residents remain in-state, rather than 
traveling out-of-state, to gamble at casinos.  
Since the proposed tax rate on gross gaming revenues (27 percent) exceeds the general 
sales tax in Massachusetts (5 percent)107, one would expect the casino industry to result in a net 
increase in tax revenues to the extent that the substitution effect exists and applies to goods and 
services on which the standard sales tax is applied.  
The casinos would be expected to lead to net increases in state tax receipts to the extent 
that they attract new tourists, and to the extent that the casinos attract tourist spending away from 
other firms/industries. (The net tax revenue increase in the latter case would be the differential 
between the tax rates on casino revenues and the alternative industry, times the amount of 
diverted expenditure.)  
Another source of increased tax revenues from casino introduction would be from those 
Massachusetts residents who currently travel out-of-state to gamble at casinos. In one report, this 
amount was estimated to be quite large ($846.2 million dollars per year), which could mean a 
significant increase in Massachusetts tax receipts if most of these individuals stay home and visit 
Massachusetts casinos instead.108 This component is the one area that would provide the greatest 
benefits to the state from legalized casinos. 
The only case in which ―substitution‖ could have a negative impact on tax receipts is 
with the state‘s lottery, as discussed previously. However, we expect the impact on the lottery to 
be minimal, as discussed earlier.  
 
Competition in market economies 
It is important for voters and policymakers to be aware of the likely economic effects of 
introducing casinos in Massachusetts prior to enacting such a policy change. One of the most 
important considerations has been the extent to which the ―substitution effect‖ described above 
will cause declines in other industries as the casinos are opened.  
Two decades ago, a Spectrum managing director noted in an analysis on the initial 
impacts of casinos on the economy of Atlantic City that competition increases when gaming is 
introduced: 
―The new competition has touched virtually every segment of the economy in a big way. 
Everything from huge banking conglomerates from Newark to large, multi-national home 
building corporations to national drug store chains entered a market that had forever been 
the private domain of small entrepreneurs. … An appliance store‘s sales of refrigerators 
and television sets would be expected to increase with the coming of casinos. What it 
                                                 
107 County and city governments may impose their own supplemental sales taxes. 
108 Clyde Barrow (2007), ―New England Casino Gaming Update, 2007,‖ Center for Policy Analysis. University of 
Massachusetts, Dartmouth. 
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should also have expected was more – and possibly better – appliance stores coming into 
the area that was traditionally a one-store domain.‖109 
A good understanding of the substitution effect requires an understanding of how market 
economies operate at a fundamental level.  
 
Review of market economics 
Transactions that occur in market economies are mutually beneficial. This means that 
both parties expect to benefit by engaging in the transaction; otherwise they would not agree to 
the trade. This basic principle is true whether we are discussing the purchase of a $20,000 car, a 
$1 can of soda, a $40 haircut, or a $20 bet at a casino. Each is an example of a market 
transaction; the first two examples are goods, the latter two services. Because both parties 
willingly engage in market transactions, generally, both parties are expected to benefit. That is, 
when one purchases a car for $20,000, the buyer expects benefits to exceed the $20,000 paid, 
while the seller prefers the money to the car. The seller earns profit (the difference between the 
selling price and the cost of production), and the buyer similarly earns a ―profit‖ (the difference 
between the value of the good to the consumer and the price paid). Although the consumer‘s 
profit is more abstract (termed ―consumer‘s surplus‖ by economists), it is no less real than the 
producer‘s profit. The consumer‘s and producer‘s profit together represent the social benefit 
from the market transaction. Thus, such transactions enhance society‘s welfare because the two 
parties involved are better-off.  
The same analysis applies to bets placed at casinos. Obviously each bet carries a negative 
expected value for the patron; on average the typical bettor can expect to lose a percentage of 
each dollar bet, depending on the game and playing strategy. The typical casino gambler does 
not play simply to increase their monetary holdings. Most players understand that the games 
have negative expected returns. The reasons they are willing to pay to play casino games may 
vary by individual. Some people like the social aspect of being at a casino and others may like 
the chance of winning money, but most are paying for the excitement of engaging in activity 
with an uncertain outcome. That is, will the card dealt next to their ace be a jack? Will the third 
reel also stop on cherries? Will the dice again show 7? 
In this sense, the product sold at a casino is similar to that sold at a movie theater. It is an 
experience for which people are willing to pay even if different people are buying different 
―products.‖ What the customer expects or hopes to receive is a benefit or product – social 
interaction, fun, entertainment, a chance to win money, etc. – worth more than the amount of 
money than is spent (lost).  
Sometimes people regret transactions in which they have engaged. But a bad outcome 
does not necessarily reflect a bad decision. Nor does regret negate the above analysis. To the 
contrary, economists assume that consumers typically learn from their mistakes. In the case of 
the casino game player, if the entertainment, social interaction, etc., derived from playing the 
casino game does not exceed the price paid (the amount the consumer loses), then he or she will 
quit gambling. The caveat here is that some individuals develop problem gambling behaviors – 
                                                 
109 ―Hostage to Fortune: Atlantic City and Casino Gambling,‖ by Michael Pollock, Center for Analysis of Public Issues, 
Princeton, NJ, 1987. 
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effectively becoming ―addicted‖ to gambling. Relatively few individuals develop such problems. 
(The National Gambling Impact Study Commission in 1999 reported that 1.2 percent of U.S. 
adults are ―lifetime‖ pathological gamblers [that is, they have met the psychological criteria for 
pathological gambling at some point in their lives] and another 1.5 percent of U.S. adults are 
lifetime problem gamblers, which means they met fewer criteria than pathological gamblers.110 
The Commission noted that estimating the prevalence of gambling problems is a ―contentious 
subject.‖) 
Free market transactions are a primary source of economic growth, which is manifest in 
rising per capita incomes. Transactions in goods and services are conceptually the same; yet, 
many observers seem to discount or ignore the fact that an increase in the quality or quantity of 
services represents an increase in wealth or living standards – just as an increase in tangible 
goods does.  
Consumers vote with their dollars. Industries that please consumers expand while those 
that do not can be expected to contract. This may be bad for selected producers/sellers, but it is to 
the best interest of society that this process be allowed to occur. The concern over substitution is 
no more warranted in the case of casinos than it would be any time any new business opens in a 
local economy. Ultimately, the change in the allocation of expenditures is a good thing because it 
is the result of consumers‘ self-interested spending decisions. Efficiently functioning economies 
– which produce the highest standards of living in the world – produce what consumers want, 
and the ―destruction‖ of certain industries frees up resources to be used in more productive ways. 
Although some sellers, especially those having a difficult time competing, may not be 
sympathetic to this view, it is essentially the well-accepted theory of creative destruction outlined 
by the Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter.111  
Robert Detlefsen provides an insightful explanation of substitution in the context of 
casino gambling:112 
―Invocation of the substitution effect [argument in the context of casino gambling] not 
only presumes a static, zero-sum economy in which no business can grow except at the 
expense of other firms. It mistakenly implies that certain types of commercial activities, 
such as casino gambling, create no new ―real‖ wealth and provide no tangible products of 
value. That view overlooks the key point that all voluntary economic exchanges 
presumably are intended to improve the positions and advance the preferences of both 
parties (in other words, improve their social welfare). That the gains from such exchanges 
(particularly in a wealthier, service-oriented economy in which a greater proportion of 
disposable income is consumed for recreational activities) are not easily quantifiable in 
every case is beside the point. After all, the only true measure of the value of 
entertainment-oriented goods and services in the diverse U.S. economy ultimately 
remains in the spending preferences expressed by individual consumers.‖ 
Perhaps equally important, when a new industry enters a market, scarce productive 
resources, such as labor, land and capital, are reallocated among the different industries. If 
                                                 
110 The National Gambling Impact Study Commission, Final Report, June 1999, p. 4-4. 
111 See Joseph Schumpeter (1934 [1983]), The Theory of Economic Development. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. 
112 See R. Detlefsen (1996), ―Anti-Gambling Politics – Time to Reshuffle the Deck.‖ Washington, DC: Competitive Enterprise 
Institute. 
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resources are allocated according to consumers‘ preferences, overall welfare increases, despite 
unfortunate losses by some firms and industries. 
In terms of shifting employment due to the introduction of casinos, the reshuffling of jobs 
across industries is a necessary component of free markets that helps to ensure an efficient 
allocation of scarce productive resources.  
In general, increased competition resulting from a new industry tends to improve 
conditions for workers, as employers competing for a given pool of available workers. Typically, 
wages, benefits, and working conditions improve as the number of firms competing for workers 
increases. This suggests that the overall effect of casinos in Massachusetts is to increase the 
overall employment picture for the state. We recognize, at the same time, that businesses that are 
marginally profitable and tend to be operate in areas where there is less demand for labor might 
face sizable increases in their labor costs if they must compete against casinos that pay 
competitive wages plus benefits. 
Casinos are, by their nature, relatively labor intensive. This means that they tend to use a 
higher proportion of labor to other input resources than other industries do. For example, 
compared to a movie theater, casinos require substantially more labor to operate. In terms of 
worker per dollar of revenue, however, the intensity of labor in casinos relative to other 
industries is not so straightforward. In any case, the state of Massachusetts and the communities 
in the state that are potential sites for casinos may be more concerned with the net number of 
jobs created, rather than jobs per dollar of revenue.  
The argument here is not that the introduction of casinos will have only positive effects 
for everyone, or that Massachusetts policymakers needn‘t be concerned with the plight of 
industries that will have to compete with casinos. The important point is that increased 
competition – be it in the entertainment, automobile, or energy production sector – is in the best 
interest of consumers and society. This is because consumers always have an interest in 
abundance and lower prices for goods and services, but producers have an interest in scarcity and 
higher prices for what they are producing. This simple idea helps to explain why firms 
competing with casinos can be expected to oppose casinos in Massachusetts. 
Capital inflow 
One effect of casino development is the inflow of capital investment to the region or 
state. The building of huge casinos is an example of this capital inflow. This capital expansion in 
effect increases the productive capacity in the state economy. Once casinos are established, the 
potential for other firms to enter the market may rise or fall. It would depend, to an extent, on 
local/regional market conditions. On the other hand, one could argue that if casinos enter the 
economy, there are fewer resources available to be devoted to other goods and services in the 
economy. Still, one could argue that the productive resources (capital or labor) should move into 
industries that tend to please consumers the most; this is required for economic efficiency. 
In the Massachusetts case, the proposal is to build three casinos costing at least $1 billion 
each. This will represent significant capital inflow to the state. 
Tax substitution 
As discussed elsewhere, tax revenues are a primary goal in introducing casinos. There is 
an additional argument that one could make to favor taxes on casino revenues over taxes on 
transactions for other goods and services. For example, if there is a choice between an 
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―avoidable‖ tax like a tax on lotteries or casino owners where taxes fall on the consumers or 
sellers of specific goods, and an ―unavoidable‖ tax like a sales tax, then many people may prefer 
the lottery tax or taxes on casino revenues (―avoidable taxes‖) over a general sales tax 
(―unavoidable taxes‖). Of course, from a consumer‘s perspective, a sales tax is avoidable, but not 
easily, and less so than a casino tax. Simply put, gambling taxes may be preferable simply 
because they are so easy for consumers to avoid. 
In the Massachusetts case, casino taxes are to be used, in part, for property tax relief. 
Residents may see this as a benefit of the introduction of casinos, even if casinos cause a 
substitution effect away from other industries. That is, residents may favor introducing a new 
―avoidable‖ tax in return for reducing a different ―unavoidable‖ tax. 
Import substitution 
Perhaps one of the strongest arguments for legalizing casinos in a particular state is that 
the residents enjoy gambling and they are currently going outside to gamble. If instead they had 
the opportunity to gamble at a casino in their home state, the local benefits would be greater. So 
instead of ―importing‖ gambling services (i.e., purchasing these services from outside providers 
– like in Connecticut) they substitute the imports with locally provided gambling services. This 
is often called ―import substitution.‖ This may result in positive economic effects from casino 
expansion, including capital development, increased demand in labor markets, and increased tax 
revenue. The tax revenue ―kept home‖ is one of the primary arguments used by supporters of 
legalized casinos, and is likely to be significant in the case of Massachusetts, as we note in more 
detail elsewhere.  
Increased transactions volume  
Schumpeter113 lists five primary sources of economic development. These include the 
introduction of a new good to an economy. A common feature of all the paths to growth listed by 
Schumpeter is that each implies an increase in the number of mutually beneficial, voluntary 
transactions. This is perhaps the greatest benefit of introducing casinos, despite the political 
arguments on other issues.  
Consumer profit and variety benefits 
Each voluntary transaction involves expected profit to both the buyer and seller, as 
discussed above.114 Normally, consumers benefit when increased competition in markets leads to 
lower prices. This is one source of consumer profit, illustrated in two examples. First, sometimes 
casinos advertise particular games and offer better odds than competing casinos. If the effective 
price of playing the casino games falls, then consumer‘s profit rises. (This could occur, for 
example, if new casinos in Massachusetts advertise that their games pay better odds than the 
casinos in Connecticut.) Of course, lower ―prices‖ of casinos could be a catalyst for other 
entertainment firms to lower their prices too. 
Second, casinos are often bundled with other products like hotels and restaurants. In the 
Massachusetts case, the expectation is that the casinos will be destination resorts, so proposals 
must include complementary products to be offered along with the casinos. To the extent that 
                                                 
113 See Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development.(1934, p.6) 
114 Here, for consistency and to avoid economics jargon, we call these values ―profit‖ for consumers and producers. 
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casino competition increases competition in the local restaurant and hotel markets, whether 
through price decreases, quality increases, better service, etc., the casinos will spur higher 
benefits to consumers in the form of ―consumer profit‖ because of the downward pressure on 
prices and pressure to increase the quality of products. These benefits have been ignored in most 
of the cost-benefit studies of casinos and in the discourse in Massachusetts.  
Another potential benefit casinos may provide to consumers is related to product variety. 
When casino gambling is introduced to a state, it has the effect of increasing the product choices 
for consumers. This ―variety benefit‖ could be significant but it is difficult to measure.  
Earl Grinols examines the potential for ―distance‖ consumer profit.115 Consumers who 
would otherwise travel to Connecticut or elsewhere to gamble at casinos will obviously benefit 
by having casinos within a shorter distance. This argument becomes even more important as gas 
prices rise to historically high levels.  
Unfortunately, these types of consumer benefits in the U.S. have not generally been 
subject to measurement by economists. However, simply because they have not been measured 
does not mean that they do not exist or that they should be ignored in the current policy debate 
over casinos in Massachusetts. 
The ―substitution effect‖ should be considered within the context of this more general 
understanding of market economics. To reiterate, it is certainly true that some industries may see 
intense competition from new casinos; and these industries may see a loss in revenues and some 
may even be forced out of business. But if casino revenues are the result of consumers ―voting 
with their dollars,‖ then the reallocation of resources among industries is good for the overall 
economy. 
We are not suggesting that the substitution effect possibility should be ignored. Rather, 
we suggest that the real economic effects of casinos are not likely to be limited to the substitution 
effect. Indeed, there are a variety of very important consumer benefits from introducing a new 
good. These should be considered along with substitution issues. Overall, the existing empirical 
evidence suggests that the benefits of casino introduction are likely to outweigh the costs. But the 
empirical estimates on these effects are tentative. Theoretically, it is much clearer that the 
benefits are likely to outweigh the costs of casinos in Massachusetts. 
 
Anticipated impact on restaurants, hotels, related businesses 
Above we have discussed general effects of casinos being introduced in Massachusetts. 
In this section we begin to narrow the discussion so as to focus more on specific industries that 
may be adversely affected by the introduction of casinos.  
It is important to note that the effect of casinos – whether a substitution or 
complementary effect – is likely to be felt within a relatively short distance of the casinos. 
Without knowing where the three Massachusetts casinos would be located, we cannot project the 
specific local impacts on businesses. We can, however, state that any adverse effects casinos 
                                                 
115 See a discussion of this in Douglas Walker (2007), The Economics of Casino Gambling (p. 162). New York, NY: Springer. 
Grinols calls this ―distance consumer surplus,‖ but I use ―profit‖ here for consistency. 
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may have on other industries could be significantly mitigated if the locations for the casinos are 
chosen wisely, with an eye for strategic placement. 
The same argument would apply to restaurants. Casino resorts typically offer a number of 
restaurants that will cater to all types of casino customers, so that the casino patrons tend to 
spend most of their ―vacation dollars‖ at the casino or its affiliated businesses. One proposal to 
ensure some complementary effect is to have the casino complex dedicate a minimum amount of 
space to be leased by local restaurants or firms. This issue is addressed elsewhere in this report. 
One of the major recommendations in this report is that casino development be designed 
to increase tourism, including the frequency of visitation, increase in the length of visitors‘ stays, 
expansion of the traditional core demographic base, and targeting additional markets including 
convention attendees.  
In this section we examine the economic implications on restaurants, hotels, and other 
entertainment firms – or more generally, the hospitality and entertainment industries – 
potentially affected by the introduction of casinos.  
Labor market effects 
Interviews with the Massachusetts Restaurant Association and others indicated that there 
are serious concerns regarding casinos, in areas ranging from competition for customers to 
competition for employees. Such concerns must be addressed, in part through sustained efforts 
by casino licensees and the Commonwealth to increase the available pool of labor through 
workforce development efforts that can train unemployed and underemployed adults (as noted in 
more detail elsewhere). We note that the impact on labor is likely to be more pronounced in less 
populated areas. The following charts, for example, show a range in compensation among the 
same jobs throughout the Commonwealth. 
The first table looks at all food-preparation and serving workers by area: 
 
Food preparation and food service workers, 
including fast food 
 Mean hourly 
rate  
 Mean annual 
wage  
 Median hourly 
rate  
 Median annual 
wage  
Barnstable Town, MA  $ 9.29   $ 19,330   $ 8.68   $ 18,050  
Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, MA   $ 9.07   $ 18,860   $ 8.47   $ 17,620  
Brockton-Bridgewater-Easton, MA   $ 8.73   $ 18,150   $ 8.32   $ 17,310  
Framingham, MA NECTA Division  $ 9.20   $ 19,140   $ 8.48   $ 17,640  
Haverhill-North Andover-Amesbury, MA-NH   $ 9.09   $ 18,900   $ 8.59   $ 17,880  
Lawrence-Methuen-Salem, MA-NH NECTA   $ 8.36   $ 17,390   $ 8.20   $ 17,050  
Leominster-Fitchburg-Gardner, MA  $ 8.20   $ 17,060   $ 8.04   $ 16,720  
Lowell-Billerica-Chelmsford, MA-NH   $ 8.49   $ 17,670   $ 8.25   $ 17,160  
Lynn-Peabody-Salem, MA   $ 9.15   $ 19,030   $ 8.60   $ 17,900  
New Bedford, MA  $ 8.82   $ 18,340   $ 8.34   $ 17,350  
Pittsfield, MA  $ 8.55   $ 17,780   $ 8.35   $ 17,360  
Springfield, MA-CT  $ 8.66   $ 18,020   $ 8.18   $ 17,010  
Taunton-Norton-Raynham, MA   $ 8.90   $ 18,510   $ 8.52   $ 17,720  
Worcester, MA-CT  $ 8.88   $ 18,480   $ 8.57   $ 17,830  
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics 
The differences can be more pronounced within individual job categories. We looked at 
the following examples: 
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Short-order cooks  Mean hourly 
rate  
 Mean annual 
wage  
 Median hourly 
rate  
 Median annual 
wage  
Barnstable Town, MA  $  11.75   $ 24,440   $  11.52   $      23,950  
Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, MA   $  11.86   $ 24,670   $  11.65   $      24,240  
Brockton-Bridgewater-Easton, MA   $    9.02   $ 18,770   $    8.39   $      17,450  
Framingham, MA   $  11.18   $ 23,250   $  11.46   $      23,830  
Haverhill-North Andover-Amesbury, MA-NH   $  10.18   $ 21,170   $    9.99   $      20,770  
Lowell-Billerica-Chelmsford, MA-NH   $  10.45   $ 21,750   $  10.37   $      21,560  
Lynn-Peabody-Salem, MA   $  10.44   $ 21,710   $  10.33   $      21,500  
New Bedford, MA  $    9.77   $ 20,330   $    9.85   $      20,480  
Pittsfield, MA  $  10.36   $ 21,540   $  10.22   $      21,250  
Springfield, MA-CT  $  10.25   $ 21,310   $    9.93   $      20,660  
Taunton-Norton-Raynham, MA   $  10.71   $ 22,280   $  11.33   $      23,560  
Worcester, MA-CT  $  11.22   $ 23,350   $  11.63   $      24,190  
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Short-order cooks in Brockton, for example, might earn $4,000 less per year than their 
counterparts in Boston, while a New Bedford short-order cook might earn $3,000 less. A casino 
would likely pay wages closer to the prevailing rates in Boston, regardless of their location, in 
order to help ensure an adequate supply of labor. This would have a more pronounced upward 
effect on wages at existing establishments in order to retain a sufficient workforce. 
We see similar discrepancies among hosts and hostesses: 
 
Hosts and hostesses  Mean hourly 
rate  
 Mean annual 
wage  
 Median 
hourly rate  
 Median annual 
wage  
Barnstable Town, MA  $         10.69   $   22,230   $    10.00   $       20,790  
Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, MA   $           9.90   $   20,600   $      9.64   $       20,050  
Brockton-Bridgewater-Easton, MA   $           9.90   $   20,600   $      9.61   $       19,980  
Framingham, MA NECTA Division  $           9.32   $   19,390   $      9.24   $       19,230  
Haverhill-North Andover-Amesbury, MA-NH   $           8.85   $   18,420   $      8.65   $       17,990  
Lawrence-Methuen-Salem, MA-NH NECTA   $           9.56   $   19,890   $      9.26   $       19,260  
Leominster-Fitchburg-Gardner, MA  $           8.68   $   18,060   $      8.53   $       17,740  
Lowell-Billerica-Chelmsford, MA-NH   $           9.83   $   20,440   $      9.02   $       18,760  
Lynn-Peabody-Salem, MA   $           9.63   $   20,020   $      9.26   $       19,260  
New Bedford, MA  $           9.56   $   19,890   $      9.57   $       19,900  
Pittsfield, MA  $           9.03   $   18,780   $      8.89   $       18,490  
Springfield, MA-CT  $           8.94   $   18,600   $      8.59   $       17,860  
Taunton-Norton-Raynham, MA   $         11.35   $   23,610   $    11.88   $       24,710  
Worcester, MA-CT  $           9.72   $   20,210   $      9.11   $       18,950  
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Elsewhere in this report there are detailed estimates of the number of jobs that can 
reasonably be expected for casino operations and the initial construction of the casinos. 
This represents a significant economic stimulus to the Massachusetts economy. However, 
it is unclear the extent to which such jobs will be coming from a pool of currently unemployed 
workers, or from workers with existing jobs. We consider both possibilities. 
First, to the extent that the jobs in casino construction and operation come from the pool 
of unemployed individuals in Massachusetts, the casinos represent a clear economic stimulus for 
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the state. The workers who receive the jobs obviously benefit, as they become productive 
members of society and earn a good wage. In addition, these workers‘ wages are taxed which 
helps to support the state‘s budget both on the tax side (additional revenues) and the benefits side 
(less unemployment compensation paid-out). These benefits apply to both the construction and 
casino operation jobs.  
Subsequent to the construction of the casinos, it is difficult to predict how the 
construction jobs will change. Some workers may be able to get other jobs; others may become 
unemployed. In either case, the endeavor of casino construction is helpful to this segment of the 
workers. 
To the extent that the workers for constructing and operating the casinos are hired from 
the existing pool of employed workers, again the casino projects will provide benefits. In terms 
of construction jobs, if workers willingly choose to take the jobs, they are thereby signaling that 
the new job is superior to their current job. (We do not need to know exactly why each worker 
has decided to change jobs. It may be for a higher salary or benefits, or other preferences.)  
The same argument applies to other workers who take jobs operating the casinos. If those 
workers willingly choose to leave their current job to work at the casino, we can safely assume 
that the new job is preferred to the job they left.  
We can illustrate the effect of casinos on the local/state labor market with a standard 
market graph from economics. With the supply and demand for workers (supply comes from 
individual workers; demand comes from firms wishing to hire workers) shown in a graph with 
wage levels on the vertical axis, and number of workers on the horizontal axis, the opening of 
casinos will affect the labor market by increasing the demand for workers. As the demand for 
workers increases, the number of jobs increases and the average wage rate can be expected to 
increase. Both effects are beneficial to the labor market and the local economy.  
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After the casinos open, existing firms in the regions surrounding the casinos may face 
higher labor costs, as the competition for workers will have increased significantly. Typically, 
higher wages will attract workers from surrounding areas, especially those in which 
unemployment is relatively high. If the number of workers increases, or if previously 
unemployed workers take jobs, the supply curve in the above graph would shift to the right 
(increase), causing the wage rate to fall back near its original level, Wage (1). 
It is highly unlikely that there will be negative effects on the labor market as a result of 
the casinos being built and operated in Massachusetts, if public agencies and casinos make 
concerted efforts to train and hire from the ranks of the unemployed and underemployed. During 
the building phase and early operational stages, workers will be attracted from the unemployed, 
from the employed in less preferred jobs, and possibly from workers outside the region attracted 
by the prospect of significantly better jobs than their current ones. At these early stages, the 
casinos are unlikely to have much of any effect on other regional businesses. Thus, the 
introduction of casinos is clearly beneficial to workers. What about other firms that will have to 
compete with the casinos once they are operational? 
 
Changes in consumer spending 
Earlier, we discussed conceptual issues surrounding consumers‘ spending and economic 
growth. We revisit this discussion but include more details applied to casinos in Massachusetts. 
To understand how the substitution effect may be applicable in the Massachusetts case, it is 
useful to decompose total spending into several distinct scenarios, with respect to how 
expenditures would shift to affect non-casino businesses: 
(1) Suppose people currently leaving Massachusetts to gamble in Connecticut and in 
other states do not change their behavior. The remaining non-gambling Massachusetts 
population goes to casinos and reduces their spending at other businesses in 
proportion to their casino expenditures. Assume these are the only casino customers.  
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(2) Suppose casinos do not entice any new residents to gamble, but those who were 
previously going out-of-state now gamble the same amount in-state only.  
(3) Suppose new tourists are drawn in-state from neighboring states and/or more 
conventions are held in Boston because it becomes a more attractive option now that 
an additional entertainment venue has been introduced. 
(4) Suppose the casino revenues are explained by a mix of all of the above scenarios. 
 In scenario (1), the substitution effect is certain to have a negative impact on non-casino 
businesses. Furthermore, in this case the casinos are not keeping any gamblers in-state. This is 
the worst situation for other Massachusetts businesses, but is extremely unlikely. Moreover, even 
if this case was real, consumers are still benefiting from the change. Scenario (2) is a reasonable 
possibility, at least to some extent. One would expect many gamblers to stay in-state. Whether or 
not new gamblers frequent the casinos, new tax revenues are created. In scenario (3), additional 
tax receipts and revenues for casinos and non-casino businesses increase as spending is attracted 
from out-of-state. This scenario is likely to occur, to a moderate extent, and is clearly beneficial 
to the state. Scenario (4), or a bit of each of the other effects, is likely to occur. The net effect is 
almost certainly positive; the substitution effect is likely to be minor. 
 
Empirical evidence 
In a previous section we reviewed some of the academic literature on the relationships 
between casinos and lotteries, as well as casinos and other industries. There was also some 
discussion of tax effects. (See the previous section on lottery substitution.) We now review a new 
study that examines the employment effects of casinos being introduced into a local economy. 
This fall, a new study will be published in Journal of Gambling Business and Economics, 
a peer-reviewed academic journal. The study is by economist Chad Cotti, and provides the most 
comprehensive analysis of the employment and labor earnings effects of casinos.116 Although 
some of the previously-cited studies have addressed these issues, most studies are very limited in 
their scope (e.g., they examine a single state only). Cotti‘s analysis covers all U.S. counties from 
1990 through 1996, a period which encompasses much of the U.S. casino expansion. Hence, we 
view this as being the best study to look to in developing expectations as to how casinos will 
affect earnings and employment in Massachusetts.  
Cotti uses county level employment and average weekly earnings data for all U.S. 
counties. There are 161 counties which have casinos during his study period. He examines the 
differences in these variables between casino and non-casino counties. His analysis focuses on 
employment and earnings on three different levels: (i) county level; (ii) the entertainment sector, 
comprised of arts, entertainment, and recreation; and (iii) the hospitality sector, comprised of 
accommodation and food services.  
Among his results, Cotti finds that total county employment in casino counties rises 8.21 
percent relative to non-casino counties, and county earnings in casino counties rise 0.79 percent 
faster in casino than in non-casino counties. Cotti summarizes, ―On average, casinos play a 
                                                 
116 See Chad Cotti (2008), ―The Effect of Casinos on Local Labor Markets: A County Level Analysis.‖ Journal of Gambling 
Business and Economics (forthcoming).  
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significant role in increasing both employment, earnings, and promoting economic development 
in a county‖ (p. 15). However, a caveat applies, as the casino employment and wages are 
included in these county-level data. Still, positive results suggest that the casinos have a net 
positive impact, even accounting for any industry substitution that might exist.  
Cotti‘s results also show that casinos increase employment in the entertainment sector by 
over 50 percent relative to the control (non-casino) counties, and earnings increase 19 percent 
more in casino counties than in non-casino counties. As for the hospitality sector, Cotti finds that 
the employment is insignificant, but that earnings are positive and significant. This is consistent 
with the idea that casinos increase the demand for labor, pushing wages higher. 
To assess the robustness of his results, Cotti adjusts the model to include county-level 
trends in employment. With this adjustment, he still finds the same qualitative effects, but 
smaller in magnitude.  
Cotti also considers a time trend, by including data for one year prior to and five years 
after casinos are introduced. This time component does not change the above conclusions 
markedly. However, the results do support the evidence previously reviewed (Walker and 
Jackson 1998, 2007), that there are short-term positive economic growth effects at the state level, 
but that the effects appear to diminish in the longer-run. 
The analysis is repeated after partitioning the data into three groups, according to county 
population. The results suggest that the positive employment and earnings effects are 
significantly greater for rural casinos than they are for urban casinos. This makes sense, as a 
large casino is likely to represent a significant component of a rural county economy, compared 
to a large urban county economy.  
The next step in Cotti‘s analysis is to assess the extent to which the increased 
employment at the county level and in the entertainment sector is coming at the expense of other 
sub-sectors. (Even though there is a net positive employment and wage effect at the county level, 
there may still be some measure of substitution among industries.) Cotti finds that there is an 
insignificant effect on the sub-sectors tested, including museums, zoos, parks, golf courses, ski 
resorts, marinas, fitness centers, and bowling alleys. Of course, these sub-sectors do not cover all 
entertainment and recreation sectors. But the positive coefficient on the ―casino effect‖ in his 
model suggests a complimentary effect – if any – on other competing entertainment industries. 
The only sector in which there is any hint of substitution is for bars and restaurants. For 
these, Cotti finds a negative coefficient on employment, but the results are not statistically 
different from zero.  
Finally, Cotti tests whether there are employment and/or earnings effects on counties 
neighboring casino counties. Theoretically, one could argue that any new employment or higher 
earnings are coming at the expense of neighboring counties, as workers migrate to the casino 
counties. Cotti‘s results suggest that there are no significant neighboring county effects, with one 
exception. Employment in the entertainment sector in counties neighboring casino counties 
increases.  
These results represent good news to Massachusetts businesses. Based on the most 
comprehensive study to date, which uses a nation-wide county-level sample, there is no evidence 
of a significant substitution effect for employment and earnings between the casino sector and 
entertainment/hospitality sectors. The empirical evidence suggests that there is a moderate 
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complementary effect. These results are based on solid, peer-reviewed academic research. 
However, as noted previously, these nationwide results will not necessarily be borne out in 
Massachusetts, but policy makers and voters can be optimistic about casinos because there is 
little evidence to support a substitution effect.117  
 
Conclusions: substitution effect 
It is critical that voters and policymakers try to account for the whole picture. It may be 
easy to focus only on the beneficiaries of the casinos, or what non-casino businesses stand to 
lose. But good policy is based on full consideration of both costs and benefits. 
Massachusetts business owners may be concerned that casinos will adversely affect 
existing businesses. The best empirical evidence on the casino effect on entertainment and 
hospitality sector employment and earnings suggests that these fears are unwarranted. Based on 
nationwide data from 1990-96, the casino industry tends to supplement employment and 
earnings at the county level, and more specifically, in the entertainment and hospitality sectors. 
Some earlier, limited scope studies found otherwise, so it should be stressed that Massachusetts 
is unique, and the effect of casinos there may differ from that found in previous studies.  
Even if casinos have a different effect in Massachusetts than they have had at the county-
level nationwide, any substitution away from Massachusetts businesses to casinos can be offset if 
the casinos can do some combination of the following: 
 Entice Massachusetts residents who currently travel out-of-state to stay in-state to 
gamble. 
 Attract new tourists or conference attendees or entice existing tourists to spend more. 
 Entice Massachusetts residents who currently do not visit casinos to become 
customers.  
Regardless of which scenario is seen, the net benefits are likely to be greater the larger 
the share of the casino patrons come from outside the area. Individual businesses can avoid the 
negative effects from casinos by traditional ways of competition: offer higher quality products, 
better service, and more competitive pricing. 
Our analysis of the substitution effect also supports the core thesis that destination 
casinos are more likely to advance public policy. Destination casinos would: 
 Draw from a wider geographic area, thus diffusing any substitution. 
 Draw from a broader demographic, thus diffusing the number and variety of 
industries that could arguably be deemed competitors. Destinations, for example, 
do not simply compete against other casinos, or against restaurants and taverns. 
They arguably compete against any business that targets discretionary income, 
from professional sports teams to golf courses, and so on. 
 Hire more people, and return a larger portion of their revenue to the community in 
the form of purchases and payrolls. 
                                                 
117 The results of Cotti‘s study are generally confirmed by the smaller study by Garrett. See Thomas Garrett (2004), ―Casino 
Gaming and Local Employment Trends.‖ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, vol. 86, no. 1, pp. 9-22.  
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We note a very important point that was articulated rather well by Michael E. Porter who 
makes the point that substitution is an omnipresent issue that must be viewed in a much larger 
context: 
―Substitutes are always present, but they are easy to overlook because they may appear to 
very different from the industry‘s product: To someone searching for a Father‘s Day gift, 
neckties and power tools may be substitutes. It is a substitute to do without, to purchase a used 
product rather than a new one, or to do it yourself (bring the service or product in-house).118‖ 
With that in mind, we caution that any analysis of the substitution effect defies 
simplification. If a casual dining establishment loses customers to casino restaurants, it is easy to 
identify a competitive culprit. But what if patrons of high-end restaurants decide to alter their 
spending patterns, and shift more dollars to casual restaurants to free up more discretionary 
income to visit a spa at a destination casino. Who benefits? Who suffers? What if income levels 
rise in a community, thus allowing more households to spend less money at supermarkets to 
prepare home-cooked meals while they increase spending at area restaurants? Again, in such 
situations, it is difficult to identify the competition. 
We reiterate the core thesis that the most effective means of ameliorating any negative 
substitution is to authorize only destination casinos that have developed plans and strategies to 
grow the visitor base, expand employment and engage in joint marketing opportunities with 
other local businesses. 
 
Policy implications: in-state spending 
Questions have been raised, and suggestions have been made, as to policies that should 
be developed that favor Massachusetts residents and businesses. For example, the University of 
Massachusetts Dartmouth Center for Policy Analysis has made several gaming-related 
suggestions designed to advance public policy. For example, the center suggests that 
Massachusetts should ―require each commercial resort casino to adopt a state and local vendor 
preference program for Massachusetts businesses as part of its commitment to spread small 
business growth, job creation and economic development. This program should also include a 5 
percent set-aside for minority and women-owned businesses119.‖ The center also recommends 
hiring preferences for legal residents of the Commonwealth. 
Such goals are indeed laudable, and would surely advance the public interest. However, 
we must note the practical limitations and implications of such policies. New Jersey, for 
example, offers no preferences for in-state or local vendors. And, even though New Jersey was a 
pioneer in the concept of requiring that casinos develop plans to do business with minority and 
women business enterprises, those requirements were successfully challenged. A court ruled that 
the state could not impose such requirements on private businesses in the absence of any 
evidence of prior discrimination.120 
                                                 
118 ―The Five Competitive Forces that Shape Strategy,‖ by Michael E. Porter, Harvard Business Review, January 2008, p. 84. 
119 ―Maximum Best: A Preliminary Blueprint for Casino Gaming and Economic Development in Massachusetts,‖ by Clyde W. 
Barrow, Center for Policy Analysis, August 2007, p. 6. 
120 Association for Fairness in Business, Inc. v. The State of New Jersey, Gaming Law Review, February 1, 2000 
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Still, we note that – even in the absence of mandates – the casino industry is likely to 
spend a significant portion of its purchases in-state. The following chart shows the past 21 years 
of spending by Atlantic City casinos in-state, absent any mandates: 
 
 
This data includes purchases in areas ranging from utilities to slot machines. In 
Massachusetts, we would expect that many of the purchases would mirror those of existing 
lodging and hospitality operators. Many of the vendors who already service this market – from 
linen suppliers to food wholesalers – will be in a strong position to service gaming properties. 
We do not expect, however, that the percentage of in-state spending will reach the level seen in 
New Jersey, largely because some slot suppliers and other gaming-related vendors have set up 
operations in that state to service the $5 billion casino industry. That is not likely to be replicated 
in Massachusetts. Based on the experience of various gaming states, we can conservatively 
project that casinos would spend the equivalent of at least 15 percent of their gross gaming 
revenue on in-state purchases of goods and services. For a $500 million casino, that would 
equate to at least $75 million per year. 
We also caution that mandates can often create unanticipated consequences. When Act 
71 was adopted in 2004 in Pennsylvania, for example, it included requirements that casinos must 
purchase slot machines from in-state distributors. The requirement quickly became unworkable, 
generating complaints that the requirement unnecessarily increased the price of equipment, with 
distributorships being viewed as political sinecures. In 2006, the requirement was eliminated. 
In terms of employment, preferences for Massachusetts residents could be best served by 
developing comprehensive training programs at the earliest possible dates. Absent that, casinos 
might import trained workers from other states who would quickly gain residency status, thus 
negating the perceived benefit of such mandated preferences. 
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Recommendation: Leverage conventions and meetings 
Regional and national gaming destinations continue to focus on conventions and 
meetings as an integral part of their business strategy for a host of reasons, including the critical 
point that they can effectively expand a gaming market beyond what would otherwise be 
perceived as a saturation point. Note, for example, that the $700 million, 825-room MGM Grand 
at Foxwoods, which opened in May 2008, includes a 50,000-square-foot ballroom, which will 
double the size of Foxwoods' existing Grand Ballroom. The Premier is being touted by 
Foxwoods as the largest column-free ballroom in North America.121 The MGM Grand will be 
blanketed with free wireless Internet, even outdoors at the Grand Lawn and a 5,500-square-foot 
pool. 
In part, gaming and conventions are a natural fit because such meetings tend to focus on 
mid-week, while gaming tends to have its peak periods on weekends. Gaming can also boost the 
attractiveness of a destination by creating a perception of ―value.‖ Las Vegas, as a destination, is 
not inexpensive. However, conventioneers and other visitors perceive it as a value destination 
because the quality of the amenities, from the hotel rooms to the restaurants, is more likely to be 
viewed as high-end or luxury. Indeed, all other things being equal, a hotel with a casino can price 
its rooms, meals and other offerings at a more attractive rate than a non-casino hotel, simply 
because it has a casino as an additional revenue source. 
That, of course, would be of scant comfort to non-casino hotels in Boston and other areas 
of Massachusetts that rely to varying degrees on the convention and meetings business. They 
would not have the same flexibility in pricing their rooms and other products. Instead, they 
would have to rely on a coordinated marketing approach that boosts the number of meetings and 
other events at area convention centers. We have visited both the Boston Convention & 
Exhibition Center (with 516,000 square feet of contiguous exhibition space) and the John B. 
Hynes Veterans Memorial Convention Center (with nearly 200,000 square feet of space), and 
recognize that Boston can compete for conventions at any level. Indeed, the 2004 Democratic 
National Convention, which was held in Boston, underscores that point. 
Major cities that have long targeted conventions and meetings are increasingly viewing 
casinos as a competitive weapon. Cities such as Atlanta (ranked No. 5 among convention cities, 
according to Tradeshow Week magazine) and Chicago (ranked No. 3) are considering adding 
gaming, in part to give them an edge over cities such as Boston (No. 7) that do not offer gaming. 
PKF Hospitality Inc. produced a study last year that projected one downtown Atlanta casino 
could generate $1.7 billion into the local economy, including $135.3 million in taxes.122  
We have not examined, and thus do not necessarily endorse, such findings. It is important 
to point out that the very existence of such studies is significant, in part, because they hold the 
potential to become self-fulfilling prophecies: The more convention destinations that offer 
gaming will prompt more cities to add gaming to their arsenal. 
The growth opportunities are very real for both Boston, which has the wherewithal to 
target large national conventions, and for other areas of Massachusetts, that would more 
realistically focus on smaller, regional meetings. 
                                                 
121 ―MGM at Foxwoods will aim at business market,‖ by Robert S. Anthony, New York Daily News, March 30, 2008 
122 ―Atlanta's rivals pondering casinos,‖ by Rachel Tobin Ramos, Atlanta Business Chronicle,  August 17, 2007 
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A 2006 survey by PricewaterhouseCoopers of 100 convention centers shows that 
occupancy has been increasing among large centers (with more than 500,000 square feet of 
space), reporting a 44.4 percent occupancy rate in 2005-06, up from 43.9 percent in 2004-05. 
Overall demand increased by 1 point, reaching 38 percent. Nearly two-thirds of all convention 
centers last year reported that demand had reached or exceeded 2000 levels: a significant 
milestone, as that was pre-9/11.123 
Smaller and mid-sized convention centers showed sizable gains as well, according to the 
same report. Small centers (under 100,000 square feet) reported a 17 percent increase in 
occupancy, while demand at mid-sized centers (between 100,000 and 500,000 square feet) rose 6 
percent. Their overall occupancy rates remain lower, however, with small centers reporting 27 
percent occupancy and medium-sized centers reporting 28 percent. 
The segment of conventions and meetings that require less than 50,000 square feet of 
space is both large and growing. The following table shows the percentage of events by the 
square footage of floor space. 
Conventions and tradeshows by net square feet
124
 
Net Square Feet % of Total Events 
0-50,000 61.8 
50- 100,000 19.6 
100- 150,000 19.6 
100- 150,000 3.9 
200- 250,000 2.3 
250- 300,000 2.2 
300- 350,000 0.8 
Over 350,000 3.3 
The next table shows the average attendance by size of meeting: 
Average attendance by size of meeting
125
 
Net Square Feet Mean Attendance Median Attendance 
0- 50,000 3,242 2,500 
50- 100,000 8,459 7,250 
100- 150,000 14,090 11,800 
150- 200,000 16,131 13,085 
200- 250,000 21,717 20,000 
250- 300,000 30,447 30,000 
300- 350,000 15,104 46,120 
Over 350,000 13,500 37,500 
National studies indicate that the average delegate at a convention spends 3.56 nights126 
and spends the following, not including airfare to and from the host city, or other expenses 
incurred outside the host city: 
                                                 
123 ―The Ripple Effect,‖ by Dave Kovaleski , www.meetingsnet.com , December 1, 2006 
124 Tradeshow Week 
125 Tradeshow Week 
126
 Destination Marketing Association International Foundation 
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Type of expenditure Total expenditures Daily expenditures % of total 
Lodging and incidentals  $       450.10   $                126.45  47.6% 
Food and beverage  $       271.13   $                 76.17  28.7% 
Hotel food and beverage  $         93.92   $                 26.39  9.9% 
Other food and beverage  $       177.21   $                 49.79  18.7% 
Entertainment/recreation  $         29.51   $                   8.29  3.1% 
Tours and sightseeing  $         19.82   $                   5.57  2.1% 
Recreation  $           6.62   $                   1.86  0.7% 
Sporting events  $           3.07   $                   0.86  0.3% 
Retail  $       103.79   $                 29.16  11.0% 
Transportation  $         90.04   $                 25.30  9.5% 
Local transportation  $         29.96   $                   8.42  3.2% 
Auto rental  $         23.70   $                   6.66  2.5% 
Gas, tolls, parking  $         36.38   $                 10.22  3.8% 
Other  $           0.60   $                   0.17  0.1% 
Total  $       945.17   $                265.54    
Adjusted expenditure* $     1,036.00 $                290.00  
* The original survey was conducted in 2003, and the adjusted expenditure is for year-end 2005 dollars. 
Source: Expact Convention Expenditure & Impact Study 
We apply the following, based on Expact guidelines: 
 Exhibiting companies spend $349.84 per delegate with local businesses. This includes 
such items as food and beverage, advertising in the host city, local transportation and 
local services. The adjusted amount spent per delegate per day is $100. 
 Event organizers spend $95.70 per delegate on similar items, including overall food-
and-beverage spending and renting exhibit space. The adjusted amount spent per 
delegate per day is $24. 
The following table incorporates a variety of assumptions designed to project a range of 
economic impacts related to meetings and conventions held on-site at a destination casino resort 
in Massachusetts. Note that these are averages, and the impacts would be significantly greater in 
Boston than they would be in smaller markets. 
We are assuming a range of 70,000 to 100,000 square feet of space of meeting space in 
our initial model. We also assume 2,000 hotel rooms on-site. Note that some of the numbers, 
such as the room impact on other properties, are negative. This essentially means that some of 
the rooms needed to service these meetings would siphon demand from other properties. 
However, we add the caveat that this model does not take into account demand for rooms 
generated by meetings and conventions at BCEC, the Hynes center or any other facility. In our 
experience, a casino would sufficiently increase demand for larger conventions – and, at the very 
least, make a region more competitive in attracting such meetings.  
For smaller markets, however, that would not be the case – since those markets do not 
compete for larger events. In such markets, a casino destination might very well compete against 
other area lodging facilities for room nights. However, that begs a related question: How many 
of these regional meetings would locate in such markets in the absence of a casino hotel? In 
other words, we can expect that a significant, unquantifiable portion of these meetings would 
likely go to other regions. 
Still, any negative impact on area hotels in any scenario can be minimized, or eliminated, 
if casinos focus largely on their own gaming customers as hotel guests. This often occurs in 
many markets where casino guests prove to be much more valuable as overnight visitors than 
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cash-paying hotel guests would be. In effect, this would reduce the number of room nights made 
available to conventions and meetings.  
 
  Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Total Square Feet, meeting and exhibition space 70,000 80,000 100,000 
Annual Sq. Ft. Availability 25,550,000 29,200,000 36,500,000 
Utilization Percent 40% 30% 20% 
Sq. Ft. Utilized 10,220,000 8,760,000 7,300,000 
Sq. ft. per attendee                    43.03                      43.03              43.03  
Projected Annual Conference Center Attendance 237,513 203,582 169,652 
Percentage Adult Attendees 90% 90% 90% 
Conference Center Adults, total days 213,762 183,224 152,687 
Est. pct. of adults who would stay overnight 80% 60% 50% 
Est. demand for room nights 171,009 109,934 76,343 
Daily spending by overnight convention visitor $290.00  $290.00  $290.00  
Total spending by overnight convention visitors, Massachusetts 
destination casino property 
$49,592,673  $31,881,004  $22,139,586  
Spending by event organizers, per delegate per day  $                24.00   $                24.00   $         24.00  
Spending by event organizers $5,130,276  $4,397,380  $3,664,483  
Spending by exhibiting companies, per delegate per day  $              100.00   $              100.00   $       100.00  
Pct. of events that include exhibiting companies 40% 30% 20% 
Spending by exhibiting companies $8,550,461  $5,496,725  $3,053,736  
Total convention/meeting spending $63,273,410  $41,775,108  $28,857,805  
Pct. of spending outside Massachusetts destination casino 
property 
60% 50% 40% 
Dollars spent at other area businesses $37,964,046  $20,887,554  $11,543,122  
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Sensitivity analysis 
This section of the report analyzes the impact on other area businesses based on changes 
in two key variables: the percentage of adults who would stay overnight, and the percentage of 
spending outside the casino destination: 
 
Estimated Dollars spent at other area businesses: Scenario 1 
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 Pct. Of adult attendees who stay overnight 
 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 
60%  $       30,525,145   $       26,805,695   $       23,086,244   $       19,366,794   $       15,647,343  
55%  $       27,981,383   $       24,571,887   $       21,162,390   $       17,752,894   $       14,343,398  
50%  $       25,437,621   $       22,338,079   $       19,238,537   $       16,138,995   $       13,039,453  
45%  $       22,893,859   $       20,104,271   $       17,314,683   $       14,525,095   $       11,735,507  
40%  $       20,350,097   $       17,870,463   $       15,390,829   $       12,911,196   $       10,431,562  
35%  $       17,806,335   $       15,636,655   $       13,466,976   $       11,297,296   $         9,127,617  
30%  $       15,262,573   $       13,402,847   $       11,543,122   $         9,683,397   $         7,823,672  
25%  $       12,718,810   $       11,169,039   $         9,619,268   $         8,069,497   $         6,519,726  
 
Estimated Dollars spent at other area businesses: Scenario 2 
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 Pct. Of adult attendees who stay overnight 
 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 
60% 
 $            25,065,065   $            21,876,965   $            18,688,864   $            15,500,764   $            12,312,664  
55% 
 $            22,976,310   $            20,053,884   $            17,131,459   $            14,209,034   $            11,286,608  
50% 
 $            20,887,554   $            18,230,804   $            15,574,054   $            12,917,303   $            10,260,553  
45% 
 $            18,798,799   $            16,407,724   $            14,016,648   $            11,625,573   $              9,234,498  
40% 
 $            16,710,043   $            14,584,643   $            12,459,243   $            10,333,843   $              8,208,442  
35% 
 $            14,621,288   $            12,761,563   $            10,901,838   $              9,042,112   $              7,182,387  
30% 
 $            12,532,533   $            10,938,482   $              9,344,432   $              7,750,382   $              6,156,332  
25% 
 $            10,443,777   $              9,115,402   $              7,787,027   $              6,458,652   $              5,130,276  
 
Estimated Dollars spent at other area businesses: Scenario 3 
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 Pct. Of adult attendees who stay overnight 
 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 
60% 
 $ 19,971,433   $ 17,314,683   $ 14,657,933   $ 12,001,182   $ 9,344,432  
55% 
 $ 18,307,147   $ 15,871,793   $ 13,436,438   $ 11,001,084   $ 8,565,729  
50% 
 $ 16,642,861   $ 14,428,903   $ 12,214,944   $ 10,000,985   $ 7,787,027  
45% 
 $ 14,978,575   $ 12,986,012   $ 10,993,450   $   9,000,887   $ 7,008,324  
40% 
 $ 13,314,289   $ 11,543,122   $   9,771,955   $   8,000,788   $ 6,229,621  
35% 
 $ 11,650,003   $ 10,100,232   $   8,550,461   $   7,000,690   $ 5,450,919  
30% 
 $   9,985,717   $   8,657,342   $   7,328,966   $   6,000,591   $ 4,672,216  
25% 
 $   8,321,431   $   7,214,451   $   6,107,472   $   5,000,493   $ 3,893,513  
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The sensitivity analysis indicates the following: 
 In Scenario 1, every 10 percent increase in the number of adult attendees who 
stay overnight would generate between $1.8 million and $3.7 million in 
additional spending at other area businesses. 
 In Scenario 2, every 10 percent increase in the number of adult attendees who 
stay overnight would generate between $1.6 million and $3.2 million in 
additional spending at other area businesses. 
 In Scenario 3, every 10 percent increase in the number of adult attendees who 
stay overnight would generate between $1.3 million and $2.6 million in 
additional spending at other area businesses. 
 In Scenario 1, every 5 percent increase in the percentage of spending outside 
the destination casino would generate between $1.3 million and $2.5 million 
in additional spending at other area businesses. 
 In Scenario 2, every 5 percent increase in the percentage of spending outside 
the destination casino would generate between $1.0 million and $2.1 million 
in additional spending at other area businesses. 
 In Scenario 3, every 5 percent increase in the percentage of spending outside 
the destination casino would generate between $780,000 and $1.6 million in 
additional spending at other area businesses. 
The second part of our sensitivity analysis assumes the same number of hotel rooms, but 
adds significantly more convention and meeting space in all three scenarios. 
 
Estimated dollars spent at other area businesses: Scenario 1 
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 Square footage of meeting/convention space at destination casino 
 70,000 80,000 90,000 100,000 110,000 
60% 
 $            37,964,046   $            43,387,481   $            48,810,916   $            54,234,351   $            59,657,786  
55% 
 $            34,800,375   $            39,771,858   $            44,743,340   $            49,714,822   $            54,686,304  
50% 
 $            31,636,705   $            36,156,234   $            40,675,764   $            45,195,293   $            49,714,822  
45% 
 $            28,473,034   $            32,540,611   $            36,608,187   $            40,675,764   $            44,743,340  
40% 
 $            25,309,364   $            28,924,987   $            32,540,611   $            36,156,234   $            39,771,858  
35% 
 $            22,145,693   $            25,309,364   $            28,473,034   $            31,636,705   $            34,800,375  
30% 
 $            18,982,023   $            21,693,741   $            24,405,458   $            27,117,176   $            29,828,893  
25% 
 $            15,818,352   $            18,078,117   $            20,337,882   $            22,597,646   $            24,857,411  
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Estimated dollars spent at other area businesses: Scenario 2 
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 Square footage of meeting/convention space at destination casino 
 70,000 80,000 90,000 100,000 110,000 
60% 
 $            21,931,932   $            25,065,065   $            28,198,198   $            31,331,331   $            34,464,464  
55% 
 $            20,104,271   $            22,976,310   $            25,848,348   $            28,720,387   $            31,592,426  
50% 
 $            18,276,610   $            20,887,554   $            23,498,499   $            26,109,443   $            28,720,387  
45% 
 $            16,448,949   $            18,798,799   $            21,148,649   $            23,498,499   $            25,848,348  
40% 
 $            14,621,288   $            16,710,043   $            18,798,799   $            20,887,554   $            22,976,310  
35% 
 $            12,793,627   $            14,621,288   $            16,448,949   $            18,276,610   $            20,104,271  
30% 
 $            10,965,966   $            12,532,533   $            14,099,099   $            15,665,666   $            17,232,232  
25% 
 $              9,138,305   $            10,443,777   $            11,749,249   $            13,054,721   $            14,360,194  
 
Estimated dollars spent at other area businesses: Scenario 3 
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 Square footage of meeting/convention space at destination casino 
 70,000 80,000 90,000 100,000 110,000 
60% 
 $            12,120,278   $            13,851,746   $            15,583,215   $            17,314,683   $            19,046,151  
55% 
 $            11,110,255   $            12,697,434   $            14,284,614   $            15,871,793   $            17,458,972  
50% 
 $            10,100,232   $            11,543,122   $            12,986,012   $            14,428,903   $            15,871,793  
45% 
 $              9,090,209   $            10,388,810   $            11,687,411   $            12,986,012   $            14,284,614  
40% 
 $              8,080,185   $              9,234,498   $            10,388,810   $            11,543,122   $            12,697,434  
35% 
 $              7,070,162   $              8,080,185   $              9,090,209   $            10,100,232   $            11,110,255  
30% 
 $              6,060,139   $              6,925,873   $              7,791,607   $              8,657,342   $              9,523,076  
25% 
 $              5,050,116   $              5,771,561   $              6,493,006   $              7,214,451   $              7,935,896  
 In Scenario 1, every 10,000 square foot increase in meeting/convention space would 
generate between $2.2 million and $5.4 million in additional spending at other area 
businesses. 
 In Scenario 2, every 10,000 square foot increase in meeting/convention space would 
generate between $1.3 million and $3.1 million in additional spending at other area 
businesses. 
 In Scenario 3, every 10,000 square foot increase in meeting/convention space would 
generate between $721,000 and $1.7 million in additional spending at other area 
businesses. 
Our most conservative projections, as detailed in the above model, are that conventions 
and meetings at a destination casino would generate at least $7.2 million in annual spending at 
other area businesses. 
We believe this is realistic and practical, in large measure because a destination casino is 
going to limit the number of rooms on site that would be available to convention attendees. Bear 
in mind that convention attendees would have to be measured, in terms of profitability, against 
all other overnight visitors, including casino guests. It would be neither practical nor prudent to 
expect a casino operator to displace, or turn away a profitable casino guest to favor a less 
profitable convention attendee.  
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However, limiting the number of rooms available to convention attendees could actually 
advance public policy, assuming there is a sufficient level of quality lodging and other facilities 
in close proximity to the casino hotel. 
For example, in our Scenario 3 above – which assumes 100,000 square feet of meeting 
space – the demand would be for 76,343 room nights for convention attendees. If a destination 
casino limits its availability to 250 nights a year (five mid-week nights times 50 weeks, roughly), 
and allocates 10 percent of its available 2,000 rooms to convention attendees, this would fill 
50,000 room nights a year. 
Assuming there are a sufficient number of qualified lodging facilities nearby, this would 
generate 26,343 room nights at other facilities – if half the convention attendees stay at least one 
night. The following chart shows differing levels of demand, assuming that the destination 
casino limits its available rooms to either 10 percent or 15 percent of its inventory: 
 
 
 
Note the inverse relationship between the number of on-site rooms allocated to 
conventions and meetings and the potential demand for room nights at other properties. 
 
Conventions and meetings: policy implications 
The policy implications of this section of the analysis indicate that the Commonwealth 
has an interest in encouraging in-house convention and meeting space for casino destinations. 
This analysis makes it clear that conventions and meetings can complement gaming revenue and 
generate incremental revenue for the casino property as well as other area businesses. 
Market forces and the potential returns on investment will dictate the overall quality and 
breadth of amenities that would be located on site for a destination casino. However, the bidding 
process should encourage a focus on conventions and meetings. 
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This analysis does not suggest that destination casinos would compete against established 
centers, such as the Boston Convention & Exhibition Center, the John B. Hynes Veterans 
Memorial Convention Center or the  MassMutual Center. Indeed, we fully expect that gaming 
operators would seek to complement such facilities, where appropriate, if they are sited within 
reasonable proximity. As noted, the presence of casinos could help fund the marketing of such 
centers, and would help make such marketing efforts more effective, since the presence of 
casinos and their attendant amenities would prove to be attractive to more meeting planners. 
Most convention and visitors bureaus (also known as ―destination marketing 
organizations‖), including the Greater Boston Convention & Visitors Bureau, rely on hotel taxes 
as a key means of funding their marketing efforts. In our experience, such marketing efforts, 
funded by overnight guests, become self-generating sources of revenue that allow the local DMO 
or CVB to market the destination to more potential visitors, who then stay overnight and provide 
more funding for future marketing efforts. Traditionally, such funding is set as a percentage of 
the average daily rate. Since casino hotels, however, operate under a different business model, in 
which many room nights are offered at reduced or complimentary rates, the legislation should 
consider establishing fixed dollar amounts that would equate to a similar amount. 
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Section III: Employment & Wage Analysis  
 
Casino jobs forecast 
The following represents an estimate of the number of total employees, by department, 
needed to operate a typical casino property with the following assumed level of amenities.  
 2,000-room hotel 
 3,000 slot machines 
 120 table games 
 60 poker tables  
 Six restaurants 
 Two bars  
 One nightclub  
 20,000 square feet retail space  
 Convention center  
 Entertainment venue  
 Pool and spa  
 This estimate is used as the basis for the economic impact analysis of salaries and wages. 
The number of gaming positions ranges higher than we used in our revenue estimate, which was 
conservatively based on population models. However, we assume that destination casinos in 
Massachusetts would use the hotel rooms, convention center and other amenities to pursue 
incremental revenue, as we noted earlier. This would likely allow a property to ultimately justify 
a higher number of gaming positions. More important, for purposes of planning an employee 
training program, the higher number should be used as the basis for identifying employee skill 
requirements, analyzing the local labor pool and recommending recruitment and training 
strategies. 
Department  Line Employees  Supervisors  Shift Managers  and 
Dept Heads  
Total  
Casino  1,201 267 22 1,490 
Hotel  1,262 98 15 1,375 
F&B  936 63 8 1,007 
Marketing  206 24 5 235 
Finance  96 67 7 170 
Admin 80 10 3 93 
Vice Presidents      7 7 
 Total  3,781 529 67 4,377 
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Department  Job SOC Code
127
  Estimated Full-time Equivalents 
Casino  Slot Service Attendants  39-1012 70 
Casino  Slot Technical  49-2097 24 
Casino  Slot Supervisory  39-1021 15 
Casino  Slot Shift Manager  11-9071 4 
Casino  Exec Director Slot Operations  11-1021 1 
Casino  Tables  39-3011 720 
Casino  Tables Supervisory  39-1011 180 
Casino  Table Games Shift Manager  11-9071 4 
Casino  Executive Director Table Games  11-1021 1 
Casino  Poker  39-3011 240 
Casino  Poker Supervisory 39-1011 60 
Casino  Poker Shift Manager  11-9071 3 
Casino  Poker Director  11-1021 1 
Casino  Casino Cashiering  39-3019 75 
Casino  Casino Credit Clerks  39-3019 15 
Casino  Pit Clerks  39-3019 21 
Casino  Cashiering Supervisors  39-1011 5 
Casino  Casino Cashiering Shift Manager  11-9071 3 
Casino  Count Room  39-3019 16 
Casino  Count Room Supervisory  39-1011 3 
Casino  Director Casino Accounting  11-1021 1 
Casino  Surveillance  33-9031 20 
Casino  Surveillance Supv  39-1011 4 
Casino  Surveillance Shift Manager  11-9071 3 
Casino  Surveillance Director  11-1021 1 
Hotel  Housekeepers  37-2012 359 
Hotel  Housekeeping Supervisory  37-1011 20 
Hotel  Public Areas  37-2011 200 
Hotel  Public Areas Supervisory 37-1011 20 
Hotel  Housekeeping/Public Areas Shift 
Managers  
11-9081 4 
Hotel  Director Housekeeping Public 
Areas  
11-9081 1 
Hotel  Director Hotel Operations  11-9081 1 
Hotel  Front Desk  43-4081 57 
Hotel  Front Desk Supervisory  39-1021 6 
Hotel  Bell Services  39-6011 30 
Hotel  Valet Attendant  53-6021 140 
Hotel  Valet Cashier  41-2011 10 
Hotel  Valet Supervisor  39-1021 6 
Hotel  PBX Operator  43-2021 40 
Hotel  PBX Supervisor  39-1021 6 
Hotel  Message Therapists  29-1123 30 
Hotel  Spa Attendant  39-9099 12 
Hotel  Spa Manager  11-9111 1 
Hotel  Spa Supervisor  39-1021 3 
Hotel  Health Club Attendant 39-9032 12 
Hotel  Health Club Supervisor  39-1021 3 
Hotel  Pool Supervisor  33-1099 3 
Hotel  Life Guard  33-9092 12 
Hotel  Grounds Keeper  37-3011 30 
Hotel  General Maintenance 47-2061 30 
Hotel  Painter  47-2141 20 
Hotel  Electrician  47-2111 20 
Hotel  Carpenter  47-2031 20 
Hotel  Plumber  47-2152 15 
Hotel  HVAC  49-9021 10 
Hotel  Facilities Supervisory  11-9021 4 
Hotel  Facilities Shift Manager  11-9021 3 
Hotel  Executive Director Facilities  11-9041 1 
Hotel  Security  33-9032 160 
Hotel  Security Supervisor  33-1099 20 
Hotel  Security Shift Manager  11-9071 3 
                                                 
127 SOC = Standard Occupational Code, a system is used by federal statistical agencies to classify workers into occupational 
categories for the purpose of collecting, calculating or disseminating data. 
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Department  Job SOC Code
127
  Estimated Full-time Equivalents 
Hotel  Executive Director Security 11-1021 1 
Hotel  Convention Services  53-7062 25 
Hotel  Retail Manager  11-9081 1 
Hotel  Retail  41-2031 30 
Hotel  Retail Supervisors  41-1011 6 
F&B Bartender  35-3011 56 
F&B Bar Porter  35-9011 19 
F&B Beverage Server  35-3041 150 
F&B Food Server  35-3031 140 
F&B Bus Person  35-9011 70 
F&B Greeter  35-9031 15 
F&B Stocker  35-0000 42 
F&B F&B Supervisor  35-1012 20 
F&B F&B Shift Managers  11-9051 4 
F&B Director Beverage  11-9199 1 
F&B Exec Director Food and Beverage  11-9021 1 
F&B Banquet Beverage 35-3011 50 
F&B Banquet Server  35-3031 61 
F&B Banquet Manager  35-1012 9 
F&B Director Catering/Convention 
Services  
11-9199 1 
F&B Room Service Food Server  35-3041 40 
F&B Room Service Attendant  35-9011 21 
F&B Room Service Order Taker  41-2011 12 
F&B Cafeteria  35-9011 20 
F&B Uniforms Attendant 43-5071 12 
F&B Room Service Supervisor  35-1012 6 
F&B Butler  35-3031 5 
F&B Director Room Service  11-9199 1 
F&B Cooks  35-2014 82 
F&B Sous Chef  35-1011 12 
F&B Stewards 35-9021 140 
F&B Steward Supervisor  35-1012 14 
F&B Executive Chef  11-9051 2 
Marketing  Box Office Supervisor  39-1021 3 
Marketing  Box Office 41-2031 12 
Marketing  Entertainment ** 27-4011 40 
Marketing  Stage Managers  27-2012 3 
Marketing  Promotions Booth 41-9041 35 
Marketing  Promotions Supervisor  39-1021 8 
Marketing  Telemarketing/Reservations  41-9041 95 
Marketing  Bus Greeter  41-9041 12 
Marketing  Hosts  41-9099 12 
Marketing  Player Development Execs  11-2022 10 
Marketing  Executive Director Player 
Development  
11-2022 1 
Marketing  Director Advertising 11-2021 1 
Marketing  Director Public Relations  11-2031 1 
Marketing  Director Database Marketing  11-2021 1 
Marketing  Director Marketing Operations  11-2021 1 
Accounting  Hotel/F&B Cashier  41-2011 34 
Accounting  Accountants  13-2011 10 
Accounting  Accounting Clerks  43-3031 30 
Accounting  Casino Accounting  43-3031 20 
Accounting  Casino Controller  11-3031 1 
Accounting  Director Financial Analysis  11-3031 1 
Accounting  Director Financial Reporting  11-3031 1 
Accounting  Controller  11-3031 1 
Accounting  Director Hotel Accounting 11-3031 1 
Accounting  Purchasing Manager  11-3061 1 
Accounting  Purchasing Agent  43-3061 10 
Accounting  Warehouse Supervisor  43-1011 6 
Accounting  Warehouse Attendant  43-5071 20 
Accounting  Director IT  11-3021 1 
Accounting  Information Technology Techs and 
Programmers  
15-1041 15 
Accounting  Computer Operator 43-9011 12 
Accounting  Internal Audit  13-2011 5 
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Department  Job SOC Code
127
  Estimated Full-time Equivalents 
Accounting  Executive Director Internal Audit  11-3031 1 
Admin  Human Resources 
Supervisors/Professionals  
13-1071 10 
Admin  Executive Director Human 
Resources  
11-3049 1 
Admin  Director Employee Relations  11-3041 1 
Admin  Director Personnel  11-3042 1 
Admin  Human Resources Administrative  43-4161 20 
Admin  Executive Directors  11-3011 0 
Admin  Administrative Professionals  43-6014 60 
Admin  Vice Presidents  11-1011 7 
Total Jobs     4.377 
 
Reasoning and assumptions on number of positions  
The number of positions was estimated based on reviewing casinos and proposed casinos 
in New Jersey, Kansas, Louisiana, Indiana and Florida. Where applicable, the number of 
employees was based on a ratio of employees to units. The ratios were determined by taking an 
average of multiple casinos where possible.  
Table games  
We calculated the number of table games employees after reviewing the average number 
of dealers per table, and the average supervisor/dealer ratio of all of the Atlantic City casinos as 
reported in the most recent Atlantic City Benchmark Survey128. Four dealers per table and one 
supervisor for every four dealers is the current average in Atlantic City. Borgata uses seven 
dealers per table, which is in part a reflection of busier tables. To keep our estimate realistic but 
conservative we used six dealers per table which is higher than the city wide average but still not 
as high as Borgata‘s current ratio.  
Slots  
We have reduced the number of slot attendants below traditional models based on a 
review of current industry data. It is clear that the number of slot attendant positions needed has 
been significantly reduced by technology. Atlantic City casinos have been operating with 
significantly fewer slot attendants since they have become coinless. The current average number 
of slot machines in Atlantic City per slot attendant FTE is 56, while the Borgata uses 30. It is 
expected that the volume of business in the Massachusetts Casinos will be similar to the Borgata. 
To keep our estimate realistic but conservative, we used the midpoint between the Borgata 
average and the overall Atlantic City average.  
The number of slot technicians in the forecast is also proportionate to the number of slot 
machines. Technology improvements, which could reduce the need for staff in this position are 
not expected until after server-based slots are fully developed and implemented. Borgata 
averages 91 slot machines per slot technician while Atlantic City averages 160 overall. For 
purposes of this study, to keep our estimate realistic but conservative, we again used the 
midpoint between Borgata and Atlantic City overall average which is 126 slot machines for each 
technician.  
                                                 
128 Compensation managers within Atlantic City casino hotels annually share salary ranges for about 100 key positions. 
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Poker  
We projected the number of poker dealers by reviewing the average number of dealers 
per table at three prominent Atlantic City poker rooms of varying size. The average of the three 
casinos reviewed was three dealers per poker table. The house with the highest average of the 
group was 4.3 which was the Tropicana a casino with significantly less revenue than Borgata. 
Again to keep our estimate realistic but conservative, we used an average of four dealers per 
poker table. Typical casinos average one supervisor for every four dealers which is the ration 
used in this forecast.  
Guest room attendant  
We estimated the ratio of employees per hotel room by reviewing the number of 
employees and the number of hotel rooms at two prominent casino hotels in Atlantic City – 
Borgata (high end) and Tropicana (mid-market). Borgata averages 5.57 hotel rooms per guest 
room attendant and the Tropicana averages 6.83.  
The number of housekeeping positions needed will vary depending upon the mix of 
suites and standard rooms. Typically a larger, more upscale room or a suite will take longer to 
clean, thus increasing the number of required housekeepers. For example, in Atlantic City, guest 
room attendants are required to clean the equivalent of 14 rooms per shift based on the UNITE 
HERE union contract. If they are assigned larger rooms or suites then they are given ―extra 
credits‖ for those assigned rooms. One credit is equivalent to one-half hour of work for a guest 
room attendant. For example, Borgata assigns the following credits to its suites and larger rooms:  
 Standard room = 1 credit  
 Fiore suites = 2 credits  
 Opus suites = 2 credits  
 Studio = 2 credits  
 Piatto = 4 credits  
 Quad = 7 credits  
Fiore suites are given two credits even though they only contain one physical room 
because they are larger in square footage, and contain additional items such as a sofa and 
separate bath. Opus suites are made up of two separate rooms, a living room and a bedroom, and 
also includes an upscale bathroom design including separate bath tub and shower.  
The Ritz Carlton Hotel in Philadelphia uses a similar methodology for the assignment of 
Housekeeping attendants.129 Each housekeeper is assigned 14 credits per day. Standard rooms are 
worth one credit, suites two credits, and Penthouse suites six credits.  
We assumed for the purposes of this study that the casino hotels in Massachusetts will be 
similar to Borgata and thus have used a ratio of one housekeeper for every 5.57 rooms.  
  
                                                 
129 Interview with former Hotel Supervisor, Ritz Carlton Hotel Philadelphia 
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Security  
We projected the number of security guards by comparing the number of security guards 
at similar sized properties to the ones in the forecast.  
Pit clerks/casino cashiers 
We projected the number of pit clerks by reviewing the average number of table games 
per employee in all of the Atlantic City casinos. The ratio used for this study was one pit clerk 
for every 5.6 tables. This number is the midpoint between the Borgata Average of 4.5 tables per 
pit clerk and the Atlantic City average of 6.65 tables per pit clerk. 
The average number of cashiers in Atlantic City is one cashier for every 2.75 table 
games. This number varies drastically between the various casinos, however, and does not 
appear to be directly proportional to the number of table games. It is also a function of the 
number of slot machines as well as the volume of business on the casino floor. For purposes of 
this study, we estimated that 75 cashiers would be sufficient based on comparing properties with 
a similar mix of slots and tables.  
Convention center/entertainment venue  
 We consulted two sources in forecasting the number of entertainment and convention 
services employees needed to staff the proposed convention facility: a former assistant vice 
president of entertainment for a prominent casino in Atlantic City and the current general 
manager of the Atlantic City Convention Center and Boardwalk Hall.130 Both executives reported 
that to avoid excess staff between major events, a small full-time staff is retained and a large 
number of casual employees are hired from the union hall to cover major events. The diverse 
mix of technically skilled employees is needed on the full-time staff to ensure that casuals can be 
adequately trained in the use of the convention and entertainment equipment in the facility. 
Additionally, a larger full time staff can be cost justified if the facility is booked frequently. 
We based the forecast in this study on the comment of the two individuals then checked 
for reasonableness by reviewing the staffing at a casino in Atlantic City that has a large 
convention facility and showroom, with conventions as a significant part of their marketing plan.  
Food and beverage positions  
We forecast food and beverage positions based on the number of anticipated restaurant 
seats in the proposed casinos. Certain positions would fluctuate in direct proportion to the 
number of restaurant seats. For those positions, we used a model that assumes 85 percent 
utilization and 3.2 turns per day for each restaurant seat. The following ratios were used in the 
forecast: 
Position  Seats per FTE  
Food server  10 
Bus person  20 
Stocker  33 
Cooks  17 
                                                 
130 Atlantic City Convention Hall has almost 500,000 square feet of convention space and Boardwalk hall has 268,000 square 
feet, ACCVA Website, http://www.atlanticcitynj.com/meeting_ACCC.asp 
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Position  Seats per FTE  
Stewards  10  
Bartender  25 
Bar porter  75 
 
We anticipate that the six restaurants, two bars and one nightclub will create 
approximately 1,400 food and beverage seats at each property.  
We forecast the room service positions based on a typical ratio of number of rooms per 
employee as used in a mid range casino hotel in Atlantic City. We used a ratio of one room 
service food server for every 50 rooms, along with one room service attendant for every 95 
rooms.  
All other positions  
We based all other projections for number of positions on a review of the most recent 
Atlantic City Benchmark survey from 2007 as well as a review of existing and proposed casinos 
in Kansas, Louisiana, Indiana and Florida.  
 
Methodology cross-check: revenue, employment 
In this section of the report, we are cross-checking our employment model with the 
revenue projections that were developed to ensure that they are essentially compatible. We want 
to make certain that the level of employment we have projected is appropriate to staff destination 
resorts that would generate the range of revenue we have projected. 
To do this, we rely on the Atlantic City model because of the availability of data, and 
because the destinations in Atlantic City are roughly comparable to what has been contemplated 
in this legislation. The following table lists the most recent public data for employment levels in 
Atlantic City casinos: 
 
Full-time Part-time Other* 
Atlantic City Hilton 2,104 262 257 
Bally's 4,259 252 550 
Borgata 6,558 689 605 
Caesars 3,131 333 529 
Harrah's 3,373 253 481 
Resorts 2,063 237 306 
Showboat 2,302 149 498 
Tropicana 2,988 424 250 
Trump Marina 1,718 263 249 
Trump Plaza 2,056 176 535 
Trump Taj Mahal 3,368 523 320 
Total 33,920 3,561 4,580 
*Seasonal, temporary employees. Source: New Jersey Casino Control Commission 
For more than a dozen years, we have been estimating gross gaming revenue per full-
time equivalent employee in Atlantic City, based on a proprietary formula we developed in our 
publication, Gaming Industry Observer, that considers each part-time employee to be the 
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equivalent of 0.5 FTEs, while other employees are considered to be 0.33 FTEs. The following 
chart shows the range of estimated gross gaming revenue per FTE for the industry in Atlantic 
City. 
 
The general increase in revenue per FTE over time can be attributed to a variety of 
reasons, from improvements in technology to consolidation within the industry. 
For the last 12 months, the range of estimated revenue per FTE, by property, is detailed 
as follows: 
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Our moderate scenario projection of $1.5 billion would generate a ratio of $114,355 per 
FTE, at the low end of the range in the chart above. Our high-case would have generated 
$135,290 per FTE, slightly higher than the average here. Based on this, we believe our 
employment estimates are reasonable. 
 
 
Construction jobs forecast 
The Massachusetts casinos as proposed would create approximately 3,000 direct 
construction jobs – that is, the total number of people who would have a direct casino-
construction job for any length of time – for each of the three casinos. This was calculated by 
applying a methodology131 suggested by Sam Sabin, a senior vice president of Perini Building 
Company, a major construction firm based in Framingham, MA. Perini has extensive experience 
in constructing destination casino resorts, including the current $9.2 billion MGM Mirage 
CityCenter in Las Vegas, the MGM Grand at Foxwoods, and several major projects on the Las 
Vegas Strip. 
 We compared the result of Sabin‘s methodology against the actual experience at Borgata 
Hotel, Casino & Spa, a 2,000-hotel-room destination gaming resort constructed in Atlantic City 
from 2000-03. Borgata is approximately the same size as each of the three casino resorts 
envisioned for Massachusetts. Construction at Borgata resulted in 3,000 direct jobs, according to 
Tom Ballance, Borgata‘s senior vice president of development. (The number of construction jobs 
at Borgata at any one point during the three-year building period peaked at 2,000.) 
Ballance further estimated that it would cost 1.5 times more to construct Borgata today 
than it did in 2000-03; Borgata‘s actual construction cost then was roughly $650 million, which 
at today‘s prices would cost $975 million. We have thus assumed $1 billion each in actual 
construction costs for the Massachusetts casinos. 
We are aware of other formulas that may project a higher number of direct construction 
jobs, but in keeping with our policy of being conservative for this report, and respecting Perini‘s 
local knowledge and extensive experience building large-scale casino resorts, we will assume 
3,000 construction jobs per casino. 
The following table lists the estimated compensation levels for various construction jobs 
in the Boston area: 
 
                                                 
131 Sabin suggested that the best way to estimate number of construction employees is to calculate payroll, typically 
between 25 percent and 35 percent of actual construction costs; we used a factor of 30 percent. Assuming $1 billion 
of hard construction costs, we estimate total payroll for the project to be $300,000,000, or $100,000,000 per year for 
a 36-month construction period. Sabin estimates that a reasonable, blended, ―all-in‖ hourly rate for construction 
employees in Massachusetts is $65 per hour. This includes the average wage rates plus benefits, FICA tax, union 
fees, etc. Using these assumptions, the total number of employees per year is calculated by dividing $100,000,000 
by 52 weeks per year, by 40 hours per week, and by $65 per hour.  This results in 740 full-time-equivalent (FTE) 
positions per year. Sabin estimates average time on the job for construction workers is 9 months. Thus over 3 years, 
2,960 people would be employed, which virtually matches the 3,000 actual jobs created during constructing of 
Borgata Hotel, Casino & Spa in Atlantic City. For this study, we assume 3,000 direct construction jobs per casino.     
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(SOC 
code) 
Occupation Employment Hourly mean wage Annual mean wage Total Wages 
47-0000 Construction and Extraction 
Occupations 
84,630 $24.60  $51,160  $4,329,670,800  
47-1011 First-Line 
Supervisors/Managers of 
Construction Trades and 
Extraction Workers 
7,440 $33.04  $68,720  $511,276,800  
47-2022 Stonemasons 450 $24.70  $51,370  $23,116,500  
47-2031 Carpenters 14,690 $24.25  $50,440  $740,963,600  
47-2044 Tile and Marble Setters 410 $26.14  $54,370  $22,291,700  
47-2051 Cement Masons and Concrete 
Finishers 
1,240 $22.77  $47,370  $58,738,800  
47-2061 Construction Laborers 10,980 $20.72  $43,090  $473,128,200  
47-2071 Paving, Surfacing, and 
Tamping Equipment Operators 
750 $19.70  $40,980  $30,735,000  
47-2072 Pile-Driver Operators 230 $30.65  $63,760  $14,664,800  
47-2073 Operating Engineers and Other 
Construction Equipment 
Operators 
3,610 $26.66  $55,460  $200,210,600  
47-2081 Drywall and Ceiling Tile 
Installers 
660 $23.26  $48,380  $31,930,800  
47-2111 Electricians 10,370 $26.90  $55,950  $580,201,500  
47-2121 Glaziers 740 $19.69  $40,960  $30,310,400  
47-2131 Insulation Workers, Floor, 
Ceiling, and Wall 
900 $17.32  $36,020  $32,418,000  
47-2141 Painters, Construction and 
Maintenance 
3,360 $20.82  $43,300  $145,488,000  
47-2151 Pipelayers 330 $23.71  $49,310  $16,272,300  
47-2152 Plumbers, Pipefitters, and 
Steamfitters 
8,060 $27.53  $57,260  $461,515,600  
47-2211 Sheet Metal Workers 3,490 $23.32  $48,500  $169,265,000  
47-2221 Structural Iron and Steel 
Workers 
790 $28.84  $59,990  $47,392,100  
47-3011 Helpers--Brickmasons, 
Blockmasons, Stonemasons, 
and Tile and Marble Setters 
960 $20.90  $43,480  $41,740,800  
47-3012 Helpers--Carpenters 670 $15.88  $33,030  $22,130,100  
47-3013 Helpers--Electricians 1,580 $14.96  $31,120  $49,169,600  
47-3014 Helpers--Painters, 
Paperhangers, Plasterers, and 
Stucco Masons 
160 $10.77  $22,390  $3,582,400  
47-3015 Helpers--Pipelayers, Plumbers, 
Pipefitters, and Steamfitters 
580 $13.43  $27,940  $16,205,200  
47-3016 Helpers--Roofers 240 $15.88  $33,040  $7,929,600  
47-3019 Helpers, Construction Trades, 
All Other 
350 $12.89  $26,820  $9,387,000  
47-4011 Construction and Building 
Inspectors 
1,790 $22.98  $47,790  $85,544,100  
47-4021 Elevator Installers and 
Repairers 
600 $34.20  $71,130  $42,678,000  
47-4031 Fence Erectors 390 $15.93  $33,130  $12,920,700  
47-4041 Hazardous Materials Removal 
Workers 
930 $17.46  $36,310  $33,768,300  
47-4051 Highway Maintenance Workers 1,650 $18.70  $38,900  $64,185,000  
47-4071 Septic Tank Servicers and 
Sewer Pipe Cleaners 
440 $16.90  $35,150  $15,466,000  
47-5021 Earth Drillers, Except Oil and 
Gas 
260 $19.00  $39,520  $10,275,200  
47-5081 Helpers--Extraction Workers 90 $12.65  $26,310  $2,367,900  
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(SOC 
code) 
Occupation Employment Hourly mean wage Annual mean wage Total Wages 
  Total  79,190     $4,007,269,600  
  Average    $21.29  $44,282    
  Weighted Average    $24.33  $50,603    
 
If we assume average annual compensation of $50,603 for construction employment, and 
740 full-time equivalents (FTEs) per year, this will result in total annual construction payroll of 
$37,446,220 for each of the three casinos. With that in mind, and assuming a 36 month 
construction period, we estimate total direct construction wages for the state of Massachusetts to 
be more than $337 million. 
 
Casino wage analysis  
This section of the analysis details our estimates for the total compensation for the 
projected number of FTE positions that would be required to operate each of the three casinos in 
Massachusetts. It is expected that the casino located in the Boston area will have slightly higher 
salaries and wages than the casinos located in the southeastern and western sections of 
Massachusetts. The mean hourly rates were higher for the Boston MSA than for the state of 
Massachusetts for most positions listed on the Bureau of Labor Statistics website. See below for 
a detailed breakdown by position for each area. Salary and wage information for Casino 
positions was obtained from the National Section of the Bureau of Labor Statistics website.  
  
 Boston MSA State of Massachusetts 
 
Position SOC 
Code 
Est. 
FTEs 
Mean 
Hourly 
Rate 
Annual 
Rate 
Total 
Compensation 
Mean 
Hourly 
Rate 
Annual 
Rate 
Total 
Compensation 
Slot Service Attendants  39-
1012 
70 $12.16 $25,293  $1,770,510  $12.16 $25,293  $1,770,510 
  
Slot Technical  49-
2097 
24 $17.26 $35,901  $861,624  $17.26 $35,901  $861,624  
Slot Supervisory  39-
1021 
15 $17.35 $36,088  $541,320  $17.35 $36,088  $541,320  
Slot Shift Manager  11-
9071 
4 $32.28 $67,142  $268,570  $32.28 $67,142  $268,570  
Exec Director Slot 
Operations  
11-
1021 
1 $53.42 $111,114  $111,114  $53.42 $111,114  $111,114  
Dealers   39-
3011 
720 $8.18 $17,014  $12,250,368  $8.18 $17,014  $12,250,368  
Tables Supervisory  39-
1011 
180 $20.38 $42,390  $7,630,272  $20.38 $42,390  $7,630,272  
Table Games Shift Manager  11-
9071 
4 $32.28 $67,142  $268,570  $32.28 $67,142  $268,570  
Executive Director Table 
Games  
11-
1021 
1 $53.42 $111,114  $111,114  $53.42 $111,114  $111,114  
Poker Dealers  39-
3011 
240 $8.18 $17,014  $4,083,456  $8.18 $17,014  $4,083,456  
Poker Supervisory 39-
1011 
60 $20.38 $42,390  $2,543,424  $20.38 $42,390  $2,543,424  
Poker Shift Manager  11- 3 $32.28 $67,142  $201,427  $32.28 $67,142  $201,427  
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 Boston MSA State of Massachusetts 
 
Position SOC 
Code 
Est. 
FTEs 
Mean 
Hourly 
Rate 
Annual 
Rate 
Total 
Compensation 
Mean 
Hourly 
Rate 
Annual 
Rate 
Total 
Compensation 
9071 
Poker Director  11-
1021 
1 $53.42 $111,114  $111,114  $53.42 $111,114  $111,114  
Casino Cashiering  39-
3019 
75 $11.59 $24,107  $1,808,040  $11.59 $24,107  $1,808,040  
Casino Credit Clerks  39-
3019 
15 $11.59 $24,107  $361,608  $11.59 $24,107  $361,608  
Pit Clerks  39-
3019 
21 $11.59 $24,107  $506,247  $11.59 $24,107  $506,247  
Cashiering Supervisors  39-
1011 
5 $20.38 $42,390  $211,952  $20.38 $42,390  $211,952  
Casino Cashiering Shift 
Manager  
11-
9071 
3 $32.28 $67,142  $201,427  $32.28 $67,142  $201,427  
Count Room  39-
3019 
16 $11.59 $24,107  $390,084  $11.59 $24,107  $390,084  
Count Room Supervisory  39-
1011 
3 $20.38 $42,390  $127,171  $20.38 $42,390  $127,171  
Director Casino Accounting  11-
1021 
1 $53.42 $111,114  $111,114  $53.42 $111,114  $111,114  
Surveillance  33-
9031 
20 $14.65 $30,472  $609,440  $14.65 $30,472  $609,440  
Surveillance Supv  39-
1011 
4 $20.38 $42,390  $169,562  $20.38 $42,390  $169,562  
Surveillance Shift Manager  11-
9071 
3 $32.28 $67,142  $201,427  $32.28 $67,142  $201,427  
Surveillance Director  11-
1021 
1 $53.42 $111,114  $111,114  $53.42 $111,114  $111,114  
Housekeepers  37-
2012 
359 $10.82 $22,506  $8,081,005  $10.62 $22,090  $7,931,634  
Housekeeping Supervisory  37-
1011 
20 $19.09 $39,707  $794,144  $19.05 $39,624  $792,480  
Public Areas  37-
2011 
200 $12.57 $26,146  $5,229,120  $12.47 $25,938  $5,187,520  
Public Areas Supervisory 37-
1011 
20 $19.09 $39,707  $794,144  $19.05 $39,624  $792,480  
Housekeeping/Public Areas 
Shift Managers  
11-
9081 
4 $27.38 $56,950  $227,802  $24.97 $51,938  $207,750  
Director Housekeeping 
Public Areas  
11-
9081 
1 $27.38 $56,950  $56,950  $24.97 $51,938  $51,938  
Director Hotel Operations  11-
9081 
1 $27.38 $56,950  $56,950  $24.97 $51,938  $51,938  
Front Desk  43-
4081 
57 $11.60 $24,128  $1,378,743  $11.42 $23,754  $1,357,349  
Front Desk Supervisory  39-
1021 
6 $19.74 $41,059  $246,355  $18.96 $39,437  $236,621  
Bell Services  39-
6011 
30 $11.39 $23,691  $710,736  $11.78 $24,502  $735,072  
Valet Attendant  53-
6021 
140 $10.19 $21,195  $2,967,328  $10.33 $21,486  $3,008,096  
Valet Cashier  41-
2011 
10 $9.38 $19,510  $195,104  $9.39 $19,531  $195,312  
Valet Supervisor  39-
1021 
6 $19.74 $41,059  $246,355  $18.96 $39,437  $236,621  
PBX Operator  43-
2021 
40 $13.07 $27,186  $1,087,424  $12.38 $25,750  $1,030,016  
PBX Supervisor  39-
1021 
6 $19.74 $41,059  $246,355  $18.96 $39,437  $236,621  
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 Boston MSA State of Massachusetts 
 
Position SOC 
Code 
Est. 
FTEs 
Mean 
Hourly 
Rate 
Annual 
Rate 
Total 
Compensation 
Mean 
Hourly 
Rate 
Annual 
Rate 
Total 
Compensation 
Message Therapists  29-
1123 
30 $31.49 $65,499  $1,964,976  $31.26 $65,021  $1,950,624  
Spa Attendant  39-
9099 
12 $12.41 $25,813  $309,754  $12.43 $25,854  $310,253  
Spa Manager  11-
9111 
1 $46.52 $96,762  $96,762  $45.14 $93,891  $93,891  
Spa Supervisor  39-
1021 
3 $19.74 $41,059  $123,178  $18.96 $39,437  $118,310  
Health Club Attendant 39-
9032 
12 $12.46 $25,917  $311,002  $12.08 $25,126  $301,517  
Health Club Supervisor  39-
1021 
3 $19.74 $41,059  $123,178  $18.96 $39,437  $118,310  
Pool Supervisor  33-
1099 
3 $23.43 $48,734  $146,203  $22.70 $47,216  $141,648  
Life Guard  33-
9092 
12 $11.10 $23,088  $277,056  $10.85 $22,568  $270,816  
Grounds Keeper  37-
3011 
30 $14.19 $29,515  $885,456  $14.01 $29,141  $874,224  
General Maintenance 47-
2061 
30 $20.72 $43,098  $1,292,928  $20.00 $41,600  $1,248,000  
Painter  47-
2141 
20 $20.82 $43,306  $866,112  $20.05 $41,704  $834,080  
Electrician  47-
2111 
20 $26.90 $55,952  $1,119,040  $26.18 $54,454  $1,089,088  
Carpenter  47-
2031 
20 $24.25 $50,440  $1,008,800  $23.64 $49,171  $983,424  
Plumber  47-
2152 
15 $27.53 $57,262  $858,936  $26.50 $55,120  $826,800  
HVAC  49-
9021 
10 $23.48 $48,838  $488,384  $23.53 $48,942  $489,424  
Facilities Supervisory  11-
9021 
4 $48.26 $100,381  $401,523  $46.39 $96,491  $385,965  
Facilities Shift Manager  11-
9021 
3 $48.26 $100,381  $301,142  $46.39 $96,491  $289,474  
Executive Director Facilities  11-
9041 
1 $60.64 $126,131  $126,131  $58.56 $121,805  $121,805  
Security  33-
9032 
160 $12.24 $25,459  $4,073,472  $12.10 $25,168  $4,026,880  
Security Supervisor  33-
1099 
20 $23.43 $48,734  $974,688  $22.70 $47,216  $944,320  
Security Shift Manager  11-
9071 
3 $32.28 $67,142  $201,427  $32.28 $67,142  $201,427  
Executive Director Security 11-
1021 
1 $53.42 $111,114  $111,114  $51.36 $106,829  $106,829  
Convention Services  53-
7062 
25 $12.99 $27,019  $675,480  $12.61 $26,229  $655,720  
Retail Manager  11-
9081 
1 $27.38 $56,950  $56,950  $24.97 $51,938  $51,938  
Retail  41-
2031 
30 $12.14 $25,251  $757,536  $12.04 $25,043  $751,296  
Retail Supervisors  41-
1011 
6 $19.84 $41,267  $247,603  $19.79 $41,163  $246,979  
Bartender  35-
3011 
56 $11.32 $23,546  $1,318,554  $11.08 $23,046  $1,290,598  
Bar Porter  35-
9011 
19 $10.05 $20,904  $390,208  $9.96 $20,717  $386,714  
Beverage Server  35-
3041 
150 $10.72 $22,298  $3,344,640  $10.50 $21,840  $3,276,000  
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 Boston MSA State of Massachusetts 
 
Position SOC 
Code 
Est. 
FTEs 
Mean 
Hourly 
Rate 
Annual 
Rate 
Total 
Compensation 
Mean 
Hourly 
Rate 
Annual 
Rate 
Total 
Compensation 
Food Server  35-
3031 
140 $11.01 $22,901  $3,206,112  $11.04 $22,963  $3,214,848  
Bus Person  35-
9011 
70 $10.05 $20,904  $1,463,280  $9.96 $20,717  $1,450,176  
Greeter  35-
9031 
15 $9.77 $20,322  $304,824  $9.78 $20,342  $305,136  
Stocker  35-
0000 
42 $10.78 $22,422  $951,253  $10.75 $22,360  $948,606  
F&B Supervisor  35-
1012 
20 $15.98 $33,238  $664,768  $15.85 $32,968  $659,360  
F&B Shift Managers  11-
9051 
4 $24.67 $51,314  $205,254  $23.63 $49,150  $196,602  
Director Beverage  11-
9199 
1 $46.42 $96,554  $96,554  $44.12 $91,770  $91,770  
Exec Director Food and 
Beverage  
11-
9021 
1 $53.24 $110,739  $110,739  $46.39 $96,491  $96,491  
Banquet Beverage 35-
3011 
50 $11.32 $23,546  $1,177,280  $11.08 $23,046  $1,152,320  
Banquet Server  35-
3031 
61 $10.72 $22,298  $1,360,154  $11.04 $22,963  $1,400,755  
Banquet Manager  35-
1012 
9 $15.98 $33,238  $299,146  $15.85 $32,968  $296,712  
Director 
Catering/Convention 
Services  
11-
9199 
1 $46.42 $96,554  $96,554  $44.12 $91,770  $91,770  
Room Service Food Server  35-
3041 
40 $10.72 $22,298  $891,904  $10.50 $21,840  $873,600  
Room Service Attendant  35-
9011 
21 $10.05 $20,904  $440,084  $9.96 $20,717  $436,143  
Room Service Order Taker  41-
2011 
12 $9.38 $19,510  $234,125  $9.39 $19,531  $234,374  
Cafeteria  35-
9011 
20 $10.05 $20,904  $418,080  $9.96 $20,717  $414,336  
Uniforms Attendant 43-
5071 
12 $15.23 $31,678  $380,141  $14.81 $30,805  $369,658  
Room Service Supervisor  35-
1012 
6 $15.98 $33,238  $199,430  $15.85 $32,968  $197,808  
Butler  35-
3031 
5 $11.01 $22,901  $114,504  $11.04 $22,963  $114,816  
Director Room Service  11-
9199 
1 $46.42 $96,554  $96,554  $44.12 $91,770  $91,770  
Cooks  35-
2014 
82 $12.43 $25,854  $2,129,186  $12.39 $25,771  $2,122,334  
Sous Chef  35-
1011 
12 $20.71 $43,077  $516,922  $20.42 $42,474  $509,683  
Stewards 35-
9021 
140 $8.95 $18,616  $2,606,240  $8.95 $18,616  $2,606,240  
Steward Supervisor  35-
1012 
14 $15.98 $33,238  $465,338  $15.85 $32,968  $461,552  
Executive Chef  11-
9051 
2 $24.67 $51,314  $102,627  $23.63 $49,150  $98,301  
Box Office Supervisor  39-
1021 
3 $19.74 $41,059  $123,178  $18.96 $39,437  $118,310  
Box Office 41-
2031 
12 $12.04 $25,043  $300,518  $12.04 $25,043  $300,518  
Entertainment ** 27-
4011 
40 $20.79 $43,243  $1,729,728  $19.81 $41,205  $1,648,192  
Stage Managers  27- 3 $28.39 $59,051  $177,154  $27.32 $56,826  $170,477  
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 Boston MSA State of Massachusetts 
 
Position SOC 
Code 
Est. 
FTEs 
Mean 
Hourly 
Rate 
Annual 
Rate 
Total 
Compensation 
Mean 
Hourly 
Rate 
Annual 
Rate 
Total 
Compensation 
2012 
Promotions Booth 41-
9041 
35 $16.31 $33,925  $1,187,368  $16.12 $33,530  $1,173,536  
Promotions Supervisor  39-
1021 
8 $19.74 $41,059  $328,474  $18.96 $39,437  $315,494  
Telemarketing/Reservations  41-
9041 
95 $16.31 $33,925  $3,222,856  $16.12 $33,530  $3,185,312  
Bus Greeter  41-
9041 
12 $16.31 $33,925  $407,098  $16.12 $33,530  $402,355  
Hosts  41-
9099 
12 $20.78 $43,222  $518,669  $21.43 $44,574  $534,893  
Player Development Execs  11-
2022 
10 $56.01 $116,501  $1,165,008  $54.54 $113,443  $1,134,432  
Executive Director Player 
Development  
11-
2022 
1 $56.01 $116,501  $116,501  $54.54 $113,443  $113,443  
Director Advertising 11-
2021 
1 $56.01 $116,501  $116,501  $56.19 $116,875  $116,875  
Director Public Relations  11-
2031 
1 $53.02 $110,282  $110,282  $51.63 $107,390  $107,390  
Director Database Marketing  11-
2021 
1 $56.01 $116,501  $116,501  $56.19 $116,875  $116,875  
Director Marketing 
Operations  
11-
2021 
1 $56.01 $116,501  $116,501  $56.19 $116,875  $116,875  
Hotel/F&B Cashier  41-
2011 
34 $9.38 $19,510  $663,354  $9.39 $19,531  $664,061  
Accountants  13-
2011 
10 $30.29 $63,003  $630,032  $29.84 $62,067  $620,672  
Accounting Clerks  43-
3031 
30 $17.90 $37,232  $1,116,960  $17.52 $36,442  $1,093,248  
Casino Accounting  43-
3031 
20 $17.90 $37,232  $744,640  $17.52 $36,442  $728,832  
Casino Controller  11-
3031 
1 $53.49 $111,259  $111,259  $51.54 $107,203  $107,203  
Director Financial Analysis  11-
3031 
1 $53.49 $111,259  $111,259  $51.54 $107,203  $107,203  
Director Financial Reporting  11-
3031 
1 $53.49 $111,259  $111,259  $51.54 $107,203  $107,203  
Controller  11-
3031 
1 $53.49 $111,259  $111,259  $51.54 $107,203  $107,203  
Director Hotel Accounting 11-
3031 
1 $53.49 $111,259  $111,259  $51.54 $107,203  $107,203  
Purchasing Manager  11-
3061 
1 $44.66 $92,893  $92,893  $43.03 $89,502  $89,502  
Purchasing Agent  43-
3061 
10 $18.53 $38,542  $385,424  $17.45 $36,296  $362,960  
Warehouse Supervisor  43-
1011 
6 $25.74 $53,539  $321,235  $24.97 $51,938  $311,626  
Warehouse Attendant  43-
5071 
20 $15.23 $31,678  $633,568  $14.81 $30,805  $616,096  
Director IT  11-
3021 
1 $56.53 $117,582  $117,582  $55.95 $116,376  $116,376  
Information Technology 
Techs and Programmers  
15-
1041 
15 $27.22 $56,618  $849,264  $26.45 $55,016  $825,240  
Computer Operator 43-
9011 
12 $18.42 $38,314  $459,763  $18.25 $37,960  $455,520  
Internal Audit  13-
2011 
5 $30.29 $63,003  $315,016  $29.84 $62,067  $310,336  
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 Boston MSA State of Massachusetts 
 
Position SOC 
Code 
Est. 
FTEs 
Mean 
Hourly 
Rate 
Annual 
Rate 
Total 
Compensation 
Mean 
Hourly 
Rate 
Annual 
Rate 
Total 
Compensation 
Executive Director Internal 
Audit  
11-
3031 
1 $53.49 $111,259  $111,259  $51.54 $107,203  $107,203  
Human Resources 
Supervisors/Professionals  
13-
1071 
10 $30.44 $63,315  $633,152  $29.99 $62,379  $623,792  
Executive Director Human 
Resources  
11-
3049 
1 $53.12 $110,490  $110,490  $51.64 $107,411  $107,411  
Director Employee 
Relations  
11-
3041 
1 $50.64 $105,331  $105,331  $49.72 $103,418  $103,418  
Director Personnel  11-
3042 
1 $52.90 $110,032  $110,032  $52.12 $108,410  $108,410  
Human Resources 
Administrative  
43-
4161 
20 $18.66 $38,813  $776,256  $18.30 $38,064  $761,280  
Executive Directors  11-
3011 
0 $39.98 $83,158  $0  $37.88 $78,790  $0  
Administrative 
Professionals  
43-
6014 
60 $17.16 $35,693  $2,141,568  $16.70 $34,736  $2,084,160  
Vice Presidents  11-
1011 
7 $73.12 $152,090  $1,064,627  $70.43 $146,494  $1,025,461  
Total Casino Jobs   4,377   $120,938,929    $119,641,611 
Average     $26.43 $54,970    $25.82 $53,702   
Weighted Average    $13.28 $27,631   $13.14 $27,335  
Source:  Bureau of Labor Statistics, Area: Boston MSA, Massachusetts State,  National     
We estimate that total annual salaries and wages would be $121 million for a Boston 
casino and $119.6 million for each of the two casinos in the eastern and western regions of 
Massachusetts. With benefits, total compensation would be $157.3 million for Boston and 
$155.5 million for each of the other two properties. This represents more than $468 million in 
annual direct compensation in Massachusetts with three casino properties. With benefits, the 
average compensation level for casino workers in Massachusetts would be $35,641. 
 
Employee turnover  
Two aspects of turnover must be considered in assessing the impact to the community 
from three new casinos in Massachusetts. Short-term turnover that will occur for existing hotels 
and restaurants in the areas of the casinos and ongoing turnover that will continue in the casinos 
as the new market matures.  
Short-term turnover  
The opening of a new casino in an area generates excitement and opportunity for 
advancement for other service workers and professionals in the area. Some workers from other 
industries will be motivated to seek employment at the new casino while others will remain with 
their existing employer for various reasons including comfort level, preferred days off, preferred 
shift schedule and length of service accruals such as number of vacation days.  
If employees are hired from existing hotels and restaurants, a chain reaction of 
promotions occurs at the businesses from which employees are leaving. This can lead to 
improved opportunities for advancement for lower-level employees, resulting in increased 
earnings and morale. 
 The Impacts of Expanded Gaming on the Commonwealth of Massachusetts                    182 
Long-term turnover  
Turnover in a typical casino ranges between 25 percent and 30 percent annually. This rate 
can vary significantly by department, by casino, by market and by operator. One factor that can 
impact the potential for turnover is the opportunity for workers to move to another property in 
the general vicinity without having to relocate. Effectively, this means that the more gaming 
properties in a market, the more opportunities arise to change jobs for either better career 
opportunities, greater benefits (including preferred days or hours) or, in some cases, for higher 
compensation. We note, however, that compensation for the same job position will likely level 
off quickly among operators, who are keenly aware of wages and salaries at competitive 
properties. 
Depending on the location of the casinos in Massachusetts, it may or may not be 
convenient for workers to move to other casinos. In Atlantic City, where the 11 casinos are in 
close proximity to each other, turnover averages closer 30 percent and sometimes even higher. 
At Philadelphia Park casino in Pennsylvania, however, where casinos are, by legislation, spread 
out, turnover is averaging closer to 25 percent. 
Based on those factors, we can reasonably project annual turnover at the Massachusetts 
casinos at about 25 percent, which translates into approximately 1,100 job openings annually at 
each casino. These will be disproportionately greater in certain job categories, such as unskilled, 
entry-level positions, where the turnover rate can reach as high as 40 percent. 
 
Labor pool analysis 
 The following section details unemployment rates in Massachusetts by 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) and by county. It discusses areas of greatest opportunity, 
the impact of the proposed casino projects on employment in Massachusetts, and training 
requirements and strategies to maximize the employment benefit to state residents.  
 
Area unemployment analysis  
Unemployment in Massachusetts is slightly lower than the national average and it has 
been trending downward from a peak of 5.9 percent in 2003.132 In April 2008, the unemployment 
rate was 5 percent for the nation and 4.1 percent for Massachusetts. Several areas in the state, 
however, have unemployment rates that are significantly higher than the national average.  
Area unemployment by MSA  
By Metropolitan Statistical area, New Bedford MSA has the highest unemployment rate 
in Massachusetts at 8.2 percent. The following table provides unemployment rates by MSA, as 
well as in all of Massachusetts and the nation. 
 
                                                 
132 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Massachusetts Economy at a Glance, Back Data, http://www.bls.gov/eag/eag.ma.htm 
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Metropolitan Statistical Area  Employed  Unemployed  Unemployment Rate  
Massachusetts      
Barnstable  114,900 8,200 6.7% 
Boston, Cambridge, Quincy 2,368,200 109,200 4.4% 
Leominster, Fitchburg, Gardner 67,500 4,600 6.3% 
New Bedford 77,500 6,900 8.2% 
Pittsfield 36,800 1,900 5.0% 
Providence, Fall River, Warwick 654,200 47,500 6.8% 
Springfield 332,900 19,400 5.7% 
Worcester  276,400 15,400 5.3% 
    
State totals 3,257,100 151,700 4.5% 
USA    4.8% 
Source:  Bureau of Labor Statistics, Economy at a Glance, Metropolitan Statistical Areas Massachusetts, February 
08, seasonally adjusted,   http://www.bls.gov/eag/eag.ma.htm 
 
Area unemployment by county  
 Only five of the 14 counties in Massachusetts had unemployment rates below the 
national average. The following table provides the unemployment rates by county, as well as the 
state and national rates. 
Counties  Employed   Unemployed  Unemployment  Rate 
Massachusetts     
Barnstable  103,565 7,904 7.1% 
Berkshire 68,043 3,729 5.2% 
Bristol  266,868 20,230 7.0% 
Dukes  8,440 559 6.2% 
Essex 354,274 19,103 5.1% 
Franklin 37,196 1,819 4.7% 
Hampden 208,377 13,510 6.1% 
Hampshire 84,920 3,516 4.0% 
Middlesex 782,588 31,062 3.8% 
Norfolk 342,555 14,596 4.1% 
Plymouth 245,869 13,923 5.4% 
Suffolk 331,651 15,953 4.6% 
Worcester 376,702 21,506 5.4% 
State totals  3,257,100  4.5% 
USA  299,398,484 151,700 4.8% 
Source: Census2000, Quick Facts by county, Population 2006 estimated, Below Poverty Level 2004, Degrees 2000 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/25000.htm 
 
Employment impact of the proposed casino projects 
The jobs provided by three large casino projects will have a notable impact on 
employment in Massachusetts. We project the number of jobs for the three casinos at opening to 
be more than 13,000, about 9 percent of the total unemployed population of Massachusetts as of 
this writing.  
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Although the number of total jobs created by the casinos represents a large percentage of 
the unemployed population on a statewide basis, the impact on the unemployment rate for the 
state is not significant. If all casino jobs were filled by unemployed Massachusetts residents, 
which of course will not happen, it would reduce the unemployment rate by less than one-half 
percentage point, to 4.1 percent. If half of the jobs were filled by unemployed residents, the 
impact on the unemployment rate would be only 0.2 percent, to 4.3 percent  
Depending on the location of the proposed casinos, the additional jobs can have a much 
more significant impact on local employment. The following table shows the percentage of 
unemployed residents that 4,377 jobs represents to each of the Metropolitan Statistical Areas in 
the state. It also shows the corresponding unemployment rate impact if 50 percent of the jobs 
were filled by unemployed residents.  
The reduction in the unemployment rate if the casino was located in each of the MSAs 
listed below would be significant. In all but Boston and Providence MSAs the reduction would 
be more than a full percentage point. 
 
MSA   Employed  Unemployed  Casino Jobs as 
% of 
unemployed 
Current 
Unemployment 
Rate  
Unemployment 
rate if 50% of 
jobs are filled by 
unemployed 
        
Barnstable  114,900 8,200 53% 6.7% 3.1% 
Boston, 
Cambridge, 
Quincy 
2,368,000 109,200 4% 4.4% 4.2% 
Leominster, 
Fitchburg, 
Gardner 
67,500 4,600 95% 6.3% .3% 
New Bedford 77,500 6,900 63% 8.2% 3.0% 
Pittsfield 36,800 1,900 230% 5.0% NA 
Providence, 
Fall River, 
Warwick 
654,200 47,500 9.2% 6.8% 6.2% 
Springfield 332,900 19,400 22.6% 5.7% 4.3% 
Worcester  276,400 15,400 28.4% 5.3% 3.8% 
 
Socio-economic factors  
Overall, Massachusetts residents are better educated than the overall national population 
and fewer of them live below the poverty level. In the United States, 80.4 percent of the 
population 25 years and older has a high school diploma and 24.4 percent has a bachelor‘s 
degree. The percentage of Massachusetts residents over age 25 with a high school diploma is 
84.8 percent and 33.2 percent have bachelor‘s degrees – almost 9 percentage points higher than 
the national average. In the United States, 12.7 percent live below the poverty level while in 
Massachusetts it is only 9.9 percent. Additionally, the Median Household income for 
Massachusetts is $53,657 which is almost $10,000 above the national average. 
The following table provides the vital education and income statistics by county, as well 
as for Massachusetts and the nation. Casino development can have the most significant impact in 
– or adjacent to – those counties where below-poverty and unemployment rates are the highest. 
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Casinos have a large percentage of jobs that do not require high levels of education. Casinos 
often have a history of benefits such as tuition reimbursement, upward mobility, and on-the-job 
training that can help employees who start in entry level positions to grow and advance within 
the company.  
 
Counties  Population  Median 
House-hold 
Income  
% 25 and 
older with HS 
Diploma   
% 25 and 
older with 
Bachelors   
% Below 
Poverty 
Level  
Unemployment 
Rate   
Massachusetts        
Barnstable  224,816 $50,334 91.8% 33.6% 7.3% 7.1% 
Berkshire 131,177 $41,589 85.1% 26.0% 10.5% 5.2% 
Bristol  545,379 $46,986 73.2% 19.9% 10.6% 7.0% 
Dukes  15,515 $51,490 90.4% 38.4% 6.2% 6.2% 
Essex 735,958 $52,050 84.6% 31.3% 10.3% 5.1% 
Franklin 72,183 $44,393 88.0% 29.1% 9.2% 4.7% 
Hampden 460,520 $40,595 79.2% 20.5% 15.1% 6.1% 
Hampshire 153,471 $48,359 89.4% 37.9% 9.7% 4.0% 
Middlesex 1,497,016 $62,854 88.5% 43.6% 8.1% 3.8% 
Nantucket 10,240 $58,525 91.6% 38.4% 4.5% 5.6% 
Norfolk 654,753 $67,066 91.3% 42.9% 5.4% 4.1% 
Plymouth 493,623 $60,359 87.6% 27.8% 7.8% 5.4% 
Suffolk 687,610 $41,587 78.1% 32.5% 16.7% 4.6% 
Worcester 784,992 $51,354 83.5% 26.9% 9.8% 5.4% 
Massachusetts   6,437,193 $53,657 84.8% 33.2% 9.9% 4.5% 
       
USA  299,398,484 $44,334 80.4% 24.4% 12.7% 4.8% 
Source:Census2000, QuickFacts by county, Population 2006 estimated, Below Poverty Level 2004, Degrees 2000 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/25000.htm 
 
Labor pool skills assessment  
An adequate labor pool exists in Massachusetts to staff three casinos with 4,377 jobs 
each. The high percentage of high school and college graduates that exists in the state provides a 
skilled base of employees from which to draw for mid- and upper-level positions. Entry-level 
positions can be filled with unskilled workers who are trained on the job. A detailed training and 
recruiting plan follows this section.  
Depending on where the casinos are located, there may be varying degrees of skilled 
employees already available in the workforce. In the Boston MSA, for example, the dense 
population and the plentiful supply of existing hotels and restaurants creates a skilled labor pool 
from which to draw for 65 percent of the positions in the casino properties as proposed. For 
example, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics Occupational Employment Statistics, in the 
Boston MSA there are 186,410 food prep and server employees, 2,280 front desk clerks and 
42,830 customer service reps.133 Conversely, in the New Bedford MSA, no match could be found 
                                                 
133 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Boston MSA, Occupational Employment Statistics, May 2006 
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for several hotel operations positions including security, housekeeping, PBX operator and others. 
This suggests employees in this area may need more on-the-job training than in the Boston MSA.  
A strategy for hiring casino workers is outlined in the next section of this report.  
 
 
Career paths 
Casino employment typically provides an excellent career ladder for entry-level 
employees. People can begin to work in a casino with only one week of on-the-job training and, 
as experience is gained, they may be promoted into higher-paying positions. The following are 
some examples of career progression, showing the different compensation levels. 
  
Department   
Entry Level, 
Mean Annual 
Compensation   
Supervisor, 
Mean Annual  
Compensation   
Manager/S
hift Manager 
Slots  $25,293 $36,088 $67,142 
Tables  $17,014 $42,390 $67,142 
Hotel  Front Desk  $23,754 $39,437 $51,938 
Housekeeping $22,090 $39,624 $51,938 
Food and Beverage  $21,840 $32,968 $49,150 
Security  $25,168 $47,216 $67,142 
Casino Cashiering  $24,107 $42,390 $67,142 
Source: Mean Hourly Rate information, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Labor Statistics 
 
Employee skill requirements  
The following section details our analysis of the skills requirements of employees needed 
to staff each casino/hotel in the study. We classified the positions into the following categories: 
 Entry level 
 Semi-skilled, non-gaming 
 Semi-skilled, gaming  
 Highly-skilled, non-gaming  
 Highly-skilled, gaming  
 
Entry level 
Employees with no experience can be prepared for entry-level positions with a small 
amount of on-the-job training so the qualified applicant pool is greatest in this classification. Job 
specific training for this group typically can be completed in one week or less. Examples of jobs 
that fall into this category are clerical staff, food servers, housekeeping, porters, liquor 
attendants, food and beverage cashiers, and cocktail servers.  
Semi-skilled, non-gaming 
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These positions require either general experience in a service-related business or on-the-
job training completed by an experienced supervisor or manager. Unskilled workers for this 
group can typically be trained in one to two weeks. Examples of jobs that fall into this category 
are hotel and food and beverage supervisors, cooks, parking attendants, and lower level 
accounting, IT, and human resources employees.  
Semi-skilled, gaming 
These positions require a slightly higher level of training than the non-gaming positions. 
These positions may be filled with inexperienced employees; however an experienced gaming 
professional must complete specific on-the-job-training for them. Examples of jobs that fall into 
this category are cage cashiers, count room employees, security officers, surveillance, pit clerks, 
and slot service attendants. Basic math skills are needed for many of these positions.  
 Highly-skilled, non-gaming 
These positions require advanced training, education, and/or experience and typically 
three to five years of experience in the area of expertise, or a formal degree. Examples of jobs 
that fall into this category are management positions in hotel, or food and beverage, and 
professionals in such areas as accounting, information technology, finance human resources, and 
the trades.  
Highly-skilled, gaming  
These positions require specialized training and material experience at high levels within 
highly specialized areas of the gaming industry. Examples of jobs that fall into this category are 
casino dealers, slot technicians, table games floor persons, pit bosses, and department directors. 
The following table provides a summary of training requirements for employee skill sets, 
as well as the number of positions in typical Massachusetts casino resort used throughout this 
report: 
Category Jobs Training required No. of positions 
Entry Level  F&B, Convention Services, Retail, 
Marketing, Hotel  
1 week on-the-job-training  2,008 
Semi-skilled 
Non-Gaming  
Operations Supervisors, Entertainment, 
Accounting,  Human Resources, 
Executive Administrative Staff 
1 to 2 weeks on-the-job-training  382 
Semi-skilled 
Gaming 
Slots, Security, Surveillance, Cashiering, 
Internal Audit  
2 weeks on-the-job-training 
Basic Math Skills  
466 
Highly-skilled 
Non-Gaming  
Department Heads, Facilities, 
Entertainment, Information Technology 
Professionals 
3 – 5 years experience and/or 
College Degree  
254 
Highly-skilled 
Gaming  
Department Heads, Slot Technical, 
Tables, Executive  
Dealer school 
Slot Technical Training  
5 – 10 years experience and/or 
College Degree  
1,267 
 
 
  Total  4,377 
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The following chart shows the percentage of jobs that fall into each category.  
 
Recommendations:  recruiting and training strategies  
The following section outlines some potential strategies to maximize the positive impact 
of each of the proposed Massachusetts casinos. To maximize the positive benefit to the state as 
noted above, public/private partnerships have proven to be successful in other jurisdictions and 
should be used as a model in Massachusetts. By focusing hiring efforts on pockets of the local 
communities that need it the most, casino projects can have a significant impact in improving the 
quality of life for many Massachusetts residents. 
 
Entry level: 2,008 positions, 1 week on-the-job-training  
Entry-level positions have the lowest level of job skills requirements, so they have the 
highest potential to create opportunity for residents who may be unemployed or underemployed 
because of lack of skills or experience. The location of the proposed casinos will determine the 
areas that should be targeted to maximize community impact while hiring employees into this 
classification. A Casino Workforce Development Partnership (CWDP) will be the most effective 
way to achieve this goal.  
If the casinos are located in Boston, New Bedford, and Springfield, the impact to the 
community can be significant. Many of the 2,008 entry-level positions can be successfully 
performed by workers who have not obtained a high school diploma. Kitchen utility, 
housekeeping and public areas are examples of jobs that are appropriate for employees with this 
skill level. Approximately 700 jobs in each casino fall into this category. Suffolk, Bristol, and 
Hampden counties each has more than 20 percent of residents age 25 and older without a high 
school diploma. With only one week of on-the-job-training required, these jobs represent an 
excellent opportunity for employees to get a start in the industry and begin a career path to jobs 
of increasing skill levels. This can be accomplished through the CWDP by providing the 
necessary training to ensure employees are work -ready.  
45%
9%
11%
6%
29%
Entry level
Semi-skilled, non-gaming
Semi-skilled, gaming
Highly-skilled, non-gaming
Highly-skilled, gaming
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The remaining 1,300 jobs in the entry-level classification require a slightly higher skill 
level than those discussed above but still only require one week of on-the-job training. Examples 
of jobs in this category are clerical staff, food servers, liquor attendants, food and beverage 
cashiers, and cocktail servers. These positions will command a higher wage rate and some of 
them have the opportunity for gratuities, which can significantly add to the earning potential. 
These positions are also an excellent way to begin a career path for workers with a minimal level 
of basic skills.  
  
Semi-skilled, non-gaming: 382 positions, 1 to 2 weeks on-the-job training 
Semi-skilled, non-gaming positions are an excellent opportunity to recruit graduating 
high school seniors who do have college plans or those who must work to help pay for college 
expenses. The semi-skilled job classification provides a way to introduce those high school 
graduates to a worthwhile career path that can lead to higher paying positions as experience is 
acquired.  
This is also a category where newly graduated college students may be recruited for their 
first job with the goal of moving into highly skilled positions as experience is obtained.  
 Massachusetts has an extensive system of higher education, with five campuses of the 
University of Massachusetts, nine state colleges, 15 community colleges, and 69 private colleges 
and universities. Virtually all of the colleges and universities offer degrees in business and 
information technology, among other majors. The University of Massachusetts-Boston also 
offers a degree in hospitality. Many of the community colleges offer certificates or degrees in 
hospitality, including Berkshire, Bristol, Bunker Hill, Holyoke, Massachusetts Bay, Middlesex, 
Northern Essex, Quinsigamond, and Roxbury. Students earning a certificate or graduating with a 
degree in hospitality management are exceptionally qualified for the semi-skilled jobs in this 
classification. The following lists the local state colleges and universities and community 
colleges with relevant fields of study: 
 
Colleges/Universities Enrollment
134
 
University of Massachusetts Amherst  25,593 
University of Massachusetts Boston  13,300 
University of Massachusetts Dartmouth 8,700 
University of Massachusetts Lowell  12,000 
Bridgewater State  9,800 
Framingham State  5,903 
Westfield State 5,531 
Fitchburg State 5,201 
Salem State  8,790 
Worcester State  3,342 
Massachusetts College of Liberal Arts  1,850 
                                                 
134 Obtained from each individual website of the college or university or from other public sources.  
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Colleges/Universities Enrollment
134
 
Berkshire Community College 2,400 
Bristol Community College  6,900 
Bunker Hill Community College  8,500 
Cape Cod Community College  4,000 
Greenfield Community College  3,000 
Holyoke Community College  9,000 
Massachusetts Bay Community College  5,040 
Massasoit Community College  6,795 
Middlesex Community College  11,000 
Mount Wachusett Community College  4,170 
North Shore Community College  6,604 
Northern Essex Community College  6,000 
Quinsigamond Community College  13,000 
Roxbury Community College 2,382 
Springfield Tech  3,285 
 
Semi-skilled, gaming: 466 positions, 2 weeks on-the-job-training, basic math skills  
This classification is an opportunity for residents who are unemployed or underemployed 
to advance into a gaming position and receive on-the-job training. In most jurisdictions 
employees in this classification must be 21 years old to obtain a gaming license. It may prove to 
be in the licensee‘s best interest to hire some experienced employees from casinos in other states, 
but for the most part, local employees with basic math skills can be trained in a relatively short 
period.  
The higher mean wage of these positions enables employees to either commute from 
farther away or relocate to the area. The mean annual income of the Semi-Skilled Gaming 
classification is $38,820. These jobs provide an excellent opportunity to recruit employees from 
those areas that need employment the most, even if they are not in the immediate vicinity of the 
new casinos.  
 
Highly-skilled, non-gaming: 254 positions, 3 to 5 years experience and/or college degree  
It is essential that any new entry into a market hire experienced individuals in this 
classification to ensure successful operation of the property. In the Highly-Skilled, Non-Gaming 
classification this may be accomplished by hiring experienced workers from the local community 
from existing hotel and restaurant facilities. This will be more feasible in certain areas of the 
state depending on where the casinos are located. If a casino is located in the Boston or 
Springfield areas, for example, there is a strong existing base of experienced workers from which 
to draw. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics there are about 205,100 jobs in the 
Hospitality and Leisure segment for the Boston MSA135 and there were 24,600 in the Springfield 
                                                 
135  Bureau of Labor Statistics, Economy at a Glance, Metropolitan Statistical Area http://www.bls.gov/eag/eag.ma.htm 
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MSA. In other areas, however, the base of experienced workers is not as strong. In New Bedford 
MSA, there are only about 6,200 jobs is this segment. It may be more difficult to find 
experienced workers in the New Bedford area so it may be necessary to import workers from 
other parts of the state or from out of state.  
It is anticipated that the number of experienced workers brought in from other 
jurisdictions will be a relatively small percentage of the total number of employees hired. At 
Philadelphia Park Casino in Pennsylvania, for example, only about 20 percent136 of all workers 
hired at opening were experienced workers from other casino jurisdictions. The remainder was 
hired from the local community. This casino is located only one hour from Atlantic City.  
Spectrum analyzed an Internal Revenue Service migration database. It tracks income tax 
returns of taxpayers who move from one county into another. Our analysis of the database shows 
that most of the movement into New London County – home to Foxwoods and Mohegan Sun – 
was from within the state of Connecticut itself. The average yearly migration of households into 
New London County during the past 12 years has been roughly 6,500, or 13,000 people. The top 
three counties where people came from were Hartford, Windham and Middlesex, all in 
Connecticut. Another high exporter of residents was Washington County in Rhode Island. 
But the data also shows an Atlantic County, N.J., link as well. From 1995 to 2007, 256 
households, or 490 people, moved from Atlantic County (home of Atlantic City) into New 
London County. It is likely that many of those people worked in the casino industry in Atlantic 
City. The IRS database shows that there was little, if any movement, from Atlantic County to 
southeastern Connecticut prior to the opening of Foxwoods and Mohegan Sun. The number of 
Atlantic County residents moving into New London County represents a small percentage of the 
overall casino workforce at Foxwoods and Mohegan Sun. But executives at both casinos 
acknowledged that many of the top managers have been hired from Atlantic City casinos. 
Indeed, both CEOs of the Connecticut casinos worked at one time in Atlantic City. So, 
too, did many other past and present executives at both tribal properties. It is likely that at least 
some of the high-skilled management positions may be filled by executives from outside 
Massachusetts. 
 
Highly-skilled, gaming: 1,267 positions, 5 to 10 years experience and/or college degree 
About 960 of the 1,276 jobs in this classification are casino/poker dealers, and 33 of them 
are slot technicians. These jobs require specialized training, yet the training can be accomplished 
in a relatively short period, providing opportunity to a large section of the labor pool. The high 
pay of the slot technician position and the dealer wages, including gratuities, makes these jobs 
very desirable. People will be willing to commute and possibly relocate to fill these positions.  
Rapidly changing slot technology is forcing a change in the type of knowledge and skills 
required in this area. Indeed, the traditional ―slot technician‖ job will soon require computer 
networking skills and much higher educational levels.  
The dealer and slot technician positions are an excellent opportunity to train local 
residents with an aptitude for technical work. Massachusetts‘ strong network of community 
                                                 
136 Interview with Human Resources employee, Philadelphia Park Casino 
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colleges is a natural mechanism for providing this training especially with a public/private 
partnership like the CWDP described above. Several of the community colleges in 
Massachusetts already list Workforce Development Partnerships on their websites.  
 The time frame for a typical dealer training class is as follows: 
 Craps: 160 hours  
 Blackjack: 80 hours  
 Roulette: 80 hours  
 Baccarat: 80 hours  
 Poker: 80 hours  
The timeframe for a slot technician training class for a person without any prior 
knowledge or experience is 375 classroom hours. For a person who is already skilled in 
electronics, the training period is about 200 hours of on-the-job-training.  
 
Employment and workforce development 
 
Public policy considerations 
The establishment and regulation of casino gaming in Massachusetts would give the 
Commonwealth a unique opportunity to expand its workforce development efforts to address the 
vital needs of the unemployed and underemployed as well as people on welfare. The public 
interest would be best served through private/public partnerships designed to provide basic skills 
and workplace training to those who need it the most. Additionally, the gaming industry‘s efforts 
to help lower-skilled, entry-level workers become part of the Massachusetts labor force will help 
instill public confidence in casino gaming. 
Through the legalization of gaming, Massachusetts can leverage casino licensees to 
realize many of its workforce development public policy goals. Through a statutory framework 
and incentives, Massachusetts can lead casino licensees to develop innovative workforce 
development programs. These programs would meet the new labor demand by providing suitable 
job opportunities for thousands of workers. Workforce development partnerships between casino 
licensees and the other major stakeholders will enable the Commonwealth to maximize the 
economic benefits of gaming. 
In Connecticut, the introduction of casino gaming at Foxwoods Resort Casino by the 
Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation is a good example of how a private gaming employer 
assumed a leadership role in creating job opportunities for those who need it the most. The 
Tribe‘s Work ETC (Work, Education, Transportation and Childcare) program achieved 
significant welfare reform by lifting families out of poverty through training and employment.  
The Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation, working in a partnership with the public sector, 
developed a unique program to address the vital needs of people on welfare who were seeking a 
new job or a return to the workforce. Since its inception in 1997, the Work ETC program trained 
and employed more than 150 people in just its first three years. The Tribe was the first private 
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employer in Connecticut to play such an integral part in the support of a complete welfare-to-
work program by offering financial support, administrative and government support and, most 
importantly, entry-level positions that were suitable to the participants. This program has resulted 
in reduced state transfer payments, generated tax revenue and induced new spending on 
consumer goods137. 
 
Case study: Atlantic City Jobs & Opportunities Program138  
Borgata, a 2,000-room luxury casino hotel in Atlantic City, is a joint venture between 
Boyd Gaming and MGM Mirage. When it opened in July 2003, Borgata was the first new casino 
hotel property in Atlantic City in 13 years. Since its debut, Borgata has consistently been 
Atlantic City‘s top grossing casino. 
The Atlantic City Jobs & Opportunities Program is a commitment made by Borgata and 
MGM Mirage in August 2000 to the City of Atlantic City to provide training and employment 
opportunities to unemployed and underemployed Atlantic City residents. While not designed 
solely for the benefit of Borgata, the program‘s goal is to improve the quality of Atlantic City‘s 
workforce overall and thereby improving Borgata‘s pool of job candidates.  
The program was initially funded by approximately $1 million from Boyd Gaming and 
MGM Mirage. The program has leveraged this initial funding by securing over $1.5 million in 
grants through the federal Workforce Investment Act and Perkins Vocational and Technical 
Education program, the New Jersey Department of Education, and the New Jersey Department 
of Labor and Workforce Development‘s Customized Training Program. To date, the Atlantic 
City Jobs and Opportunities Program has spent more than $3 million to train and secure jobs for 
more than 2,200 Atlantic City residents. This number exceeds the original goal of 2,000 job 
placements.  
The program is a collaborative effort that utilizes broad community outreach to further its 
objectives. The program‘s participants include: 
 Atlantic City casino industry 
 City of Atlantic City  
 Atlantic City School District 
 Atlantic Cape Community College  
 Rutgers University  
 Atlantic County Institute of Technology  
 New Jersey Department of Education  
 New Jersey Department of Labor and Workforce Development  
                                                 
137 ―The Economic Impact of the Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation Operations on Connecticut,‖ November 28, 2000, 
Connecticut Center for Economic Analysis, p. 3 
138 This section of the analysis was based, in large measure, on an interview with Eric Reynolds, vice president of Atlantic City 
Jobs & Opportunities for Borgata. 
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 Atlantic City Housing Authority  
 Atlantic City Rescue Mission  
 Atlantic Cape May Workforce Investment Board  
 Atlantic Cape May Careers Centers, Inc. 
 Atlantic City Employment Service  
 Atlantic County Department of Family and Community Development  
 Atlantic City Family Centers  
 Covenant House New Jersey 
 South Jersey Legal Services 
 Atlantic County Social Service and Healthcare Network  
 Faith and Civic Communities  
 Local businesses  
The program‘s main components include: 
 Life and employability skills training 
 Occupational skills training 
 Professional development 
 The Academy of Hospitality and Marketing Careers 
 The Building and Construction Trades Apprentice Program 
 Adult basic education/GED classes  
 Job placement activity 
The Life and Employability Skills Training component offers a flexible, individualized 
approach to workforce development through a series of multiple assessments, career exploration 
exercises and developmental activities. Instructors from Atlantic Cape Community College 
facilitate this component of the program. The goal of this training component is to improve an 
individual‘s success in identifying, finding and keeping employment by:  
 Improving an individual‘s understanding of their aptitudes, attitudes, skills, behavior 
and life coping skills. 
 Improving an individual‘s understanding of employer expectations and requirements 
of today‘s work environment. 
 Developing an individual‘s job search and job retention skills. 
This component of the program includes the following services: 
 Adult basic education 
 Literacy (math and reading) 
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 GED prep 
 English as a Second Language 
 Expungement assistance 
 Citizenship, driver‘s and casino licensing assistance 
 Social services referrals 
 
The Occupational Skills Training component offers training for participants in the 
following gaming and hospitality positions, among others: 
 Casino dealer 
 Security 
 Slot attendant 
 Slot technician 
 Coin and cage cashiers 
 Front desk clerk 
 Pit clerk 
 Culinary occupations 
 Food service 
 Slot marketing 
 Office administration 
 Computer competencies 
 Retail sales 
 General maintenance 
The Professional Development component provides the necessary knowledge, skills and 
abilities that an underemployed individual needs for career enhancement or, in some cases, 
simply a full-time job. This component assesses participants‘ knowledge, skills and abilities as 
well as their aptitudes, interests and preferences and develops individual career plans. The plan 
identifies the competencies needed for a specific job or career as well as the experience, 
education, certification or license required for full-time employment or upward mobility. 
The Academy of Hospitality and Marketing Careers is the youth-oriented component of 
the Atlantic City Jobs and Opportunities Program. The Academy is a partnership between the 
Borgata, the Atlantic City School District and the Atlantic City High School Business 
Department. It offers two-year programs in hospitality management, travel, tourism and 
marketing to 11
th
 – and 12th-grade students. The program uses a school-to-careers approach to 
integrate academic learning with occupational training. The program offers 12
th
-grade students 
400 hours of paid work experience in the hospitality, travel and tourism industries through 
cooperative education. Classroom instruction is supplemented by field trips to area employers 
and job shadowing activities. The goals of this unique program are to: 
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 Acquaint students with the tremendous career opportunities in the hospitality, travel 
and tourism industries. 
 Prepare students for entry-level positions and introduce them to management 
opportunities. 
 Provide college bound students with the background they need for post-secondary 
study in hospitality and marketing. 
Through the Building and Construction Trades Apprentice Program, Borgata has 
established a goal to develop a pool of qualified Atlantic City residents to meet the demands and 
admission requirements of trade union apprenticeships leading to journeyman status. The 
program provides financial support and recruitment for building and construction trade union 
pre-apprentice and apprentice programs. 
  
Recommendation: Casino Workforce Development Partnership 
program 
The enabling gaming legislation should clearly state that it is in the public interest for the 
Commonwealth to maximize the economic benefits of gaming by establishing new programs to 
provide training and job opportunities to those who need it the most. The enabling legislation 
should include provisions that expand the Commonwealth‘s workforce development efforts by 
establishing private/public partnership programs between the casino licensees and the other 
major stakeholders. The programs should focus on how best to meet the labor demand generated 
by the casino resorts and also address the vital needs of the unemployed, underemployed as well 
as people on welfare. 
The Massachusetts Casino Workforce Development Partnership (CWDP) program could 
utilize the existing structure of the Massachusetts Workforce Development System. The lead 
agency for workforce development at the state level in Massachusetts, the Massachusetts 
Department of Labor and Workforce (DLWD) and the two principal workforce development 
agencies under the DLWD, the Commonwealth Corporation (CommCorp) and the Division of 
Employment and Training (DET) could lead the public sector‘s efforts in developing these 
initiatives. 
The Commonwealth Corporation, a quasi-public agency, serves as the Commonwealth‘s 
fiscal agency for federal Welfare to Work grants and portions of the Workforce Investment Act 
(WIA) and administers Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) funds. The foundation of the 
CommCorp‘s work is partnership: bringing the private and public sectors together to create 
successful outcomes. The agency has a 25-year history of developing and implementing 
innovative workforce development programs in Massachusetts. As a result, it would clearly be 
the ideal organization to lead any casino licensee/public sector initiatives to provide workers 
with basic skills and workforce training needed to meet the labor demand created by casino 
gaming.  
The CWDP would incorporate CommCorp‘s approach, which is to meet the needs of 
private employers and workers through unique workforce development programs designed for 
specific sectors of economy. CommCorp‘s methodology (see below) is well suited to meet the 
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labor and workforce development challenges Massachusetts would face if casino gaming is 
legalized:  
 Identifying critical needs 
 Delivering effective services 
 Sharing promising practices 
Identifying Critical Needs - CommCorp analyzes labor market information to identify 
service and skill gaps. They utilize industry/employer needs assessment and research and data to 
design programs. For example, according to the Massachusetts Job Vacancy Survey (2
nd
 Quarter-
2007) 65 percent of employers in Massachusetts were satisfied with the information technology 
(IT) skills level of their new hires. However, only 38 percent of employers in the accommodation 
and food service sector were satisfied with the IT expertise of their new hires. This skills gap is 
likely to have an impact on the Massachusetts labor market if casino gaming is established 
because this is an industry that hires disproportionately large numbers of first-time job seekers 
who tend to lack related work experience.  
Delivering Effective Solutions - CommCorp designs sector initiatives that build worker 
skills and address employer job vacancies. They also facilitate coalitions and partnerships that 
connect school, employers, colleges and community resources to improve educational and 
employment opportunities for youth and adults. As outlined in this report, Connecticut and New 
Jersey are good examples of where casino gaming employers assumed a leadership role by 
forming partnerships and/or collaboratives to realize successful workforce development 
outcomes. 
Sharing Promising Practices – This includes evaluation of demonstration projects with 
results and implications for practitioners and policymakers, impact studies and calculation of 
return on investment resulting in documentation and dissemination of lessons learned and 
promising practices. In this regard, Massachusetts can use the experience of other gaming 
jurisdictions in formulating an appropriate strategic plan to confront the critical issues 
concerning labor and workforce development.  
To guarantee an adequate funding source for the CWDP, the enabling legislation should 
provide for the establishment a CWDP Trust Fund. Initially, these funds could be derived from a 
set-aside of casino licensing fees. To ensure a permanent and stable funding source for the 
program, the enabling legislation should also include a provision which mandates that a fixed 
percentage of gross casino gaming revenues be dedicated to the trust fund. As in the case of the 
Atlantic City Jobs and Opportunities Program, additional funding can be derived from direct 
contributions from casino operators as well as leveraging available funds through appropriate 
federal grant programs.  
These funds could be targeted toward eliminating the backlog in demand for workplace 
literacy (reading and math,) adult basic skills education, General Equivalency Diploma (GED) 
and English as a Second Language programs. The funding could also be used to provide other 
supplemental education and support service such as citizenship, drivers and casino licensing 
assistance and appropriate social services referrals.  
The leadership of the CWDP program would be addressed by the establishment of a 
statutory CWDP Advisory Board with clear oversight authority to develop and implement the 
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program. The members of the Board could include, but not be limited to, representatives of the 
following stakeholders: 
 Casino licensees 
 Local school districts 
 Local municipalities 
 Colleges and universities 
 Community colleges 
 Casino trade schools 
 Massachusetts Department of Labor and Workforce Development 
 Massachusetts Commonwealth Corporation 
 Local/Regional Workforce Investment Boards (WIBs) 
 Employment and Career Services Centers 
 Massachusetts Department of Education 
 Massachusetts Department of Transportation 
 Organized labor community 
 Local/regional family and community development agencies 
 Local/regional social services agencies 
 Faith-based community 
 Civic organizations 
 Local businesses 
Massachusetts can maximize the economic benefits of casino gaming by expanding the 
Commonwealth‘s workforce development public policy efforts to address the employment needs 
of those who need it the most. Through private/public partnerships designed to provide basic 
skills and workplace training, Massachusetts can lead casino licensees to develop innovative 
programs which will result in suitable job opportunities for thousands of workers.  
By including provisions in the casino gaming enabling legislation to establish and fund 
the Casino Workforce Development Partnership program, which utilizes the expertise of the 
Commonwealth Corporation, Massachusetts can establish a model casino workforce 
development public policy program that would serve the public interest and instill public 
confidence in casino gaming.  
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Section IV: Social Impacts  
 
A critical question on the minds of Massachusetts‘ citizens, civic leaders and legislators 
considering whether to introduce or expand legalized gambling in their community is how it will 
impact crime and problem gambling. The question is not an easy one to answer conclusively. 
The national experience since legalized gambling saw its first major expansion into Atlantic City 
30 years ago offers only limited guidance. The one clear and certain lesson learned since then is 
that there is no ―one size fits all‖ state policy on gambling.  
Furthermore, establishing exactly how gambling related costs and benefits are best 
measured, evaluated and interpreted is subject to different analytical frameworks, methodologies, 
and more importantly, personal values. In Massachusetts, at the present time, any analysis is a bit 
more complicated since the exact location and composition of the three gaming resorts outlined 
in the legislative proposal remain to be determined.  
The literature on the economic impacts of casino gaming is in broad agreement that 
typically there are many ostensible benefits to the host communities including job creation, new 
tax ratables and economic growth. In the case of Atlantic City, as a longstanding example, 
casino-generated economic growth brought the region better access to health care and services, 
more retail and dining opportunities, and a greater variety of cultural and entertainment 
opportunities.  
In 2006, nationwide gross gaming revenues grew to $32.42 billion. Of that amount, more 
than $5 billion was redirected to state and local governments through taxation. More than 
366,197 individuals who collectively earn a total of $13.3 billion are employed in 460 
commercial casinos in 11 different states.139  
Economic stress and fiscal pressures are often the catalyst behind most state initiatives to 
expand gambling. By legalizing or expanding gambling, governments hope to avoid 
implementing new or increased taxes, which often face strong public resistance. Instead, 
policymakers hope to augment the state treasury in what appears to be a relatively painless 
fashion by capturing revenue from activities that would otherwise go outside the state or might 
otherwise lost to the underground economy.  
Massachusetts is currently facing budgetary problems. Income tax revenues are expected 
to shrink in the coming year, which will worsen an anticipated $1.3 billion budget deficit. 
Municipal officials, heavily dependent on state aid, say their budget problems have already risen 
to crisis proportions.
140
 Cities and towns throughout Massachusetts face the prospect of deep cuts 
in school aid and local revenue and state aid can't keep up with such rapidly rising expenses as 
employee health insurance, heating oil, and even street paving.141 In an interview, Thomas 
Ambrosino, Mayor of Revere City, predicted a bleak economic future for his city if new sources 
                                                 
139 ―2007 State of the States: The AGA Survey of Casino Entertainment‖, American Gaming Association, p. 2. 
140 Matt Viser, ―State's fiscal picture dims: Cuts, tax hikes may be on table,‖  The Boston Globe On Line, www.boston.com, 
March 28, 2008. 
141 Eric Moskowitz, ―Deep cuts loom across state,‘‘  Boston Globe, April 6, 2008. 
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of revenue are not found. Ambrosino, who supports the administration gambling proposal, 
expressed his views on the matter bluntly: ―If not this, then what?‖142  
To those who believe that the social costs of increased gambling opportunities extend 
beyond crime and problem gambling, the social costs simply outweigh the economic benefits. 
These individuals believe that governments may be making a Faustian bargain when it comes to 
gambling. They believe that the impacts of gambling include qualitative considerations that 
transcend standard economic metrics. They hold the view that gambling may subvert traditional 
family values that serve as the bedrock to social stability. They are not likely to change to a more 
favorable position regarding this matter despite any economic blessings that gambling may 
bring, yet their views cannot be ignored.  
This point of view was expressed best by Irving Kristol on the editorial pages of the Wall 
Street Journal at a time when a new expansion of legalized gambling was poised to begin.143 He 
argues that a gambling environment ―…most definitely undermines the classical virtues 
(moderation, self reliance, self discipline, thrift, diligence, etc.) while nourishing the classical 
vices (extravagance, avarice, the lack of social responsibility, etc.).‖144 Readily accessible 
gambling undermines positive virtues by encouraging people to believe that there is an easy way 
to quick wealth. The subversion of these values, some believe, are what lead to the problems of 
increased crime and problem gambling in gaming communities, as well as a breakdown in the 
social order. 
We believe that the bottom line on the ongoing economic impacts vs. the social impacts 
is best expressed in the title of the April 2000 U.S. Government Accounting Office report, 
―Impact of Gambling: Economic Effects More Measurable Than Social Effects.‖ The GAO 
report said: 
―Neither NGISC [the 1997-99 National Gambling Impact Study Commission] nor 
our Atlantic City case study was able to clearly identify the social effects of gambling for 
a variety of reasons. The amount of high quality and relevant research on social effects is 
extremely limited. While data on family problems, crime, and suicide are available, 
tracking systems generally do not collect data on the causes of these incidents, so they 
cannot be linked to gambling. Sometimes data were available only at the county level, not 
for Atlantic City. Further, while studies have shown increases in social costs of 
pathological gamblers, it is difficult to isolate whether gambling is the only factor causing 
these problems because pathological gamblers often have other behavior disorders. While 
NGISC and our case study in Atlantic City found some testimonial evidence that 
gambling, particularly pathological gambling, has resulted in increased family problems 
(such as domestic violence, child abuse, and divorce), crime, and suicides, NGISC 
reached no conclusions on whether gambling increased family problems, crime, or 
suicide for the general population. Similarly, we found no conclusive evidence on 
whether or not gambling caused increased social problems in Atlantic City.‖145 
                                                 
142 Interview with Thomas Ambrosino,  Mayor of Revere City, MA, Revere City Hall, March 12, 2008. 
143  Kristol, Irving. ―Vice and Virtue in Las Vegas.‖ Op Ed the Wall Street Journal (September 18, 1973). 
144 Ibid. 
145 U.S. Government Accounting Office, ―Impact of Gambling: Economic Effects More Measurable Than Social Effects,‖ April 
2000, p. 3. 
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Prominent problem-gambling epidemiologist Rachel Volberg, President of Gemini 
Research in Northampton, MA, also notes that the social impacts of casino gambling are 
significantly more difficult to objectively analyze and estimate: ―The negative impacts of 
gambling [which chiefly concern the social impacts] typically take much longer to emerge than 
the positive impacts and they‘re also often much harder to measure in terms of quantitative and 
economic terms.‖146 
Evidence exists that casinos – when developed correctly – can advance the public interest 
by ameliorating some social problems, and by doing so, can reduce dependence on government 
programs. But, as the following research shows, the likelihood is greater that casinos will reduce 
dependence throughout the region on various government programs. 
The National Opinion Research Center (NORC), at the request of the National Gambling 
Impact Study Commission, developed a database of social and economic indicators and 
estimated gaming-related spending in a random sample of 100 communities that had a 
population base in excess of 10,000. The NORC147 reported that proximity to a casino was a key 
factor in various markets, resulting in, among other things: lower unemployment and increased 
earnings in such key industries as lodging, recreation and construction. Some of the findings are 
summarized here: 
 
Economic Impact Area Percent change 
Income Maintenance (Welfare) Payments -13 Percent 
Unemployment Insurance -17 Percent 
Other Transfer Payments -3 Percent 
Per Capita Construction Earnings +18 Percent 
Hotel and Lodging Earnings +44 percent 
Recreation & Amusement Industries +22 Percent 
Those are significant changes that have been supported by other reports, including some 
anecdotal findings. For example, the University of Connecticut‘s Center for Economic Analysis 
issued a report in 2000 that found Foxwoods had created 41,000 jobs in the state since its 1992 
opening, and contributed about $1.2 billion a year to the state‘s economy. Foxwoods was also 
given credit for a $1.9 billion increase in personal income.148 
 
Impact on school enrollment and costs 
The issue of casinos‘ impact on local education is both social and economic, but after our 
many interviews for this report we made a judgment call and placed this section under the Social 
Impacts section – although it just as easily could be placed under the Economics Impact section. 
The placement of this section in the report, however, is insignificant. 
                                                 
146 Speaking at the ―Big Gamble‖ symposium at Quinnipiac University, March 18, 2008 
147 NGISC 
148 ―Study Finds Pequot Businesses Lift Connecticut's Economy,‖ New York Times, November 29, 2000 
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Communities will ultimately have numerous concerns about the impact of a casino on the 
ability to provide public services. We use education as one example. The question of whether 
three destination casinos will have a material impact on the costs of providing education to 
students as well as housing and other costs is dependent on a variety of factors that we simply do 
not know at this point such as: 
 The precise locations of casinos. 
 The potential investment in job training and other costs. 
The location, for example, would influence factors ranging from the size of the casino to 
the potential existence of an available workforce, as well as related issues such as the amount of 
affordable housing, access to mass transit as well as commuting times. 
The Town of Middleborough, which conducted a study to determine how a casino might 
impact their community, determined that it was unlikely to have a substantial impact in overall 
school enrollment. However, they noted that even a small increase in English Language Learners 
may require the Town to hire additional staff.149 The citizen‘s committee that conducted the study 
noted in its report: 
―The Town of Middleborough provides full day education to its residents at five schools 
from Kindergarten through Grade 12. Enrollment for the 2006-2007 school year indicated 
3,561 students (MA Dept. of Education). Currently there are 5 English Language Learner 
(ELL) students enrolled in Middleborough (which does not qualify the Town for federal 
grant funding for ELL professionals). 
―We interviewed the superintendents of three host community schools in Ledyard, CT 
(Foxwoods Casino), Montville, CT (Mohegan Sun Casino) and Mount Pleasant, MI 
(Soaring Eagle Casino). None of the superintendents interviewed felt their school districts 
had experienced an ―out of the ordinary‖ enrollment increase due to the presence of the 
casinos. In fact, the Town of Ledyard's enrollment decreased 4.6% from 1997- 1998 to 
2005-2006.  
―The Connecticut schools experienced an increase in ELL students. Montville had an 
increase from 5 ELL students in 1999 to 114 today (out of total of 3,000). This change 
resulted in the hiring of an ELL Coordinator at an approximate salary of $70,000. The 
Ledyard school district has hired several para-professionals to work with ELL students. 
The Mount Pleasant, MI school district has not seen an increase in ELL students.‖ 
The impact of new jobs on the school districts in the host communities was not 
significant. It was mentioned that the low availability of rental housing and relatively high rents 
in the host communities resulted in casino workers living in surrounding communities. A similar 
situation could develop in the communities surrounding Middleborough. 
Ledyard schools host 40 students from reservation land. The district received about 
$4,000 from the Bureau of Indian Affairs for each of the 40 tribal children attending their 
schools, in addition to its state per child payment (similar to our Chapter 70 money). Based on 
the information from these schools, it appears that the impact to Middleborough Schools would 
                                                 
149 Middleborough Casino Gambling Study Committee, ―Community Impact Analysis and Mitigation of a Casino Resort in the 
Town of Middleborough, Massachusetts, July 23, 2007. P. 8.  
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be minimal. While it does not appear that there is a high likelihood of a substantial increase in 
overall school enrollment, even a small increase in English Language Learners may require the 
Town to hire additional staff.‖150 
 The experience of Norwich, CT, a neighbor to the nearby Mohegan Sun casino in 
Montville, lends credence Middleborough‘s supposition. Although the Mayor of Norwich 
considers the nearby casino a ―godsend,‖ over a six-year period the number of non-English-
speaking students in public schools in Norwich quadrupled, from 100 to 400.151 And the Norwich 
schools are not just educating children. Half the students who study at an adult education center 
are there to learn the English language and American customs. Of those 600 students, 480 work 
at the casinos. 
Economists Phineas Baxandall and Bruce Sacerdote looked at the possible impact of 
impact of casinos on education in Massachusetts in the 2005 study. They noted:  
 ―Casinos can affect both the demand for education and the resources available to pay for 
it. If, for example, casinos attract workers with families, they will create increased 
demand for—and spending on—schools. And if casinos generate additional revenues for 
local governments, they could lead to increases in per-capita spending on education. On 
the other hand, if casinos result in demands for other public services, such as additional 
policing, or lead to economic declines that reduce tax revenues, education spending 
(either in total or on a per-capita basis) might lag in counties that introduce casinos. To 
see how casinos affect local spending on education, we examined data on relative 
changes in area-level expenditures for education by county, both as totals and in terms of 
per-pupil spending. To examine changes in total spending between 1987 and 1997, we 
compare the size of each spending change relative to the absolute level of education 
spending in that county. To compare changes in per-pupil spending, we divide total 
spending by the number of pupils. We compare counties that introduced a casino between 
1987 and 1997 to those that did not. 
 ―Looking first at total educational spending, we see that the only statistically significant 
relationship was among counties with large casinos. Introducing these casinos (with over 
1,760 slot machines) was associated with an 8 percent greater increase in total school 
spending compared to other counties between 1987 and 1997. When we examine 
spending on a per-pupil basis, however, the data indicate that counties which introduced 
casinos show no statistically significant differences in their rates of education spending 
compared to other counties in the state. This is true for large-casino counties as well. 
Looking at the sample of 16 largest recent casino counties, we find that 
education spending per-pupil increased on average 2 percent faster than state averages for 
the period as a whole. These results were not statistically significant. Moreover, in half of 
these counties per-pupil spending increased slower than the state averages; while in the 
other half of counties, per-pupil spending grew faster. Among our three mega-casino 
                                                 
150 Ibid. 
151 Stephanie Vost, ―Casinos bring jobs - and a strain on schools - to ailing Norwich,‖ Cape Cod Times, July 23, 2007  
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counties, per pupil spending grew 6 percent slower than the state average in San Diego 
County.‖152  
 
In its analysis of the impacts of casino gambling for the Greater Boston Chamber of 
Commerce, UHY looked at the impact on school enrollment and costs and concluded: 
―Local education resources may be impacted with casino developments. Depending on 
the number and ethnicity of workers who migrate from out of the area, schools may have 
to address issues such as additional space requirements, language barriers and special 
needs students. These concerns cannot be addressed until the casino is actually developed 
and the actual impact known.‖153 
We concur with UHY‘s cautionary note, and emphasize that the direct impacts can be 
better analyzed once locations and project scope are more clearly known.  
For this study, we assume about 20,000 direct, indirect and induced employment 
positions to be generated by three properties spread throughout the Commonwealth, in keeping 
with the projected estimates as outlined earlier.  
Over the years, Spectrum has studied numerous gaming markets, as well as interviewed 
third-parties, and we suggest there is a well-established link in this industry between where 
people work and where they live or would want to live. Other things being equal, people tend to 
want either to minimize their commute time or at least to keep it within certain limits. In a 
service industry like casinos, it is especially important that workers arrive on time regardless of 
the weather or other circumstances; so casino workers would tend to be especially sensitive to 
issues of commute time and distances between home and work and also between work and their 
children‘s schools.  
Additionally, if casino employees are either recent immigrants or have lower household 
incomes when they start their careers, they would face higher transportation costs as many would 
not own cars. 
In the case of the Atlantic City casinos, approximately 25 percent of the casino 
employees live within Atlantic City, while 84 percent of casino workers chose to live within 
Atlantic County.154  
Spectrum reviewed a 2003 report titled ―Employment Effects of Casino Gambling in the 
Eighth District,‖ prepared by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. It found that the percent of 
casino employees residing in the host county ranged from a low of 30 percent to a high of 80 
percent.155 Additionally, it is common throughout the casino industry that many households will 
have two or more adults who are holding one of these jobs.  
                                                 
152 Phineas Baxandall and Bruce Sacerdote The Casino Gamble in Massachusetts: Full Report and Appendices; Release date: 
January 13, 2005 Rappaport Institute for Greater Boston, John F. Kennedy School of Economics, Harvard University. P. 10. 
153 UHY Advisors, ―Casino Gaming in Massachusetts: An Economic, Fiscal and Social Analysis,‖ Commissioned by the Greater 
Boston Chamber of Commerce, March, 2008, p. 104. 
154The New Jersey Casino Control Commission, as of April 2008 
155 Although this study was performed before Pinnacle Entertainment opened Lumiere Place in St. Louis, we do not anticipate it 
would have had a material impact on this percentage. 
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This pattern may be more common for unmarried casino workers who may choose to live 
together for any number of reasons including common background, to facilitate commuting, etc. 
For this section of the analysis, we are assuming there will be an average of 1.2 casino workers 
per household. That is, on average, for every five households, one would include two casino 
workers.  
 A few households may have more than two casino jobs, but the average would still be 
1.2. We consider this 1.2 estimate to be, if anything, on the high side, and it was chosen to 
maintain the essentially conservative nature of our forecast of casino impacts. 
If we assume that all of the 20,000 employees are new to their respective areas (highly 
unlikely), and if we assume that half of those employees have school-age children,156 we then 
anticipate that there will be some 8,334 households (20,000 divided by 1.2 casino jobs per 
household, divided in half) that have school-age children. 
If each of those households has 1.5 school-age children, it would generate new 
enrollment of as much as 12,500 children. That outcome is not likely, however, as it assumes that 
all casino employees and all the jobs that they help generate throughout the local economies of 
Massachusetts are new residents. It is, of course, assumed that many of the new casino jobs will 
be filled by current Massachusetts residents whose children presumably are already in the public 
school system, and thus should not be counted as part of the casino impact on the area schools.  
If these current residents were holding jobs, and they simply transferred to a casino job, 
then one would need to assume that, at least in a strong economy, these jobs will be back-filled 
and that eventually new residents will need to move into the casino region to fill these vacated 
jobs.  
Additionally, we assume that 90 percent157 of the students will be in public school, with 
the rest in private or parochial schools. With those factors in mind, the creation of three 
destination casinos would likely increase school enrollment throughout the Commonwealth by a 
small amount, but to some communities a meaningful amount. 
That relatively small number could be material if many of those families are concentrated 
in a few communities that, as a result, require greater capital investment in new schools. This 
would be more easily managed if, say, the communities that absorb new residents are also the 
host communities for the casinos, since the casino itself would generate significant property 
taxes. That would not necessarily be the case, however. 
 
The situation in Monson 
Monson is a rural, residential town (8,359) in western Massachusetts – in many ways a 
typical small town in the state. Its school district had a school enrollment of 1,525 for the 2007-
08 school year. It spent $14.4 million to educate its students, or $9,075 per pupil. Of that amount, 
36 percent came from Monson taxpayers and 64 percent came from state aid. 
                                                 
156 ―Wages and Healthcare Benefits of Workers at Aqua Caliente Casino,‖ Eric Nilsson, et. al., March 2003. This report 
suggested that 46 percent of casino workers have children. 
157 This is in keeping with national estimates: http://www.census.gov/prod/2007pubs/08statab/educ.pdf  
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Town leaders said they fear that a major casino resort built near Monson would cause the 
student population to swell from casino-employee families seeking to live close to their 
employer. Each non-special education student that enters Monson Public Schools would inflate 
the district‘s budget by $9,075. The amount could be higher if the surge included students who 
required special education or English language learners (ELL); there currently are no ELLs in 
Monson Public Schools. (We note that many of the families that are attracted to a region because 
it offers casino employment come from non-English speaking cultures. This often requires a 
concomitant investment in unanticipated programs such as teaching English as a second 
language.) 
Further, the Monson elementary and middle school populations are ―near capacity‖ and 
the high school is at more than 85 percent capacity.158 School transportation, which is funded 
locally, is another costly concern, according to Kathleen Conley Norbut, a Monson Selectman 
and Chairman of the town‘s Local Casino Study Committee. ―Additional buses and fuel to 
service additional routes and students without state assistance is untenable,‖ she said.159 The 
school district already assesses students in grades 7-12 $1 per day, or $180 per year, to ride the 
school bus. 
With an average single-family property tax bill in the town of $2,825 for fiscal year 2008, 
town leaders say they would be forced to raise property taxes – perhaps dramatically – to 
adequately fund a surge in school enrollment. Most of that burden would fall on the residents, as 
residential property taxes account for 93 percent of the town‘s annual tax receipts. 
Norbut noted that in other nearby towns, such as Brimfield, Holland and Wales, residents 
account for closer to 100 percent of the local-tax burden.  
We recognize that even small changes in school enrollment in small communities can 
have a significant impact on school budgets. The Commonwealth must be prepared to offer 
financial assistance to such communities from mitigation programs, irrespective of the size of 
such impacts. 
Montville, CT, schools are struggling to cope with a huge influx of Chinese students who 
are not proficient in English. The number of English Language Learners or ELLs has increased 
from 13 to 133 since 2000.160 The district has had to hire a full-time coordinator to operate an 
expanded program. Montville is where the Mohegan Sun casino is located. Other school districts 
in southeastern Connecticut have also experienced a marked increase in the number of ELL 
students.  
However, we strongly suggest that public policy with respect to gaming should take 
meaningful steps, as detailed elsewhere in this report, to reduce the ranks of unemployed and 
unemployable adults by targeting them for training. At the same, casinos should be sited in areas 
that provide easy access for this potential workforce. Indeed, a policy of focusing on existing 
residents in need of employment would advance public policy on several fronts, including 
limiting the need for additional funding of government services. Access and training should be 
important criteria in weighing any application. 
                                                 
158 Letter from Kathleen Conley Norbut, Monson Selectman and Chairman of Local Casino Study Committee, June 17, 2008 
159 Ibid. 
160 Interview with Montville schools ELL coordinator, May 1, 2008 
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Crime 
Does casino gambling lead to increased crime?
161 
This is a question of paramount 
concern to both proponents and opponents of casino gambling. No one wants to make their 
community less safe and hospitable. During an interview with representatives of the 
Massachusetts District Attorneys Association, (MDAA), District Attorney Michael D. O‘Keefe 
expressed a view that is commonly held in the law enforcement community. Although he 
believes that any initiative that increases the number of tourists in a given area will also result in 
an increase in crime, casinos are more prone to criminal activity.
162
 
It is important to note that the MDAA does not take a formal position on the 
administration‘s proposal. However, in evaluating the proposal, the MDAA believes it is 
essential to bear in mind the broad range of mandated responsibilities already imposed upon 
district attorneys. The MDAA does not want new casino development to impose another 
unfunded mandate upon local district attorneys who already have limited resources. They believe 
that it is incumbent upon the proponents of the Governor‘s proposal to anticipate and properly 
plan for the impacts of resort casinos and that those who may undertake this initiative understand 
that casino revenues will be offset by higher law enforcement costs. They also recommend that 
any state funding for crime mitigation be based on actual need and not allocated according to a 
preset amount.
163
 
 The compact negotiated between Connecticut and the two Indian tribes, as described, 
stipulates that the casinos pay for the cost of a State Police presence.164 The state troopers 
investigate all casino crimes that occur on the casino floor just as the New Jersey State Police 
does in New Jersey. But Connecticut failed to provide for any funding for the prosecution of 
those crimes. The State‘s Attorney in New London County currently absorbs all of those costs. 
The 2004 Uniform Crime Report165 shows that Foxwoods had 378 larcenies. Twenty-six 
of them resulted in convictions. At Mohegan Sun, there were 113 larcenies. Thirty-four of them 
resulted in convictions. There were also three aggravated assault convictions and a robbery 
conviction as well at Mohegan Sun. Prosecutors in New London County told us that they expend 
considerable resources each year prosecuting casino floor crimes.  
                                                 
161 In this analytical context crime refers to reportable offenses included in the FBI Uniform Crime Reporting program. These 
offenses include:  murder and non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny and 
motor vehicle theft. Arson is also included although it is generally not included in studies of the effects of casino gambling and 
crime. Not all crimes, such as embezzlement, are readily brought to the attention of the police. Also, some serious crimes, such as 
kidnapping, occur infrequently. Therefore, the UCR Program limits the reporting of offenses to the eight selected crime 
classifications because they are the crimes most likely to be reported and most likely to occur with sufficient frequency to provide 
an adequate basis for comparison. http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/ucrquest.htm 
162 Interview with Interview with the Massachusetts District Attorneys Association, Boston, MA, March 12, 2008,  In attendance 
were: Geline W. Williams, Executive Director,  Michael D. O‘Keefe, District Attorney, Timothy J. Cruz, District Attorney, 
David Capeless, District Attorney, by Telephone. 
163 Ibid. Interview with Interview with the Massachusetts District Attorneys Association, March 12, 2008 
164 Various interviews with Connecticut casino executives and law-enforcement officials 
165 Connecticut State Police 2004 Uniform Crime Report 
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There would clearly be an impact on taxpayers in Massachusetts if district attorneys were 
expected to be responsible for the prosecution of casino floor crime without any special funding, 
as is done in Connecticut.  
The MDAA also expressed the opinion that the social impacts of a casino resort would be 
greater on rural communities who have neither the experience nor infrastructure to deal with the 
magnitude and broad range of issues that will accompany a large scale casino development.  
 The MDAA cited a recent study by economists Earl L. Grinols and David B. Mustard 
which purports to show a more definitive link between casino gambling and crime.166 That report 
will be discussed in more detail later in this report.  
 Similar concerns regarding the relationship between casino gambling and crime were 
also expressed by Thomas J. Foley, a retired, former head of the Massachusetts State Police and 
member of the Governor‘s Council, who tracked crime statistics around the country as part of his 
duties. Although Foley stated that he had not taken a position for or against the Governor‘s 
proposal, he believes that if the state were to permit casinos, it should be prepared to fend off 
unwanted criminal activity. Foley noted that ―location is critical in curtailing the crime impacts 
from casinos.‖ He attributes the success of casino resorts such as Foxwoods or Mohegan Sun to 
their rural setting. ―Once you put these types of facilities in an urban setting it makes for more of 
an opportunity for other kinds of crimes and individuals to start coming into the area.‖167  
As for the connection between crime and gambling, the Attorney General of the State of 
Maryland was more strident and to the point when the matter was before his state. In a report that 
thoroughly catalogued statistical studies as well as anecdotal impressions on the relationship 
between gambling and crime, he concluded, ―It is simply a fiction to delude ourselves that it is 
possible to have casinos without more crime. … Casinos would bring increases in every area of 
criminal activity.‖168  
The views of those in law enforcement rank highly in assessing this matter since they are 
the ones on the frontlines. There does appear to be prima facie evidence to support a connection 
between crime and gambling. Crime does tend to correlate positively with casino gambling. 
However, policy analysis requires that a causal relationship be analyzed and established as well 
as a correlation. Understanding the distinction between the two is critical. A lighthearted way to 
illustrate this point is to note that there is a high correlation between people who have ridden in 
an ambulance arriving at hospital emergency rooms with life-threatening illnesses and injuries. 
However, one would be grossly mistaken to conclude that riding in an ambulance was the cause 
of those illnesses and injuries. 
                                                 
166 The Journal of Economics and Statistics, ―Casinos, Crime and Community Costs,‖ Earl L. Grinols and David B. Mustard, 
February 2006, 88(1): 28-45. This report was also cited in a Massachusetts District Attorneys Association handout. 
167 John J. Monahan, ―Ex Cop Lists Casino Faults: Crime May Follow Gambling,‖ Worchester Telegram and Gazette On Line 
Edition, Worcester Massachusetts, March 16, 2008. 
168 Report of the Attorney General J. Joseph Curran, Jr. on the Impact of Casino Gaming on Crime, Presented to the Joint 
Executive-Legislative Task Force to Study Commercial Gaming Activities in Maryland, October 16, 1995, p. E-2. Similarly, see 
also a Sullivan County New York focused study, Constantine & Aborn Advisory Services, Gambling: Who's really at risk? The 
connection between gambling and crime, May 19, 2005. 
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The question then is whether casino gambling per se causes more crime or the increase in 
the number of tourists and visitors (visitation) who come as a result of these new attractions 
results in more crime. 
The Pennsylvania example is illustrative. In Pennsylvania, where slots-only casinos have 
been opening at various points throughout the state over the past two years, 967 crimes were 
reported at six properties that were open in 2007. Of those, more than half – 567 – were thefts. 
Law enforcement personnel in Pennsylvania have characterized most of those as ―crimes of 
opportunity.‖ "We may have had a handful where somebody has tried to grab a ticket from 
somebody," Capt. Tim Allue, supervisor of the State Police gaming-enforcement unit, told 
reporters recently. In most cases, the owner of a purse or a ticket – which is bar-coded with a 
specific dollar value and is effectively currency – loses track, and someone else appropriates the 
purse or ticket, according to Allue169. 
Three months after the Hollywood Casino at Penn National opened this year, local police 
reported no significant increase in crime. "Most of them (are) very minor in nature. In fact, 
probably all of them minor in nature -- a few public drunkenness, criminal mischief, theft -- 
things like that. We're very pleased with the way things are going right now," said Pennsylvania 
State Trooper Karl Schmidhammer.
170
 
Spectrum Gaming Group and its principals have studied this issue from many different 
approaches over a span of nearly three decades, as former law-enforcement officials and 
regulators, as historians, journalists, public officials, casino operators and – perhaps most 
importantly – as residents of a gaming community. 
We have examined the statistical data carefully and have developed our own quantitative 
and qualitative studies. Our experience has led us to determine that the following guidelines must 
be applied if this subject is to be properly analyzed: 
 Casino-related crime must not be confused with crime that might be related to 
increased economic activity. 
 Visitor population must be taken into account when analyzing data. 
 To the extent possible, factors such as the urban or rural nature of a community must 
be considered in the analysis. 
In his aforementioned comments, Foley lends credence to the latter point when he 
mentions how a casino‘s location may be a factor when it comes to crime. In many communities 
such as Atlantic City, Detroit, Gary, IN, or parts of Philadelphia, the nature of crime and the 
crime rate itself are often related to pockets of embedded poverty. Such problems preceded the 
arrival of casinos and, in some instances, gaming was introduced as part of a solution to address 
social dysfunctions that are believed to cause crime.  
 The scholarly literature that examines the relationship between gambling and crime has 
been somewhat contradictory or inconclusive in its findings. A 2005 study by Phineas Baxandall 
and Bruce Sacerdote is illustrative of this. These two economists analyzed the concerns of those 
                                                 
169 ―Casino's biggest crime: thefts,‖ by Sharon Smith, The Patriot-News, June 2, 2008,  
170 ―No Increase In Crime Since Casino Opened, Operators Say,‖ WGAL-TV, May 14, 2008  
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who wondered what spinoffs casino gambling in Massachusetts might produce.171 Their analysis, 
which compares the experience of counties in the United States that host casinos with those that 
do not, suggests that both sides in this debate are wrong. What they conclude may be 
dissatisfying to those who want a more definitive answer to the questions at hand: 
―For over a decade, advocates and opponents of casinos in the Commonwealth have 
argued about whether legalized gambling would produce prosperity or ruin. Our analysis 
indicates that at the county level - where any positive or negative effects are likely to be 
concentrated – casinos would have only relatively minor effects. On the positive side, 
they may create more jobs and they are likely to attract more residents as well. However, 
since the increases in jobs and population are about equal, jobless rates are not likely to 
change dramatically in areas with new casinos. On the negative side, total crime may 
increase, but the increase appears to be due solely to the increase in population. 
Bankruptcies are likely to rise in counties with casinos but the total number of people 
affected by the increase is relatively small. Perhaps most surprising is that casinos appear 
to have little or no effect on home values (at least in populous counties) or on total 
spending for either policing or roads. ... These findings do not mean that casino gambling 
is a trivial issue – only that employment, finances, and crime are insufficient rationales 
for deciding whether to deny or allow casinos in Massachusetts. Policymakers, therefore, 
must consider other issues when deciding whether to allow casino gambling in the state. 
These might include questions such as whether (and how) casinos would alter the 
Commonwealth‘s character, whether it is problematic to rely on gaming revenues to fund 
public services; and whether allowing limited casino gambling will compromise the 
state‘s ability to control gambling in the future.‖172  
A recent study prepared for the Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce by UHY Advisors 
also notes the difficulties of accurately measuring the social impacts of gaming:173 
―The effect and impact the legalization of casinos has on society is difficult to 
measure. Unlike counting the number of jobs created or tax dollars generated, 
many of the costs to society are less tangible. Therefore, the results of the various 
studies focused on the societal costs of gambling should be view with some 
appreciation of the limitations to this type of research.‖174  
The Chamber study goes on to note other limitations such as: 
 Measurements of the effects of new styles of gambling cannot adequately take into 
account the effects of gambling opportunities in the period before legalization. 
  
                                                 
171  Phineas Baxandall and Bruce Sacerdote The Casino Gamble in Massachusetts: Full Report and Appendices; Release date: 
January 13, 2005 Rappaport Institute for Greater Boston, John F. Kennedy School of Economics, Harvard University. 
172 Ibid. p.  
173 UHY Advisors, ―Casino Gaming in Massachusetts: An Economic, Fiscal and Social Analysis,‖ Commissioned by the Greater 
Boston Chamber of Commerce, March, 2008, pp. 87 - 96. 
174 Ibid. p. 87. 
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 Given the increasing variety of forms of gambling that are increasingly readily accessible 
such as lotteries, race or sports betting, Internet gambling, etc., it becomes more difficult 
to strictly attribute the adverse impacts of gambling to any one type of gaming activity.
175
 
The Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce, according to its president, Paul Guzzi, does 
not take a position on the proposed legislation. The chamber‘s intention in commissioning this 
study was to take a fact-based look at the economic and socio-economic impacts of casino 
gaming. He stated that unintended consequences resulting from the proposal is a legitimate area 
of concern and should be taken into consideration.176 
The Baxandall and Sacerdote study and the Chamber study illustrate the limitations of a 
quantitative analysis of the impact of gambling. Such analyses have methodological restraints as 
well as problems in clarifying causation that do not provide definitive answers.  
Spectrum‘s review of the literature identifies two ways in which these limitations may 
cause one to draw premature or inappropriate conclusions which often overstate the crime related 
impacts of gambling on crime rates: 
 Since the standard reporting of crime rates are based on incidents per 100,000 people, 
such studies are inherently flawed in communities with a significant hospitality 
industry that attracts a large number of tourists on a daily basis. The studies are 
routinely based on resident population, rather than on residents plus visitors. 
 Not surprisingly, some types of crimes can increase as a result of more money in a 
community (economic activity) or more people, (social activity). In a gambling 
environment both results are inevitable. Thus, gaming is viewed as the proximate 
cause of any increases in crime when the underlying cause is often increased 
economic and social activity. 
Authoritative analysis therefore requires that the existing socio-economic characteristics 
of a community must be taken into account when assessing any link between gambling and 
crime. As mentioned earlier, this point was raised during the interview with the MDAA, where 
the opinion was expressed that the social impacts of a casino resort might be greater on rural 
communities. The reason is the perception such communities are less apt to have either the 
necessary experience or infrastructure, both social and physical, to properly cope with the broad 
range of issues that will accompany a large scale casino development.177 A similar view was 
expressed by Marc D. Draisen, executive director of the Metropolitan Area Planning Council, in 
an op-ed article in the Boston Globe. Draisen noted, ―… localities often fail to negotiate the best 
deal. Smaller towns lack the professional staff to evaluate the true impacts of development. 
Desperate for cash now, they often forgo longer-term benefits for short-term payments.‖178 
                                                 
175 Ibid. p. 88. 
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 Interview with Paul Guzzi, President and CEO, Greater Boston Chamber and Jim Klocke, Executive Vice President, Boston 
MA, March 13, 2008. 
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 Ibid. Interview with Interview with the Massachusetts District Attorneys Association, March 12, 2008 
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 Marc D. Draisen, ―Gambling on our Future,‖ Op Ed, The Boston Globe On Line. August 4, 2007. Assessed March 24, 2008. 
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What also must be considered is the data that suggest that when casinos have served as an 
economic catalyst for a local community, they reduced some degree of the poverty-related crime 
problems as well as demands on social services. 
Several explanations and theories have been offered to explain any nexus between 
casinos and crime. The simplest and most straight forward is what some call the Willie Sutton 
theory, named after the famous bank robber who supposedly answered a reporter inquiring why 
he robbed banks by saying ―because that's where the money is.‖179 In other words, casinos attract 
large numbers of visitors who carry large amounts of cash. These individuals become tempting 
targets for the criminal element. 
A more serious explanation posits that gambling increases criminal activity because it is 
has a strong attraction to individuals who have certain types of addictive disorders and mental 
illnesses, and as a result, are more prone to commit crimes. For example, problem gamblers soon 
use up their personal resources and have to turn to illegal activities in order to fund their habit.  
Numerous academics, journalists and public officials have attempted to reach conclusive 
results about the relationship between crime and casinos, and appear to have fallen short. This is 
largely because communities can be so different in their demographics as well as values, norms, 
priorities, histories, traditions and attitudes concerning gambling. This diversity of opinion is 
further compounded when one looks at the multitude of variables that could conceivably impact 
on crime in a community.  
In 1999, the National Gambling Impact Study Commission, more conservative than the 
1976 federal commission180 that preceded it, examined how the proliferation of gambling was 
affecting the fabric of America.181 The Commission noted the contradictory conclusions 
regarding how gambling may increase crime in a community. According to the Commission: 
―Since the types of crime involved in each of these hypotheses are different, it is not 
surprising that the proponents of both views are able to advance research to support their 
views. The reliability of these studies however, is questionable.‖182 
 Based on testimony and a review of the literature, the commission reached a simple and 
straightforward conclusion:  
―Taken as a whole, the literature shows that communities with casinos are just as  safe as 
communities that do not have casinos.‖183  
A more recent study, the one referenced by the MDAA, was done by two economists 
who have extensively studied the impacts of gambling. It purports to have established a 
connection between casino gambling and crime. Their study, published in The Review of 
Economics and Statistics, examined the relationship between casinos and crime using county-
                                                 
179
 Where the Money Was: The Memoirs of a Bank Robber (Viking Press, New York, 1976) 
180 Commission on the review of the National Policy Toward Gambling, Gambling in America, Final Report (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976. 
181 National Gambling Impact Study Commission Final Report, June, 1999. 
182 Ibid. p. 7-12. 
183 Ibid. p. 7-14. 
 The Impacts of Expanded Gaming on the Commonwealth of Massachusetts                    213 
level data for the United States between 1977 and 1996.184 They find that most factors that reduce 
crime occur before or shortly after a casino opens. However, factors that increase crime, 
including problem and pathological gambling, occur over time. They conclude that the effect on 
crime is low shortly after a casino opens, and grows over time:  
―The crime-ameliorating effects of casinos through increased employment opportunities 
and wages for low skilled people will be concentrated shortly after opening. Also law 
enforcement agencies can frequently use casino openings to leverage greater immediate 
staffing increases, but are unable to sustain this growth. This effect further reduces the 
immediate impact of casinos on crime. However, over time these effects are dominated 
by casino-related factors that increase crime. Specifically, problem and pathological 
gamblers commit crimes as they deplete their resources, non residents who visit casinos 
may both commit and be victims of crime, and casino induced changes in the population 
start small but grow. The data show that these crime inducing and crime mitigating 
effects off set each other shortly after opening, but over time the crime-raising effects 
dominate and crime increases in subsequent years.‖185 
Although Grinols and Mustard regard their study as the ―…most exhaustive in terms of 
the regions examined, the years covered, and the control variables used,‖186 they are not without 
their critics. Douglas M. Walker, an associate professor of economics at the College of 
Charleston is one.187 He is author of The Economics of Casino Gambling188 and has written 
extensively on the impacts of gambling.189 Walker deemed their results invalid due to ―…a 
variety of serious problems in their data and analysis.‖190 More specifically, Walker faulted them 
for not adequately addressing the seemingly irreconcilable issue of causation: 
―The authors simply compared casino to non-casino counties. But they did not control for 
the volume of tourists, so the crime effect they found may have been caused by tourism 
generally rather than casino tourism specifically. To show a valid link between crime and 
casinos, the authors would have needed to compare casino counties to other counties with 
non-casino tourism.‖191 
Walker states that few, if any, of the researchers whom Grinols and Mustard cite 
acknowledge this issue or properly consider it when formulating their conclusions. The result is 
an overstatement of the social costs of gambling.192 The Grinols and Mustard study, according to 
Walker: 
                                                 
184 Ibid. Grinols and Mustard. 
185 Ibid. p. 44. 
186 Ibid. P. 43. 
187 Walker is a significant contributor to this report, working as a subcontractor to Spectrum Gaming Group 
188 Douglas M. Walker The Economics of Casino Gambling Springer, New York, 2007 
189 See also Douglas M. Walker, Problems in Quantifying the Social Costs and Benefits of Gambling, American Journal of 
Economics and Sociology 66(3) pp. 609 – 645. 
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 Did not account for visitors in calculating the crime rate. 
 Did not distinguish between visitor and resident victims. 
 Did not distinguish between on-premises and off-premises crimes. 
 Use a changing sample of casino counties on which to base their claim that there is a 
―rising trend‖ in crime rates several years following the introduction of casinos. 
It is especially noteworthy that they do not adjust for visitors, and they cannot distinguish 
between casino crime and tourism crime, as is already noted in the report. Additionally, we note 
that their measure is not sensitive to the amount of gambling, the size of casinos, etc. So the 
study treats Clark County, NV, the same as a county in another state that has a single, tiny 
casino. Both would be counted as having casinos, with no distinction between their market sizes. 
 For a more relevant assessment of the link between casinos and crime, Walker cites the 
work of B. Grant Stitt, Mark Nichols and David Giacopassi. They compared the crime rates of 
six new casino communities to the rates found in six non-casino
 
control communities. The 
communities were matched on 15 socioeconomic variables. Conventional thinking was that 
crime would be expected to rise in the casino communities, consistent with the belief that casinos 
serve as magnets for crime.
 
Instead, the effects of casinos on crime appear to
 
be related to a 
variety of poorly understood variables. In some casino communities crime rates rose 
significantly, in some they remained relatively stable,
 
and in others it decreased. However, their 
analysis yielded few consistent findings. Their conclusion is worth noting in its entirety: 
―The fact that the [research] results are mixed suggests that there may be some 
contextual factors operating in some communities that allow for casinos to positively 
affect crime under certain, as yet unknown, circumstances. At the same time there is no 
way of knowing whether the apparent casino effect, when present, is a direct one. 
―When a casino opens in a community, it often changes the nature of the community in 
a multitude of ways, both positively (e.g., stimulating the economy and adding 
employment and entertainment options) and negatively (e.g., adding traffic congestion, 
altering traditional patterns of interaction, and introducing large numbers of 
nonresidents into a community). The interplay of these and other factors (location, size, 
and number of casinos; state gaming regulations; law enforcement policies; etc.) vary 
by jurisdiction and may well determine the effect of the casino on crime in the 
community. Finally, in those instances where crimes have increased suggesting a 
possible casino effect, it will be very difficult to determine if the increase is due to 
casino-related factors or increased tourism, which has been linked to increases in crime 
in other studies. Clearly more research is needed to clarify the relationship of casinos to 
crime. At this point, however, it can be concluded that comparing multiple jurisdictions 
where casino gambling has been introduced and comparing them to matched control 
jurisdictions reveals that crime does not appear to be an inevitable or necessary product 
of casino presence.”193  
                                                 
193 Crime & Delinquency, Vol. 49, No. 2, 253-284 ―Does the Presence of Casinos Increase Crime? An Examination of Casino 
and Control Communities,‖ by B. Grant Stitt, Mark Nichols, David Giacopassi, (2003) 
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 Two Ohio University researchers, William J. Miller and Martin D. Swartz, who studied 
the relationship between casino gambling and street crime, recognized the need to account for 
the effects of increased tourism in their 1999 study. They concluded: 
―We have not found here any compelling evidence to suggest that there is something 
unique about casinos that cause an increase in street crime in the surrounding area. Of 
course, with increased people traffic, it is entirely likely that raw numbers of crime will 
go up. With tourists walking around with large amounts of money and expensive 
equipment, often vulnerable because of alcohol and their behavior, it should not be 
surprising that more crimes will be committed. Most important of all, if large numbers of 
new hotel and motel rooms are built, particularly if little security is provided and it 
becomes known that people are leaving valuables (jewelry, cameras, winnings) in these 
rooms, then an increase in burglary should not be unexpected… So far there is no reason 
to believe that gambling casinos are different from any other tourist attraction in this 
regard.‖194 
The experience in the state of Connecticut further illustrates the vague and ambiguous 
relationship between casino gambling and crime. The following chart from a 2000 report by the 
Connecticut Center for Economic Analysis at the University of Connecticut shows changes in 
the crime rate in the town of Ledyard, CT, following the 1993 opening of Foxwoods. 
 
  In-casino crime Out-of-casino crime Total crimes 
1990      -        -     214  
1991      -        -     214  
1992      -        -     283  
1993     496      535   1,031  
1994    1,212      573   1,785  
1995    1,231      542   1,773  
1996     828      523   1,351  
1997     757      541   1,298  
1998     989      364   1,353  
Source: Connecticut Division of State Police 
 
A casual reading of this data would likely lead to the conclusion that Foxwoods was the 
proximate cause of significantly increased crime in the Ledyard area. In reviewing this data, the 
authors of the University of Connecticut report analyzed the data in a broader perspective, 
writing: 
―Public opposition to the spread of casino gaming has been driven mainly by fears of 
adverse social impacts. Some examples are neighborhood crime issues linked to casinos, 
such as robberies, larceny, loan sharking, and drug dealing. A study covering 1990 to 
1998 (The Connecticut Economy, Summer 1999) shows that over these years the crime 
rate decreased statewide by 29.7 percent. In the New London Labor Market Area alone it 
has declined by 10.8 percent. According to the study, the crime rate in Ledyard has 
                                                 
194 William J. Miller and Martin D. Swartz, ―Casino Gambling and Street Crime,‖ The ANNALS of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, Vol. 556, No. 1, p. 135. (1998) 
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increased by more than 300 percent. However, if we disaggregate the total crime in the 
Town of Ledyard as ‗in casino‘ and ‗out of casino‘ crimes, then it is true that crime in 
Ledyard per thousand people has increased by only 70 percent. In North Stonington the 
crime rate has increased by 14 percent and in Preston it decreased by 31 percent 
measured as crimes per thousand people. … 
―However, considering ‗out of casino‘ crimes only, the effect of Foxwoods Resort Casino 
on crime in the area is minimal. The statistics for crimes (as shown in the data provided 
by the Department of Public Safety) in the years 1990 to 1992 does not take into account 
Part II crimes, such as ‗disorderly conduct‘, ‗driving under the influence‘, ‗runaways‘ and 
‗vandalism‘, which contribute approximately 50 percent of the crimes committed in the 
three towns from 1993 to 1998. In fact, the abrupt jump in number of crimes from the 
year 1992 to 1993 is mainly due to the addition of Part II crimes described above. Thus, 
crime estimates as given by the Department of Public Safety for these years are biased 
downwards. In fact, the total number of ‘out of casino’ crimes in Ledyard declined from 
535 in 1993 to 364 in 1998. ‘In casino’ crimes also show a decline from 1,212 in 1994 to 
989 in 1998 with 60 percent of them being larceny.”195 (Emphasis added) 
The Connecticut State Police is an agency charged with policing both the interior and 
exterior of Foxwoods and the state‘s other casino, the neighboring Mohegan Sun. According to 
Sgt. J. Paul Vance, the State Police does find that the activity of casino gaming is responsible for 
an increase in crime. ―Certainly there is some crime that does occur due to the sheer volume of 
people that frequent both facilities – from petty larceny to assaults – but we would expect that 
with any large venue.‖ Vance added, ―The other side of the coin is that they are gaming facilities, 
which involve people carrying cash in or away from those facilities. We recognize there may be 
certain preyers [sic] attempting to prey on these folks to relieve them of their funds.‖ 196 
 As we have shown, the social science literature is contradictory and inconclusive and 
does not help to clarify the relationship between gambling and crime. Spectrum Gaming Group 
believes that the Atlantic City experience, which is often cited negatively in the Massachusetts 
gambling debate, may help to provide one with a better understanding of the uncertain nature of 
this issue.  
 Atlantic City is a region with which Spectrum Gaming Group is intimately familiar, 
having worked in it for nearly three decades. We have analyzed the available data, and suggest 
that multiple factors must be taken into account when examining this sensitive issue.  
 There are several reasons why Atlantic City is relevant to this debate: 
 Atlantic City is indeed a classic example of a community with a lopsided ratio of 
visitors to residents. According to the South Jersey Transportation Authority, 33.3 
million people visited Atlantic City in 2007,197 which, according to the U.S. Census 
                                                 
195 ―The Economic Impact of the Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation Operations on Connecticut,‖ By Fred Carstensen, William 
Lott, Stan McMillen, Bobur Alimov, Na Li Dawson, Tapas Ray, November 28, 2000, Connecticut Center For Economic 
Analysis, University of Connecticut. 
196 Interview conducted by Spectrum Gaming Group September 8, 2005 
197 South Jersey Transportation Authority Website Press Release33.3 Million Trip Visits to Atlantic City in 2007 March 26, 2008  
www.sjta.com.  
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has a permanent population of only 40,385 residents. In previous years, the number 
of visitors reached approximately 35 million. 
 Casinos are a dominant part of the tourism industry in the Atlantic City area, but 
they are not the entire industry. Nor are casinos the sole attractions. The city‘s 
convention facilities are among the largest and most modern in the nation. During 
warmer months, millions converge on the region to enjoy its beaches, dining 
opportunities, shopping and seashore attractions. Other communities in the region, 
such as nearby Cape May in the south, have their own unique and historic 
attractions. Collectively, these communities further swell the ratio of visitors to 
year-round residents. 
 Atlantic City is an older urban center, prone to many of the same socio-economic 
problems that plague other such cities.  
 Atlantic City is a small community, not just in population but in total area. It is 48 
blocks long, hardly a neighborhood in some bigger cities. The Atlantic City region, 
on the other hand, encompasses two entire counties, and includes vast stretches of 
rural and agricultural land, as well as suburban communities. 
The latter two points are critically important to any understanding of data coming from 
Atlantic City.  
In 1976, New Jersey voters approved a constitutional amendment and legalized casino 
gaming ―as a unique tool of urban redevelopment for Atlantic City.‖198 At that time, the city was 
arguably was one of the worst suffering urban centers in the United States. Its unemployment 
rate reached 40 percent in the winter and it had the third-highest concentration of public housing 
in the nation. It had effectively lost its tourism industry and was plagued by seemingly 
intractable problems tied to urban poverty, from drugs to gang violence to street crime to teenage 
pregnancy199. 
Casino gambling provided a means to address many of these problems. However, many 
of these problems are not unique to Atlantic City. They are national in scope and endemic to 
older urban areas. Their lingering presence today cannot be linked to any causal relationship with 
casinos. They are part of the current fabric of urban America. Many who are familiar with 
Atlantic City‘s pre casino era believe these problems would be far worse in the absence of the 
city‘s casino industry.  
In Atlantic City, the relationship between casinos and crime remains unclear and subject 
to different feasible explanations. How much of it is due to an entrenched underclass, or to the 
exorbitant number of visitors who go there or to the very nature of gambling?  
The New Jersey Casino Control Commission, in a report to the 1999 National Gambling 
Impact Study Commission, looked at Atlantic County‘s crime statistics and concluded that if the 
daily non resident population of Atlantic City was taken into account, Atlantic City was safer 
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than it is was before the first casino opened nearly 20 years earlier.200 This is illustrated well in 
the following chart, which tracks the first 15-year history of gaming in Atlantic City: 
 
 
This view was reiterated by former Atlantic County Prosecutor Jeffrey Blitz. In 
commenting at the time on the 1998 Uniform Crime Report that showed that although crime fell 
by 11 percent in Atlantic County, the county‘s crime rate appeared to be the highest in the state. 
Blitz believed that crime should not be measured per 1,000 year round residents in Atlantic City. 
This figure did not take in account the enormous number of visitors who came to Atlantic City, 
especially during the summer season. According to Blitz, ―With that skewed figuring Atlantic 
County and Atlantic City will always have the highest crime rate.‖201  
Peter Reuter of the School of Public Affairs at the University of Maryland provided 
scholarly support for this position. In a 1997 study he noted:  
―Certainly the overall crime in Atlantic City has increased greatly since the introduction 
of casinos; by the standard measure of crimes per capita, it has become the most crime-
ridden city in the nation. Whereas in 1977, Atlantic City ranked as number 50 among 
U.S. cities with populations of more than 25,000, within two years after the introduction 
of large-scale casinos in 1978, it led the nation. … However, the claims about Atlantic 
City usually ignore the fact that the population base for these calculations by the FBI is 
simply the number of residents, as is always the case for crime statistics. The resident 
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population in recent years has been about 37,000. Each day now, approximately 80,000 
visitors come to the casinos, offering targets for crime, as well as potential offenders.‖202 
Reuter highlights the most common misconception about the relationship between 
casinos and crime. Our over 25 years of experience in Atlantic City is that the growth in crime 
from a pre-casino era to a casino era can be attributed to the growth in visitation, as well as to 
generally improved economic conditions in which people with more money attract more 
criminals. 
Based on a careful review of the literature, it cannot be conclusively deduced that casino 
gambling, in and of itself, fosters increased criminal activity. Instead, increased criminal activity 
is related more to an increase in the number of visitors descending upon a given area.  
 A 1997 report by Jeremy Margolis, a former Director of the Illinois State Police and 
Assistant United States Attorney in Chicago, who also testified before the National Gambling 
Impact Study Commission, offers further corroboration:  
―A thorough consideration of the literature indicates that there is little valid evidence to 
support the notion that the presence of casino gaming in a community has any meaningful 
impact on crime rates. The literature shows that communities with casinos are just as safe 
as communities that do not have casinos. Many jurisdictions hosting a single casino or a 
small number of casinos experience no increase in crimes or crime rates following the 
introduction of casino gaming. In some cases, the numbers of crimes actually decrease, as 
do crime rates. Where the number of crimes has increased following the introduction of 
gaming – a scenario sometimes experienced where clusters of casinos have commenced 
operations or in very small host communities – the increase in the number of crimes is 
not due to gaming per se, but simply because of the additional population present and, 
therefore, at risk in these communities. That is, when the increased population is properly 
accounted for, there is no increase in crime rates when comparing pre and post-casino 
periods. Increases in the number of crimes, if they do occur, are primarily limited to 
traffic violations and property claims, often of the petty variety.‖203 
It is interesting to note that in the case of Atlantic City, a curious fact appears to further 
undermine the argument that casino gambling increases crime. Throughout most of the 1990s, as 
Atlantic City‘s casino industry matured, the crime rate went down.204 The decrease in the crime 
rate was attributed to better law enforcement cooperation and techniques.205 It is this point that 
must be borne in mind. The crime rate in a community with expanded gambling opportunities 
can be mitigated through good law enforcement leadership, support and practices. 
  
  
                                                 
202 ―The Impact of Casinos on Crime and Other Social Issues,‖ by Peter Reuter, School of Public Affairs, University of 
Maryland, 1997. 
203 Jeremy Margolis, Altheimer & Gray, ―Casinos and Crime: An Analysis of the Evidence, 1997 prepared for the American 
Gaming Association, December, 1997, p. 59. 
204 Pete McAleer, ―Crime Continues to Drop in Atlantic City, Atlantic County,‖ The Press of Atlantic City, June 21, 1999, p. C1. 
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Number of Violent Crimes Reported by Atlantic City by Year and Total 
   Population 
Murder/ 
Manslaughter Rape Robbery Assault Total 
1980 38,239 11 51 644 331 1,037 
1985 38,623 8 36 562 390 996 
1990 37,986 14 69 662 654 1,399 
1995 36,752 15 42 554 338 949 
2000 40,517 11 30 279 210 530 
2001 40,854 5 33 255 450 743 
2002 41,364 5 21 283 354 663 
2003 40,397 5 23 276 296 600 
2004 40,668 5 37 308 342 692 
2005 40,669 9 44 374 326 753 
2006 40,399 18 46 355 423 842 
 
Number of Non-Violent Crimes Reported by Atlantic City by Year and Total  
 Population Burglary Larceny Theft Vehicle Theft Total Property 
Crime 
1980 38,239 1,620 7,993 1,197 10,810 
1985 38,623 1,657 11,463 707 13,827 
1990 37,986 1,401 11,174 522 13,097 
1995 36,752 1,245 7,554 354 9,153 
2000 40,517 675 5,621 237 6,533 
2001 40,854 688 5,168 178 6,034 
2002 41,364 482 4,031 169 4,682 
2003 40,397 596 4,094 164 4,854 
2004 40,668 599 3,871 179 4,649 
2005 40,669 556 3,838 154 4,548 
2006 40,399 507 3,148 204 3,859 
Source: www.disastercenter.com/: New Jersey Law Enforcement Agency Uniform Crime Reports 1980 to 2006. 
A careful study of the literature shows that any direct relationship between the 
introduction of casino gambling in a community and an increase in crime is unclear and often 
contradictory. However, communities that successfully introduce casino gaming are likely to 
experience an attendant increase in the number of tourists that will descend upon that 
community. An increase in the number of tourists coming to a given area is likely to result in an 
increase in crime.  
Consider that a successful casino that generates 10,000 visitor trips a day – including 
overnight guests – is essentially adding that number of adults to the general population. Most 
will be driving, adding a significant traffic burden. Because casinos serve alcohol in a variety of 
outlets ranging from restaurants and nightclubs to the casino floor itself, the demands also will 
increase for law-enforcement to increase vigilance to deal with drivers who may be under the 
influence of alcohol. 
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The dilemma for Massachusetts is that, for the most part, resources at the state level are 
often allocated to local communities based on population, as one objective measure, yet 
visitation rarely factors in to population estimates. Additionally, one concern expressed by the 
Massachusetts District Attorneys Association is that political representation is largely a function 
of population as well, thus giving densely populated areas a louder voice when it comes to 
demanding resources. 
Spectrum suggests that visitation must be taken into account when allocating resources, 
particularly when it comes to funding law enforcement. The following guidelines for staffing a 
local law-enforcement agency have been developed by the U.S. Department of Justice: 
 
Population Served  Full-Time Officers Per 1,000 
Residents (avg. ratio) 
50,000 or more  2.5  
100,000 to 249,999  1.9  
50,000 to 99,999  1.8  
25,000 to 49,999  1.8  
10,000 to 24,999 2.0 
2,500 to 9,999 2.2 
1,000 to 2,499 2.6 
All Sizes 2.5 
By this measure, a community that hosts a casino would require between 20 and 25 
additional full-time officers for every 10,000 daily visitors, based on the notion that the 
increment in population should be judged by the average daily visitation. However, there are 
factors that would mitigate that. A number of visitors would arrive by bus, which reduces the 
number of vehicles, as well as the potential for driving while intoxicated. 
In general, casinos also tend to mitigate some of the direct costs of public safety since for 
the most part they provide for their own security and public safety needs. They are constructed 
with state-of-the-art security and surveillance systems as well as fire detection and suppression 
equipment. As a condition of approval, casinos have often agreed to pay local governments for 
the costs of any additional equipment a community might need, such as a new fire apparatus, an 
ambulance, or a police substation. 
With those factors in mind, Massachusetts should consider mitigation funding based on 
no more than 20 officers for every 10,000 daily visitors for host communities. Depending on the 
locations, of course, the number of communities that could qualify for such funding will vary.  
Experience has shown that the crime rate in communities with casino gambling can be 
more effectively addressed by good law enforcement policies, procedures and administration. 
Law enforcement officials should identify, study, and when possible, replicate such techniques in 
their home communities. Increased police presence and community outreach, public safety 
awareness campaigns, inter-local cooperation and a positive relationship with casino security 
personnel, should be an essential part of this. 
The social, demographic and urban/suburban nature of a community may have a 
profound effect on the relationship between gambling and crime. Communities interested in a 
casino development should carefully evaluate their social, physical and municipal governmental 
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infrastructure, as well as citizen attitudes about gambling, before proceeding with a casino 
initiative.  
 Additional funding to mitigate the increased costs of crime should be based upon actual 
need and not allocated according to a predetermined amount. According to one study, a gambling 
community can anticipate a significant increase in E-911 calls, demands for additional temporary 
holding cells, prisoner transportation, municipal court facilities and additional street patrols.206 
Such additional expenses were estimated to be at least $500,000 annually in Middleborough.207 
To take a different, more universal approach to this question, we recognize that – as no 
locations for potential destination resorts have been determined – the Commonwealth needs to 
know whether such additional funding, based on need, is affordable within the context of three 
resort destinations. 
With that in mind, we assume that each police and sheriff patrol officer‘s salary is 
$51,850, based on the Boston wage scale. If we assume an additional 50 percent increment to 
cover benefits and other ancillary costs, the total annual cost per officer would be $77,775. 
If each of 10,000 visitors loses $125 per day,208 at a tax rate of 27 percent, the cost of 20 
officers per every 10,000 visitors would be 1.3 percent of the annual gambling revenue tax 
generated by that daily average. 
We tested these assumptions with a sensitivity analysis, examining the percentage of tax 
revenue that would be required to fund additional police officers by changing two key variables: 
 The multiple of salary that would be required to fund the necessary positions. 
 The number of patrol positions required to meet the needs of this visitor base. 
 
Pct. Of gaming tax needed to fund additional officers, per 10,000 daily visitors, per community 
  Multiple of average salary to determine cost 
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 20 1.3% 1.3% 1.4% 1.5% 1.7% 
22 1.4% 1.5% 1.6% 1.7% 1.9% 
24 1.5% 1.6% 1.7% 1.8% 2.0% 
26 1.6% 1.8% 1.9% 2.0% 2.2% 
28 1.8% 1.9% 2.0% 2.1% 2.4% 
30 1.9% 2.0% 2.1% 2.3% 2.5% 
 
  
                                                 
206 Middleborough Casino Gambling Study Committee, ―Community Impact Analysis and Mitigation of a Casino Resort in the 
Town of Middleborough, Massachusetts, July 23, 2007. pp. 4-5.  
207 Ibid. p. 4. 
208 Note that is a conservative estimate. In Atlantic City, the average daily gaming revenue per visit is $150, according to Gaming 
Industry Observer, a Spectrum publication that tracks this data. 
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We tested these assumptions further, examining the percentage of tax revenue that would 
be required to fund additional police officers by altering the key variables: 
 The multiple of salary that would be required to fund the necessary positions. 
 The daily gross gaming revenue generated per visitor. 
Pct. Of gaming tax needed to fund additional officers, per 10,000 daily visitors, per community 
 
  Multiple of average salary to determine cost 
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$130 1.2% 1.3% 1.4% 1.5% 1.6% 
$120 1.3% 1.4% 1.5% 1.6% 1.8% 
$110 1.4% 1.5% 1.6% 1.7% 1.9% 
$90 1.8% 1.9% 2.0% 2.1% 2.3% 
$80 2.0% 2.1% 2.2% 2.4% 2.6% 
$70 2.3% 2.4% 2.6% 2.7% 3.0% 
The two tables above illustrate some critical points that must be considered when 
evaluating the need to fund community services: 
 While the legislation we have analyzed focuses on a percentage of gaming revenue 
that would be earmarked for mitigation funding, the real need for such funding will 
be determined by the number of people drawn to a property, particularly with respect 
to the number of visitors. In other words, a property that attracts fewer visitors who 
stay longer and spend more per visit would create less of a demand for public services 
than one that focuses on high volume and low spending per visit. 
 This means that the bidding process must evaluate each applicant, in large measure, 
on its commitment to develop a destination resort, rather than a convenience-driven 
property. As this analysis shows, the Commonwealth and all impacted communities 
have an abiding interest in gaming policies that focus on high-end visitation. 
This analysis indicates that, in the worst case we have envisioned, the cost of additional 
law-enforcement resources would require no more than 3 percent of the tax on gaming to fully 
fund the demand for each community. Realistically, however, the need for law enforcement and 
related funding would likely be no more than 1.3 percent, based on ensuring a relatively high 
quality visitor. 
We caution, however, that the number of communities potentially impacted by casinos is 
impossible to ascertain in advance of knowing the location, project scope, ease of access or other 
factors for any of three destination resorts. Therefore, we suggest that the bidding process should 
require all applicants to take a broad view when defining their local community. At the same 
time, the Commonwealth would have an abiding interest – in terms of reducing costs and 
reducing the negative impact of gaming – in ensuring a relative ease of access to highways, 
airports, rail lines and any other means of transit that would limit automobile traffic on local 
roads. 
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Problem and pathological gambling  
The 1976 Federal Commission on Gambling began its report with this simple, 
straightforward observation: ―Gambling is inevitable. No matter what is said or done by 
advocates or opponents of gambling in all its various forms, it is an activity that is practiced, or 
tacitly endorsed, by a substantial majority of Americans.‖209 In effect, the commission was 
suggesting that gambling has deep cultural and historic roots in America. At the time the report 
was issued in the 1970s, the American public was becoming more familiar and accepting of a 
growing variety of legalized gambling practices. It was in this context that the Commission, 
conducting one of the first authoritative and substantive studies of this topic, issued its blunt 
observation. 
If it was ―inevitable‖ that people would seek ways to gamble, then, some believed, it was 
incumbent upon government to minimize its negative impacts and maximize its benefits. At that 
time, the Commission estimated that less than one percent of the U.S. population were probable 
―compulsive‖ gamblers, the term that was in use then. It was not until 1980 that pathological 
gambling was first included as a mental health disorder in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders (DSM), the official publication of the American Psychiatric Association. 
In issuing its final report, the Federal Commission on Gambling helped to usher in a new 
era in American gambling. Their report was written at a time when casinos were only legal in 
Nevada and problem gambling was looked upon more as a moral failure rather than a mental 
illness. Today, 32 years later, only two states — Utah and Hawaii — do not have some form of 
legalized gambling. The other 48 states now offer one or more types of gambling opportunities 
ranging from tribal and commercial casino to lotteries and pari-mutuel wagering. Forty-three 
states have lotteries, mostly marketed as a way to fund education.210 It is within this context of 
continually increasing gambling locales and varieties of gambling that problem and pathological 
gambling must be analyzed.  
The impact of a state‘s gambling policy transcends its jurisdictional boundaries. It also 
renders a careful study of the impact of a state‘s gambling policy more difficult since the type of 
gaming offered in a nearby state may be the cause of one‘s gambling problem rather than the 
style offered locally. We do not imply that a particular type of gaming can be ―the cause‖ of 
pathological gambling. This is not the case, since the behavioral problems associated with 
pathological gambling result from an impulse control disorder or addictive behavioral pathology 
that can manifest itself in various ways, not just in gambling. The gambling is the means by 
which this problem is expressed. The accessibility of a means that is particularly attractive to the 
individual (i.e., nearby existence of a type of gambling they enjoy) just helps to enable the 
behavior, but does not cause it.211 
                                                 
209 Ibid. Commission on the Review of the National Policy Toward Gambling, Gambling in America, Final Report p. 1 
210 America Gaming Association, 2007 State of the States. 
211 Lesieur HR, Rosenthal RJ. Pathological gambling: a review of the literature (prepared for the American Psychiatric 
Association task force on DSM-IV committee on disorders of impulse control not elsewhere classified). J Gambling, Stud. 
1991;7:5-39. 
Rosenthal, R. The categorization of pathological gambling and the Impulse-Control Disorders Not Elsewhere Classified. 
Proceedings of the 19th annual conference on prevention, research, and treatment of problem gambling. June 23–25, 2005, New 
Orleans, Louisiana. National Council on Problem Gambling, Washington, DC. 
Grant JE, Kim SW. Demographic and clinical features of 131 adult pathological gamblers. J Clin Psychiatry 2001;62:957-962. 
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According to one study: 
―The availability of legal gambling has increased sharply in the past 20 years. More 
people are gambling, and they are wagering more. As a result, there is increased concern 
about pathological gambling. Clinical evidence suggests that pathological gamblers 
engage in destructive behaviors: they commit crimes, they run up large debts, they 
damage relationships with family and friends, and they kill themselves. With the 
increased availability of gambling and new gambling technologies, pathological 
gambling has the potential to become even more widespread. A greater understanding of 
this problem through scientific research is critical. Recent methodological and theoretical 
advances in epidemiology, medicine, and the social and behavioral sciences should aid 
this understanding.‖212 
How to manage negative social impacts is clearly an area of critical concern to 
Massachusetts regardless of whether the Commonwealth legalizes casino gaming in any form. A 
successful approach lies in developing responsive and effective public policies and industry 
programs to prevent and reduce gambling-related problems. At the same time, such policies 
should encourage capital investment, increased employment, tax revenues, more tourism and 
other public policy goals 
In an interview, Kathleen M. Scanlan, Executive Director, Massachusetts Council on 
Compulsive Gambling, spoke frankly and knowledgeably about the challenges that various 
forms of gambling readily available to the citizens of Massachusetts impose upon her 
organization.213 Currently available local opportunities to gamble include four race tracks, state 
lotteries, keno, one floating casino that cruises beyond U.S. territorial waters, and nearby casinos 
in neighboring states. Scanlan also noted that obsessive stock market trading and illegal 
wagering such as sports betting are other types of gambling behaviors affect her caseload as well. 
Scanlan believes that, at the present time, resources to address compulsive gambling in 
Massachusetts could be expanded. The primary source of funding for this purpose is unclaimed 
lottery winnings that amount to approximately $1 million a year. She further stated that treatment 
centers are not funded in the most optimal manner and she believes such centers to be under-
developed and under-used. The centers are paid on per client or fee-for-service basis. Getting 
clients the treatment they need is very important, especially since new therapies are showing 
much promise, she said. 
Scanlan stated that the Council‘s greatest concern is that increased gambling 
opportunities will arise in Massachusetts without adequate safeguards in place to protect 
vulnerable individuals. With an expansion of gaming in the state, Scanlan predicts that there will 
be an initial bulge in individuals with gambling-related problems that will level off over time. 
Similar type increases were seen with the introduction of keno and casino gaming in 
Connecticut. Gambling problems within specific population groups were also discussed. 
                                                 
212 Committee on the Social and Economic Impact of Pathological Gambling, National Research Council, ―Pathological 
Gambling: A Critical Review,‖ Executive Summary,  http://books.nap.edu/catalog/6329.html, p. 3.  
213 Interview conducted by Spectrum Gaming, Boston Massachusetts, March 13, 2008. 
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Nineteen percent of adolescents and 16 percent of college students are said to experience such 
problems.214 
The Massachusetts Council on Compulsive Gambling instituted a 24-hour Helpline in 
1987, and since 1989, state law required that all gambling outlets post the number.215 The Council 
reports receiving 1,472 calls to its Helpline in Fiscal 2007, which ended June 30, 2007. The 
following chart summarizes the type of calls received: 
 
 
 
As the chart shows, the great majority of such calls came from people who had gambled 
in either the lottery or casinos. 
Since Massachusetts does not have casinos, this high percentage – about one-third – 
would support the argument made that other states that do have casinos are effectively exporting 
the treatment costs for such gamblers. The following chart lists the 12 most prevalent forms of 
gambling cited by Helpline callers: 
                                                 
214 Shaffer, H.J., and Korn, D.A. (2002) Gambling and Related Mental Disorders: A Public Health Analysis. Annual Review of 
Public Health. 23, 171-212. 
215 Massachusetts Council on Compulsive Gambling 
45%
34%
11%
5% 4%
1%
Callers to Massachusetts Council on Compulsive Gambling 
Helpline participated in these forms of gambling:  
Lottery
Casino
Sports
Pari-mutuel
Internet
Stock market
Source: Massachusetts Council on Compulsive Gambling, Fiscal 2007 
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The table below, from the council, lists the county of residence for 867 callers who 
volunteered their place of residence: 
 
County No. of callers who reside 
there 
Berkshire 12 
Franklin 8 
Hampshire 12 
Hampden 45 
Worcester 132 
Middlesex 186 
Essex 85 
Suffolk 128 
Norfolk 86 
Plymouth 63 
Bristol 89 
Barnstable 21 
Source: Massachusetts Council on Compulsive Gambling 
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A number of public officials and legislators reinforced Scanlan‘s point that adequate 
funding must be provided for problem gamblers. 
Studies216 have found that: 
 Most social costs result from individuals with low to intermediate (levels 1 and 2) 
symptom patterns. 
 Problem gamblers are more responsive to intervention programs than pathological 
gamblers. 
Problem gambling funds, under the proposal, would come from the Public Health 
Mitigation Fund, which would receive 2.5 percent of gross casino revenues. The administration 
expects that figure to total $50 million, while our estimate (based on our moderate case scenario) 
would be closer to $37.5 million. And while either figure is impressive, it is important to note 
that the money is to split among three areas: 
 Prevention and treatment of gambling-related problems 
 Domestic violence and child welfare services 
 Education and prevention campaigns 
Even an equal split among the three areas would likely make Massachusetts the state with 
the highest dollar contribution to problem gambling.  
While it would not be reasonable to expect all of the available funds to be used for 
compulsive gambling treatment, it is important that it receive a substantial amount of money 
from the Public Health Mitigation Fund as problem gambling was a universal concern of almost 
everyone we interviewed about the casino proposal. 
  
                                                 
216 Ibid 
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The following chart lists funding by state: 
 
 
Sources:  
Connecticut: Source: Connecticut Lottery Corporation, Year: FY 2008  
Indiana: Indiana Gaming Commission, Year: FY 2007  
Iowa: Iowa Department of Public Health, Iowa Gambling Treatment Program, Year: FY 2008 
Kansas: Kansas Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services, Year: FY 2008 
Louisiana: Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, Office of Addictive Disorders, Year: FY 2008 
Massachusetts: Massachusetts Council on Compulsive Gambling, Year: FY 2008 
Michigan: Michigan Department of Community Health, Year: FY 2008 
Missouri: Missouri Department of Mental Health, Year: FY 2007 
Mississippi: Mississippi Council on Problem and Compulsive Gambling, Year: FY 2008 
Nevada: Nevada Department of Health and Human Services, Year: FY 2008 
New Jersey: Council on Compulsive Gambling of New Jersey, Year: FY 2008 
Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board, Year: FY 2008 
Indiana, which has a population roughly the same as Massachusetts,
217
 puts $4.2 million 
each year into its Problem Gamblers Fund, with half being used for substance abuse treatment, as 
noted in the chart above. With that in mind, the Indiana experience may provide useful insights 
for policy makers in Massachusetts. What‘s little known about the Problem Gamblers Fund is 
that half of the money that goes into it is used for substance abuse treatment. In some years, as 
little as a quarter of the Problem Gamblers Fund was used for problem gamblers.
218
 
                                                 
217 U.S. Census Bureau estimate for 2006. Massachusetts, 6,437,193; Indiana, 6,313,520  
218 Interview May 5, 2008 with Jerry Long, executive director of Indiana Council on Problem Gambling 
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Indiana has 11 riverboat casinos. In addition, two racinos are expected to open in June 
2008. The chart shows trends over the three most recent years that were available from the 
Indiana Council on Problem Gambling. In that time, one new casino in French Lick has opened. 
The state now has 11 casinos. Two racinos with 2,000 slot machines each are expected to open 
by June 1.  
Intakes are calls to the state‘s hotline deemed to be related to a problem gambler seeking 
assistance. The number of referrals indicates the number of people who were referred to a 
treatment provider. The hotline actually receives many more calls from the general public that 
have nothing to do with problem gambling. They are from patrons seeking information about 
gambling. 
 
The Indiana Council on Problem Gambling lobbied its state administration earlier this 
year to agree to use 100 percent of the Problem Gamblers Fund for the treatment of problem 
gamblers. The agreement will be phased in over the next five years. In addition, the Legislature 
passed a bill requiring the two new racinos to each contribute $500,000 to the fund.
219
 
The council‘s executive director, Jerry Long, noted that, as a result, the amount used for 
treatment of compulsive gamblers will eventually total $5.2 million, more than double what it 
currently is. He said Massachusetts would be wise to avoid the controversy that developed in 
Indiana by mandating a specific percent or amount that will be given each year to combat 
problem gambling. Long is hopeful that the increased funds in Indiana will enable the state to 
use trained crisis counselors. The current practice, he said, is to use referral operators. Another 
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problem, he noted, is that it takes far too long, sometimes as much as two weeks, to get a 
problem gambler into treatment. That should happen within 48 hours, he said. 
―The current Indiana law only allows the state to pay for treatment for problem gamblers 
with incomes of less than $20,000,‖ Long said. That figure is way too low as it rules out any 
middle class person, he noted. In five years, after Indiana increases its funding level to more than 
$5 million, Long said income limits will be removed. According to Long, the cost of treatment 
per individual in Indiana averages around $2,500. 
In New Jersey, the state allocated less than $1 million dollars in the most recent fiscal 
year for problem gambling. Almost all of it came from fines assessed against casino operators. 
The problem gamblers there are referred to a certified group counselor for up to 25 sessions at a 
cost of $85 per session. There are no income limits.
220
 
Long suggested Massachusetts would do well to create a program with no income limits 
as well. His point about mandating a certain percent or amount for problem gaming is well taken. 
Such a move would guarantee the program a stable source of funding. 
While the Massachusetts Council on Compulsive Gambling does not take a position 
either for or opposed to gambling as such, they do demand responsible public policy. According 
to the Council: 
―Responsible public policy takes into account that there is a downside associated with 
gambling, makes provisions to limit unintended negative consequences, and assures help 
for those who are harmed through gambling. To increase opportunities to gamble and, at 
the same time, not have adequate safety measures in place creates a particularly risky 
situation. Increases in gambling opportunities need to be matched by increased awareness 
of risk, increased prevention initiatives and increased resources for help. With gambling 
available at present in Massachusetts and in considering expanding it, the Commonwealth 
needs to make a strong commitment to a full array of services that include a continuum of 
prevention, intervention and treatment strategies.‖221 
Considerations of co-morbidity: 
Addressing the challenge of problem and pathological gambling is complicated by the 
fact that an individual may be plagued by preexisting behavioral disorders such as drug and 
alcohol problems as well as other types of mental illnesses. Once again, the question of causation 
is raised. Simply noting that certain types of behavioral disorders are associated with gambling 
does not necessarily mean that gambling caused them.  
This factor was cited by the 1999 National Gambling Impact Study Commission which 
noted: 
―Pathological gambling often occurs in conjunction with other behavioral problems, 
including substance abuse, mood disorders, and personality disorders. The joint 
occurrence of two or more psychiatric problems — termed co-morbidity — is an 
important, though complicating factor in studying the basis of this disorder. Is problem or 
pathological gambling a unique pathology that exists on its own or is it merely a 
                                                 
220 Interview with Jeff Beck, managerial assistant for the New Jersey Council on Compulsive Gambling 
221 Massachusetts Council on Compulsive Gambling, ―Problem Gambling Services in Massachusetts,‖ January 14, 2008. 
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symptom of a common predisposition, genetic or otherwise, that underlies all 
addictions?‖222 
 Douglas Walker elaborates upon this point: 
―If gambling were not an option, a person who is predisposed to a pathological disorder 
may manifest his disorder in other unhealthy ways. Many pathological gamblers have 
other behavioral disorders – coexisting disorders or co-morbidity as it is called in the 
literature. Examples include alcohol and drug problems, and mood and anxiety disorders. 
If pathological gambling is simply a symptom of some more basic disorder, then, it is the 
more basic disorder rather than gambling itself that is the underlying cause of the adverse 
consequences and social costs of the pathological gambling…In addition, clinical 
research has shown that a large proportion of pathological gamblers have coexisting 
disorders. The study by Petry, Stinson and Grant (2005) indicates the extent to which 
pathological gamblers have an alcohol use disorder. The lifetime prevalence rate for drug 
use disorders among pathological gamblers is 38.1 percent, and for nicotine dependence 
it is 48.9 percent. Other co-morbid conditions include mood disorders (49.6 percent), 
anxiety disorders (41.3 percent), and obsessive- compulsive personality disorder 
(28.5 percent). … The recent study by Westphal and Johnson (2007) finds that 77 percent 
of their study subjects with a gambling problem had co-occurring behavioral problems, 
and 56 percent had multiple problems.‖223 
The data therefore suggest that individuals who are afflicted with such behavioral issues 
may be more vulnerable to a gambling problem. However, even in the absence of opportunities 
to gamble, they would have to cope with the ramifications of other problem behaviors.  
Whatever the significance of such findings, they should in no way minimize the social 
responsibility and challenges that are associated with problem and pathological gambling. 
However, co-morbidity should be given consideration when determining the social costs related 
to gambling policy. For example, if a person is both an alcoholic and loses his business because 
of a gambling problem, what degree of responsibility should be attributed to the gambling 
problem and what degree to the alcohol problem? Failure to take co-morbid disorders into 
consideration may tend to overstate the impacts of problem gambling and lead to policies and 
programs with limited range and effectiveness.  
 
Problem gambling and bankruptcy 
Bankruptcy is a process under federal law that provides relief from overwhelming 
financial obligations as well as an orderly means for creditors to obtain some degree of payment. 
There is concern whether casinos increase the rate of bankruptcies in the communities that host 
them. This is based on the notion that problem and pathological gamblers accumulate high levels 
of unsustainable debt and declare bankruptcy at higher rates than others who gamble or do not 
gamble at all.  
                                                 
222 The National Gambling Impact Study Commission Final Report, p. 4-3. 
223 Ibid. Walker, American Gaming Association 10th Anniversary White Paper Series, ―Challenges that Confront  Researchers on 
Estimating the Social Costs of Gambling,‖ p. 2. 
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The relationship between the proliferation of gambling and increased bankruptcies was 
noted by Stuart A. Feldman, President of SMR Research Corporation, in a 1999 presentation 
before the House Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law regarding the 
increasing number of bankruptcies in America. Feldman noted that among other factors: 
―The spread of casino gambling appears to be a problem. When we look at bankruptcy 
rates in counties that have major gambling facilities in them, those rates are higher than in 
counties that have no gambling facilities…On the county map in Nevada, the closer you 
come to Las Vegas and Reno, the higher the bankruptcy rate generally gets. In California, 
the highest bankruptcy rates are in San Bernardino and Riverside Counties, which are 
closest to Las Vegas, and the fourth highest rate often is in Sacramento County, closest to 
Reno. In New Jersey, Atlantic County, which is where the casinos are, typically has 
either the  highest bankruptcy rate or one of the two or three highest in the state. In 
Tennessee, the bankruptcy rate is highest in Shelby County, the heart of Memphis, which 
is right across the state line from the Tunica MS casino gambling complex, reportedly the 
largest outside of Nevada.‖ 224 
Three other researchers, John M. Barron, Michael E. Staten, Stephanie M. Wilshusen, 
concluded that the proximity of casino gambling does correlate with higher bankruptcy rates. 
However, they note that although casino gambling does have a more pronounced local impact, 
the proliferation of casino gambling fails to explain much of the rise in bankruptcies during the 
preceding decade.225 
This issue was examined by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) in their 
report to the National Gambling Impact Study Commission in 1999. They noted:  
―Pathological gamblers have clearly elevated rates of indebtedness, both in an absolute 
sense and relative to their income. Indebtedness per person is 25-percent greater than that 
of low-risk gamblers and about 120-percent greater than that of non-gamblers. However, 
the disparity is even greater when debt is compared to income: pathological gamblers 
owe $1.20 for every dollar of annual income, while low-risk and non-gamblers only owe 
$0.80 and $0.60, respectively. In accord with their higher debt, pathological gamblers 
have significantly elevated rates of having ever declared bankruptcy: 19.2 percent, versus 
5.5 percent and 4.2 percent for low-risk and non-gamblers. Again, for problem gamblers 
the story is not as clear. Their average level of indebtedness is actually the lowest of any 
type of gambler; however, they still have an elevated rate of bankruptcy (10.3 percent), 
but this is only marginally statistically significant when compared to the rate among non-
gamblers. On average, excess lifetime losses involved with bankruptcy are about $3,300 
for pathological gamblers and $1,600 for problem gamblers. Almost 19 percent of 
pathological gamblers have ever declared bankruptcy, versus an expected 10.8 percent, 
given their personal characteristics. For problem gamblers, their 10-percent rate compares 
to an expected rate of 6.3 percent.‖226 
                                                 
224 Stuart A. Feldman, President SMR Research Corp., ―The Rise in Personal Bankruptcies: Causes and Impact,‖ Presentation 
before the House Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law, March 10, 1998. 
225 John M. Barron, Michael E. Staten, Stephanie M. Wilshusen (2002) The Impact of Casino Gambling on Personal Bankruptcy 
Filing Rates, Contemporary Economic Policy 20 (4), 440–455 doi:10.1093/cep/20.4.440. This is a revision of a paper presented 
at the western Economic Association international 75th Annual Conference, Vancouver, B.C., June30,2000. 
226  NORC, ―Report to the National Gambling Impact Study Commission, 1999, p. 46. 
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Two Creighton University researchers, Ernie Goss and Edward A. Morse, also studied 
the relationship between casinos and individual bankruptcy rates.227 They analyzed bankruptcy 
filings between 1990 and 2002, a period when bankruptcies grew nationally from 709,967 to 
1,520,717. They noted that during this timeframe changing economic and demographic data 
made the assignment of cause difficult to isolate without an in-depth analysis that would 
disentangle the variables that contribute to higher bankruptcy rates. They also studied impact of 
casinos over time and only focused on the specific county where the casino was located. They 
concluded:  
―Estimates contained in this study show a statistically significant and positive correlation 
between the introduction of legalized casinos in a county and individual bankruptcy rates. 
These effects occur over a time cycle of several years. After small increases in 
bankruptcy rates during the initial years of operation, we estimate that bankruptcy rates in 
a casino county will be lower than a non-casino county for the third through the ninth 
year of operations. Thereafter, the rate differentials between the casino and non-casino 
counties are expected to increase, with casino counties having substantially higher 
bankruptcy experiences than the non-casino counties. These results suggest that the 
bankruptcy impacts from many of the casinos opened during the latter half of the 1990s 
are just beginning to appear, and that the social costs of those impacts  need to be 
considered as further expansions are planned. Estimates from our model show that 
personal bankruptcy rates in a non-casino county increased by 266 percent over a 13-year 
period whereas a county with a casino in operation during this period would experience 
an increase in bankruptcy rates by approximately 325 percent -- a compound annual 
growth rate differential of nearly 2 percent. It should be noted that this analysis ignores 
the bankruptcy results from non-casino counties that are contiguous to casino counties. In 
that respect, our results likely understate the bankruptcy impact of casinos.‖228 
In terms of this analysis, we have taken a broader view of such issues and note that a 
number of factors could be present that would impact bankruptcy rates that have little to do with 
the nature of casinos. Gaming is often introduced in communities that have been struggling 
economically for years, where the potential for bankruptcy is already high. At the same time, 
because casinos are often viewed as an economic catalyst that prompts local entrepreneurship, 
this could also be a risk factor that might fuel such findings. 
This debate was summarized well in an article that appeared in the Las Vegas Sun in 
2001 detailing a report issued by SMR Research that reported a link between casinos and 
bankruptcy rates:  
―In 2000, Nevada ranked fourth among the 50 states in bankruptcy rates, behind 
Tennessee, Utah, and Georgia. In 1996, Nevada also ranked fourth behind the same three 
states, SMR Research's first bankruptcy study said.  
SMR's 12-month study found that the 244 U.S. counties that have casinos had a 
bankruptcy filing rate that was 13.5 percent higher than the 2,865 counties that didn't 
have casinos in 2000.  
                                                 
227 Ernie Goss and Edward A. Morse, (2005) Creighton University, The Impact of Casino Gambling on Personal Bankruptcy 
Filing Rates From 1990 to 2002, Working Paper: 2005-04 
228 Ibid. pp. 17 – 18. 
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‗There is a connection between problem gambling and the increase in bankruptcy filing 
rates,‘ said Ed Looney, executive director of the Council of Compulsive Gambling of 
New Jersey.  
Atlantic County, NJ, which has 12 casinos, all of which are in Atlantic City, had a 
bankruptcy filing rate double that of the state's average.  
Atlantic County's bankruptcy filing rate went from 5.28 per 1,000 adults in 1994 to 11.68 
per 1,000 adults in 2000. The state's average, excluding Atlantic County, rose from 3.83 
in 1994 to 5.99 in 2000. …  
Frank Fahrenkopf, chief executive of the American Gaming Association, said the SMR 
Research study is misleading, noting that other variables -- such as aggressive soliciting 
by credit card companies and liberalized bankruptcy laws -- assist in the rise of 
bankruptcy rates.  
Fahrenkopf acknowledged that communities with casinos often do have higher 
bankruptcy rates. He believes that's because those communities attract people trying to 
get a fresh start. Those efforts don't always work out, leading to personal bankruptcy, 
Fahrenkopf said.  
‗That doesn't mean they filed for bankruptcy because there are casinos in the 
community,‘ he said.‖  
In studying this issue over years, we suggest that it be viewed in the broadest possible 
context. The following chart, which is a snapshot of a recent quarter that was compiled by the 
American Bankruptcy Institute, shows no correlation between states that have casinos and those 
that do not in terms of bankruptcy rates. 
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We also looked at two New England states, one with destination casinos and one without: 
 
 
 
The spike in 2006 can be directly attributed to changes in federal bankruptcy law that 
prompted a spate of nationwide filings in advance of an arbitrary deadline that changed the 
criteria for eligibility. For much of this period, Massachusetts exhibited a higher rate of jobs to 
bankruptcies than nearby Connecticut, although changes in federal law prompted a reversal of 
that. 
The following table provides a more detailed look for the entire New England region: 
 
Total Bankruptcies (number of business and consumer filings, not seasonally adjusted) 
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Total Bankruptcies (number of business and consumer filings, not seasonally adjusted) 
  US  NE  CT  ME   MA   NH   RI  VT 
Mar-96 
               
266,113  
                    
9,354  
                    
2,560  
                        
629  
                    
4,027  
                        
810  
                        
997  
                        
331  
Jun-96 
               
297,121  
                  
10,945  
                    
3,025  
                        
825  
                    
4,621  
                    
1,022  
                    
1,109  
                        
343  
Sep-96 
               
303,268  
                  
10,377  
                    
2,809  
                        
756  
                    
4,453  
                        
935  
                    
1,087  
                        
337  
Dec-96 
               
311,131  
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4,634  
                        
925  
                    
1,131  
                        
357  
Mar-97 
               
335,073  
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3,282  
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367,168  
                  
16,327  
                    
3,717  
                    
1,145  
                    
8,190  
                    
1,298  
                    
1,474  
                        
503  
Sep-97 
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400,394  
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1,385  
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Sep-01 
               
359,518  
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838  
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Dec-01 
               
364,971  
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393  
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463  
Sep-02 
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Total Bankruptcies (number of business and consumer filings, not seasonally adjusted) 
  US  NE  CT  ME   MA   NH   RI  VT 
Jun-04 
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Source:  Federal Reserve Bank of Boston 
 
Massachusetts must bear in mind the observation of Ed Looney, former director of the 
New Jersey Council on Compulsive Gambling, who noted that problem gamblers are much more 
likely to fall into severe economic problems, such as bankruptcy. This is an issue that must be 
considered in this debate in Massachusetts, and we suggest that a comprehensive approach to 
pathological and problem gaming behavior is the best way to address a host of related issues. 
 
Easy access and problem gambling 
Much research suggests that factors that lead to increased availability and opportunities to 
gamble throughout the general population will also contribute to a corresponding increase in the 
prevalence of problem gambling. The growth of the casino gambling industry did not come 
without some adverse consequences. The National Gambling Impact Study Commission noted 
the nearby presence of gambling facilities as a contributing factor in the incidence of problem 
and pathological gambling in the general population.229 
Nevada has problem gambling rates between two and three times the national average
230
. 
More recently, Shaffer et al. examined prevalence rates from counties within Nevada and found 
that the four counties with the greatest access to casinos had the highest problem gambling rates 
and the four with the least availability had the lowest rates. 
                                                 
229 The National Gambling Impact Study Commission Final Report, p. 4-4. 
230 Volberg, R.A. (2002). Gambling and problem gambling in Nevada. Report to the Nevada Department of Human Resources. 
Carson City, NV: Department of Human Resources. Available at heep://www.hr.state.nv.us/ 
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One study which has examined availability and problem gambling compared the 
prevalence of pathological gambling in five states in the United States
231
; and statistically 
significant results were found. In states where legal gaming had been available for less than 10 
years, less than 0.5 percent of the adult population was classified as probable pathological 
gamblers. In states where legal gambling had been available for more than 20 years, 
approximately 1.5 percent of the adult population was classified as such. Thus, increasing the 
availability of gaming will contribute to an increase in the prevalence of gambling-related 
problems in the general population.  
In the Netherlands, the introduction of casinos and an increase in the number of gaming 
machines in other venues appear to have led to an increase in compulsive gambling
232
. A positive 
relationship between casino proximity and gambling problems was also found in the 1999 New 
Zealand national survey.
233
 In that study, higher prevalence rates were found in the two New 
Zealand cities, Auckland and Christchurch, with casinos than in other cities without them. 
However, some longitudinal studies have indicated that the development of 
comprehensive prevention strategies and the provision of treatment and information about 
problem gambling can militate against such increases. Volberg‘s study234 of Montana, North 
Dakota, Oregon, and Washington states demonstrated that problem gambling prevalence 
declined in the states with services and increased in the states without them. 
Thus, it is possible to minimize the negative social impacts when new casino projects are 
introduced, with the development of a well-thought out plan. The plan should include the 
provision of treatment program and education of public and casino employees, among other 
initiatives.  
 
Casino employees and problem gambling 
Arnold Wexler, a private consultant who formerly served as executive director of the 
New Jersey Council on Compulsive Gambling, who worked on this analysis, cautioned that a 
focus on employees is essential, as experience has shown that casino employees in various 
markets have had a noticeable share of compulsive gamblers. 
As a participant in the research for this report, Wexler235 – a strategic partner of Spectrum 
– noted the following: 
                                                 
231 Volberg, R.A. (1994). The prevalence and demographics of pathological gamblers: Implications for public health. American 
Journal of Public Health, 82(2). 
232 Remmers, P. (1995). The use of early recognition for the gaming business. The National Association for Gambling Studies, 
7(1), 26-30. 
233 Abbott, M.W., & Volberg, R.A. (2000). Taking the pulse on gambling and problem gambling in New Zealand: Phase one of 
the 1999 national prevalence survey report number three of the New Zealand gaming survey. Wellington: Department of Internal 
Affairs. 
234 Volberg, R.A. (in press). Changes in gambling availability, participation and problem gambling prevalence in four states. 
Journal of Gambling Issues.  
235 This section was drafted by Arnie and Sheila Wexler, who have provided extensive training on Compulsive, Problem and 
Underage Gambling, and have written Responsible Gaming Programs for major gaming companies. In addition, they have 
worked with casino regulators and have presented educational workshops nationally and internationally. They also run a national 
help line (888 LAST BET). Sheila Wexler is the Executive Director of the Compulsive Gambling Foundation 
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―When I was the Executive Director of the Council on Compulsive Gambling of New 
Jersey, 8 percent of our calls to the hot line came from casino employees. Since 1994, we 
have trained more than 35,000 casino workers, nationwide. Raising the awareness of 
employees through training on the subject of compulsive gambling is sometimes the 
catalyst for the employee to seek help. Every time we do training, some workers who 
have a gambling problem, themselves, or have a family member with the problem, 
approach us for help. Often, we receive phone calls from employees, several months after 
they hear our presentation. Many of these people find it difficult to come forward with 
the problem, fearing that exposure will affect their chances for advancement with the 
company. Supervisors who recognize an employee who has a serious gambling problem 
also often approach us.  
―The problem exists at all levels of employment. Workers have approached us, from 
housekeepers to executives of casino companies. Here are some examples: 
 There was a housekeeper who revealed that she stole items from guest rooms in 
order to support her gambling addiction.  
 A casino limousine driver called us and was planning to kill himself as the result 
of his gambling problem.  
 There was a pit boss who let dead-beat gamblers sign markers and then got a pay 
off from the gambler.  
 A racetrack announcer called me for help after trying to fix races in order to get 
money to gamble with.  
 We received a call for help from an employee on the hotel side, who was using 
customers' credit cards to access gambling money for his gambling.  
 A legal counsel to a casino company asked for our help in getting him excluded 
from gambling in casinos in his state.  
 A woman who worked in credit came forward to ask for help as she was in 
jeopardy of losing her marriage and children. 
―As problem or compulsive gamblers become more and more preoccupied with their 
gambling, they will eventually affect their company and their job performance. Some 
areas include erratic work performance, inconsiderate treatment of customers, borrowing 
money from coworkers or customers, absenteeism, tardiness, theft, embezzlement, 
affecting the integrity of the game they are dealing or by being coerced to fix games by 
bookmakers or loan sharks to whom they may owe money, as well as increased health 
care costs for them and their affected families. 
―It would be beneficial and good, prudent business judgment, if gaming companies 
helped their employees who had a gambling problem, rather than terminating them. 
Employees are their most valuable asset as they are often, in the front line with their 
customers. Employers and supervisors need to realize that compulsive gambling is an 
addiction, similar to alcoholism and drug addiction.  
―Many companies already have health benefits that include treatment for other 
addictions. These benefits should also include treatment for compulsive gambling for 
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employees and their families, paid for by the employer. Employers can also make 
available a room for an in house Gamblers Anonymous meeting. Human Resource and 
EAP personnel should have training on the subject of compulsive gambling. Brochures 
and information regarding help for a gambling problem, should be made available to all 
employees. 
―Another area that employers may want to consider is the legal ramifications of not 
taking action if they recognize that their employee has a gambling problem. They may be 
held accountable by the regulatory body in their state, for continuing to employ someone 
who has a compulsive gambling problem and is currently gambling. On the other hand, 
employers should have documented information before approaching a worker who is 
suspected of having a gambling problem. 
―Early detection of this hidden illness may result in the employee getting help before he 
or she reaches the desperation phase of compulsive gambling. With recovery, both the 
employee and the employer will benefit. 
―We are encouraged to see that some gaming companies have come a long way, in the 
last few years, by addressing this issue. They have developed training programs and 
responsible gaming programs and policies that have helped their employees who have a 
gambling problem.‖ 
Also, Spectrum suggests that the more time and effort that is required to enable an 
individual to gamble (in terms of planning and actually getting to a venue) could decrease the 
opportunity to gamble on impulse. Convenience is, therefore, a crucial regulatory issue and this 
has implications for the location of casinos. 
We suggest it would be helpful for Massachusetts to examine the experience elsewhere, 
and thus we present a relevant case study. 
 
Case study: Australia 
Australia appears to have the most comprehensive responses to potential social problems 
related to the offering of casino gaming. The Productivity Commission
236
 estimated that 
approximately 1 percent of the adult Australian population (around 130,000 people) had ―severe 
problems‖ with gambling, while an additional 1.1 per cent (160,000) had ―moderate problems,‖ 
making a pool of approximately 290,000 ―problem gamblers,‖ or 2.1 percent of adult 
Australians.  
Following a public-health approach to problem gambling, many gambling providers have 
implemented a variety of responsible gambling measures to improve harm minimization and 
consumer protection in gambling. Approaches taken by the state or territory governments 
generally have been diverse and fragmented, reflecting varying levels of commitment to 
reducing the negative social impacts of gambling. These approaches can be grouped into 
                                                 
236 Productivity Commission (1999). Australia’s gambling industries: Report no. 10. Canberra: Ausinfo. 
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legislation, funding, provision of direct services for problem gambling, research, and community 
education about gambling.
237
 
 Legislation: All Australian state governments have legislated minimum returns to 
players, outlawed underage and credit betting, and established substantial monitoring 
and control systems in all jurisdictions. Various states also have different policies on 
advertisement, management and staff training in responsible gambling, display of 
problem gambling signage, provision of product information, placement of ATMs, 
and removal of legal impediments to self-exclusion. 
 Funding: Most Australian state and territory governments either impose a levy on 
certain gambling sectors, usually casinos, hotels and clubs, to raise funds for specific 
community projects including those that address problem gambling, or they fund 
problem gambling services from a percentage of gambling revenue. The exceptions 
are Western Australia and South Australia, which rely on voluntary contributions 
from industry. 
 Direct services for problem gambling: Governments and industry in most 
jurisdictions fund two types of problem gambling support services — a network of 
problem gambling counseling and support services and a 24-hour help line. 
 Research: Many Australian governments direct a proportion of industry levies to 
research into gambling, typically into areas such as its social and economic impacts, 
the effectiveness of harm minimization measures and the efficacy of problem 
gambling treatment approaches. 
 Community education: Broad-based education programs aim to minimize harm from 
gambling through education about responsible gambling strategies, and the risk 
factors, symptoms and effects of problem gambling. Comprehensive community 
education strategies have not been implemented in any Australian jurisdiction except 
Victoria which has had three television, radio and billboard campaigns, each 
evaluated and linked to impacts on its telephone hotline and other services. 
Because many responsible gambling programs in Australia are voluntary, compliance 
mechanisms are limited, with industry associations and steering committees having few powers 
to enforce such measures. Where compliance rates are monitored, these usually are based on a 
self-auditing system, rather than an independent process evaluation. In terms of the effectiveness 
of the programs in changing players‘ behavior, to date, no such evaluations of responsible 
gambling programs have been conducted in Australia. Instead, all existing responsible gambling 
programs have been developed using a ‗top-down‘ approach, developing practices and processes 
that are assumed to reduce problem gambling and promote responsible gambling. 
 
                                                 
237Hing, N. (2006). Gambling and Chinese Culture. In C.H.C. Hsu (Ed.), Casino Gaming Asia Pacific: Development, Operation, 
and Impact (pp. 201-224). New York:  The Haworth Hospitality Press. 
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Recommendations: problem gambling 
Spectrum reiterates an important theme that underlies our entire analysis of the impact of 
new casino development on problem gambling: The critical responsibility for ensuring that 
public policies adequately address this issue must lie with the bidders for licensure.  
Spectrum recommends that the burden of ensuring the efficacy of all policies related to 
problem gambling be placed upon the applicant. This should be an intrinsic element that would 
materially weigh on the bidding and approval process. Any casino operator who would consider 
bidding for a license in Massachusetts must demonstrate a strong commitment to mitigating the 
negative impacts of gaming on the community. This commitment should also include a 
comprehensive effort to identify and treat problem gamblers among employees as well. 
 The fulfillment of corporate social responsibilities and actions to ensure ―responsible 
gaming‖238 extends beyond merely retaining a license to operate. Socially responsible casino 
management can be expensive, and the benefits of such practices often are not immediately clear. 
However, given that the legislative proposal would grant regional monopolies to successful 
applicants, there is both a practical and ethical imperative on their part to act responsibly and 
with the utmost integrity. 
Spectrum‘s experience in studying this issue around the world supports the suggestion 
that the maintenance and continuous improvement of responsible gaming standards will govern 
the sustainability of the industry. That is, in order to be a viable long-term enterprise, issues such 
as problem gambling must be addressed effectively. Similar responsibilities are imposed upon 
the alcoholic beverage industry. The need to develop and maintain a stable customer base that 
gambles within its means is very real incentive for casino operators to promote responsible 
gaming. 
Responsible gaming occurs as a result of the collective actions and shared commitment 
among key stakeholders (i.e., gaming industry, government, not-for-profit sector, communities, 
individuals, and academic researchers) to achieve outcomes that are socially responsible and 
responsive to community concerns.  
Governments in various jurisdictions have begun to require the gaming industry to 
address problem gambling by developing responsible gaming strategies itself and/or contributing 
a percentage of their revenues to provide funds for the implementation of responsible gaming 
strategies. Many gaming operators have done both. 
 
Responsible gambling strategies  
The following suggested strategies had previously been developed for Spectrum by Cathy 
H.C. Hsu of Hong Kong Polytechnic University, who has global expertise in this area. 
Responsible gaming strategies can be targeted at three different populations: the general 
public, patrons, and problem gamblers. Strategies targeting the general public are intended to 
                                                 
238 ―Responsible gaming‖ is a term that has become widely used in recent years by both the gaming industry and those involved 
in treating this issue. We suggest that the term serves as an effective shorthand for public and private policies designed to address 
this issue. 
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assist and inform people, among all sectors of the population, before they enter a gaming 
environment and make a decision to participate in gaming activities. Strategies targeting patrons 
are directed towards customers while they participate in gaming activities. Strategies targeting at 
problem gamblers focused on those who already display signs of a problem, usually requiring 
treatment.  
Casino operators should focus their efforts on responsible gaming while financially 
supporting research and services for problem gamblers. There should also be a strong firewall 
between casino-sponsored research and the people who make decisions on which research 
projects to fund. This would prevent industry funding from influencing the research agenda and 
decisions. 
Both the government and casino operator must contribute to the overall responsible 
gaming strategies. Some strategies will need to be initiated by the government, while others need 
the lead of casino operators. Cooperation between government and the private sector is the key to 
success. Government may be assisted in this role by private not-for-profit organizations (such as 
the Massachusetts Council on Compulsive Gambling) that are not associated with the casino 
industry. 
 
Strategies targeting the general public 
These strategies aim to inform the community about the risks of problem gambling and to 
encourage players to know their limits and to play within their means. These strategies can help 
reduce possible increases in problem gambling throughout the population even when new 
gaming venues are introduced. They are more beneficial in the long run than later interventions 
when problem gambling occurs. 
The following strategies can be initiated to achieve the above stated objective:  
 Public education and information campaigns should be launched through local media 
(e.g., radio, newspaper, billboard, poster, television, websites) to provide information 
on responsible gaming, warn individuals of the risk of excessive gambling, educate 
the general public about the warning signs of problem gambling, and alert them to 
where to find help if needed. Research has shown that these measures can lead to 
increases in the awareness of support and services for problem gamblers, in the 
number of calls to help lines and in the number of clients seeking help. 
 Dedicated websites should be designed for youth, teachers, and parents with 
information related to responsible gaming. 
 The declaration of a ―responsible gaming education week‖ has been tried in other 
markets to increase awareness of problem gambling, and provide information and tips 
for practicing responsible gaming. Events like these could also yield a much greater 
opportunity for media coverage and therefore reach many more citizens. 
 The Commonwealth can consider regulations to limit gambling-related advertising in 
local media. If advertising of gaming is allowed, messages should not depict or 
promote the consumption of alcohol while engaged in gaming activities. 
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 The casino/resort complex can offer non-gaming activities/programs and sponsor 
local community events to provide local residents with alternative recreation options. 
 The casino operator should be committed to social responsibility, which extends to 
seeking an active role in supporting various community and charitable events. The 
purpose should be to improve the well being of society through a number of 
significant partnerships with charitable organizations, sponsorships, donations, and 
philanthropic initiatives involving casino operators, employees, facilities and 
resources. 
 
Strategies targeting the patrons 
These strategies aim to reduce the potential for customers to move from recreational 
gaming to involvement with problem gambling. This embodies the training and empowerment of 
employees to promote responsible use and discourage problem play, together with a range of 
policies and standards to ensure the consistent and responsible delivery of gaming. 
The following strategies can be initiated to achieve the above stated aim.  
 The casino should cultivate a ―culture of responsibility‖ by ensuring employees 
receive training in responsible gaming at a level appropriate to their role, supporting 
objective ongoing research, promoting integrity through sound and ethical business 
practices, and providing recreational opportunities to social gamblers.  
 Casino design can incorporate responsible gaming operation principles, such as 
providing opportunities for players to take a break from gaming (e.g., food and 
beverage facilities outside of the gaming area), displaying clocks in the gaming area, 
and offering adequate non-gaming recreation and leisure facilities on premise. 
 With respect to serving alcoholic beverages in the general gaming area, alcohol needs 
to be served responsibly with guidelines provided to employees. 
 Policy on prevention of underage gaming needs to be strictly enforced. No underage 
patrons should be allowed at any time in any area of the gaming floor. Facility design 
needs to take this into consideration so that minors will have no need to be near the 
gaming area. 
 Robust self-exclusion programs should be offered where players or their family 
members can request that they be banned from the casino, removed from the mailing 
list, and sanctioned if they re-enter the premise. Such a voluntary exclusion program 
provides problem gamblers with a means to acknowledge that they have a problem 
and to take personal responsibility for it. 
 As noted in the legislation, casinos can provide information kiosks or centers on their 
premises to distribute information to employees and players, run awareness-raising 
activities about underage and problem gambling and the importance of responsible 
gaming practices for employees. Casinos can post help line numbers and brochures 
(e.g., dispel myths about gambling, help players evaluate their current behavior, and 
provide information about where to get help) around their properties. 
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 An effective way to assist potential problem gamblers and minimize the associated 
harms is to educate them about the risk factors so that those who are at risk either will 
choose to abstain from gambling or will make a concerted effort to follow the 
principles of gambling responsibly if they do choose to gamble. And they (or their 
family members) will at least recognize the symptoms of problem gambling early so 
that the individuals can work to avoid becoming engulfed by the condition. 
 Specialized staff training should be developed to allow casino employees to 
understand problem gambling, recognize the signs of problematic behavior in 
customers, and enable them to take the necessary steps to intervene (i.e., knowledge 
of resources for problem players and assisting those who show signs of problems). 
Casinos can provide advice on responsible gambling and make referrals to specialist 
agencies if they feel a player‘s behavior has become out of control.  
 Three levels of training programs are suggested to casino employees. These programs 
are progressive in nature. Ideally, each program should last for 30 hours. A brief 
description of each program is provided below. 
 
Basic module 
The goal of the basic module is to develop a positive attitude among front-line casino 
employees to the responsible conduct of gaming. The module should be informative and fun to 
facilitate employees‘ learning and broaden their understanding of the gaming industry and its 
social responsibilities. The basic module will include the following topics: 
 Scope and nature of the gaming industry 
 Economic and social impacts of gaming 
 Gaming operators‘ responsibilities and their employer‘s responsible gaming 
philosophy 
 Requirements of relevant laws and house policies 
 Types of players and observable signs of distress or problem gambling behaviors 
 Customer service in a gaming environment 
 
Advance module 
The purpose of the advance module is to equip casino managers with the proper skills to 
respond to critical incidents involving problem gamblers, in a customer friendly approach. The 
module, employing both theoretical and practical approaches, should address techniques to 
interact with problem gamblers as well as manage the gaming area with the presence of a 
problem gambler. The advance module will discuss the following topics:  
 Communication and crisis management skills 
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 Ability to deal tactfully with gaming related incidents or situations including requests 
for self-exclusion, underage gambling, disputes or complaints, and involvement of 
family and friends 
 Personality dynamics of problem gamblers 
 The psychology of problem gamblers: meaning of money and unresolved personal 
issues 
 Problem gambler counseling fundamentals 
 
Additional suggestion for casino operators 
A Code of Conduct for Responsible Gaming should be developed, adhered to, and made 
known to the public to demonstrate an operator‘s concern for the society at large and its 
commitment to corporate social responsibility. The code of conduct should pledge support to 
employees, patrons, and the public.  
The pledge to employees should include providing education, training and information 
materials on responsible gaming issues, as well as supply contact information for organizations 
where they can find assistance if needed.  
The pledge to customers should include promoting responsible gaming, preventing 
underage gaming by keeping minors out of gaming areas, serving alcoholic beverages 
responsibly, advertising responsibly, and the provision of a self-exclusion program. 
The pledge to the public includes funding research on gaming and health, using the 
research results to develop practical ways to improve responsible gaming programs, and 
conducting regular reviews of the operation to ensure compliance with regulations and code of 
conduct. 
 
Transportation issues 
Transportation is arguably an economic issue, as it affects factors ranging from revenue 
to employment opportunities. However, we suggest viewing it as a social issue as it largely 
affects the potential quality of life, and is clearly linked to other issues, such as demands on law 
enforcement. 
 Casinos of the size recommended in the administration‘s proposal will certainly affect 
the transportation network of surrounding communities. Successful casinos in Connecticut and 
Atlantic City allow us to project the probable transportation impacts of similarly sized casinos in 
Massachusetts. For example, the Borgata Hotel Casino & Spa in Atlantic City, which opened in 
July 2003, is roughly the proposed size and range of what we have assumed in developing our 
revenue model.  
The Borgata estimates that, in its early years, approximately 14,000 patrons visited the 
property on an average day.239 In addition to the daily volume of guests, the Borgata workforce 
                                                 
239 Borgata PowerPoint presentation 
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(total full-time and part-time of more than 6,000 on-site five of seven days240) adds another 4,300 
individuals each day. Since the casino does not operate a busing program, virtually all of the 
patrons and employees arrive in private automobiles, taxis, or limos. There are 7,100 parking 
spaces on site, including surface lots and garages for both patrons and employees. In 2007 nearly 
2.1 million visitor vehicles parked on the Borgata property, about 5,800 per day. Employee 
vehicles added to total onsite parking numbers. Obviously, on peak days, such as weekends, 
holiday, and special events, the annual average is exceeded significantly.  
These numbers underscore why a large casino destination requires a comprehensive 
transportation plan. On site, the facility must have a series of roads, access ramps, and parking 
facilities designed to move and store vehicles efficiently. It is imperative that its ingress and 
egress road design should minimize vehicle accumulation. Nonetheless, even under ideal site 
plan conditions, the street and highway network external to the gaming property will still be 
impacted by the relatively large volume of vehicles entering and exiting the facility. The 
magnitude of impact will depend on many factors. The cumulative experience of existing East 
Coast gaming properties sheds light on what transportation questions should be asked.  
Transportation modes and visitor composition  
 What percentage of patrons and employees arrive in private automobiles versus other 
modes of transportation such as charter buses, public transportation, limos, taxis, 
employee vans/minibuses, and pedestrian movements?  
 What is the percentage of overnight guests (who may stay on property for a few days 
without moving their vehicle) versus day-trippers who come and go daily? 
How guests and employees arrive, as well as the visitor composition of day-trippers 
versus overnight guests have significant impact on traffic patterns in the area. Data collected by 
Spectrum Gaming Group and its Gaming Industry Observer publication indicates that on an 
average day among patrons of the Borgata and the other two casinos (Trump Marina and 
Harrah‘s) located in Atlantic City‘s Marina District approximately: 
 72.2% are day-trippers who arrive by car 
 26.6% are overnight guests who arrive by car 
 only about 1.2% are visitors who arrive by bus 
The Marina District of Atlantic City, which includes Borgata, is rather isolated from the 
resort‘s general street grid. The district is served by direct ramps connecting the three properties 
with the Atlantic City Expressway. Visitors from afar can access these casino hotels without ever 
passing through a signalized intersection. Each property occupies a site with large parking 
garages. Consequently, automobile access is relatively easy and these casinos have little need to 
develop busing programs. Moreover, both Borgata and Harrah‘s have large hotel room inventory 
relative to casino size. They can therefore market their properties to upscale overnight guests 
whose vehicles remain on property, thereby reducing ingress and egress movements.  
                                                 
240 New Jersey Casino Control Commission. The employment numbers are current, reflecting significant expansions at Borgata, 
including the opening of a new hotel tower. The property opened in 2003 with about 4,500 full-time equivalents. 
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In more heavily congested midtown Atlantic City, casino properties are more likely to 
emphasize busing programs. Their visitor distribution is as follows: 
 54.1 percent are day-trippers who arrive by car 
 23.4 percent are overnight guests who arrive by car 
 22.5 percent are visitors who arrive by bus 
During the 1980s, before hotel room inventory was greatly expanded, most Atlantic City 
gaming operations relied quite heavily on busing programs. In 1988 nearly 14.2 million visitors 
arrived in Atlantic City on casino bus programs, more than 40 percent of total annual visit-trips 
that year. In 2007, largely as a result of intentional downsizing of their busing programs as hotel 
room inventory increased, casino bus programs brought in 5.4 million visitors, or approximately 
16.2 percent of the 33.3 million visit-trips to the resort. 
Thus, the future distribution by transportation mode of patrons to the three Massachusetts 
properties should be viewed as highly fungible. It will depend on many factors, including site 
location, surrounding street systems and access routes, emphasis on day-trippers versus 
overnight stays, competition from other regional casino or racino busing programs, and general 
marketing strategies. But it is safe to assume that the large majority of patrons and employees 
will arrive by automobile. 
The following questions need to be considered when evaluating transportation impact 
Peak hour factors 
 How might employee daily shift changes affect traffic patterns in the surrounding 
community?  
 What is the hourly flow of traffic to and from the facility? When does the gaming 
property experience peak hours of traffic? 
 How do those peak hours vary by day of the week, holidays, and special 
entertainment events? 
 Are there major seasonal variations in traffic flow? 
These questions are inter-related. For example, the employee shift change is a factor that 
should not be overlooked. A new facility of the size suggested in the Governor‘s proposal will 
have at least 4,000 employees, probably more when part time workers are factored in. If the 
casino is a 24 hour operation, careful planning of shift size and shift changes can reduce the 
amount of employee vehicles mixing with pre-existing community peak hour traffic patterns. For 
example, many Atlantic City casinos schedule weekday shifts from 7 a.m. to 3 p.m., instead of 
the 8 a.m. to 4 p.m. ―normal‖ sift hours of many day workers in other industries. This helps to 
reduce the impact of casino employee traffic on congestion experienced during morning and 
afternoon rush hours. 
Data (see below) from the South Jersey Transportation Authority for the Atlantic City 
Expressway, which is the main road into Atlantic City, clearly shows how casino-destined 
vehicles influence hourly traffic patterns during peak periods. We note that the patterns exhibited 
here for the July 4
th
 weekend last year are similar to those of previous years. 
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While traffic into the resort is moderate during what is considered normal morning rush 
hours, these charts show that on weekdays, peak inbound hours on the Expressway occur in the 
late morning-early afternoon time interval. These hours correspond with the arrival of both day 
trippers and overnight guests who typically cannot check into their hotel rooms until 3 p.m. 
Outbound from the casinos, the peak weekday hour is 3 p.m. to 4 p.m., not the usual 4 p.m. to 6 
p.m. rush hours experienced in most urban areas. The outbound peak, as stated above, is 
influenced by large numbers of casino employees coming off shift at 3 p.m. Adding to this 
hour‘s outbound traffic are overnight guests who check out at mid-day and either gamble or 
enjoy a late lunch before loading up the car and heading home. But shifting many exit trips to the 
3 p.m. hour has the positive effect of spreading outbound weekday traffic over three hours, rather 
than the customary two, with the result of no major congestion during any of this time interval. 
On weekends, most American urban areas enjoy limited traffic congestion at any hour, 
except perhaps in the summer on Sunday evenings as motorists head home from resort areas. 
Atlantic City, a resort community, experiences significant traffic movements in either direction 
on both Saturdays and Sundays, especially in July and August. But there is a remarkable 
continuity over many hours for inbound traffic. Traffic volumes typically begin to climb in late 
morning and continue more or less at similar levels for many hours into early evening. Major 
inbound congestion usually occurs only on Saturdays, particularly during summer season, 
between 6 p.m. and 8 p.m. as vehicles converge on the city whose passengers will attend 
headliner shows, dine in the many casino restaurants, and of course gamble.  
Leaving Atlantic City, peak outbound hours on Saturdays occur in late evening. Often the 
period between midnight and 1 a.m. is the peak outbound hour, a time when non-casino traffic is 
minimal. 
Sunday hourly inbound traffic in Atlantic City mirrors Saturday patterns, with the 
exception that traffic falls off in late afternoon and evening while on Saturdays it does not. 
Outbound, especially in summer, traffic may build as early as 10 a.m. and continue increasing 
through the afternoon and early evening hours. During the summer season, traffic on the Atlantic 
City Expressway is often more heavily influenced by vehicles going to or coming from the beach 
resorts north and south of Atlantic City. 
The key lesson to learn from Atlantic City traffic volumes on weekdays is that peak hour 
casino patron and employee traffic does not correspond to typical weekday rush hour traffic 
patterns in most other communities. Consequently, especially for a casino proposed for an urban 
or suburban environment, the new traffic it generates might not interfere dramatically with 
existing rush hour traffic. Similarly, while traffic volumes at a casino on Saturdays and Sundays 
will be heavy, those are days where community traffic is typically less than weekday traffic.  
Traffic on neighboring streets and highways  
 Does the property have an efficient internal road and parking network to ensure that 
vehicles can quickly enter/exit the facility without contributing to or causing traffic 
congestion in the surrounding community? 
 How might pre-existing traffic patterns in the area be altered by the additional traffic 
of a new casino property, particularly during peak hours? Will casino traffic disrupt 
local neighborhoods, or exacerbate existing blockage? 
 The Impacts of Expanded Gaming on the Commonwealth of Massachusetts                    253 
 What infrastructure improvements may be necessary to minimize adverse traffic 
impacts in the street grid near the casino? Will major upgrades of existing traffic 
signal equipment and dedicated turning lanes from existing streets be necessary? 
In Connecticut, Mohegan Sun and Foxwoods are relatively close to each other, which 
compounds traffic management issues. In Atlantic City, situated on a small island, 11 large 
casino hotels generate substantial traffic movement every day of the year. Consequently, both 
Connecticut and New Jersey have had to devote major resources to ensure that local streets and 
state highways can cope with the added volume of vehicles In Atlantic City at present, the 
Casino Reinvestment Development Authority is funding a study of transportation improvements 
that will begin with adjusting street traffic patterns241. 
As discussed above, a key element is to make it possible to enter and leave the casino 
hotel property with minimal traffic disruption to local street and highway systems. Typically, this 
requires updating intersection signal systems and installing dedicated turn lanes to ensure that 
pass by traffic is not unduly obstructed.  
It is important to note that the plan to award just one license in each of three separate 
areas of Massachusetts greatly reduces the potential for the congestion experienced in 
Connecticut and New Jersey. Another factor to consider is that one large stand-alone casino hotel 
will have traffic patterns comparable to a large regional shopping mall. Visitors usually arrive at 
both malls and casinos after 10 a.m. in the morning. Their vehicles are thereby not adding to 
morning workday rush hour traffic volume which usually is concentrated between 7 a.m. and 9 
a.m. Traffic leaving a casino, like leaving a regional mall, typically spreads out over afternoon 
and evening hours. Often malls, like casinos, experience their heaviest concentration of traffic on 
holidays and weekends, periods when community work traffic is nominal.  
 
 Macro-transportation factors 
 Is the new facility located in close proximity to an existing superhighway or multi-
lane surface arterial? Will major highway improvements and ramp construction be 
necessary? 
 Is public transportation nearby? If not, what is the potential for linking the new 
facility to surface bus routes and light or heavy rail systems?  
 What percentage of casino visitors will arrive in the region by air, and how will they 
be transported from the airport to the gaming facility?  
Each of the three potential destination casinos in Massachusetts would clearly be required 
to develop marketing strategies to attract regional and long distance travelers. Access to each 
property will of course be maximized if suitable locations are found near the Massachusetts 
Turnpike, an interstate highway, or multi-lane highway. A good example of ideal highway access 
is the Oneida Nation‘s Turning Stone Casino Resort located between Syracuse and Utica 
adjacent to what was formerly the low volume Exit 33 of the New York State Thruway in the 
town of Verona. The surrounding area is basically rural. Turning Stone is less than two miles 
from Exit 33 on state Route 365. With minimal improvements to the Thruway exit area and to 
                                                 
241 Spectrum has been retained by CRDA in an advisory role on that project. 
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the short stretch of Route 365, the casino hotel is easily accessed via the Thruway from all of the 
urban and suburban communities of upstate New York. 
In Pennsylvania, the recently opened Mount Airy casino in the Poconos is located near I-
80. The Sands Bethlehem casino, scheduled to open in 2009, will occupy a site near I-78. Both 
properties because of their proximity to major interstate highways perceive themselves to be 
positioned to attract visitors from the lucrative North Jersey and New York markets.  
The three specific sites ultimately chosen in Massachusetts may or may not enjoy similar 
ideal superhighway access. For example, State Senator Anthony Petruccelli commissioned a 
study that estimates the cost of improving the Route 1A corridor that connects Copeland Circle 
in Revere to the Sumner-Callahan tunnel – which already experiences regular rush-hour traffic 
jams – would cost $420 million. A casino in that area would make the problem more acute. 
In addition to highway access, other advantages such as potential linkage to public 
transportation systems should be considered, including locations near light or heavy rail stations. 
Convenient public transportation would greatly assist employee recruitment and retention, attract 
certain segments of the visitor market, and generally help reduce vehicular movements in the 
neighborhood of the casino/hotel. 
For example, by reopening the Philadelphia-Atlantic City rail line in the 1980s, New 
Jersey transportation official provided an alternative for visitors, and just as importantly 
employees, to abandon their cars and travel to Atlantic City on heavy rail. New Jersey Transit, 
operators of the line, has a contract with the Atlantic City Jitneymen‘s Association to link each 
arriving and departing train with free jitney service (mini-buses) with all 11 casinos. Ridership 
has been steadily increasing, although the rail contribution to total visitor volume to Atlantic City 
is still very small. 
All of the transportation issues discussed above need to be factored into the site selection 
process. But once the Massachusetts sites are chosen it is critical that public authorities and 
casino representatives work closely with community groups to answer all questions and allay the 
perfectly normal concerns of the communities that will be impacted by casino traffic. 
Anticipating that significant infrastructure improvements may be needed, the administration‘s 
plan correctly establishes a set-aside fund from casino tax revenue dedicated to transportation 
improvements and a mitigation fund to compensate host and surrounding towns for costs 
incurred to accommodate the resort casinos.  
Transportation plans, which must be an essential element in any consideration of 
licensure, should be weighed in concert with all other elements of the bidding process. For 
example, plans to ensure that employment opportunities are targeted to existing Massachusetts 
adults who are unemployed or under-employed must include plans to provide affordable 
transportation to and from communities where such adults reside. 
 
The Foxwoods-Mohegan Sun contrast in Connecticut 
The experience in Connecticut provides cautionary guidance in the siting of a destination 
casino resort. Mohegan Sun in Montville has significantly easier access than Foxwoods, which is 
across the Thames River in Ledyard. For most patrons, the approach to Foxwoods involves an-
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eight mile trip along a two-lane state road, Route 2, off Interstate 95. It can take 15 minutes 
without traffic. With traffic, it can take more than a half-hour. 
In sharp contrast sits the Mohegan Sun, less than a mile off Interstate 395. The casino 
developers funded a $29 million widening of Route 2A to four lanes and added an interchange at 
Mohegan Sun Boulevard for patrons to drive directly to the casino. The project was finished in 
time for the casino‘s opening in October 1996. The result: 95 percent of drive-in patrons arrive at 
Mohegan Sun via Interstate 395,242 thus avoiding local roads. Mohegan Sun executives 
acknowledge that easier access from Interstate 395 provides their facility with a competitive 
advantage over Foxwoods.
243
 
Ledyard Mayor Fred Allyn Jr. said the Mohegan tribe did a good job making egress and 
ingress painless. ―It‘s a pleasure to go over there. You shoot in and shoot out easily. It is a whole 
different story with Foxwoods,‖ Allen said. 
Allyn noted that Route 2 itself is maintained by the state so that local resources are not 
expended. He and others, though, argue that the highway is not maintained as well as it should be 
and it is incapable of handling the traffic that currently travels on it. In fact, the road is so 
congested that local feeder roads often become backed up with motorists trying to get onto Route 
2. 
Foxwoods is currently improving access at its casino, but improvements to Route 2, if 
they are ever undertaken, are years away, according to James Butler, executive director of the 
Southeastern Council of Governments. Even when the improvements are undertaken, Butler 
noted, that there are no plans to widen the two-lane highway into four lanes. 
Meanwhile, the Route 2 feeder roads continue to deteriorate. Allen said local funds are 
constantly used to resurface and repair those roads. For example, he noted that Ledyard plans to 
spend nearly $750,000 this year to resurface Shewville Road, on which many Foxwoods 
employees commute. 
Traffic volumes from 1992 to 2005 have nearly doubled along some sections of Route 2 
in southeastern Connecticut, especially the eight-mile section between Foxwoods and Interstate 
95.
244
 Several sites along the highway are considered ―only marginally adequate‖ to handle 
traffic flow.
245
 
Preston Selectman Jerry Grabarek, a dairy farmer, knows firsthand how difficult it can be 
to cope with the increased traffic. His farm at Route 2 and Hewitt Road lies between an 
employee parking lot and a storage facility for Foxwoods. Traffic can be so heavy that Grabarek 
has to wait 10 minutes in his pickup truck to cross between his barns and his house.
246
 
North Stonington First Selectman Nick Mullane said more and more Foxwoods‘ patrons 
are coming off of Route 2 into his town to get to Foxwoods. And thousands of employees at 
Foxwoods use North Stonington roads to get to work. There has been an enormous amount of 
                                                 
242 Interview with Jeffrey Hartmann, Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer, Mohegan Sun, June 19, 2008 
243 Interviews April 16, 2008 
244 Southeastern Connecticut Council of Governments Regional Transportation Plan FY 2007-2035 
245 Ibid 
246 Hartford Courant, May 27, 2005 
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wear and tear on downtown streets and the increased traffic has resulted in more traffic 
accidents, Mullane added. ―Before the casino in Foxwoods, we had one traffic light. Now we 
have nine,‖ he said. 
There has been a tremendous impact on the infrastructure. North Stonington used to hire 
part-time constables to address traffic issues, Mullane said. That‘s no longer possible due to the 
increased traffic, he noted, adding that the town has had to pay for the salaries of at least two 
additional police officers. 
Mullane said the town‘s business community has not benefitted from the increased traffic 
through the downtown area. Gas stations and donut shops are doing well but that‘s about it, he 
said. ―We‘ve actually lost business. It is a shame that Foxwoods had to be built where it was, but 
there‘s nothing anybody can do about it now,‖ he said. 
Mullane said he believes that the improvements being undertaken at the entrance to 
Foxwoods will makes things worse, not better. He fears that motorists using the flyway will fail 
to slow down once they get into North Stonington, causing more accidents to occur. 
Interstate 395, serving Mohegan Sun, is not without its share of problems. It, too, is 
beginning to show signs of stress, especially at interchange areas.
247
 But the problems pale in 
comparison to those experienced along Route 2. 
 
Relevance to Massachusetts 
The contrast in access between the two Connecticut casinos should guide the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts when it examines the siting of casinos. Casinos on or near 
high-volume highways can cause less disruption to the host and surrounding communities; 
casinos nestled among towns, farther from high-volume highways, can cause considerable 
disruption in terms of traffic, quality of life, and maintenance costs. 
Proximity to a high-volume highway may facilitate access to a destination casino but it 
would not necessarily eliminate the traffic burdens on neighboring towns. Town of Monson 
Selectmen Edward Harrison and Kathleen Conley Norbut, for example, said that they fear that a 
casino along the Massachusetts Turnpike in neighboring Palmer (a proposed casino site) would 
prompt casino patrons with local knowledge, as well as casino employees, to drive on Route 32 
through the heart of Monson, clogging the otherwise quiet village. 
Likewise, Sturbridge Town Administrator James Malloy said that township officials fear 
that patrons headed northwest for a casino in Palmer would avoid the Turnpike and instead cut 
through Sturbridge and ―bog down traffic‖ on Route 20 and side roads. 
(We are not offering an opinion on Palmer or another specific town or site as a casino 
location, but using it as one example of issues involved in siting.) 
In this vein, the Commonwealth, local planners and developers must consider the casino 
access points from all directions. That is, they must examine whether patrons from the close-in 
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markets would logically bypass the major highways and use ―shortcut‖ roads through towns, and 
they must examine which roads would be used by commuting casino employees. 
 
Recommendations: mitigation funding 
The legislation that we have analyzed contemplates using 2.5 percent of gaming revenue 
as mitigation funding for host communities. The requirements for such funding will depend on 
the specific locations, and will vary by the type of gaming property contemplated, as well as 
other factors from ease of access to levels of employment, to whether or not a property is in an 
urban or rural location. 
We suggest that certain steps be taken to ensure that adequate funding is available for 
local communities. These include: 
 Applicants for licensure should bear the burden of minimizing the impact on local 
communities. Such steps would require the applicants to bear the burden of proof that 
they have selected an optimal location that offers sufficient access to both patrons and 
employees, and that the property is pursuing marketing and other strategies designed 
to minimize such impacts. 
 Law-enforcement responsibilities on the casino floor should be handled at the state 
level, with minimal demands on local law enforcement. This should include the cost 
of handling any prosecution of crimes on the casino floor, as is done in other states. 
 The responsibility to minimize the need for mitigation funding should be held jointly 
by the operators and the public sector. To do this would require that applicants seek 
out sites that minimize the need for such funding, and that steps are taken – such as 
hiring the currently unemployed – to ameliorate any potential impacts. 
 The public sector must recognize that not all types of communities will be impacted 
in the same way, so a one-size-fits-all funding formula might not prove effective once 
casinos are operational. Indeed, this requires that public officials adopt an expansive 
view as to the type of communities that would be impacted, and should not limit 
funding to only communities that host gaming facilities. 
Absent information regarding specific casino sites, it would be impossible to determine 
whether or not 2.5 percent of gaming revenue would be sufficient to address the needs of all 
impacted local communities. With that in mind, we respectfully suggest that lawmakers adopt a 
flexible approach to funding, with 2.5 percent being a guideline rather than a fixed amount. 
Some communities might require more; others less. 
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Section V: Gaming Regulation 
 
Overview of regulatory issues 
For various reasons, casino gaming is one of the major worldwide growth industries, and 
that expansion of gaming has continued into the first decade of the new century. Legalized 
gambling has existed in Nevada for more than 75 five years, in New Jersey for more than 30 
years and has been expanded to most of the states in the United States.248  
Both the governments that legalize casinos and the casino industry face challenges in 
jurisdictions either expanding legalized gaming activity or considering casino gaming for the 
first time. The challenge for government is to put into place effective controls to oversee gaming 
and to maintain the will to regulate the industry for the public benefit. There is a direct nexus 
between effective regulation of the gaming industry and the long-term success of casinos. For the 
reasons discussed in this section of the report, those jurisdictions that create effective regulatory 
controls will not only protect themselves but will also provide a strong foundation for investment 
in the gaming industry. 
The remainder of this section will focus on those standards that gaming jurisdictions 
should consider in regulating and controlling casinos. In just about every successful jurisdiction 
that has legalized casino gaming, that activity is highly regulated. The elements of effective 
casino regulation include various operational controls and licensing of those companies and 
individuals who participate in the gaming industry. The goal of licensing is to ensure that only 
those companies and individuals who meet the standards of the particular jurisdiction actually 
receive a gaming license, that organized criminal elements are kept out of the ownership and 
operation of the casino industry and vendors that service casinos, and that otherwise unqualified 
companies and individuals do not receive a casino license. Additionally, from an operational 
perspective, the goal of casino regulation is to ensure that all monies are accounted for, the 
casinos are not used to launder money, and that the games are operated fairly. 
Many jurisdictions have also incorporated in their gaming legislation public policy goals 
relating to the regulation and oversight of gaming including some or all of the following: 
1) Strict regulation of the industry, including detailed provisions pertaining to licensure, 
ongoing regulation and taxation; 
2) Framing the granting of a casino license as a privilege that can be revoked by the 
government if circumstances so warrant rather than as a right or entitlement. In this way, 
the holder of any type of license is placed on notice that it must conform its conduct to 
certain standards; 
3) Creation, by the enabling legislation, of an independent agency to oversee gaming 
activity. Alternatively, the oversight of gaming should be placed in an agency or cabinet 
department with sufficient authority to effectively regulate gaming activity. In either 
event, the regulatory agency should have law enforcement powers and should be isolated, 
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 The Impacts of Expanded Gaming on the Commonwealth of Massachusetts                    259 
to the extent possible, from the political whims of the day. The powers typically granted 
to regulatory agencies include: 
o Investigation of the qualifications of casino applicants 
o Issuance of casino licenses and permits 
o Promulgation of regulations 
o Investigations if violations of the gaming act and regulations 
o Initiation of regulatory compliance actions 
o Continuing reviews of casino operations 
o Financial and operational audits of casino operations 
o Hearings and adjudication of licensing and other cases 
o Collection of fees and penalties  
4) An all-encompassing and continuing obligation of individuals and companies who want 
to participate in gaming activity to disclose information to the appropriate regulatory 
agency. A subcomponent of this category is that those companies and individuals 
applying for a casino or vendor license should be required to pay for all costs associated 
with the conduct of their background investigations. This requirement allows the 
regulatory agency to undertake what are often complex and multi-faceted entity and other 
investigations without having the taxpayers of the state pay for these types of 
investigations. 
5) A strict code of ethics under which regulatory agencies and senior government officials 
should operate so that actual and perceived conflicts of interest can be avoided and the 
regulatory decisions can be made on the basis of merit.  
 
Casino licensing 
One of the fundamental methods to preserve the integrity of casino gaming is an effective 
and comprehensive licensing process. Licensing standards are designed to allow regulatory 
agencies to perform these functions and maintain public confidence in the integrity of the 
process. 
Licensing standards are commonly divided into affirmative and disqualification criteria. 
Many jurisdictions require that applicants for a casino, vendor and employee license 
affirmatively demonstrate qualifications for licensure. For example, an affirmative demonstration 
of good character, honesty and integrity for a designated period prior to licensure is a common 
feature of the licensing process. Generally, a demonstration of financial stability, responsibility 
and integrity relating to financial solvency, viability and honesty in business dealings is also 
required.  
Disqualification criteria permit a casino regulatory body to deny a license even if the 
affirmative criteria have been met. Failure to provide information, failure to reveal material facts, 
or supplying false or inaccurate information are generally independent bases to deny licensure. 
However, not every failure to disclose information may lead to a licensure denial. For example, a 
failure to disclose must generally be willful or show a conscious disregard for the regulatory 
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process; an inadvertent failure to disclose a non-material fact would not usually mandate 
automatic disqualification. 
Other disqualification factors typically relate to criminal conduct and convictions. 
Convictions of certain offenses, generally felonies or first or second degree crimes, within a 
specific period of time, usually 10 years preceding the date of the casino application, results in 
automatic disqualification. Disqualification is also usually mandated if an applicant is a career 
offender, a member of a career offender cartel or an associate of a career offender cartel. 
Involvement in the illegal drug trade would also be a basis for denial.  
The licensing standard discussed above safeguards against infiltration of organized crime 
or other undesirables through the ownership or management of a casino. Qualification standards 
ensure that all individuals who have control or influence over the corporate structure of a casino 
licensee satisfy minimum standards for licensure.  
The scope of the licensing process is important to note as well. Typically for casino entity 
licensing, the individuals who are required to file application forms include: 
 Members of the Board of Directors 
 Major stockholders owning 5 percent or more of the casino company or its parent 
company 
 Company officers 
 Key employees 
Similar standards typically are applied to companies that engage in business activities 
with casinos and for casino employees. 
Corporations and their board of directors, major stockholders of the casino companies, 
financial sources, casino service industries and casino employees are typically subject to 
licensure. Once a casino applicant receives a license, the licensee remains under government 
scrutiny, and its operations are subject to review, audit and regulation. 
The standards discussed above are used by most gaming jurisdictions but the 
interpretation of these standards can differ among jurisdictions. Nevertheless, the basic goal of 
barring organized crime and undesirables from the industry and determining the ―suitability‖ of 
applicants remains a universal goal of credible gaming jurisdictions. Strict licensing standards 
and their implementation has been successful in frustrating hidden casino ownership and 
ensuring that only qualified individuals are licensed and employed in the casino industry. 
 
Operational controls 
Once a casino applicant has been licensed, it is important to monitor and regulate casino 
operations. Elements of effective casino control typically relate to: 
1. Adoption and implementation of minimum accounting and other internal controls 
through the adoption of regulations 
2. Generally uniform rules of the games 
3. Effective oversight by casino supervisors 
4. Internal controls for slot machines 
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5. Anti-money laundering controls 
6. Viable surveillance 
7. Regulatory oversight 
The first element of effective control in casino operations relates to a system of minimum 
accounting and other internal controls (MICS) designed to safeguard casino assets. To the extent 
possible, MICS should establish accountability of casino revenues and pinpoint areas and 
individuals responsible for such funds during the gaming day.  
The second aspect of casino control relates to having uniform and defined rules of the 
game for each game offered by the casino. Uniform substantive rules of the game permit casino 
supervisors and regulators to identify any deviations, which may indicate cheating or tampering 
with the games.  
The third aspect of casino control relates to internal controls related to gaming equipment 
including casino chips, cards, dice, dealing shoes and casino software.249 
The fourth aspect of casino control relates to slot machines. Electronic games are unique 
and subject to unique forms of tampering and cheating. Effective controls over slot machines 
start with the testing of the slot machines by a laboratory, either independent or state operated, to 
determine the randomness of the gaming related computer chips and to determine whether the 
payouts are fair. The next step includes an aggressive inspection program to ascertain whether 
tampering has occurred. A final step relates to the verification of slot machine jackpots to make 
sure they are legitimate. 
The fifth aspect of effective gaming control relates to anti-money laundering programs. 
Since 1985, casino gaming has come under the requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act. At that 
time, casinos were deemed to be financial institutions under this federal law. Specific 
requirements have been established through regulations issued by the Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network (FinCEN) mandating the filing of Currency Transaction Reports (CTRs) 
and Suspicious Activity Reports (SARC). Many states have adopted parallel regulations that 
require the filing of CTRs and SARCs with state gaming regulators. 
The final aspect of casino control relates to the clandestine surveillance of gaming 
operations by management and regulators. Surveillance personnel act as a check and balance 
over casino personnel on the casino floor and provide an independent level of review and 
observations. The surveillance department should operate independently of the management of 
the casino and should report to the casino entity‘s Board of Directors or Audit Committee, or 
both.  
The element that ties all of the above together relates to an effective regulatory process. 
As noted, regulatory agencies should have full authority to conduct reviews, audits and 
observations of all aspects of a casino‘s operations.  
The model of regulation described herein has proven to be effective for casino operations 
in many countries, including the United States, Australia, and some in western Europe. It serves 
                                                 
249 The development of casino software to track patron play and audit various aspects of the gaming operation has made MIS 
auditing a critical component of the regulatory process. Regulators, as well as operators, need to know and understand this 
technology in order to effectively regulate modern gaming operations. 
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to create public confidence in casino gaming and has led to the investment of billions of dollars 
in physical facilities and the creation of tens of thousands of jobs. There is no reason why the 
same goals and objectives could not be realized in Massachusetts. 
 
Case study: Singapore 
Singapore has not yet opened either one of its two planned integrated resorts, yet is 
already being defined positively by the expected success of its gaming industry. Singapore‘s 
economy grew by 8.2 percent in the quarter ending June 2007, led by a 17.9 percent growth in 
construction. In chronicling that growth, the Financial Times reported: ―Lee Yuan Kew, 
Singapore‘s elder statesman, recently predicted that the city-state was poised for a ‗golden age‘ 
over the next five years, owing to its transformation into a private banking and gaming center.‖250 
Spectrum has been intimately involved in the planning and development of Singapore‘s 
gaming industry, having served as consultants to the Ministry of Home Affairs in advance of 
issuing licenses for the two planned integrated resorts. The following summarizes the Singapore 
experience to date. 
 
Decision to Allow Casinos 
The United States provided a backdrop in the decision by Singapore to allow casinos. In 
June 1999, the U.S. National Gambling Impact Study Commission (NGISC), established by 
President Clinton in 1996, delivered its Final Report to Congress. The report collated two years 
of comprehensive legal and factual study of the social and economic impacts of gambling in the 
United States. The basic issue addressed by the commission was simple: ―Gambling, like any 
other business, creates both profit and jobs. But the real question … is not simply how many 
people work in the industry, nor how much they earn, nor even what tax revenues flow from 
gambling. The central issue is whether the net increases in income and well-being are worth the 
acknowledged social costs of gambling.‖ 
At the time when the NGISC delivered its report it was simply inconceivable that, within 
five years, Singapore would allow casino gambling. For decades, government policy had 
opposed resolutely any and all calls to legalize casino gambling, a position that was also seen to 
be aligned with public opinion on the issue. In late 2003, opponents of casino gambling seized 
upon the case of Chia Teck Leng, the former finance manager of Asia Pacific Breweries, who 
was accused of embezzled more than S$110 million (US$70 million) as he became mired in debt 
through gambling in casinos around the world. In April 2004, he was sentenced to 42 years in 
jail in what was Singapore‘s biggest ever case of commercial fraud. 
Yet in April 2005, a proposal to develop two multi-billion-dollar integrated resorts, each 
including a casino, was approved at a special meeting of the Singaporean Cabinet, following an 
earlier government call, in late December 2004, for interested developers to submit concept plans 
for such resorts; 19 responses were received.  
                                                 
250 ―Construction Boost for Singapore,‖ Financial Times, July 11, 2007, p. 2. 
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In March 2005, Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew was briefed on the 19 proposals, and the 
next month, following four days of parliamentary debate, a formal announcement was made by 
Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong in a speech that emphasized the pressing need for Singapore to 
take positive action in the face of clear indications that the country was losing its attraction as a 
tourism destination. 
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Home Affairs Wong Kan Seng drew upon the 
NGISC report in a statement to Parliament, also made on 18 April 2005, in which he said: ―The 
(report) analyzed data from 100 communities with varying degrees of proximity to casino 
gambling and concluded that casino gambling has had no effect on the rates of serious violent or 
property crimes.‖ 
The decision to develop integrated sites at Marina Bay near the downtown city center and 
on the resort island of Sentosa reversed decades of official antipathy to casino gambling and was 
reached only following considerable discussion and public consultation. The Parliamentary 
debate saw many Members of Parliament share their concerns on gambling, and followed more 
than a year of vigorous public discussion on the subject. 
Significant differences of opinion still exist within Singaporean society, with concerns 
focused primarily on the social implications of legalized casino gambling.  
Against this backdrop it is noted that the decision to proceed with two integrated resorts 
came as major global casino operators are turning to Asia for expansion, attracted partly by the 
explosive growth seen in Macau. Between 1993 and 2002, visitor arrivals to Singapore averaged 
between 6.5 million and 7.5 million visitors; over the same period tourism receipts fell by 17 
percent, from S$11.3 billion to S$9.4 billion, reflecting a corresponding fall in the contribution 
of tourism to GDP from 6.1 percent in 1993 to 3 percent in 2002. At the same time, however, the 
Asia Pacific region as a whole recorded year-on-year growth in tourism traffic of more than 6 
percent. Over the course of this 11-year period Singapore witnessed a decline of more than 50 
percent in its share of regional tourism receipts from 13.1 percent to 6 percent. In 2005, the 
tourism sector generated an estimated S$10.8 billion in tourism receipts. 
The integrated resort developments are regarded by the government therefore as essential 
components of the strategic drive to double tourist numbers to 17 million a year and significantly 
enhance annual spending by tourists. They are primarily envisaged to be iconic lifestyle 
developments showcasing a comprehensive range of world-class amenities including hotels, 
convention facilities, retail and dining, entertainment shows, themed attractions and of course 
casinos. The strategic objective is to broaden domestic leisure and entertainment options to 
enhance Singapore‘s reputation as a premium ―must-visit‖ destination for leisure and business 
visitors.  
It is the government‘s intention that the gaming resorts will have a compelling mix of 
non-gaming attractions, with casino gaming revenues constituting a minority component of total 
resort revenues. It is expected that international patrons, instead of local residents, will contribute 
the greater proportion of total gaming revenues. 
In his speech, Prime Minister Lee noted that the Marina Bay and Sentosa sites attracted 
two very different types of proposals. The Marina Bay was deemed most suitable for a large 
business and convention facility specifically targeting MICE (Meetings, Incentive tours, 
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Conventions and Exhibitions), while the Sentosa site was identified as more suitable for a 
family-friendly resort.  
The total investment earmarked for both sites will exceed US$ 7 billion. Gaming will 
occupy no more than 5 percent of the total floor area of the Marina Bay and Sentosa 
developments. The Ministry of Trade & Industry further estimates that, combined, the two 
gaming resorts will create some 10,000 direct jobs and indirect employment for a further 25,000 
people. The contribution to annual GDP is expected to be in the region of S$1.5 billion. 
Singapore regulatory framework 
In parallel with the decision to proceed with the IR projects, the government of Singapore 
has also worked to develop a transparent and effective regulatory framework to govern the 
operation of the casino components of these projects. Central to this is the Casino Control Bill, a 
150-page document that was passed by the Singaporean Parliament in February 2006, and which 
came into force in June 2006. 
In drafting the bill, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) studied the regulatory practices 
of well-known casino jurisdictions in other parts of the world, including both multi-casino 
jurisdictions, such as Nevada and New Jersey; and single-casino jurisdictions, such as New 
South Wales and Victoria in Australia and Macau. MHA officials, including the Minister, Wong 
Kan Seng, visited casinos and regulators in Las Vegas, Macau and Australia to learn from their 
experience. 
The draft Casino Control Bill was subject to public consultation in late 2005, and 
potential investors in the IR projects were also invited to provide feedback. In addition, the 
Singaporean government sent the draft to regulators in the United States and Australia for 
comments. The ultimate goal, as expressed by Minister Wong when presenting the Bill to 
Parliament, was simple: ―We aim to position our integrated resorts with the best in the world. 
Our regulatory standards must necessarily be on par with theirs too.‖ 
The objectives of the Casino Control Bill are primarily to ensure that: 
 The casinos remain free from criminal influence or exploitation 
 Gaming in the casinos is conducted honestly 
 The potential of casinos to cause harm to minors, vulnerable persons and society at 
large is minimized  
The provisions of the Casino Control Bill will be implemented through two bodies, the 
Casino Regulatory Authority of Singapore (CRA) and the National Council on Problem 
Gambling (NCPG). The CRA will adopt primary responsibility for regulation, licensing and 
investigation, inspection and enforcement, adjudication of disputes between the casinos and 
patrons, and evaluation and audit of the casinos‘ internal controls. The NCPG, which has already 
been established by the Ministry of Community Development, Youth and Sports, will be 
responsible for actions including the promotion of public awareness of problem gambling. The 
NCPG will also be empowered to exclude persons from the casinos. 
The Bill also sets up a dedicated Casino Investigation Branch within the Criminal 
Investigation Department of the police to detect and investigate crimes that take place in the 
casino. 
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Each integrated resort operator has been granted a 60-year tenure over the land and 
awarded a concession to operate a casino for 30 years; this concession is independent of a casino 
license, for which the operator must apply to the Casino Regulatory Authority.  
The Singapore Tourism Board has further stated that for a period of 10 years from the 
date of the signing of the second integrated resort agreement, only two casino licenses will be 
issued.  
For each resort, the Controlling Shareholder, defined as the single entity that owns the 
largest direct and indirect stake of the voting shares, will not be permitted to hold an interest or a 
management contract for operating the casino in the other integrated resort. The resort operator 
can apply for the casino license only when at least half of the proposed gross floor area is ready 
to receive visitors and at least half of the committed investment has been expended. The operator 
is then required to expend 100 percent of its committed development investment within three 
years of the date of issue of the casino license. 
The Casino Control Bill contains a number of provisions intended to control access to the 
two casinos by Singaporean nationals and permanent residents, primarily through a minimum 
age restriction and a requirement that these patrons pay either a daily or annual entry fee to gain 
access to the properties. 
 The social safeguards delineated by the bill include: 
 Entry prohibited to the casino for those below 21 years 
 A casino entry levy of S$100 (US$65) per day or S$2,000 (US$1,300) per year for 
Singapore residents 
 Provision of self and third party exclusion schemes (including requests by family 
members) 
 Requirement to display information on problem gambling, help services, rules of 
games and odds of winning 
 Restrictions on advertising of casino and casino gambling 
 Restrictions on extension of gaming credit to Singapore residents, with the exception 
of premium players 
 No automatic teller machines allowed within the casino 
 Provision of a system to allow loss limits to be set voluntarily 
Section 108 of the bill also prohibits casino and junket operators from extending credit to 
Singapore nationals and permanent residents, unless they maintain a credit balance of at least 
S$100,000 (US$65,000) with the casino operator at the start of their gaming, this being the sum 
needed to qualify as a premium player. 
The legislation also requires the casino operator to put in place a robust anti-money 
laundering program that includes know-your-customer due-diligence, mandatory reporting for 
transactions above S$10,000 (US$6,500) and record keeping for transactions above S$5,000 
(US$3,250). 
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Tax will be levied at 15 percent on monthly gross gaming revenue from mass market 
players, and 5 percent on monthly gross gaming revenue from VIP (premium) players. The 
Singaporean government has committed not to raise casino tax levels for at least 15 years.  
Gross gaming revenue will also be liable to Goods & Services Tax, which was raised 
from 5 percent to 7 percent in July 2007. 
A withholding tax of 3 percent of commissions earned will also be levied upon junket 
promoters 
Overview of bidding process 
In December 2004, the Singaporean Ministry of Trade & Industry issued the ―Key 
Conditions & Requirements For The Request For Concepts,‖ which generated 19 responses. 
Marina Bay 
In November 2005, a formal Request For Proposals (RFP) for the Marina Bay site was 
issued by the Singapore Tourism Board to 12 short-listed respondents, with a deadline of March 
29, 2006, stipulated for the submission of such proposals, and an expectation that the Marina Bay 
decision would be announced by mid-2006. The approximate weightings assigned by the tourism 
board to four evaluation criteria for the Marina Bay IR were identified as: 
Tourism appeal and contribution:   40 percent 
Architectural concept and design:   30 percent 
Development investment:    20 percent 
Strength of the consortium and partners:  10 percent 
The Marina Bay site area covers approximately 51 acres and the resort will have a gross 
floor area no greater that 6.1 million square feet, and no less than 2.9 million square feet, with a 
maximum gaming area not to exceed 161,460 square feet and no more than 2,500 gaming 
machines.  
On May 26, 2006, it was announced that Las Vegas Sands had won the bidding for the 
Marina Bay development. The complex, to be called The Marina Bay Sands, is expected to be 
completed in 2009, and to generate an additional S$2.7 billion (US$1.8 billion), or 0.8 percent, 
to Singapore‘s annual GDP and create 30,000 jobs throughout the economy by 2015. Las Vegas 
Sands has committed to invest S$3.9 billion (US$2.7 billion) in the project, not including the 
fixed S1.2 billion (US$800 million) cost of the site itself, which by most estimates will make it 
among the most expensive casino investments in the world. In addition to the casino, other key 
components of the plan are three hotel towers with 2,500 rooms, a museum and a convention 
center capable of accommodating over 52,000 people.  
Sentosa 
An RFP for the Sentosa integrated resort was issued on April 28, 2006, and closed on 
October 10, 2006. The approximate weightings assigned by the tourism board to four evaluation 
criteria were identified as: 
Tourism appeal and contribution:   45 percent 
Architectural concept and design:   25 percent 
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Development investment:    20 percent 
Strength of the consortium and partners:  10 percent 
The site area is approximately 121 hectares (299 acres) with a maximum gross floor area 
of 3.7 million square feet. As with Marina Bay, the maximum gaming area allowed is 161,460 
square feet and the maximum number of gaming machines allowed is 2,500. 
On December 8, 2006, it was announced that Genting International had won the bidding 
for the Sentosa Island development. Together with the land price and other associated capital 
costs, the total investment by Genting will total S$5.2 billion (US$3.5 billion). The casino 
element of the development is to be accompanied by six hotels offering 1,830 rooms, and 
convention facilities for approximately 12,000 people. Sentosa will also host Universal Studios‘ 
largest theme park in Asia, with 22 attractions within seven themed worlds. 
 
Conclusion: Singapore case study 
The decision to allow casinos in Singapore was not made lightly and remains a 
controversial issue, and significant divisions still exist in public opinion. Just one week before 
the decision was made public, the Ministry for Community Development, Youth and Sports 
released findings stating that 58 percent of all Singaporean adults gambled, and that 2.1 percent 
were at risk of addiction. The findings arose from a survey conducted by the Ministry from 
December 2004 to February 2005. 
The government‘s decision, founded on the need to bolster flagging tourism revenues, 
therefore reflected an approach adopted by many of the jurisdictions where casino gaming is 
legal. The core elements of this approach are essentially that: 
 Limited casino gambling should be allowed, at least initially 
 A small number of large casinos is preferable to a large number of small properties 
 Casinos should visually enhance a locality, ideally constituting just one component of 
an integrated entertainment and leisure development 
 Effective consumer protection policies and social safeguards should be in place. 
 Regulatory and taxation frameworks need to be clear, fixed and reflect the realities of 
global capital markets 
 Regulation and oversight regimes must ensure that casinos are free from crime and 
vice, and that they are owned and operated only by fit and proper persons 
In his speech of April 18, 2005, Prime Minister Lee noted the concerns of opponents, but 
concluded his remarks with the following comment: ―If we reject these Integrated Resort 
projects, the world‘s investors and players will mentally scratch us off from the list of countries 
that will go for business, for leisure and entertainment.‖  
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Case study: Kansas 
Kansas has had an interest in legalizing casino gaming, though lacking in consistency, for 
the last 15 years. Most recently, that interest has created the Kansas Expanded Lottery Act, 
which has provided for destination casinos in four locations. This act also has provided for a 
general outline and requirements regarding applicants and time frames for submission of 
documents.  
The Kansas Lottery Commission was given the task of setting forth in regulation form, 
the specific time frames and rules that applicants must meet. At this time Kansas is still in the 
midst of a variety of issues relating to their Expanded Lottery Act, including the state 
constitutionality of the law itself and the selection of the best applicants, but their experience so 
far is worth examining.  
As is often the case with legislation related to gaming, the law was passed amid some 
controversy. As a result, the legislation includes provisions that could prove difficult to 
implement. For example, the law requires persons that are 0.5 percent owners of applicant 
companies to qualify, rather than the more typical and practical 5 percent. Since 0.5 percent 
owners of a company can change, especially in a publicly traded company, on an almost daily 
basis, this will make it difficult to create a package of completed investigations in a timely 
manner. Thus, this alone could serve to emphasize the importance that legislation be based on a 
practical and logical foundation. It is all the more important to solidly establish this base on 
specific matters and maintain it, regardless of any controversy that is engendered during the final 
debates.  
The legislation requires that the Lottery Commission adopt and publish rules not more 
than 30 days after the effective date of the act. This again was a difficult practical hurdle for that 
agency to meet. Such timelines can also serve to create confusion and create rules that are not as 
practical as they would otherwise be. Spectrum recommends, in fact, that an emphasis be put on 
the early part of rule-making and development of policy, to the extent possible, since the 
consequences of those actions can be felt for years.  
The Kansas Expanded Lottery Act gave responsibility to the Lottery Commission to 
approve a management contract with a licensee (called a lottery gaming facility manager in the 
law), by taking into consideration the following factors: 
 The size of the location 
 The geographic area in which the facility is to be located 
 The proposed facility‘s location as a tourist and entertainment destination 
 The estimated number of tourists that would be attracted by the proposed facility 
 The number and type of lottery facility games to be operated at the proposed facility 
 Agreements related to the ancillary lottery gaming facility operations 
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The law required that applicants needed to meet certain minimum criteria. Part of the 
process in Kansas was to give preference to Kansas-based Indian tribes. Beyond that criterion, 
the law required that a prospective applicant: 
 Should have sufficient access to financial resources to support the activities required 
 Is current in filing all applicable statewide tax returns 
 Has three consecutive years' experience in the management of gaming which would 
be Class III gaming 
Beyond those minimum criteria, the law required that there be an investment of at least 
$225 million to $50 million by the applicant, depending on the Kansas gaming zone. The law 
provides for a 90-day period for the negotiation period. This time frame also proved less than 
sufficient according to Lottery officials.  
Once approved, the law specified that the contract would have an initial term of 15 years 
and include provisions for the applicant to pay for oversight and regulation, among other things. 
A privilege fee is also required if selected as the lottery facility manager. This fee is $25 million 
for a lottery facility manager in the northeast, southeast or south central Kansas gaming zone. 
The fee is $5.5 million for a lottery facility manager in the southwest Kansas gaming zone.  
The act also creates a board (the Review Board) with a purpose of determining which 
contracts best maximizes revenue, encourages tourism and otherwise serves the interests of the 
people of Kansas. The law requires that the board hold public hearings, take testimony, solicit 
the advice of experts and investigate the merits of each contract submitted by the executive 
director. The law requires that the board, within 60 days of submittal of all contracts, select by 
vote the contract which is the best possible such contract or, if just one contract is submitted, 
determine if that contract is the best contract. If agreement cannot be reached, the board can 
request that the contract be renegotiated.  
After a determination by the Review Board that a contract is the best possible contract, 
the agency which is assigned to investigate the applicant, the Kansas Racing and Gaming 
Commission, is required to investigate the applicant and all officers and directors, as required. 
The Kansas Racing and Gaming Commission has 10 days after receiving the board‘s 
recommendation to vote to approve or reject in whole the background of the facility manager. It 
is apparent that this time frame, of 10 days, to make a determination on backgrounds of what can 
be a very complex application, presents practical issues. Though the Racing and Gaming 
Commission may start the process before the decision is made on the contract and may ask for 
additional time, this is another example of the need for a state to invest heavily in the beginning 
portion of a process.  
 Conclusions: Kansas Case study 
The Kansas Expanded Lottery Act, while setting forth criteria and time frames for the 
selection of facility managers (destination casinos), may prove most useful in illustrating a law 
that is difficult and impractical to implement. In order to implement the law the Kansas Lottery 
and Racing and Gaming officials have now contracted with consulting companies that are more 
familiar with the gaming industry so as to make informed decisions in critical areas. It may have 
been worthwhile for such actions to take place at the earliest possible time. It appears that a 
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number of small changes to the law could have saved time and money in the creation of an 
industry that will affect much of the state's population for many years. 
The time frames and criteria for applicants should allow enough time for promulgation of 
regulations in the most efficient and thorough way possible. For example, the requirement for the 
filing of applications has been done by many gaming agencies in the past several decades and 
there are precedents that abound. A law that enacts gaming should allow for the agencies with 
those responsibilities to avail themselves of those precedents and use the time-frames that are 
practical and applicable.  
Of considerable significance, the law should allow adequate time for the significant 
owners of the company to be investigated. If an unrealistic benchmark requiring qualification of 
all those who own 0.5 percent of a company is placed in the law, it could force the investigatory 
body to make unnecessary judgments as to what investigations to complete and prioritize. If an 
unrealistic timeframe to complete background investigations is imposed, it would diminish the 
serious treatment with which such an important function can be brought to completion. Such an 
investigation will take very serious resources, resources which a state is not familiar in 
dedicating. If mistakes are made and an applicant is accepted and then found to have background 
issues which are unacceptable, as has happened in other states and internationally, the 
consequences can be close to disastrous in terms of time and money for a jurisdiction.  
None of these decisions or the others in the bid process should be casually addressed in 
enabling legislation. In each case in the Kansas Expanded Lottery Act, it appears a shorter time 
frame was allowed than has proven practical. 
Kansas chose to allow simultaneous bids for contracts throughout its four designated 
zones. This has the advantage of reducing the amount of time in starting the industry but has an 
important disadvantage. Specifically, an applicant that loses a bid in one part of the state does not 
have the opportunity to rebid in another, nor the knowledge of how their bid will do in another 
area. In effect, this serves to diminish the attention that applicants can give to the bidding process 
and ultimately may deprive the state of the ability to take advantage of the best pool of 
applicants. 
One possible scenario is that one of the three sites – potentially a site in the more densely 
populated Boston area – could prove more attractive to a variety of worthy bidders all competing 
for the same license, thus precluding those same bidders from vying for one of the other licenses. 
As we have noted, simultaneous bids could deny Massachusetts an opportunity to get optimal 
development on all three of its licenses. Thus, we suggest staggered bids, but recommend 
consideration of temporary facilities to allow revenues to be generated at an earlier date. 
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State-by-state analysis of gaming regulation 
The following tables provide an overview of the regulatory system in place in seven 
states with large commercial casino industries (that is, casinos that are not racetracks or Indian 
operations): 
 
Gaming Agency Operational Analysis 
State  Gaming 
Agencies 
(Primary 
Agencies 
Only) 
Use of Police Employee 
License 
Structure 
Vendor 
License 
Structure 
Inspectors 
Presence 
Decision 
Making and 
Investigatory 
Structure 
Colorado Colorado 
Division of 
Gaming/ 
Colorado 
Gaming 
Commission/ 
Bureau of 
Investigation 
 
Colorado 
Bureau of 
Investigation 
are State Police 
License 
Required for 
Key and 
Support 
(Gaming) 
Employees 
Slot Machine 
Manufacturers 
and Distributors 
only 
Field 
Operations 
Staff not 24/7 
Independent 
Commission is 
Part Time, 
Division makes 
Decisions on 
Employees 
Illinois Illinois Gaming 
Board 
State Police are 
assigned to 
Gaming Board 
License 
Required for All 
Employees 
Gaming 
Related 
Companies only 
 
No Yes, Board is 
Part time 
Iowa Iowa Racing 
and Gaming 
Commission 
and State 
Division of 
Criminal 
Investigation 
Division of 
Criminal 
Investigation 
work with 
Racing and 
Gaming 
Commission 
 
License 
Required for All 
Employees 
Gaming 
Related 
Companies 
must be 
investigated, 
Regular and 
Continuing 
Company 
Contracts 
examined only 
 
Regulatory 
Officials at 
Casinos 
Business Days 
Investigatory 
Agency is 
Independent  
Recommendati
ons 
not made to 
Commission 
Louisiana Louisiana 
Gaming Control 
Board and 
State Police  
State Police is 
the Primary 
Regulatory 
Agency 
Key Employees 
Licensed, Work 
Permit for 
Gaming 
Employees 
 
Gaming 
Related 
Companies only 
No Yes, Board is 
Part-time 
except for Chair 
Mississippi Mississippi 
Gaming 
Commission 
 
Some Agency 
Employees are 
Law 
Enforcement 
Officers 
Key Employees 
Licensed, Work 
Permit 
Required for 
Gaming 
Employees 
Gaming 
Related 
Companies 
Licensed only 
No No 
Nevada Nevada 
Gaming Control 
Board and 
Gaming 
Commission 
Some Agency 
Employees are 
Sworn Officers 
Local Police 
Assist in some 
Process 
 
Key Employees 
Licensed, 
Gaming 
Employees 
Registered 
Gaming 
Equipment 
Distributors 
only, no 
Renewal 
No Yes, 
Commission is 
unstaffed and 
Part time 
New Jersey New Jersey 
Casino Control 
Commission 
and Division of 
Gaming 
Enforcement 
State Police 
Assigned to 
Division of 
Gaming 
Enforcement 
Key 
Employees, 
Casino 
Employees 
Licensed, 
Employees with 
Access to 
Casino are 
Registered 
Gaming 
Companies and 
Regular and 
Continuing 
Non-Gaming 
Related 
Companies 
Licensed 
Yes, 24/7 at all 
casinos 
Investigatory 
Agency is 
Independent, 
Decision 
Making Agency 
is Full time and 
Staff 
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 Nevada model 
Nevada‘s Gaming Control Board was created in 1955, with the stated purpose to 
―eliminate the undesirable element in Nevada gaming and to provide regulations for the licensing 
and operation of gaming.‖251 In 1959 the Nevada Tax Commission was relieved of its regulatory 
duties over the gaming industry and the Nevada Gaming Commission was created with licensing 
authority. In 1971 legislation expanded the duties of the State Gaming Commission to include 
tax collection. As the first modern gaming agency it has grown over the years. 
Largely because of the toughened regulatory system respected companies were attracted 
to the industry and today the gaming industry in Nevada has become a multibillion dollar 
business. The Board is comprised of three members appointed for four year terms, and has 
approximately 450 employees in seven divisions.  
 New Jersey model  
New Jersey took a different approach than Nevada when it implemented gaming in 1978. 
New Jersey had a prior history of problems with organized crime and thus the desire to keep the 
industry crime free was uppermost in the minds of those who drafted the New Jersey Casino 
Control Act. In addition, New Jersey clearly did not want to create a system were regulators were 
a captive of the industry, as they perceived existed in Nevada. 
The result in New Jersey has been a stricter regulatory environment. Rules include a 
system of internal controls which help account for the movement of cash in the casino and divide 
functions between departments so as to eliminate incompatible functions. Licensing 
requirements were implemented for both employees and casino service companies. 
New Jersey has gone through several periods of deregulation but a strict system still 
exists in areas deemed critical. Through their approach this state has largely accomplished its 
original goal, of establishing a crime free industry. The cost of regulation has been relatively 
high, as there are approximately 700 employees in the regulatory agencies now and a budget of 
about $72 million. As a percentage of revenue, however, the cost is relatively small.  
 
Variations in gaming agencies 
Gaming agencies vary, because of the differences in jurisdictions that they represent and 
also because of different approaches to regulating the gaming industry. The extent of attention 
that is given regulation, while different in budget amounts is not as different relative to gross 
revenue. More important than expense is whether those agencies are designed with the attention 
to the accomplishment of their charge. The public confidence and trust in the industry is a 
precious commodity that cannot be overestimated, for it allows for the existence of gaming 
industry itself. Moreover, it is not necessary today, with advancements in technology and well 
established networks of law enforcement and intelligence, to overlook areas of regulatory control 
that could allow for organized crime or theft of assets.  
                                                 
251 Nevada Gaming Commission. http://gaming.nv.gov/documents/pdf/gaming_regulation_nevada.pdf 
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The budget for a gaming agency should be paid for not out of the general fund, nor out of 
taxes on gaming gross revenue, but out of fees and billings charged by the gaming agencies 
directly to the gaming industry. The extent of the budget should be sufficient to assure the 
gaining of the public confidence in the integrity of the industry and should include those areas 
that allow for the needed licensing, internal controls, and regulatory oversight.  
 
Recommendations for Massachusetts gaming regulation 
As can be seen from the case studies and the above tables, gaming agencies vary in the 
following ways: with regard to license structure; presence of inspectors or other regulatory 
oversight; and decision making and investigatory structure. Our recommendations are that 
Massachusetts adopts an efficient but relatively strict approach to the regulation of their gaming 
industry at least at the start because of the extreme value that such regulations hold relative to the 
public trust and confidence.  
 Create regulations for the control of the assets that thoroughly address the rules for 
table games and controls for slot machines, including the most recent technological 
changes in the industry 
 Provide for sufficient regulatory oversight by creating a unit or team that is frequently 
on the casino floor, accessible to the public and visible to casino employees 
 Create a license structure that addresses all those that participate in the gaming 
industry, including the casino licensees, the companies that service those licensees 
and the employees. It is only by examining the background of all those who seek to 
participate in the industry that integrity can be assured. Because Massachusetts is 
considering this legislation after other licensing systems have already been 
implemented in many states, it can develop a system with optimal efficiency. 
 Create a decision-making structure that allows for independence from the 
investigatory branch of the regulatory structure. In addition, sufficiently staff the 
decision-making agency to ensure it has adequate to resources to carry out its duties. 
 
 
 
Regulatory budget 
This section provides budget guidance for effective gaming regulation. The following 
tables show, in general terms, what it would cost to fund the regulatory agencies that would 
oversee three casino properties. We project that the total annual budget required to regulate three 
destination casinos would be $16.1 million, with gaming operators providing most of the funds. 
There would potentially be some additional fees charged to individual licensees or suppliers.  
 
The budgets are summarized as: 
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Massachusetts Gaming Control Authority   
 Salaries     
 $        7,188,642  
 Operational Expenditures      $        1,509,080  
 GCA Total    
 $        8,697,722  
Massachusetts Division of Gaming Investigation and Enforcement 
 Salaries      $        6,401,376  
 Operational Expenditures     
 $           974,900  
 DGIE Total    
 $        7,376,276  
Total           
 $      16,073,998  
 
The following tables detail an annual budget for the Gaming Control Authority: 
Est. budget, Massachusetts Gaming Control Authority 
Title No. of 
positions 
Gross Pay Health 
Benefits 
Contribution, 
12.50% 
Retirement 
Benefits, 
Contribution, 
22.80% 
Other benefits, 
contribution,  
8.10% 
Projected Annual 
Expenditure 
Board 
chairman* 1  $                   -     $                   -     $                      -     $                      -     $                      -    
Appointed 
board 
members* 4  $                   -     $                   -     $                      -     $                      -     $                      -    
Auditor and 
treasurer 
board-
members* 2  $                   -     $                   -     $                      -     $                      -     $                      -    
Receptionist 3  $          75,000   $            9,375   $             17,100   $               6,075   $           107,550  
Executive 
director  1  $        150,000   $         18,750   $             34,200   $             12,150   $           215,100  
Executive 
secretary  1  $          30,000   $            3,750   $               6,840   $               2,430   $             43,020  
Administrativ
e assistant 1  $          35,000   $            4,375   $               7,980   $               2,835   $             50,190  
Chief 
inspector  1  $          75,000   $            9,375   $             17,100   $               6,075   $           107,550  
Senior 
inspector  12  $        720,000   $         90,000   $           164,160   $             58,320   $       1,032,480  
Inspector (16 
per location) 48  $    1,920,000   $       240,000   $           437,760   $          155,520   $       2,753,280  
Clerical 
support - 
inspectors 
department 3  $          84,000   $         10,500   $             19,152   $               6,804   $           120,456  
Licensing 
manager 1  $          75,000   $            9,375   $             17,100   $               6,075   $           107,550  
Senior 
licensing 
specialist 1  $          60,000   $            7,500   $             13,680   $               4,860   $             86,040  
Licensing 
specialist  3  $        120,000   $         15,000   $             27,360   $               9,720   $           172,080  
Chief 
revenue 
auditor   1  $          75,000   $            9,375   $             17,100   $               6,075   $           107,550  
Supervising 
revenue 
auditor 4  $        240,000   $         30,000   $             54,720   $             19,440   $           344,160  
Revenue 
auditor 12  $        480,000   $         60,000   $           109,440   $             38,880   $           688,320  
Clerical 
support - 
revenue audit 
department 3  $          84,000   $         10,500   $             19,152   $               6,804   $           120,456  
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Est. budget, Massachusetts Gaming Control Authority 
Title No. of 
positions 
Gross Pay Health 
Benefits 
Contribution, 
12.50% 
Retirement 
Benefits, 
Contribution, 
22.80% 
Other benefits, 
contribution,  
8.10% 
Projected Annual 
Expenditure 
Legal 
counsel  4  $        600,000   $         75,000   $           136,800   $             48,600   $           860,400  
Para-legal  2  $        120,000   $         15,000   $             27,360   $               9,720   $           172,080  
Clerical 
support   2  $          70,000   $            8,750   $             15,960   $               5,670   $           100,380  
 
* Board members are not paid a salary, but they may be reimbursed for round-trip travel to meetings. They are assumed to meet two 
days per month.   
** Reserved for other legal, accounting and consulting services (i.e., GLI certification of gaming devices, gaming consultants, expert 
witness, etc.)   
Note 1: The budget is prepared with the assumption that there will be three large destination properties and gross gaming revenue will be 
approximately $1.5 billion when all casinos are operational. 
Note 2: We anticipate a minimum of three deputies attorney general and two legal support staff to be assigned to assist the gambling 
commission. The Attorney General‘s Office will be reimbursed for these and other ancillary costs .  
Note 3: We anticipate a minimum of 16 inspectors assigned to each location (48 total) and a total of four senior inspectors at each 
property (12 total) to cover the 24/7 operation.   
Note 4: We anticipate a minimum of four auditors per each location (12 total) to conduct daily revenue audits books and records and 
four senior auditors to review audit work paper and report.    
Note 5: Other benefits represent overtime, comp time and administrative leaves. 
 Projected 
Annual 
Expense 
Six automobiles 
 $       150,000  
Gasoline (15,000 avg. Annual miles,  approx. 1,000 gal @$4.5) 
 $         27,000  
Supplies and materials 
 $         50,000  
Telephone, land lines 
 $       126,000  
Cell phones 
 $         23,400  
Utilities  
 $         30,000  
Cleaning  
 $         12,000  
Postage, overnight service 
  $         18,000  
Office equipment ($35,000 per dept.) 
 $       140,000  
Information system maintenance 
 $         50,000  
Printing   
 $            5,000  
Transportation/travel (air/lodging/per diem) - in state 
 $         15,000  
Transportation/travel - (air/lodging/per diem) out of state 
 $         50,000  
Conferences 
 $         50,000  
Training 
 $       150,000  
Mileage reimbursement 
 $         10,000  
Dues & subscriptions 
 $            2,500  
Computer & other electronic equipment ($10,000 per dept.) 
 $         30,000  
Monthly equipment maintenance fees - ($2000 mo.) 
 $         24,000  
Monthly remote network support ($500 mo.) 
 $            6,000  
Uniform allowance ($400 per sworn officer per annum x15) 
 $            6,000  
Sub-total, Operational Expenditures 
$       974,900 
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The following tables detail an annual budget for the Division of Gaming Investigation 
and Enforcement: 
Est. budget, Massachusetts Division of Gaming Investigation and Enforcement 
 
 
 
Title 
No. of 
positions Gross Pay 
Health 
Benefits 
Contribution, 
12.50% 
Retirement 
Benefits, 
Contribution, 
22.80% 
Other 
benefits, 
contribution,  
8.10% 
Projected Annual 
Expenditure 
Director  1  $    150,000   $   18,750   $       34,200   $   12,150   $    215,100  
Administrative 
assistant 1  $       35,000   $      4,375   $         7,980   $      2,835   $       50,190  
Chief 
compliance 
auditor   1  $       75,000   $      9,375   $       17,100   $      6,075   $    107,550  
Supervising 
compliance 
auditor 4  $    240,000   $   30,000   $       54,720   $   19,440   $    344,160  
Compliance 
auditor 12  $    480,000   $   60,000   $    109,440   $   38,880   $    688,320  
Clerical 
support - 
compliance 
audit 
department 3  $       84,000   $   10,500   $       19,152   $      6,804   $    120,456  
Chief of 
enforcement 
(state police) 1  $       85,000   $   10,625   $       19,380   $      6,885   $    121,890  
Enforcement 
supervisor 
(state police) 3  $    195,000   $   24,375   $       44,460   $   15,795   $    279,630  
Enforcement 
officer (state 
trooper) 12  $    660,000   $   82,500   $    150,480   $   53,460   $    946,440  
Clerical 
support (state 
police) 4  $    120,000   $   15,000   $       27,360   $      9,720   $    172,080  
Chief licensing 
investigator 1  $       75,000   $      9,375   $       17,100   $      6,075   $    107,550  
Senior 
licensing 
investigator 5  $    300,000   $   37,500   $       68,400   $   24,300   $    430,200  
Licensing 
investigator  18  $    720,000   $   90,000   $    164,160   $   58,320   $ 1,032,480  
Clerical 
support - 
licensing 
department 5  $    140,000   $   17,500   $       31,920   $   11,340   $    200,760  
Chief 
information 
technology 
officer 1  $       75,000   $      9,375   $       17,100   $      6,075   $    107,550  
Information 
technology 
specialist 4  $    240,000   $   30,000   $       54,720   $   19,440   $    344,160  
Legal counsel 
(attorney 
general's 
office) 4  $    600,000   $   75,000   $    136,800   $   48,600   $    860,400  
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Est. budget, Massachusetts Division of Gaming Investigation and Enforcement 
 
 
 
Title 
No. of 
positions Gross Pay 
Health 
Benefits 
Contribution, 
12.50% 
Retirement 
Benefits, 
Contribution, 
22.80% 
Other 
benefits, 
contribution,  
8.10% 
Projected Annual 
Expenditure 
Para-legal 
(attorney 
general's 
office) 2  $    120,000   $   15,000   $       27,360   $      9,720   $    172,080  
Clerical 
support 
(attorney 
general's 
office)  2  $       70,000   $      8,750   $       15,960   $      5,670   $    100,380  
Sub-Total - 
Salaries and 
Benefits 84  $ 4,464,000   $ 558,000   $ 1,017,792   $ 361,584   $ 6,401,376  
 
Note 1: The budget is prepared with the assumption that there will be three large destination properties and gross gaming revenue will be 
approximately $1.5 billion when all casinos are operational. 
Note 2: We anticipate a minimum of four deputies attorney general, two paralegal and two support staff to be assigned to the Division of 
Gaming Investigation and Enforcement.     
Note 3: Other benefits represent overtime, comp time and administrative leaves. 
 
 Projected 
Annual 
Expense 
Six automobiles 
 $       150,000  
Gasoline (15,000 avg. Annual miles,  approx. 1,000 gal @$4.5) 
 $         27,000  
Supplies and materials 
 $         50,000  
Telephone, land lines 
 $       126,000  
Cell phones 
 $         23,400  
Utilities  
 $         30,000  
Cleaning  
 $         12,000  
Postage, overnight service 
  $         18,000  
Office equipment ($35,000 per dept.) 
 $       140,000  
Information system maintenance 
 $         50,000  
Printing   
 $            5,000  
Transportation/travel (air/lodging/per diem) - in state 
 $         15,000  
Transportation/travel - (air/lodging/per diem) out of state 
 $         50,000  
Conferences 
 $         50,000  
Training 
 $       150,000  
Mileage reimbursement 
 $         10,000  
Dues & subscriptions 
 $            2,500  
Computer & other electronic equipment ($10,000 per dept.) 
 $         30,000  
Monthly equipment maintenance fees - ($2000 mo.) 
 $         24,000  
Monthly remote network support ($500 mo.) 
 $            6,000  
Uniform allowance ($400 per sworn officer per annum x15) 
 $            6,000  
Sub-total, Operational Expenditures 
$       974,900 
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A number of factors could impact the agencies‘ budgets, including the timing of 
legalization, and whether non-gaming suppliers would be licensed, and the threshold to trigger 
such licensure requirements. 
Spectrum notes that the proposed annual regulatory budgets for both agencies would 
equate to about 1 percent of projected annual gaming revenue. We cross-checked the validity of 
our budget by comparing regulatory budgets to gaming revenue in existing gaming markets, 
using 2006 for comparison: 
 
Gaming Agency Budgets Compared to Revenue 
 
State Gross 
Casino 
Revenue 
Number  and   Type of  
Casinos 
Budget for 
Gaming Agencies 
Agency Budget as 
a Percent of  
Gaming Revenue 
Gaming Agency 
Employees 
(Primary Agencies) 
Colorado $782 Million 46 Land-based 
Limited 
$8.7 Million 1.11% 97 
Illinois $1.9 Billion 9 Riverboats $15.2 Million .80% 142 
Iowa 
 
$1.2 Billion 10 Riverboat  3Land-
Based    3 Racetracks 
$10.6 Million  .90% 
 
144 
Louisiana $2.6 Billion 12 Riverboats 1 Land-
Based 3 Racetracks 
$25 Million .97% 245 
Mississippi $2.3 Billion 27 Dockside Land-Based $10 Million .48% 135 
Nevada $12.6 Billion 274 Land-Based 
 
$46 Million .37% 460 
New Jersey $5.2 Billion 12 Land-Based $72 Million 1.38% 704 
Source: State Gaming Agencies, Calendar 2006 and Fiscal 2006 Data 
 
This table suggests that our proposed Massachusetts regulatory budget is realistic and in 
line with other gaming states. 
 
Regulatory, construction timeline 
This section of the report provides general guidance as to expectations with respect to the 
potential timing of destination casinos. A number of factors could impact this timeline in 
material ways, including whether or not the bidding process would be staggered and concurrent. 
We also note the possibility of temporary facilities in this timeline.  
This timeline also does not account for all regulatory functions. For example, the drafting 
of regulations would likely take place after the licensees have been selected, and while the 
temporary facility is being developed and the vendor and employee licensing process is 
underway. 
 The construction timeframe was developed by our strategic partner, SOSH Architects, 
based in Atlantic City and New York. SOSH, which has extensive experience in designing 
casino destinations of the caliber envisioned in the Massachusetts legislation, assumed fast-track 
construction of facilities similar to Borgata in Atlantic City. 
 Gaming bill enacted: Prior to this phase, legislation will be proposed, debated and 
marked up for passage in the legislature. For purposes of this timetable, we are 
assuming that the legislation would be enacted on or about September 1, 2008. If the 
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enactment of the legislation is delayed, the rest of the timetable set forth would likely 
have to be adjusted as well. 
 Gaming Control Authority selected, confirmed: We assume it will take this 
amount of time to identify, recruit and conduct background investigations for the 
members of the Gaming Authority. 
 Initial hiring of staff: We believe that, initially, the two agencies should each hire a 
small start-up staff. Significant hiring will take place over the course of the entire 
timeline to reflect the regulatory needs as they develop. Initial hiring might include 
administrative staff, a General Counsel, Director of Licensing and other critical staff. 
  Develop RFP for gaming license awards: During this phase, the RFPs for casino 
licenses will be prepared, reviewed and eventually adopted by the Gaming Authority. 
This would involve reviewing successful RFPs used in other jurisdictions, as well as 
specifying the public-policy requirements established in Massachusetts.  
 Issue RFP: The RFP will be issued and all potential responders will be identified and 
logged into the system. 
 Response time for RFP: Responders will need time to prepare their responses to the 
RFP, prepare preliminary renderings and prepare for presentations before the 
Authority. Some of the responders will form joint ventures and they will need some 
time to come to terms. The terms of the RFP are likely to be highly specific. 
Moreover, as judged by experience in other markets, the responses would likely 
comprise multiple binders of information including Business Entity Disclosure Forms 
and Personal History Disclosure Forms for the entities and qualifiers. 
 Investigate and evaluate RFP candidates: Several actions should occur during this 
phase. The suitability investigations should take place while the other aspects of the 
RFP are being evaluated. A full-time investigative staff need not be in place at this 
point, as such functions could be outsourced. However, it should be made clear that 
any company failing to meet integrity standards will not be considered, regardless of 
how impressive the rest of their proposal may be. 
 Final selection of licensees, locations: The Authority would need time to discuss and 
deliberate on the selection(s) to be made. Public hearings may take place and there 
would need to be comprehensive decisions written. 
 Create, open employee and vendor licensing process: Once the casino licensees are 
identified, the employee and vendor licensing systems can be designed and 
implemented. The opening of the employee licensing and vendor licensing processes 
should take place approximately one year prior to the opening of the first facility. It 
would take approximately 12 to 18 months for the selected licensees to construct 
temporary facilities. 
 Development of temporary facility: The opening of the temporary facility will, 
assuming everything else fits into place, take place approximately two years after the 
legislation has been enacted and about one year after the license selections have been 
made.  
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 Full regulatory staffing process: The Authority should be fully staffed 
approximately one month before the first opening. As casinos are added, the 
Authority will need to add additional inspectors, auditors and the like. Increased 
staffing for the Authority should start approximately one year before the first casino 
opening and staff should be hired on an as-needed basis during the year.  
The chart on the following page details the general assumptions regarding a potential 
timeline. Note that, with a rigorous licensing process and a commitment to build destination 
resorts, the timeline extends beyond five years. That length of time is why we suggest the 
Commonwealth should consider temporary facilities as an interim step to create employment and 
generate tax revenue.  
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Potential impact of Indian casino pursuant to IGRA on commercial 
casinos in Massachusetts 
 
A potential Indian casino in Massachusetts is both a regulatory and economic issue. First, 
and foremost, however, it is a regulatory issue – starting at the federal level. Thus we are treating 
the issue of Indian gaming in the Gaming Regulation section of this report. 
Tribal casino gambling has taken shape in the United States as the product of several 
fairly recent legal decisions and acts.252 In 1987, the U.S. Supreme Court‘s decision in California 
v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians was a critical step in the development of tribal gambling 
and regulation. At stake in this case was whether tribal gaming fell under the state‘s regulatory 
powers. The court held that states lacked authority to regulate tribal gambling.253 But with the 
passage of the 1988 Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), Congress delegated power to the 
states to regulate Indian gaming. Furthermore, the IGRA laid out conditions under which tribal 
gaming could be offered. In practice, the legislation has meant that federally recognized Indian 
tribes can offer a particular form of gambling on their reservation, so long as that type of 
gambling is not banned under state law. However, because the IGRA delegated regulatory 
powers to the states, tribes wishing to offer gambling must negotiate the terms under which 
gambling will be offered in a tribal-state compact. The IGRA outlines the general terms of such 
agreements, and the states are expected to negotiate with the tribes in good faith in developing 
compacts. 
The Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe is seeking to build a casino in Middleborough, MA. The 
tribe took a big step forward in that effort after the US Interior Department acknowledged the 
existence of the Cape Cod-based Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe on February 15, 2007.254 The 
decision in and of itself permitted the tribe to request that the federal government hold lands for 
it in trust, a process that a newly recognized tribe follows to establish a reservation. 
Federal law generally bars a tribe from putting lands in trust for a casino after October 
17, 1988.255 There are exceptions. The Mashpee Wampanoag tribe, for example, is newly 
recognized, so that restriction does not apply. The Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head (Aquinnah) 
near New Bedford, however, was recognized prior to 1988, so we will not address it in this 
analysis. 
 The Commonwealth could decide to persuade the Mashpee Wampanoag tribe to seek 
one of the commercial casino licenses that might be proposed, or to enter into a partnership for 
one of those licenses, rather than building a tribal casino. A tribal casino would fall under a 
different regulatory structure than commercial casinos in the state. In this section, we examine 
                                                 
252 For a detailed discussion, see Steven Light and Kathryn Rand. 2005. Indian Gaming & Tribal Sovereignty: The Casino 
Compromise. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas. 
253 Light & Rand, p. 41. 
254 US Department of Interior press release, February 15, 2007 
255 IGRA, Section 2719, paragraph A 
  
The Impacts of Gaming on the Commonwealth of Massachusetts                    283 
  
some of the issues related to the IGRA and tribal casinos which should be considered in 
developing commercial casino legislation in Massachusetts.  
 
Effects of a tribal casino in Massachusetts 
If Massachusetts legalizes commercial casinos, it could effectively open the door to 
Indian tribes to also offer Class III (Las Vegas-style) gambling. However, such casinos would 
require tribal-state compacts, over which the Commonwealth would have significant negotiating 
power. Tribes could offer Class II gaming (bingo, pull-tabs and, importantly, electronic versions 
of these games that closely resemble Las Vegas-style slot machines, but not bona fide slot 
machines or casino table games) under NIGC oversight, and subject to IGRA‘s requirement. 
However, a tribal-state compact is not required for a tribal casino to offer Class II gaming.256 
Although a Class II tribal casino would represent competition to commercial casinos in the state, 
a Class III facility would pose a greater threat.  
The distinction, however, between the two forms of gaming has become somewhat 
blurred as the result of a National Indian Gaming Commission decision released June 5, 2008. 
The commission announced that it was backing off plans to possibly impose a stricter 
interpretation of Class II gaming.257 The federal agency had proposed regulations that were an 
attempt to create ―a bright line‖ between Class II and Class III gaming. The commission was 
concerned that technological advances had made the Class II bingo-type machines too similar to 
the Class III machines. 
Indian tribes argued that the regulations would have forced many of their casinos to close 
and that the negative economic impact could have been as high as $4 billion. 
The decision to abandon the controversial regulations is a positive development for the 
Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe, which could, as we have already noted, build a casino with Class II 
machines without seeking state approval.  
Meanwhile, based on information provided by Nancy Pascola at the U.S. Bureau of 
Indian Affairs, it could be a significant time before a tribal casino in Middleborough may be 
built.258 The Wampanoag tribe must first submit and have the BIA approve an Environmental 
Impact Statement, prior to the site being given tribal reservation status. The tribe is currently 
working on the Environmental Impact Statement, according to the BIA. (The fact that the 
potential casino site and tribal headquarters are at two different locations is irrelevant to the 
process of reservation approval because the tribe is seeking initial reservation approval. Other 
tribes in a similar situation have received approval from the BIA for multiple sites.) 
                                                 
256 Light and Rand (2005), p. 45. 
257 National Indian Gaming Commission, June 5, 2008, press release, via 
http://www.nigc.gov/ReadingRoom/PressReleases/PressReleasesMain/PR92062008/tabid/839/Default.aspx 
258 This is not a legal opinion, but a description of the process as it is understood, based on an interview. 
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 In August 2007, the tribe filed a land-in-trust application. The Bureau of Indian Affairs 
held a public hearing in March 2008 to determine the level of detail required of the tribe‘s 
environmental impact statement. 
A tribal Class III casino and perhaps even a Class II casino in Massachusetts could have a 
significantly negative effect on commercial casinos in the state, especially if a commercial casino 
is located near the tribal casino. This situation would have potentially disastrous effects on 
commercial casinos in the Commonwealth, as a tribal casino in this case would potentially 
contribute no tax money to the Commonwealth, and would obviously cause a decline in the gross 
gaming revenues to the commercial casinos. The result could be a significant negative impact on 
the Commonwealth‘s gaming tax receipts. The ideal situation, from the Commonwealth‘s 
perspective, would be to issue three commercial casino licenses, as discussed elsewhere in this 
report, and encourage tribal interests to pursue one or more of these licenses, either solely or as a 
partner with other interested licensees, rather than build a tribal casino.  
Level playing field 
When tribal casinos do not fall under the same regulatory and tax guidelines as 
commercial casinos, they often have a distinct competitive advantage. For example, if a tribal 
casino is built in Massachusetts, and it is able to avoid all state gaming taxes (e.g., 27 percent tax 
on gross gaming revenue), this alone would put the tribal casino at a significant advantage over 
commercial casinos in the Commonwealth. The tribal casino in this case would effectively 
operate at a significantly lower cost of operation. The more profitable tribal casino would then be 
better positioned to advertise, add amenities, and otherwise compete for the consumers‘ 
entertainment spending. The Commonwealth must be very careful to consider how tribal casinos 
can be in an advantageous position, and to help ensure that commercial operators can compete. 
There are other important considerations, as well. A tribal casino may offer smoking, while the 
commercial casinos in the state are to be non-smoking facilities. This could represent a 
significant advantage for the tribal casino over commercial casinos.  
Of course, what actually happens with tribal gambling is going to be the result of tribal-
state negotiations, legal actions and decisions, the details of which are not yet predictable. But 
given that the Commonwealth has negotiating powers in developing compacts with tribes, we 
can highlight some issues the Commonwealth may wish to consider in order to minimize any 
negative impact a tribal casino could have on commercial casinos in the Commonwealth. This is 
discussed later in this section. 
 
Effect on commercial casinos 
The process in developing tribal compacts is uncertain, as each case in each state is 
unique. Of course, all such compacts fall under the umbrella of the IGRA, but there is variation 
across compacts. However, if we consider the likely effects of a single tribal casino on the 
proposed commercial casinos in the Massachusetts, we must begin with some basic assumptions, 
most importantly with the details of the compact.  
There are a number of factors that would affect the extent to which a tribal casino would 
compete with commercial casinos in Massachusetts. These factors include:  
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 The location of each casino, relative to: 
o The population of resident and tourist casino customers 
o Other tourism attractions 
o Major highways/interstates (traffic flows) 
o Major airports (ease for non-regional tourism/convention traffic) 
o Casino opportunities in neighboring states 
 The unique nature of each casino 
o Do patrons see them as perfect substitutes, or does each offer a unique 
―theme‖ worth experiencing? 
 Other amenities offered at or near the casino, which might attract customers/tourists 
 Operation of each casino 
o A poorly managed casino would obviously be less competitive. 
o Higher slot pay-out percentages may make all the casinos in the state – as a 
group – more competitive than casinos in other states; lower pay-outs could 
have the opposite effect. 
 Regulatory and tax differential 
o Commercial casinos face state regulation and taxation, which may put them at 
a disadvantage relative to tribal casinos. 
o Non-smoking commercial casinos will be at a significant disadvantage to a 
tribal casino that permits smoking, unless and until all casinos in the region 
are smoke-free. 
Of course, there are a variety of other factors that could have a significant effect on the 
extent to which a tribal casino would act as a substitute to commercial casinos in the 
Commonwealth. Many of these issues have already been addressed in detail elsewhere in this 
report. 
At this early stage in the study and debate phases of casino development in 
Massachusetts, it is difficult to assign values to each of the variables that might affect 
competition among the casinos. However, it is obvious that there are three general (theoretical) 
possibilities: 
1. The tribal casino may act as a complement to commercial casinos.  
2. The tribal casino may have a neutral effect on commercial casinos. 
3. The tribal casino may have a negative ―substitution‖ effect on commercial 
casinos. 
The first two effects can be viewed as theoretical possibilities only. It is difficult to 
imagine that a tribal casino would be either neutral or beneficial to commercial casinos in reality. 
The third case, in which the tribal casino acts as a substitute to the commercial casino, is the case 
that would most concern policymakers, voters, and the commercial casino operators. This is the 
most likely case for the situation in Massachusetts. 
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First, let us assume that a state-tribal compact would require that the tribe pay the state 
and local governments some level of fees equivalent to any and all regulatory expenses, plus 
expenses to cover the heightened levels of public services that will be required because of the 
large number of visitors to the casino site, and surrounding area. Such expenses would include 
roads and highways, water and sewage, police and emergency response services, and others. 
With this assumption, we remove any costs to state taxpayers coming directly from the tribal 
casino‘s existence.  
Second, let us suppose that the tribal casino has a neutral effect on the Massachusetts 
Lottery. The effects of casinos on the lottery were discussed in a previous section. For simplicity, 
we could assume that the tribal casino helps to market the lottery, so that there is no significant 
substitution away from the lottery due to the tribal casino. There is no reason to assume that the 
tribal casino would market the lottery, so there would likely be at least a short-run modest 
negative impact of a tribal casino on the state‘s lottery, as discussed earlier in this report. 
Whether or not a single casino (if a tribal casino alone was approved in Massachusetts) would 
really dent the state‘s lottery receipts is debatable. If three casinos are introduced, however, we 
suggest there is the potential for a negative short-term impact on the lottery.  
Third, for simplicity, let us ignore any positive economic effects a tribal casino would 
have on its surrounding economy. What we have done up to this point is basically assume that 
the tribal casino would have no significant impact on surrounding businesses, the lottery, or 
taxpayers. The point in making these assumptions is to isolate the effects of a tribal casino on 
commercial casinos in the Commonwealth, and the State‘s tax receipts from casinos, if 
commercial casinos and a tribal casino co-exist in Massachusetts.259  
Case 1: Tribal casino instead of a commercial casino in Region 2 
If a tribal casino is built in Middleborough, and a commercial casino is not licensed and 
built in Region 2, then let us assume that the tribal casino would be a very similar facility, in 
terms of amenities, convenience of location, games offered, etc., so that it effectively has no 
impact on the commercial casinos in Regions 1 and 3, relative to the case in which the Region 2 
casino is commercially owned. In this case, then, we would simply revise the empirical estimates 
presented earlier in this study. The estimated year gross gaming revenue (GGR) for the Region 1 
casino would still be $542 million in the ―moderate‖ case. The gaming tax paid would be $146.4 
million. For the Region 3 casino unaffected by the tribal casino, its GGR would remain $432.7 
million in the moderate case, with an estimated gaming tax paid of $116.8 million.  
The major issue, in this case, of course, is that the Commonwealth would effectively lose 
the gaming tax from the Region 2 casino, an estimated $142.2 million per year in the moderate 
case. In addition to this loss would be whatever state income taxes would have been paid by the 
casino. 
                                                 
259 If readers wish to evaluate the full effects of a tribal casino on the State economy and tax receipts, they can relax each of the 
assumptions made above, and incorporate information from the rest of this report, as well as details of a prospective tribal 
compact, to predict the likely overall effect of a tribal casino. With so many variables, however, resulting estimates are likely to 
be much less precise and accurate. 
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Case 2: Tribal casino is built subsequent to a Region 2 commercial casino 
If the Commonwealth approves three commercial casinos before the tribal casino issue is 
resolved, then there is a possibility that a tribal casino could be approved and built after the 
commercial casinos have been built. It is quite difficult to imagine any situation in which the 
state would want to agree to such a tribal casino, when a tribal casino would clearly have a very 
serious ―cannibalization‖ impact on a commercial Region 2 casino, assuming the tribal casino is 
built in Middleborough. But there are some scenarios in which the tribe could be allowed to 
build against objections of the state; this possibility would depend on legal actions and decisions. 
In this case, the losses to the Commonwealth would be more difficult to estimate. The 
lost tax receipts would perhaps not be as large as the previous case, because the Region 2 casino 
would still pay some taxes, at least the $100 million minimum tax. However, one would expect 
that a tribal casino may have a very serious impact on the GGR of a Region 2 casino. If we 
assume that the casino sees only half of its projected revenue after a tribal casino is built, the 
GGR would be only $263.4 million. If the casino is required to pay a minimum of $100 million 
in taxes, then if a tribal casino in Region 2 is seen by casino license applicants as a real 
possibility, there may be few such applicants. This is because such a commercial casino would 
be paying an effective tax on its GGR of 38 percent.260 If potential applications have the 
opportunity to apply instead for the Region 1 or 3 casino sites, those are much more attractive, as 
the effective tax rate on those locations will be appreciably lower.  
In short, if the Commonwealth approves a Region 2 commercial casino and a tribal 
casino is then subsequently built, it will be disastrous for the Region 2 commercial casino, at 
least. The loss to the Commonwealth in this case could be as large as in the previous case if the 
commercial casino in Region 2 fails to be profitable and subsequently must close. There may 
also be impacts on the Region 1 and 3 casinos, but those would likely pale in comparison.  
This brief analysis suggests that a tribal casino could be very costly to Massachusetts. 
The numbers here probably understate the cost. This is because the Commonwealth may be 
required to fund infrastructure improvements, and provide a variety of public services to the 
tribal casino and the surrounding region. These costs can be substantial, and there is no guarantee 
that the tribe would be required to cover such costs. This issue is discussed in more detail below.  
 
Negotiating a tribal compact 
The agreement in Connecticut to give tribal gambling exclusive rights to operate slot 
machines in return for 25 percent of gross slot revenues has turned out to be a very profitable 
arrangement for both parties. Foxwoods and Mohegan Sun contributed $435 million to the state 
in 2007 alone.261 The state has no commercial casinos, but it still sees significant tax revenues 
because of the large amount of tourism to Foxwoods and Mohegan Sun from neighboring states.  
Massachusetts has currently and, with the introduction of commercial casinos, would still 
have significant flexibility in negotiating a compact for a tribal casino in the Commonwealth. A 
                                                 
260 Calculated $100 million / $263.4 million. 
261 Arthur Wright, ―The state of play in New England casino gaming.‖ The Connecticut Economy, winter 2008, pp. 4-7. 
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prospective agreement should focus on a fair division of benefits for the sponsoring tribe as well 
as the taxpayers of Massachusetts. The Connecticut model, where the state receives a proportion 
of the gross gaming revenue, is a model to consider. 
Costs to consider 
The first, and most basic, consideration is for the state to be compensated for the costs it 
would incur in regulating a tribal casino. As the IGRA delegates the regulatory powers to the 
states, it also allows for the states to be compensated by tribal casinos for the costs of such 
regulation. The regulatory costs of casino gambling can be significant. In states with commercial 
casinos, the casino revenues are taxed to cover such regulatory costs. If a tribal casino is 
negotiated in Massachusetts, the compact should specify how the tribe would contribute to the 
state to help offset such regulatory costs. 
There are other important issues to consider, as well. A recent article262 points out some 
potential problems that states should be aware of prior to entering compact negotiations with 
tribes. Unless such issues are specifically addressed, state or local taxpayers adjacent to new 
tribal casinos may be responsible for paying for public services such as roads, utilities, police 
and medical emergency responses. As we previously noted, Connecticut‘s compact requires the 
Indian casinos to pay for the police investigations into crime committed on the casino floor but 
state officials did not require casinos to pay the cost of prosecuting those crimes. The result is 
that this is a taxpayer expense.  
A casino development typically includes a large number of amenities, aside from the 
casino, including a hotel, restaurants, shopping, and other activities. All of these will act as 
attractions to Massachusetts residents and tourists. As a result, a tribal casino will result in a 
much larger traffic flow in the Middleborough area than it currently sees. The state will need to 
make significant improvements, in terms of street and highway capacity. 
Furthermore, the larger traffic flow from casino visitors means there will be significantly 
more stress on the public services offered in the area surrounding the tribal casino. Often the city 
or state government is required to finance such public services, if such issues are not specifically 
outlined in a state-tribal compact. For example, with so many tourists, the existing police, fire, 
emergency response, and medical resources could be put under significant stress. Supplementing 
such resources will be very expensive and will be quite burdensome in per capita terms, 
depending on the size of the population to bear the costs.  
Another issue to consider would be the environmental impacts of a casino development. 
Any large development in a city can have an impact on water and sewer systems, and may pose 
other environmental impacts and costs that should be considered. 
Ellen Perlman explains that California‘s new model under the Schwarzenegger 
Administration may provide an example for others to follow to alleviate some of those concerns: 
―All new compacts, and any amended ones, include requirements that the state get 
financial benefit from tribes and that impacts on local governments be taken into 
                                                 
262 Ellen Perlman, ―Tribes and tribulations.‖ Governing. August 2007, pp. 52-54. 
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consideration. Since 2004, tribes under the new or amended compacts have been 
obligated to reach agreements with local communities on environmental, transportation, 
and other issues.‖263 
Massachusetts‘ compact negotiations should strive to minimize any burden on local and 
state taxpayers. Furthermore, to the extent that the Commonwealth seeks to generate revenues 
from casino gaming, a compact could follow a Connecticut model in which the casino would 
agree to pay the state some fee or portion of gaming revenues in compensation for regulation and 
other costs incurred by the state‘s taxpayers.  
 
Regional monopoly rights 
The Patrick Administration‘s proposal is to have one casino in each of three regions in 
the Commonwealth. Taking the location of the casinos as given, the administration‘s preference 
is that tribal casino interests focus on obtaining or partnering to obtain one of the commercial 
casino permits. This way, all of the casinos in the state would fall under the same regulatory 
regime, and all would be subject to taxation at the same rate; a level playing field on which the 
casinos can compete.  
However, if a tribal casino outside of the commercial casino framework is inevitable, 
then the Administration must consider whether a tribal casino would compete with a Region 2 
commercial casino, or if a tribal casino would replace a commercial casino in Region 2. As 
shown by the revenue projections presented earlier, the expected GGR for a Region 2 casino 
could be sizable. However, those revenue projections assume that there are no nearby casinos 
built, which would pose serious competition.  
If the state negotiates a tribal compact for a Middleborough casino that would replace a 
commercial casino in Region 2, then the state could pursue an agreement whereby it agrees to 
protect the tribal casino‘s regional monopoly in the state. It could do this by guaranteeing that no 
commercial casinos would be approved to be developed within a particular area surrounding the 
tribal casino. As a commercial casino located in the proximity of the tribal casino would pose 
significant competition to the tribal casino, it would undoubtedly cause a significant reduction in 
the GGR of the tribal casino. A regional monopoly would therefore be extremely valuable to the 
tribal casino.  
Perhaps if a tribal casino is inevitable, the state could negotiate a compact in which the 
state agrees to prevent commercial casino development in the region surrounding the tribal 
casino, in return for a specified annual fee. This would be similar in spirit to the agreement 
reached in Connecticut. Of course, as the law develops in this area, the ability for the 
Commonwealth to negotiate such fees may be subject to legal actions and decisions.  
It would appear that the Commonwealth‘s negotiating position was weakened by the 
recent NIGC decision that will allow Class II machines to more closely resemble Las Vegas-
style slots. As the Boston Herald described the situation: ―The federal commission that oversees 
                                                 
263 Ellen Perlman, ―Tribes and tribulations.‖ Governing. August 2007, pp. 52-54. 
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Indian gaming has scrapped a crackdown on Class II bingo slot machines, a move that would 
have taken a key casino option off the table for the Cape Cod tribe. The decision by the National 
Indian Gaming Commission frees up the (Mashpee Wampanoag) tribe to use a key bargaining 
chip as it prepares to push for state approval for a full-scale casino. If all else fails and state 
lawmakers refuse to legalize a Mohegan Sun or Foxwoods style casino, the tribe has argued it 
could still go ahead with a gambling venue featuring bingo slot machines.264‖ 
One way of forestalling having to act on the Region 2 situation – whether a tribal casino 
will be built, or whether such land will be put in federal trust status – would be to stagger the 
permit bidding process, as discussed earlier in this report. If the Commonwealth begins by 
accepting and acting on bids first for the Boston area (Region 1) casino, this would buy some 
time to resolve the situation in Region 2. Under a staggered bidding process, all of the 
stakeholders in the process would have more information than if all of the commercial permits 
are allocated simultaneously. More information is better information, and this will be useful to 
all parties in the process. 
As tribal casino compacts have developed across the United States, some researchers 
suggest that states now have more negotiation power than might have been intended by the 
IGRA.265 The result is that in many states, tribes are expected to pay the state governments more 
than just the costs of casino regulation as was specified in the IGRA. The details of a 
forthcoming compact in Massachusetts are not, of course, the focus of this report. But in 
analyzing how a tribal casino could affect commercial casinos in the state, the details of the 
compact could have an impact on the overall benefits to the state from commercial casinos.  
The discussion in this section is obviously based on a number of assumptions, estimates, 
and unpredictable market conditions. What will happen in Region 2 of the state is still an 
important unknown. The Administration would likely prefer that tribal interests seek one of the 
commercial casino permits. But if the tribe seeks federal trust status for its land, or is otherwise 
able to build a casino under IGRA, then it would be a serious blow to commercial casinos in the 
state, in particular a casino in Region 2, even if the tribal casino is only Class II.266 
Overall, we view it as likely that a tribal casino will eventually be built in Massachusetts 
if commercial casinos are approved. While this may lead to a decline in revenues for commercial 
casinos, and declines in state receipts from casinos, relative to what they otherwise might be, 
overall, even in this worst-case scenario, commercial casinos will still likely have a largely 
positive impact on Massachusetts. Obviously, it is in the best interest of the Commonwealth to 
have all casino gambling fall under the state‘s regulation and taxation frameworks. However, if 
that, in the end, is not the case, we have discussed some of the issues that the state should 
consider in entering state-tribal compact negotiations. The Commonwealth should work with 
extreme care to design a regulatory and tax system under which commercial casinos are not at 
too much of a competitive disadvantage relative to a tribal casino in the Commonwealth. 
                                                 
264 ―Fed move makes Mass. Indian gaming more likely,‖ by Scott Van Voorhis, Boston Herald, June 12, 2008 
265 Light and Rand (2005), pp. 56-59. 
266 Until this year, the Seminole Tribe of Florida operated a Class II gaming operation of six casinos, including two enormously 
profitable Hard Rock-branded properties, estimated to generate gross gaming revenue of nearly $1.5 billion. 
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To the extent that commercial casinos in Massachusetts face competitive disadvantages 
relative to a tribal casino, the citizens of Massachusetts will fail to realize some of the available 
economic benefits from casino gambling. 
We add one other important consideration: Unless and until the uncertainty regarding a 
tribal casino in Massachusetts is resolved, that uncertainty will be perceived by capital markets 
and commercial operators as a heightened risk. Added risk is reflected in a higher cost of capital 
– i.e., sources of capital will demand greater returns to compensate for the increased risk. This 
will, as noted in detail earlier, result in less capital being invested, which would lead to fewer 
jobs, less gaming revenue and less overall benefit to the Commonwealth. 
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Conclusion 
Spectrum professionals have witnessed the birth of many domestic and foreign casino 
industries over the past three decades, and we have taken particular note of the political process 
that accompanies such important policy decisions. 
One common pitfall is to assume that all forms of gaming are essentially the same in that 
they operate under similar business models, compete for the same dollars and address the same 
public policies. As this report has endeavored to show in great detail, none of the above is true. 
The public sector has the opportunity at the outset to shape the nature of the industry it seeks to 
create, and to address the public policies that it has identified as priorities. That can only be 
accomplished, however, if public officials understand the critical differences between casinos 
that are designed to capture the convenience market and those that are designed to be destination 
resorts. 
A second, equally important pitfall in the process is a desire to use casinos to fill potential 
budget shortfalls in the near term. This could lead to the anticipation of gaming revenue within a 
tight and, perhaps, overly optimistic timeframe. 
Such practices are antithetical to the nature of effective regulation, and the need to 
develop a gaming industry that is best positioned to advance the public interest. This is 
particularly true at the outset of developing a casino industry, when the rules are being 
established and the decisions are being made that will have profound effects on the 
Commonwealth for many years into the future, long after the current fiscal problems have been 
addressed. 
 The opportunity exists in Massachusetts to set the highest standards for casino licensure, 
including a competitive bidding process that will be designed to attract the most creative, capital-
intensive projects that can be built. No guarantee exists, however, that submitted proposals will 
meet those standards, certainly not within all three proposed regions. 
Indeed, fiscal pressures work against some of the recommendations we have put forth in 
this analysis. For example, the suggestion that Massachusetts adopt a consecutive bidding 
process for all three regions, rather than a concurrent competition would not easily resolve short-
term fiscal issues, and could put revenue generation by two casinos years off in the future. 
We respectfully suggest, however, that the greater public interest requires the most 
responsible, creative, well-financed operators to participate in gaming, and that is less likely to 
occur if all such operators are bidding on the same potential license. 
Additionally, we believe that fiscal pressures may be so great that they could prevent 
regulators from making what could be the most important decision of their tenure: a decision that 
potentially says no bidder for any particular license has met the Commonwealth‘s high standards. 
Such pressures could enhance the appeal of proposals to allow for the relatively quick 
installation of slots at racetracks or other facilities, but we reiterate that such facilities would 
likely have different business models than destination casinos, and would thus be less likely to 
advance the same public policies. 
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As noted, one means of generating revenue early would be to allow for the development 
of temporary facilities that could potentially be open within two years of the passage of 
legislation. This has been proven effective in other markets, from Michigan to Pennsylvania, as a 
way to generate revenue without compromising the principles of integrity. 
We began this analysis with the suggestion that the power of the public sector is at its 
zenith at the earliest stage of this process. The analysis we have developed supports that notion. 
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts is considering legislation to grant up to three 
private businesses the privilege of operating regional monopolies. Such privileges must be 
accompanied by heightened responsibilities to operate in the public interest. The ability of public 
officials to hold those licensees to those responsibilities is at its greatest before the licenses have 
been issued. 
Our analysis rests on two core recommendations. To build a successful casino industry in 
Massachusetts:  
 Maintain the highest possible degree of independence from fiscal pressure to help 
ensure the highest quality facilities that operate in the public interest.  
 Develop a competitive bidding process that awards licenses to applicants who fully 
recognize their responsibilities to the Commonwealth, and have developed plans to 
address those responsibilities. 
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Appendix A: 
Summary of an ―Act to Establish and Regulate Resort Casinos in the Commonwealth 
of Massachusetts‖ 
Submitted to the Legislature October 11, 2007 
The legislation introduced by the administration of Governor Deval Patrick allows for 
licensing of three destination resort casinos in different regions of the state. The administration 
expects the three resort casinos to generate a total gross win of $2 billion. 
Applicants must: 
 Pay a non-refundable fee of $350,000 for their application to be reviewed.  
 Commit to a $1 billion investment outside of land acquisition costs. 
 Compete against each other for three licenses. The minimum licensing bid is $200 
million. Each license is renewable every 10 years. 
 Pay a minimum of 27 percent of the casino‘s gross revenues to the state or $100 
million a year, whichever is higher. 
 Pay an assessment each year on slot machines and gaming tables to cover regulatory 
costs. 
 Ensure a return to patrons of at least 85 percent of all sums wagered on slot machines. 
 Operate a smoke-free casino. 
A seven-member Gaming Control Authority will be created to oversee casino 
operations. Standards will be developed to grade licensees based on ―the highest and best 
value‖ to the region and Commonwealth. The licenses do not have to be awarded to the 
highest bidder. 
Revenues will be used for: 
 Direct property tax relief in the form of a rebate check to eligible homeowners. 
Administration estimate: $200 million. 
 Transportation improvements. Administration estimate: $200 million. 
 A public health trust fund to help treat compulsive gamblers and address other social 
issues such as domestic violence. Administration estimate: $50 million. 
 A community mitigation trust fund to compensate host and surrounding towns for 
costs incurred to accommodate the resort casinos. Administration estimate: $50 
million. 
 Assistance to the lottery to assure it of a 3 percent annual growth rate in gross 
revenues. 
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Requirements of a successful licensee 
Casinos must: 
 Possess a debt-to-equity ratio of not more than 4:1.  
 Hold a successful ballot question in the host community. 
 Establish an agreement with the host community to compensate the town for costs 
incurred to accommodate the casino. 
 Own the land where the casino will be built within 60 days after a license is 
awarded. 
 Provide complimentary on-site space for an independent substance abuse and 
mental health counseling service. 
 Develop a process so that patrons can exclude themselves from all marketing 
databases. 
 Ensure that state lottery and keno games are readily available to guests. 
Gaming Control Authority 
It will consist of seven unpaid members, two of whom will be the state Auditor and state 
Treasurer. The governor will appoint the other five members. The board must have members 
with experience in: 
 legal issues involving gaming establishments 
 regulatory aspects needed for casinos 
 finance 
 accounting 
 public health 
None of the five gubernatorial appointments can hold or be a candidate for elected office. 
Three of the five gubernatorial appointees will serve terms of five years. The other two will serve 
terms that end with the governor‘s term in office. Five members will constitute a quorum. The 
governor will designate a chairman. 
The board will hire an executive director who will report to the board. The board will: 
 Determine the number of slot machines and table games in each casino.  
 Conduct auctions, if necessary, to award licenses in three regions. 
o Region 1 - Suffolk, Middlesex and Essex counties. 
o Region 2 - Norfolk, Bristol, Plymouth, Nantucket, Dukes and Barnstable. 
o Region 3 - Worcester, Hampshire, Hampden, Franklin and Berkshire counties. 
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 Develop criteria to assess bids to provide ―the highest and best value‖ to the state. 
Criteria will include overall economic benefit to the state, amount of the licensing fee 
(minimum $200 million), amount of the gross revenue tax (minimum 27 percent), the 
number of permanent jobs created (minimum 5,000) over a five-year period, the 
extent to which public safety effects are mitigated, the extent to which the state is 
marketed as a tourist destination, proposed infrastructure improvements and 
economic development opportunities and extent of contracts with local and small 
business owners. 
 Determine whether a license should be issued in one of the three regions. It is under 
no obligation do so.  
 Create regulations to recognize an employee‘s license from out-of-state gaming 
schools and establish a process for reciprocal licensing of out-state-licensed 
employees. 
 Adopt regulations related to the application process, background checks, license fee 
and the revocation, suspension and renewal of licenses. 
 Register and license gaming suppliers and non-gaming suppliers. There is expected to 
be criteria developed for different classes of work permits. 
 Develop regulations for the registration and licensing of labor unions and gaming 
schools.  
Ethics restrictions 
Anyone who knowingly violates the pre- or post-employment restrictions could be 
subjected to criminal violations that provide for penalties of up to five years in jail and a fine of 
up to $100,000.  
The restrictions bar employment at the authority of anyone who was employed during the 
three previous years by a casino licensee, a casino service industry licensee, or a dog or horse 
racing licensee in the Commonwealth. 
Authority employees who terminate their employment must wait three years before 
accepting employment with any entity licensed or registered by the authority.  
Within 30 days after taking office all board members and their spouses must file a 
statement of financial interests with the state ethics commission.  
Executive branch members who terminate their employment must wait at least three 
years before they can work for the authority, a casino licensee, a casino service industry licensee, 
or a dog or horse racing licensee in the commonwealth 
Prior to serving the authority, employees and board members must swear that they have 
no interest in any business or organization licensed by the authority. 
Employees of the authority and board members are barred from gambling in any gaming 
establishment licensed by the authority.  
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Division of Gaming Investigation and Enforcement 
The agency will be in the Attorney General‘s office. Its director will be an assistant 
attorney general. The State Police will assign troopers to the division. 
The division will investigate crimes in the casinos, including those that impact gaming. It 
will conduct all background checks for employment. Its budget will be funded through a special 
assessment imposed on the casinos. 
Advisory Committee 
The authority will be advised by a 12-person unpaid advisory committee, consisting of 
the following secretaries: health and human services, administration and finance, housing and 
economic development, labor and public safety. The governor shall appoint three other members; 
one of whom will represent labor, another must be an expert on gaming addiction and the third 
must be a police chief. The Senate President will appoint two members and the House Speaker 
will appoint two members. 
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Appendix B: 
Professor Barrow letter to Spectrum Gaming Group 
 
 
 
 
    _______          
 
May 19, 2008 
 
Bill LaPenta 
Director of Financial Analysis 
Spectrum Gaming Group 
 
Via:  E-mail 
 
Dear Mr. LaPenta: 
 
I received your request for a summary of the assumptions that support the $1.495 billion  GGR 
estimate in the Center for Policy Analysis report, Maximum Bet:  A Preliminary Blueprint for Casino 
Gaming and Economic Development in Massachusetts (August 2007).  I have attached a spreadsheet that 
should assist you in your efforts to compare and contrast recent hypothetical Massachusetts gaming 
revenue projections.   
However, before reviewing these assumptions, I would like to clarify one misperception about 
our report that has made its way into the statewide discussion via the Worcester Telegraph & Telegram, 
the Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation (MTF) report and, more recently, an article by Eugene 
Christiansen of Christiansen Capital Advisors (CCA) in Insight: The Journal of the North American 
Gaming Industry.  When we released Maximum Bet in August of 2007, we stated in the press release that 
it was ―a conservative preliminary analysis.‖  In the report itself, we stated that our recommendations 
were a ―preliminary blueprint for casino gaming and economic development in Massachusetts,‖ but that a 
―multitude of details – financial, political, legal, and regulatory‖ still needed to be worked out through the 
state and local political processes.   
Thus, I want to emphasize that our estimates of GGR are not an estimate of market potential, but 
an estimate of GGR and tax revenues, based on a very conservative hypothetical proposal for three resort 
casinos that were much smaller than those eventually proposed by Governor Deval Patrick.  Indeed, I 
have been repeatedly quoted in the press as stating that we estimate an unmet market demand for gaming 
in New England of about $1.5 billion – not including the possibility of recapturing a significant share of 
existing Massachusetts and northern New England gaming dollars flowing to Connecticut and Rhode 
Island.  Thus, our estimate of the market potential is actually in the $2.0 to $2.1 billion range, which is 
comparable to that estimated by the Governor‘s staff and by UHY Advisors.  I reiterated this estimate in 
                                                        Clyde W. Barrow 
 Center for Policy Analysis 
University of Massachusetts Dartmouth 
North Dartmouth, MA  02747-2300 
Tel.:     (508) 999-9265 
  Fax:     (508) 999-8374 
                                                 cbarrow@umassd.edu                                             
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my oral and written testimony to the Joint Committee on Bonding, Capital Expenditures, and State Assets 
(12-18-08). 
That said, these were our assumptions in Maximum Bet: 
Location.  Three resort casinos to be located at Suffolk Downs, Middleboro, and Palmer, 
Massachusetts.  We accepted Middleboro as a hypothetical location with the expectation that the Mashpee 
Wampanoag Tribe could be induced into accepting a commercial license. 
However, I have been quoted accurately several times in the media as stating that I consider New 
Bedford a superior location for purposes of environmental sustainability and economic development. New 
Bedford has a low educational attainment level, one of the highest unemployment rates in the state, and a 
high level of poverty and welfare dependency.  It is a population that would greatly benefit from many of 
the types of jobs created by resort casinos.  The proposed site in New Bedford is immediately contiguous 
to a major interstate highway (I-195) and it already has the municipal infrastructure to support a resort 
casino (i.e., water and sewer capacity and large fire and police departments).  A resort casino is also 
compatible with New Bedford‘s local economic development strategy, which includes waterfront and 
tourism development.  Finally, previous referenda, and more recent polls, indicate that New Bedford 
residents want to host a casino by a 3-1 margin. 
In addition, based on proximity to population and income, regional propensity to gamble, and 
proximity to direct competition, it is our assessment that the Boston location is the most lucrative, 
followed by Southeastern Massachusetts and Western Massachusetts. 
Capital Investment.  The CFPA proposal suggested a minimum capital investment in each resort 
casino of $500 million (as compared to the governor‘s proposal for a minimum investment of $1billion). 
This assumption was identified in Maximum Bet and it was the basis of our projection that casino 
construction would generate approximately 10,000 jobs.  We utilize the IMPlan modeling system for 
deriving these estimates, but if we were to utilize the governor‘s $1 billion minimum figure, our model 
would project about 20,000 construction jobs, which is consistent with the governor‘s staff estimates and 
those of UHY Advisors.  Our differences are primarily due to different assumptions about the initial scale 
of the projects. 
Gaming Positions.  Our GGR estimates assume the following: 
  Slot Machines Win per Day  Table Games Win per Day 
Boston  5,000  $300   200  $2,250 
SE Mass 3,500  $300   150  $2,100 
W Mass 2,000  $300   100  $1,800 
 
The slot win per day is comparable to Foxwoods (although slightly lower than Foxwoods), while 
the table game win per day is comparable to Atlantic City casinos.  The CFPA proposal assumes 10,500 
slot machines statewide, while the governor‘s proposal assumes 15,000. 
Again, let me note that I do not see the GGR generated by these assumptions as the maximum 
market potential for Massachusetts, but given the politically controversial nature of the casino debate, I 
was also making two political assumptions: 
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(a) The state‘s racetracks have never been influential enough to pass slots-at-the-tracks 
legislation, but they have always had the support of enough legislators to block resort  casino 
legislation.  Consequently, the CFPA proposal left enough slack in the market to  accommodate 
slots, or preferably video lottery terminals (VLTs), at the state‘s two  Southeastern 
Massachusetts racetracks.  My assumption here was that Suffolk Downs  would become a resort 
casino and that Wonderland would either reach an agreement with Suffolk Downs to provide 
support services (it was being discussed between them at the time) or it would be put out of 
business by a pending referendum to outlaw greyhound racing in Massachusetts. 
Although the governor‘s main focus was rightly on economic development, it  has 
always been my experience that state legislators are more focused on tax revenues,  which 
makes VLTs at the tracks quite appealing to them, even though ―racinos‖ do not  produce the 
jobs, capital investment, or long-term economic development associated  with resort casinos.  At 
the time, the state‘s track owners were publicly offering to  accept a 50% gaming tax on 
their facilities in contrast to the 27% tax on casinos eventually proposed by the governor (and by 
the CFPA). Thus, it was my expectation  that a compromise would probably become necessary as 
the casino debate proceeded  through the state legislature – a compromise that would balance 
the competing demands  for long-term economic development and the desire immediate state 
revenues.   
Moreover, as a lottery product, VLT revenues would become part of the  state‘s  lottery 
aid distribution formula and, therefore, further allay concerns about the casinos‘  impact  on the 
state lottery and local aid. 
(b)  Even if a slots-at-the-track compromise did not pass, it was still my assessment that  an 
incremental approach to gaming expansion would be more politically viable in  Massachusetts 
and that as gaming revenues demonstrated the market potential in the  state, a Gaming Control 
Authority would be able to authorize an incremental  expansion of gaming positions at the 
three facilities based on actual revenues trends and  visitations with the goal of eventually 
capturing all unmet demand. 
Gaming Tax Rate.  27% of Gross Gaming Revenues.  This is approximately the average 
effective gaming tax rate for all non-traditional commercial casino venues in the United States. 
Hotel Revenues and Occupancy Taxes.  We assumed that each casino would have a 500-room 
hotel with a 90% occupancy rate and average revenues per occupied room of $112 per night.  The 
occupancy rate is slightly below that for Mohegan Sun (93%) and the revenues per night are similar to 
those reported for Mohegan Sun in FY 2006 and FY 2007. 
We assume the existing state room occupancy tax of 4%, plus a local room occupancy tax of 4%. 
Retail & Meals.  We assumed that revenues from retail and food and beverage would initially be 
equal to 10% of gross gaming revenues, which is a low estimate, but it is consistent with the revenues 
reported at Mohegan Sun in its first few years of operation.  We assume the state‘s 5% retail sales and 
meals taxes in projecting tax revenues. 
Regulatory Costs.  To defray the costs of regulation, the CFPA proposed a annual ―positions 
tax‖ on slots ($1,500) and table games ($750), which generates about $16.1 million.  We also proposed 
employee licensing fees of $150 per year, which generates another $1.5 million annually.  This yields 
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about $17.6 million to defray the costs of regulation, which is equal to 1.2% of estimated GGR.  This 
figure would place Massachusetts at the high end of commercial casino states in terms of spending (as a 
ratio of GGR) on casino licensing, regulation, and enforcement. 
Lottery Impact.  We assumed an initial 8% ―hit‖ on state lottery revenues, based on a report 
conducted for the Massachusetts Lottery by Christiansen Capital Advisors.  CCA estimated a temporary 
reduction in lottery revenues of 3% to 8% and in keeping with our conservative approach to the issue, we 
adopted the higher estimate. 
This estimate is also consistent with previous work we released in 1999 and 2004 that examined 
the actual impact on lottery revenues in jurisdictions that introduced commercial casinos after their lottery 
had reached maturity. 
Finally, it was my expectation that these preliminary estimates would be greatly refined with 
gravity models, and other market analyses, as the issue moved forward, because local communities or 
potential casino operators would normally commission economic and fiscal impact studies that were 
locality and facility specific. Indeed, the governor‘s proposed casino legislation required that potential 
bidders pay a $350,000 application fee to defray the cost of conducting or reviewing such studies, but as 
you know the legislation did not pass. 
Sincerely, 
Clyde W. Barrow, Ph.D., Director 
Center for Policy Analysis 
 
